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The Collection of Hindu Law Texts

Volume II Part IV

YÂJÑAVALKYA SMRTI

WITH THE COMMENTARIES

OF

(1) The MITÂKṢHARĀ by Vijñāneśvara Bhikṣu

(2) The VĪRAMITRODAYA by Mītramihra

AND

(3) The DĪPAKALIKĀ by Sūlapaṇi

Vyawahārādhyāya

Chapters VIII XXV (Pages 978-1380)

An English Translation with notes explanations etc.

BY

J R. GHARPURE, B. A., LL. B (Honours in Law)

Principal, Law College, Poona, Fellow of the University of Bombay

Senior Advocate Federal Court of India, Bombay

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NOTE

The Chapter which now follows *i.e.*, the VIII—deals with the Laws of Partition and Inheritance and topics cognate to these Mr Colebrooke selected this portion from the *Mitākṣhara* of Viṣṇuśwara and presented it along with his translations of similar portions from other works describing the whole collection as Standard Hindu Law Books. In fact what is known and referred to as Colebrooke's *Mitākṣhara* or simply the *Mitākṣhara* in judicial decisions generally is this Extract from the *Mitākṣhara* composing so much of its work as relates to Inheritance.

Having regard to the length of the period for which Colebrooke's translation has been in use and relied upon as an authority and having regard to its excellence as a translation which has thus acquired a high authority as a work of reference special care has been taken in the following pages not to disturb the spirit and generally even the letter of Colebrooke's translation unless a departure was found to be necessary in which case the differences are explained in the notes below the line.

Another point to be noted is the division into Chapters Sections and Paragraphs noticeable in Colebrooke's translation. There is no such division in the original work. It will be remembered that the *Mitākṣhara* is a running commentary written by Śrī Viṣṇuśwara on the Smṛti of Yājñavalkya. Viṣṇuśwara takes the verses of Yājñavalkya and appends his gloss thereto and the English Translation of the First Book and the first seven Chapters of the Second Book of this work published in these "Collections" has closely followed the method adopted by Viṣṇuśwara so that the translation appearing in this Series presents an exact resemblance of the original text as it is. The same method is continued in the following Chapters. However, for facility of comparison and reference the divisions made by

Colebrooke are indicated by black figures in the body of the translation, and the portion covered in each page is also indicated in brackets at the top. It is, however, necessary that the text is appreciated in its original form from which this division into Chapters, Sections and Paragraphs appears to have been made by Colebrooke probably for convenience of reference. For it has led at times to serious consequences in that some of the judgments of the Courts appear to have been influenced by this division. Indeed, some of the *placitâ* in Colebrooke's translation have been treated as *verses*, giving an impression that the portion under reference represented *verses* in the original *Smṛti*.

LIST OF CONTENTS

Chapter VIII

DISTRIBUTION ON DĀYA

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Colebrooke. Ch. I. Sect. I.		Colebrooke. Sect. III	
Dāya Defined	99	Partition after father's death	100 1006
" Discussed	n (1)	Special share	1003 1001
" Its Divisions		Mother's property; daughters	entitled 1005, 1007
" Apratibandha		In default, the issue	"
" Sapratibandha	"	Colebrooke Sect. IV	
Defined and discussed	990	Property not liable to partition	1008
Partition-defined	"	Self-acquisitions	1009
" its dependence on relationship	981	Detriment to paternal wealth	1010
" points to be discussed	"	Joint acquisitions by labour	1011
Ownership	"	Things not partible	101
" sources of (Gautama)	982	Heirlooms &c	1013
" additional for each Varṇa		Jaya & Aghra	1014
" does it arise from Śāstra		Common way	1015
alone or from any other		Basils of individuality	1016
means?		Additions to the common stock	1017
" Discussed—	982-	Colebrooke Sect. V	
Reasons in support of a worldly origin	983	Divisions per stirpes	1017 1018
The <i>Lipsā Sūtra</i>	984	<i>Vijandha</i>	1019
Additional modes of acquisitions	985	Birth right of members	1020
Special acquisitions	986 98	Colebrooke Sect. VI	
Ownership by birth	988	After-born sons	1022
Father's power over movables	988-989	" mode of allotment	1023
Rights in the ancestral property	990	" Property resorted to	1024
Father's special powers	991	One in the womb	1025
Exception for pious purposes	99	Gifts by parents	10 6
Transfer with consent of all	993	Colebrooke. Sect. VII	
Colebrooke. Sect. II		Mother entitled to a share when sons	
Partition by the father	991 996	divido after father's death	10*7
Special share for the eldest		The uninitiated to be initiated	10*8
Time for partition	995-996	The sisters to be maintained	1029
Periods for partition	"	" share of	"
Share for the wife	997	" mode of ascertainment	"
Condition for	997-998	ing	1030 1031
Those who are able may not take	999	Colebrooke Sect. VIII	
Partition with unequal shares	999-1000	Sons of different wives	1033
The eldest son	1001	Their shares	1034
		Wives and sons of different <i>varṇas</i>	1035

Subject	Page
Colebrooke Sect IX	
Effects discovered after partition	1036
Property withheld	1037
„ concealed	1038, 1039
Colebrooke. Sect X	
The <i>Dvayāmuśhyāyana</i> son	1039-40, 1062
Niyoga	1041
Chastity the highest ideal	1042
Niyoga discussed	1043
„ „	1044
Colebrooke Sect XI	
Kinds of sons	1045
The <i>Putrikāputra</i>	1046
<i>Gūdhaja, Kānīna, Paunarbhava</i>	1047
<i>Dattaka</i>	1048
Doughter's sons	1049
Ceremonies	1050
<i>Kṛita, Kṛtrima, Sahodha,</i> <i>Apavidha</i>	1051, 1052
Order of priority	1055, 1058, 1063
Colebrooke Sect XII	
<i>Dāsī, Dāsīputra</i>	1058-59
His share	1060, 1061, 1064
Colebrooke Ch II Sect I	
The canon of inheritance	1065
The wife	1066
Several wives	1067
Order of priority	1068
Heirs, when no son	1069
The wife's right to succeed	1070
<i>Gotra and Pravara</i>	1071 (n)
Niyoga, motive for	1072, 1074
Condemned	1075, 1076
Purposes of wealth	1077
The four <i>Purushārthas</i>	1078
Sacrifice, meaning of	1079
Escheat	1080
The fault of <i>Vākyabheda</i>	1082
<i>Nityānuvāda, Artha śāda</i>	1083
<i>Chāturmāsya</i>	1084
Conclusion wife is entitled to property	1087

Subject	Page
Colebrooke Sect. II	
The daughters	1088
Priority among	„
Daughter's son	1089
Colebrooke Sect III	
The parents	1090
Mother preferred, why ?	1091, 1092
Colebrooke Sect IV	
Brothers	1093
Uterine and others	1094, 1095
Brother's sons	1096
Colebrooke Sect V	
<i>Gotrajas</i>	1096
The grand-mother	1097
Act II of 1929	1098 (n)
Other agnates	1099
<i>Sapindas, Samānodakas &c</i>	1100
Colebrooke Sect VI	
Bandhus	1101
Kinds of Bandhus	1102
Colebrooke Sect VII	
Succession of Strangers	1102
Succession under <i>Vīramitro-</i> <i>daya</i>	1104-05
„ <i>Sālapāni</i>	1106
Colebrooke Sect. VIII	
Heirs to hermit &c	1107-08
Spiritual brother	1109
To a <i>Naiṣṭhika</i>	„
A hermit may have property	1110
Colebrooke Sect. IX	
Re-union—Defined	1111
Who may, and who may not	„
Succession—	1112
Re-united vs not re-united	1113-16
Colebrooke Sect X	
Causes of exclusion	1117-18
Hostile to the father	1119
Disqualification only temporary	1120
<i>Patita</i>	1121
Their Sons	1122
Also daughters	„
Their Wives	1123-24

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Colebrooke. Sect. XI		Their Children	1136
Women's property	1136	Sons	1137
Stridhana--Kinds of	1136	Step-daughter	1138
---Defined	1137	Breach of betrothal	1140
<i>Adhyaya</i>	1138	Upon the death of the betrothed	1141-43
<i>Bandhudatta Smṛti</i>	1139	Husband's right to wife's property	1143
<i>Aśvadhya</i>	1139	Solution for Supercession	1144
Succession to	1131 1139-40	What is supercession?	1145
Varying according to the		Colebrooke. Sect. XII	
forms of marriage	1132	Proof of a Partition	1146
Husband and his <i>sepatas</i>	1133	<i>The Pārśva smṛtyāyika</i>	1146 (n)
Parents	1134	Indicia of Separation	1147
Daughters	1133	Proof when partition is denied	1148

Chapter IX (Pp. 1149-1168)

BOUNDARY DISPUTES

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Kinds of boundaries	1149	When arbitrators not available	1160
Varieties of disputes	1150	The King should determine	"
Persons who should decide	1151	Mode of determination	1161
<i>Sikṣatras, Manuśa, Vyākṛta</i>	1151-52	Rule as to gardens, ware-houses &c.	1162-63
Signs of past boundaries	1152	In case of encroachments	1164
When no marks discernible	1154 11 6	When to be condoned?	1165
Number of the arbitrators	1155	Varieties of embankments &c	
The Procedure	1155-56	<i>Ārya, Kṛdhyā</i> &c	1166
Interval for the test	1157	For raising in another's field	1167
On a false decision	1158	One who does not cultivate	1168
Punishments	1159		

Chapter X (Pp. 1169-1189)

DISPUTES BETWEEN OWNERS OF CATTLE AND HERDSMEN

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
For Damage by a buffalo, Cow &c	1169	Exceptions e.g. big bulls,	
For Cattle resting in the field after		stray cattle &c	1176-77
consuming the crops	1170	Rule as to Herdsmen	1178
In land where grass or fuel is stored	1171	Their duty to restore cattle	"
When crops damaged	1172	Fine upon a loss of cattle	1179
Principle of assessment	1173	Pasture ground to be left for	1180-81
Willful trespass alone punishable	1174	Villages, cities and towns &c.	1182
In unenclosed fields	1175		

Chapter XI (Pp 1183-1192)

SALE WITHOUT OWNERSHIP

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Owner's right to recover property	1183	Transactions open to attack	1187
Purchaser's duty	1184	Alternative courses	1187-89
After the seller is found	1185	Abettors	1190
Secret purchases	1186	When recovery made by state officers	1191-92
Proof	1187	Exception to the rule	1191-92
		Special rule	1192

Chapter XII (Pp 1193-1201)

RESUMPTION OF GIFTS

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Division of the subject, discussed	1193	Gifts must be completed	1196
What may be given	1193-94	Valid gifts	1197
What may not be given	1195	Invalid gifts	1198
Things excepted	1195	Fraudulent transactions	1199
Gifts and acceptances always to be in the open	,	Charitable gifts	1200-01

Chapter XIII (Pp 1202-1208)

RESCISSION OF PURCHASE

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Rescission defined	1202	Reduction allowed in gold &c	1205
Interval for a rescission	1202-04	Increase allowed in gold &c	1206-07
When things are not returnable	1203	General rule	1207 1208

Chapter XIV (Pp 1209-1220)

BREACH OF CONTRACT OF SERVICE

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Attendants and their kinds	1209	Restrictions as to slavery	1214, 1217
Their characteristics	1210	Reasons for manumission	1216
Slaves their varieties	1211	Duty of an apprentice	1218, 1219
" their manumission	1211, 12, 13	His position	1220
No relief for apostates from asceticism	1214, 1218		

Chapter XV (Pp 1221-1229)

TRANSGRESSION OF A COMPACT

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
What is a compact ?	1221	Rules and decisions to be followed	1225
<i>Pākhanda</i> s, <i>Nāgama</i> s &c	"	Appointment of representatives	1226
Learned men to be appointed	", 1222	These should be duly honoured	1226-27
Customary Rules	1223	Misappropriation of funds	1228
Embezzlement of common property	1224	Qualifications of a manager	1229
		Extension of rules to Associations	"

Chapter XVI (Pp. 1230-38)

NON PAYMENT OF WAGES

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Penalty for Desertion	1230	Loss in transit, responsibility of a Carrier	1235
What is Desertion ?	1231	Obstruction by labourer, penalty for	1236
Rule when wages not fixed	1232	Exception—illness	1237
One disregarding orders	1233	Obstruction on anapleous occasions	1238
Joint performance	1234		

Chapter XVII (Pp. 1239-1245)

GAMBLING & BETTING ON ANIMALS

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Gambling and Betting defined	1239	Who to decide disputes ?	1242
Keeper of the gambling house	"	Gambling with false dice	1242 1245
" his duties	"	Use of the house for detection of criminals	1243
" his obligation	1240	Same rules for betting on animals	"
" his position	1241, 1244		

Chapter XVIII (Pp. 1246-1256)

ABUSE.

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Abuse defined	1246	Abuse of superiors by inferiors	1248
Kinds of	"	And conversely Penalties	1249 50
Nephews abuse penalty for	1247 1251	Penalties for different abuses	1252
Atkins abuse	1248	Of Brahmanas	1253
		According to Viramitrodaya	1253-56

Chapter XIX (Pp. 1257-1275)

ASSAULT

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Assault defined	1257	Restitution of property	1267
Assault, kinds of	"	Damages, how to be assessed	1268
Rules of procedure	1258	Offences against property	1269
Decision when no witnesses	1259	Throwing dangerous substances in houses &c	"
Penalties in special cases	1260	Assault on beasts	1270
Assault on superiors penalty for	1261-62	Injury to animals	1271
Assault by equals	1263	Injury to trees &c	"
For violent attacks	1264	Injury to sacred places	1272
For mild attacks	1265	Injury to creepers &c.	"
Injury to limbs &c.	"	Other assaults	1273
For restricting movements	1266	According to Viramitrodaya	1273-75
Attack by many	"		

Chapter XX (Pp 1276-1282)

SÂHASAS OR HEINOUS OFFENCES

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
What is a Sâhasa ?	1276	Causing a Sâhasa to be committed,	1279
Three varieties of	1276, 77	Abusing the venerable &c	1280
Highest, middle, lowest	1277	Injury to neighbours, relations &c	1280
Fine for	,	Adultery with a widow,	1281
Sâhasa and theft	1278	not giving help when able and other kinds of Sâhasas	

(Pp 1283-1295)

Similar offences

Washermen misappropriating clothes	1283	False weighment	1289
Their responsibility	1284	Adulterating articles of good quality with bad	"
Fanning family quarrels	1285	Falsely selling fake goods	1290
Falsifying scales	1286	Misappropriation of deposits	1291
Fraud by Examiner of coins	1287	Unlawful combines	1292, 93
Quack physicians	"	King to determine prices	1293
False imprisonment &c	1288	Profit on sale of commodities	1294
Dishonestly letting a party go	"	Principles of fixing the prices	1295

Chapter XXI (Pp. 1296-1303)

NON-DELIVERY AFTER SALE

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Division of the subject	1296	Non-delivery after receipt of price	1300
Consequences of non-delivery	1297	Rescission when not allowed	1301
On a re-sale	1298	Time for Rescission	1302
Fraudulent sales	1299	Rescission after the period	1303

Chapter XXII (Pp. 1304-1316)

TRADING BY PARTNERSHIP

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Rules as to profit and loss	1304	Penalties for —	1309
Partner's rights & responsibilities	1305	Succession to a trader dying abroad	1310
King's dues	1306	When a partner may be expelled	1311
Evasion of excise duties	1307	Extended application of the rules to Sacrificial Priests	1311-16
Unauthorised acts by state servants	1308	Several classes of priests, <i>Ardhina</i> &c	1312

Chapter XXIII (Pp. 1817-1839)

THEFT

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Theft defined	1817	The pick pockets, culprits &c.	1827
How to apprehend a thief ?	1817-21	Thefts of varying grades punishments	1827-1831
" detect "	1818-21	General principles for determining	1827-28-29
Suspected persons	1819	According to magnitude	1830
Those must clear themselves	1820	Accomplices	1831-32
Punishment for a thief	1822, 1839	" Responsibility of	"
" a Brahmana	1822	Bodily harm	1832
Relative responsibility of villages	1823	Wicked women; special rule	1833
" neighbouring places	1823-24	How to trace a murderer ?	1836
King's obligation	1825	Mode of inquiry	1837
Special penalties for particular offences	1826	The incendiaries, poisoners &c	1834-38

Chapter XXIV (Pp. 1840-1863)

ADULTERY WITH WOMEN

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
Detection of adultery	1840	Intercourse with	1851-52
Signs of, and intimacy &c.	1841	Prostitutes	1852-53
Exceptions	1842	Peiyas and the corpses	1854
Persistence even though warned	1843	Account of their origin	1854 (n)
Charyas &c.	1844	Intercourse with	1855
Penalty for adultery	1845 1847	Forceful intercourse	1856
The <i>Gurudharma</i> offences	1846	Unnatural offences	1857
Regarding a maiden	1848	Intercourse with <i>Adhyas</i>	1858 1862
For defiling a maiden	1849	Mixed intercourse	1859
Blasphemy of a maiden	1850 1861	Kidnapping a maiden	1860
Protected women — <i>avaruddha</i>	1861	Intercourse by many	1862

Chapter XXV (Pp. 1864-1880)

MISCELLANEOUS DISPUTES (*Pradhars*)

Subject	Page	Subject	Page
What is <i>Pradhars</i> ?	1864	Penalty for divulging state secrets	1872
Tampering with Royal Decrees	1865	" striking elders, seniors &c	1873
Dealer in false articles	1866	Impersonation	1874
Injury by quadrupeds &c.	1867	" Wrong decisions	1875
" " conveyances	1868	The <i>Adhyas</i>	1876
Penalty for negligence	1869	Unwarranted petition for a Review	1877
" Conniving at adultery	1870	Cases decided in ignorance	1878
" for sedition	1871	Fine unjustly received	1879
		Fruit of holding a judicial inquiry	188

NOTE TO ABBREVIATIONS.

Collections —	Stands for	—	“The Collections of Hindu Law Texts” as published in this Series.
Collections Sk	„	„	— Collections Sanskrit texts
Manu —	„	„	— Manu-Smṛiti as published in the Sacred Books of the East Series, Vol. XXV and this Series
Nārada —	„	„	— Published by Dr. Jolly, S. B. E. Series Vol. XXXIII.
Bṛhaspati —	„	„	— Published by Dr. Jolly, S. B. E. Series Vol. XXXIII
Gautama —	„	„	— Ānandāśrama Series No. 61
Āpastamba —	„	„	— Sacred Books of the East Series
Vasiṣṭha —	„	„	— Sacred Books of the East Series and the Bombay Sanskrit Series
Kātyāyana —	„	„	— Quotations from Kātyāyana Compiled by Mr. P. V. Kane
Jaiminī —	„	„	— The Sūtras of Jaiminī, as published in the Ānandāśrama Series No. 54
Baudhāyana —	„	„	— Sacred Books of the East Series and the Mysore Sanskrit Series

Definition of Un-
obstructible and
Obstructible *Dâya*,

of the (paternal) grandfather becomes the property of his sons or grandsons, in the right of their being his sons and grandsons respectively and thus (this) is an inheritance not liable to obstruct-

5 ion But property devolves on (paternal¹) uncle, brothers and the rest, (but only) in the absence of the male issue and of the owner, and thus the existence of a son, and the existence of the owner are impediments² (to the devolution); and as it is (only) in the absence of these³ that the property devolves upon those in their capacity
10 as uncle and brother (respectively), this is an inheritance subject to obstruction The same should be understood in respect of their sons and the rest

(4) Partation⁴ (*Vibhâga*) is the adjustment of diverse rights regarding property held collectively by assigning severally (to individuals) particular portions of the aggregate (5) Entertaining the same opinions it has been said by Nârada⁵ "Where a partition of
15 "the paternal estate is instituted⁶ by the sons, it is called by the "learned, Partition of *Dâya* (heritage)—a title at law" "Paternal"

1 This translation is in accordance with the reading adopted in the text of the "Collections" viz पित्रव्यप्राप्तादीनाम् The other reading is पित्रप्राप्तादीनाम् which appears to have been before Mr Colebrooke when he published his translation

2 *Pratibandhah*—

पुत्रसद्भावे स्वामिसद्भावाश्च प्रतिबन्ध —The existence of the son, and also of the owner, are the obstructions It should be noted that this element of non-vesting distinguishes it from the अप्रतिबन्ध in which the interest being vested, the existence of these two or others do not work as impediments The right of representation is always given effect to, with the result that the interest of persons in lineal order is unaffected, and is therefore unobstructed See *Subodhin* also p 42 l 34

3 : o the male issue and the owner

4 Compare with this *Vīramitrodaya* (p 1000 ll, 6-10) साधारणस्वत्वाश्रयस्य व्यवस्था-विशेषादिभिः तदपगमे प्रतिनियतस्वत्वाधान विभाग । See *Lakshmi Bai vs Ganpat Moroba* 5 B H O R O J 128/135, and *Yellammal vs Katha* 5 Mad 61/67

5 Oh XIII-1

6 The term in the text is *Kalpyate* (कल्प्यते) "is contemplated or thought of"

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पुत्रसद्भावे स्वामिसद्भावाच्च प्रतिबन्ध —The existence of the son, and also of the owner, are the obstructions. It should be noted that this element of non-vesting distinguishes it from the अप्रतिबन्ध in which the interest being vested, the existence of these two or others do not work as impediments. The right of representation is always given effect to, with the result that the interest of persons in lineal order is unaffected, and is therefore unobstructed. See *Subodhini* also p 42 l 34

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5 Oh XIII-1

6 The term in the text is *Kalpmate* (कल्पते) "as contemplated or thought of."

here is indicative of any¹ relationship which is a cause of property. Also (the expression), "By the sons" indicates relations by propinquity² (in general)

(6) (Thus) the following points have to be expounded in this chapter, viz : (a) at what time (b) of what, (c) how and (d) by whom is a partition to be made? Of these at what, time how and by whom will be explained in the course of interpreting the (several) verses³ (bearing on these subjects) respectively. Of what, a partition (may take place), is the only subject (to be) considered here

(7) Does the right of ownership arise after partition,⁴ or does partition take place of property after there was the right of ownership? Here the right of ownership is itself being explained. (And the question is) whether the right of ownership is deducible from *âstra* alone or whether it may be obtained from other (means of) proof?

1 Any relationship *पुत्रपौत्रसहोदरभ्रातृ* literally when translated it would be is inclusive by extension of relationship which is a cause of property. Colebrooke has translated it as if the origin were *पुत्रसहोदरभ्रातृ*. The sense indicated appears to be so.

In this sense any relationship is not necessarily {father's (*पितृ*), which entitles the claimant to take the property; not necessarily agnatic or cognatic but generally a claim based on legal title.

But the legal title is limited by the next line to propinquity *सम्पत्ति*—which has been brought in the explanation of *पुत्र* —by the sons.

The *Vṛamitrodaya* makes it further clear and restricts it to relations connected by lineal consanguinity. See also *Sulollasa* Text p. 43 ll 9-11 Tr p 109 ll 18-24

Thus while the interpretations of the *Mitakshara* and the *Viṣṇu* (and *ya*) point more to a co-jarcentary body the *Dāya Bhāṣya* extends it to a wider body viz. the joint family *सर्वविधाय समस्तसम्पत्तिविक्रयिणी* *सामानादयमेवा* ... *अथ यत्...* *मादृश्यविक्रयसम्पत्ति* *पुत्रसहोदरभ्रातृ*. The term *Dāya Bhāṣya* is used for a division of the goods of any relation by any relation. Accordingly Nārada has pointed out the distribution of the property of the mother and like others.

It would be noted that this divergence between the two points of view is in keeping with their respective backgrounds. For while the remarks of the *Mitakshara* *Viṣṇu* and *Viṣṇu* are introductory of the verse II. 116 which treats of the partition by the father, the *Dāya Bhāṣya* treats generally of partition.

1 Of Yājñavalkya.

4 See *Sulollasa*, Text I. 43 ll 16-20 Tr p. 109 ll. 3-15.

(8) Here¹ (it may be said that) it is proper to say that it is deducible from Sâstia alone, on account of the text of **Gautama**² “ An (individual becomes) owner by inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure,³ or finding Acceptance is for
 5 “ a Brâhmana an additional (mode of acquisition), conquest for a Kṣhat
 “ rîya, (and) gain (by labour) for a Vaiśya or Sûdîa” If the right of ownership be deducible from other (means of) proof, this text would not have any force⁴ So **Manu**, while discussing the extended⁵ application of the term thief, observes⁶ “ A Brâhmana seeking to obtain
 10 “ wealth from a man who took⁷ what was not given to him, is regarded
 “ precisely as a thief, even though he obtain it by sacrificing for such
 “ a man or by teaching him” If the right of ownership were (deducible from) merely temporal (sources), the rule which directs the punishment of such as obtain wealth by officiating at religious rites, or by
 15 similar means, from one ‘ who took what was not given to him,’ would be irrelevant. Moreover, were (the right of) ownership a (purely) worldly matter⁸ one should not say “my property has
 “ been wrongfully taken by him”, for according to the above assumption the ownership would be with the trespasser. Now (if it be said that because) the property of another was seized by this man, and
 20 (that therefore it) does not become the property of the usurper, (the answer is) then no doubt can arise, whether it appertain to one or the other, just as would be the case in regard to the distinction of

1 The Author sets out the opponent's argument which is called the वृत्तपक्ष

2 Ch X 39-42

3 Cf Apprehensio, vel Occupatio

4 Int it would be meaningless The original is नेद वचन अर्थवत्स्यात् “This text would have no meaning”

5 अनिदेश means “an extended application or application by analogy” अनिदेशो नाम इतरधर्मस्य इतरस्मिन् प्रयोगाय अदेशः ।

6 also अन्यत्रैव प्रणीताया कृत्तनाया धर्मसहितेः । अन्यत्र कार्यत प्राप्तिरनिदेशः स उच्यते ॥
 or प्राकृतात्कर्मणो यस्मात्तत्समानेषु कर्मसु । धर्मप्रवेशो येन स्यादतिदेशः स उच्यते ॥

7 Ch VIII 340

8 लिप्सेत् “ If he wishes or desires to take or obtain ”

8 See *Subodhini* Text P 43 ll 30-35, Tr 110 ll 7-27

* PAGE 74

- a matter of popular recognition In the third clause of the *Lapsā*¹ Sūtra the venerable *Guru* has demonstrated as untenable an objection, which might be raised viz “if restrictions relative to the acquisitions
- 5 “of goods, apply to religious ceremony, there could not be any “property, since proprietary right is not temporal”, by showing that “the efficacy of acceptance and other modes of acquisition in constituting proprietary right is a matter of popular recognition” Indeed, if
- 10 The objection acquisition of wealth be only for (the performance of) religious ceremony, there would be no right of ownership, and consequently (the celebration of) a sacrifice itself would not be possible (To this the answer would be) It is a blunder
- The answer of any one who affirms that acquisition does not produce a proprietary interest, since this is a contradiction in terms
- 15 Accordingly, the Author, premising the acceptance, by popular recognition, of the notion of the right of ownership, even in stating the demonstrated conclusion, proceeds to explain the purpose of the disquisition in this manner “Therefore a breach of

1 The *Lapsā* Sūtra—(See Bālabhāṭṭi Sk p-125 Subodhini p 44 Tr pp 112-114) This is a disquisition as regards the desire of acquisition (*Lapsā*) and is introduced in the Second Sūtra or *Adhikarana* “यस्मिन्नीति पुरुषस्य तस्य लिप्तायलक्षणविभक्तत्वात्”, in the first *Pāda* of the fourth *Adhyāya* of the Sūtras of Jaimini

In the *first* Sūtra the distinction between religious and personal purposes is examined (कृत्वर्थपुरुषार्थयोजित्वासा) In the *second*, the inquiry is whether the acts of a man e g the milking of a cow &c are relative to the person or to the act of religion In the *third* the question examined is whether restrictions as to the means of acquisition noticed in the *Vedas* in reference to the four classes, must be taken as relative to the person or to the religious ceremony And the demonstrated conclusion is that property when acquired is capable of being used for any number of purposes, but it can be used only by the person who acquires it, and since, therefore, the person acquiring it is the constant factor and the purposes for which it may be used may vary, the restrictions as to acquisition relate to the person

Acquisition implies a relation between two objects, the owner and his own—like that of a mother and son, there can, therefore, be no acquisition without the thing to be acquired, and it is a contradiction in terms to say “acquisition does not produce proprietary right” as it is to affirm “my mother is a barren woman” See Bālabhāṭṭi Sk p 126 ll 24-26 Also Subodhini Text pp 44 and 45 Tr pp 112-114

heritage subject to obstruction¹ "Seizure" or occupation is the appropriation (such as) of water, grass, wood and the like, not previously appertaining to any other (person as owner) "Finding" is the discovery of a hidden² treasure or the like If these reasons exist,
 5 the person is (recognised as the) owner If they take³ place, he becomes proprietor "In the case of a *Brâhmana*, that which is obtained by "acceptance is additional"—(the meaning of this text⁴ is) that, in the case of a *Brâhmana* whatever is obtained by means of gift &c is an additional (mode of acquisition) not common⁵ (to all tribes)', similarly as to the text "In the case of a *Kshatriya*, what is obtained by
 10 victory⁶," "additional" is again understood (The meaning is that) In the case of a *Kshatriya*, whatever is obtained by conquest, amercement, or the like is (an additional mode) not common (to all the tribes) (So in the text⁴) "In the case of a *Vaisya* and a *Sûdra* what is
 15 "earned⁷ (as wages by labour)" Here also "additional" is again understood—(The meaning is that)—what is earned as wages by agriculture, keeping the cattle⁸, or the like, is in the case of a *Vaisya* a (mode of acquisition) not common (to all tribes), and in the case of a *Sûdra*, that which is earned in the form of wages by service of
 20 the regenerate, and by similar means, is (a mode of acquisition) not common (to all tribes)

Thus, likewise, among the various causes of property which are peculiar to mankind, whatever has been stated, as peculiar in the case of certain mixed classes in the direct⁹ or inverse¹⁰ order of the tribes,
 25 e g driving of horses in the case of the *Sîtas*, and like other modes, is indicated by the word "earned", for all such acquisitions assume

1 संप्रतिबन्धो दाय ।

2 निष्पदि ।

3 कृतेषु is the reading adopted here There is another reading viz ज्ञानेषु
 Tr "if they are known &c"

4 i e of Gautama cited above

5 असाधारण : i e peculiar or special mode of acquisition specially mentioned

6 विजितम्

7 निर्विद

8 कृषिगौरक्षा

9 अनुलोमज—i e the issue of a mixed marriage when the father is of a class higher than that of the mother See Āchârâdhyâya Ver 91-92 pp 248, 250 above

10 प्रतिलोमज—is the issue of a mixed marriage where the mother is of a higher class and the father of a lower one See Āchârâdhyâya Ver 93-94 p 252 above

the form of wages or hire for according to the (lexicon) Trikaṇḍee'
" the word *surasa* is used to indicate wages or occupation " All this
should be understood as wealth acquired by modes not common
(to all tribes)

(14) As for the precept¹ (respecting the succession of) ' the widow 5
and the daughters &c., the declaration (of the order of succession),
even in that text is intended to prevent any mistake although the
proprietary right be a matter familiar to the world where many persons
might (but for this precept) be supposed entitled to share the heritage
by reason of their affinity to the (deceased) owner The whole is 10
therefore unexceptionable

(15) As for the remark that if property were temporal, it
could not be said " my property has been taken
The objection and " away by him that also is not accurate for a
The answer doubt respecting the proprietary right does arise 15
through a doubt concerning the purchase, or other transaction which
is the cause of that right.

(16) The purpose of the preceding disputation is this A
text² says : " When *Bṛīhmīn* acquire wealth by a blamable act
" they are purged of the guilt by the abandonment of such wealth, by 20
" prayer and by rigid austerity " Now if property be deducible only
from *S'ūtra*, that which has been obtained by blamable means e g by
accepting presents from an improper person or by barter or similar
other means would not be property at all and consequently would
not be property partible among sons But if the proprietary interest 25
be a worldly matter then even what is obtained by accepting presents
from an improper person &c. is property, and may be divided among
heirs, and the atonement above referred to in the text " they are
" purged of the guilt by its abandonment &c." regards the acquirer
only but of the sons, however their proprietary 30
interest arises by their right of inheritance and

* PAGE 76

1 Amara. III 3-214

2 Yājñ IL 13. *infra*

3 Of Manu Ch. XI 191

therefore no blame attaches to them, since Manu¹ says . “ There are
“ seven lawful modes of acquiring property, (*viz*) inheritance, finding,
“ or friendly donation, purchase, conquest, lending at interest, the
“ performance of work, and the acceptance of gifts from virtuous men ”

- 5 (17) Next, it is doubted whether the right of property arises
from partition or the division of a proprietary interest which already
was existing ? (18) Of these (positions), that
Another position of property arising from partition is right, since
a man to whom a son is born, is enjoined to
10 maintain a holy fire for, if property were vested by birth alone,
the estate would be common to the son as soon as born, and the
father would not be competent to maintain a sacrificial fire and per-
form other religious duties which are accomplished by the use of
wealth (19) Likewise, the prohibition of a division of that, which
15 is obtained from the liberality² of the father, previous to separation,
would not be pertinent since no partition of it can be supposed, for
it has been given by consent of all parties As says Nārada³
“ The two kinds of property, *viz*, gain of valour and the wealth of a
“ wife, and also that which is acquired by science—are three kinds of
20 “ property not subject to partition, and so is a favour conferred by
“ the father (exempt from partition) ” (20) So the text⁴ concern-
ing an affectionate gift *viz* “ what has been given by a husband,
“ when pleased,⁵ to his wife, she may consume as she pleases, even
“ when he is dead, or may give it away excepting immovable
25 “ property,” would not be pertinent, if property were vested by birth
alone Nor is it right to connect the words “excepting immovable
property ” with the terms “ what has been given ” (in this text),
for that would be a forced construction by connection of disjointed

1 Oh X 115 See *Ponnappa vs Pappuvayyanganar* 4 Mad at page 24—
where the court enters into an elaborate discussion of this and other passages of
the Mitākṣharā, for determining the relative positions of a father and a son
under the Mitākṣharā

2 प्रसाद : a favour, pleasure

3 Chapter XIII-6

4 Of Vishnu

5 Cf Mayākha IV 10-9 where it is ascribed to Nārada

See—*Damodar vs Parmanandas* 7 Bom 165 *Jagmohandas vs Mangaldas*
10 Bom 546 *Surajmuni vs Rabinath* 25 All 353,

terms. (21) As for the text "The father is master of the gems pearls, and corals and of all (other movable property), but neither the father nor (even) the grand father is so of the whole¹ immovable "estate" and also (the text)²: 'By favour of the father clothes and ornaments are used, but immovable property may not be consumed, even with the father's indulgence"—which passages forbid a gift of immovable property through favour they both relate to immovables which have descended from the paternal grand father. And although after the grand father is dead his effects become the common property of the father and sons, it appears even from this text, that the gems, pearls, and other movables, belong exclusively to the father while the immovable estate remains common. (22) Therefore property is not by birth, but by demise of the owner or by partition. Accordingly since the demise of the owner is a cause of property there is no room for supposing that a stranger could not be prevented from taking the effects because the property was vacant³ after the death of the father before partition. So likewise, in the case of an only son, the estate becomes the property of the son by the father's decease and does not require partition.

(23) To this the answer is. It has been shown that property is a matter of popular recognition and the right of sons and the rest, by birth, is most familiar to the world and so it cannot be denied but the term partition is generally understood to relate to effects belonging to several owners, and does not relate to that which appertains to another, nor to goods vacant or unowned. For the text of Gautama, expresses 'Let ownership of wealth be taken by birth, as the venerable teachers direct.' (24) Moreover the text above cited viz ' (the father is the master) of gems, pearls, corals &c.' is pertinent to the supposition of a proprietary

1 वृत्त—The meaning of the text is that, not the father not even the grand father is the master of any of the immovable property &c.

2 The author of this text is not known

See *Shri Sitaram Pandit vs Shri Haniker Pandit* 35 Bom. 169 at p. 181

3 द्रव्यतन्त्रे नृणां—There being no proprietary right over the property &c on account of the non-existence of the owner &c (See *Bilambhatti Sk.* p. 131).

4 viz. of *Nārada* II. 1-4 above.

right vested by birth Nor is it right to affirm that it relates to immovables which have descended from the paternal grand-father,¹ since the text expresses “neither the father, nor even the grandfather¹” This rule², that the grandfather’s own acquisition should not be given
 5 away while a son or a grandson is living, indicates a proprietary interest by birth According to *the other opinion*, the precious stones, pearls, clothes, ornaments, and other effects, though inherited from the grandfather, belong to the father under the special provisions of the law, so according to our opinion also, the father has³ power, under
 10 the same text, to give away such effects, though acquired by his father Thus there is no⁴ difference

(25) As for the text of Vishnu⁵ viz “(That which has been “given) by the husband when pleased &c” which mentions a gift through affection, that must be interpreted as relating to property
 15 acquired by the father himself and given with the consent of his sons and the rest for, by the text⁶ above cited viz “(the father is the “master of) gems, pearls &c.” the fitness of things, only those other than immovables, for an affectionate⁷ gift was determined with certainty (26) As for the alleged disqualification⁸ for religious
 20 duties which are prescribed by the *Veda* and which require for their accomplishment the use of wealth, sufficient for such purposes is inferred from the cogency of the text itself which enjoins their performance and which is in the nature of a command.

1 The word ancestral can only apply to the property of the paternal grandfather and his ancestors, and not to the self-acquisition of the father See *Baynath vs Maharaj* 8 Luck 28, see also *Muhammad Husain vs Kiswa Nandan* 39 Bom L R 979 (P O)

2 viz That which is stated in the text of Nārada cited above

3 See no 1, p 994

4 i e Difference of opinion

5 Cited above at p 988, ll 22-24

6 i e of Nārada & Vishnu

7 Thus a father cannot give even a small portion of ancestral property to his daughter, on the ground that she looked after him in his old age *Jinnappa vs Chimmava* 59 Bom 460, nor can he make a will, *Parvatibai vs Bhagvant* 39 Bom 593

8 Both Bālabhāṭṭi & Subodhini explain this by saying that the power to perform these is given by special texts which enjoin their performance

(27) Therefore¹ (it is settled that) ownership in the father's or grand father's estate is by birth. Still, it (also) stands (as good law) that the father has independent power in the disposal of effects others than immovables for indispensable acts of duty and for purposes prescribed by the texts of law as gifts through affection, support of the family, relief from distress and so forth but he is subject to the control of his sons and the rest, in regard to the immovable estate whether acquired by himself or inherited from his father or other

5

1 This text regarding the birth right in the ancestral property and the father's power of disposal over the same has been noticed in various cases.

In *Baba vs Tanna* 7 Mad. 317 at p. 362 Turner O. J. observes as follows in regard to this portion of the *Mitāksharā*: "The effect of the several passages taken together is that, while the ownership of the son is recognised in all property whether the self-acquired property of his father or ancestral the father has power to dispose at his pleasure of his self-acquired movables and with a consent which his son must give of his self-acquired immovables—he has the power to dispose of ancestral movables for purposes inculcated by sacred texts, and of all property for indispensable acts of duty; but the son may interdict him, if he applies ancestral wealth, whether movable or immovable to purposes other than those sanctioned. See also *Jiamappa vs Chinnara* 59 Bom. 439-437 Bom. L. R. 483-487 and 60 Cal. 266-271 45 All. 90 (will by the father)."

The following may be noted as some of these:

Pao Balwant Singh vs Rani Asaberi 2 L. A. 511 6 at p. 68 *Ga. In. Maganlal vs Bai Jadhav* 21 Bom. 211 *Bachao vs Anant Das* 21 Bom. 61

Ponnappa Pillai vs Pappayyyan 4 Mad. at pp. 8, 16, 4 &c.

G. Nigala vs Ancho H. pala 4 Mad. at p. 83

Sivamuthu Vudal vs Parvati Amu 4 Mad. at p. 103

Varanmika vs I. Sankatadri 8 Mad. 293

Vasa Tawlar vs Ramchandra Tawlar 32 Mad. at p. 381

(This case discusses the several portions of the *Mitāksharā* bearing on the father's right over ancestral property generally.)

Kal. Pershad vs Ram Chattran 1 All. 160, *Sital vs Malho* 1 All. 396

Jasoda Keer vs Shree Pershad 17 Cal. at p. 36

Chandradeo Singh vs Mal. Persad 31 All. 176 180 184 187 211

Vand Ram vs Mangalrao 31 All. 359

Mohammad vs A. Far. Mendul 6 Cal. 81.

2 Colebrooke translates as ancestral. The word in the original text is *Pratimaka* i. e. belonging to the grandfather. Mr. Colebrooke's translation has been commented on in *Jasoda Persad vs Ram Persad* 29 All. at p. 689 referring to the remarks of Baba J. O. Ghose in his *Hindu Law* page 376 (2nd Ed.)

predecessor, *vide* the text¹ “ Though immovables or bipeds have been
“acquired by a man himself, a gift or sale of them should not be made
“without convening all the sons They, who are born, as also they who
“are yet unbegotten, and they who are still in the womb, require the
5 “means of support, no gift or sale should, therefore, be made ”

*PAGE 76

(28) An exception to it follows² “ Even a single individual
An exception stated “may conclude a donation, mortgage, or sale, of
“immovable³ property, during a season of distress
“for the sake of family, and especially for pious purposes ” (29) The
10 Explained meaning of that text is this while the sons and
grandsons are minors and incapable of giving
their consent⁴ or doing similar acts, or while the brothers are so and
continue unseparated, even one person, who is capable, may
conclude a gift, hypothecation, or sale, of immovable property,
15 if a calamity affecting the whole property require it, or for sup-
porting the family, or for performing indispensable⁵ duties,

1 “ Of *Vyâsa* as cited in other compilations ”—Colebrooke

2 *Brhaspati* as cited in the *Ratnâkara* &c —Colebrooke

3 See *Bhau vs Raghunath* 30 Bom at p 239, also see, *Gorind vs Deelappa* 40
Bom L R 539 at p 543

4 and thus render the expenditure a valid binding charge upon their shares.

5 “Indispensable duties ” The expression in Sanskrit आचर्य कर्तव्येषु पित्राद्यादिषु—
(*Ācāryam Kartavyeṣhu pitr-śrāddhādiṣhu*) Tr “For acts which must be performed
such as obsequies of the deceased ancestors and the like” (see 34 Mad at p 434)

This expression has been subjected to judicial criticism—see *Gorindarazulu vs Devarabholla* 27 Mad at p 209 As regards the term *Ādi*—‘and the like’—at the end of the above expression, *Muttuswami Ayyar J* observes as follows in *Ponnappa vs Pappuwayyengar* 4 Mad at p 17 “ The phrase *Ādi* both according to Hindu law and the rule of construction, refers to annual *Śrāddhas*, the ceremony of *upanayana* in the case of minors in the three higher classes, and of marriage in the case of girls &c —and in short to such ceremonies as, if unperformed, would entail a forfeiture of caste or status etc ”—and it was held in 27 Mad 209 that that expression could not be extended to the marriage of males This interpretation was dissented from later on in *M Kameswara Sastru vs Veeracharlu*, 34 Mad where at p 434 it is observed, “ the word *Ādi*—means “beginning with” and merely indicates that the father’s ceremony which is named is one out of a group of ceremonies ” The expression simply means “acts, such as the *Śrāddha* and the like others which have necessarily to be done ” See also 32 Bom 81

such as obsequies of the ancestors¹ (manes). (30) As for the text²—
 “Kinsmen whether unseparated or separated are equal in respect
 “of (rights in) immovables for one (alone) has not power over the
 “whole to make a gift, sale or mortgage”—it must be interpreted thus:
 among unseparated kinsmen, the consent of all is indispensably
 requisite, because, since the estate is held in common no one is fully
 empowered to make an alienation but among separated kinsmen,
 the consent of all tends to the facility of the transaction, by obviat-
 ing any future doubt, as to their separation or union it is not
 required on account of any want of sufficient power in the single
 owner and hence the transaction is valid even without the consent
 of separated kinsmen (31) Again as for the text,³—“Land passes
 by six (formalities) by consent of townsmen, of kinsmen, of neigh-
 “bours, and of heirs, and by gift of gold and water”—consent of
 townsmen is required for the publicity of the transaction, since it is
 provided⁴ that “acceptance of a gift especially of the immovable pro-
 perty should be public” but not that the contract remains incomplete
 without the consent of the townsmen the consent of neighbours
 serves to obviate any dispute concerning the boundary the use of
 the consent of kinsmen and of heirs has already been explained.
 (32) By gift of gold and water—since the sale of immovable pro-
 perty is forbidden by the text: “In regard to the immovable estate,
 “sale is not allowed (but) a hypothecation may be made with the con-
 sent (of persons interested), and since also donation is praised in the
 text “Both he who accepts land as a gift as also he who gives it, are
 “performers of a holy deed and shall surely go to heaven,” even when
 a sale is to be made, it should be conducted, for the transfer of
 immovable property, in the form of a gift, delivering with it gold
 and water (to ratify the donation) This is the meaning

1 Colebrooke translates—“obsequies of the father” but the word *pitṛ* when used in connection with *Śraddha* indicates other ancestors also who are dead and whose *Śraddha* is to be performed.

2 Of *Bṛhaspati* XXV—13 See *Ponnappa vs Papparayyanar* 4 Mad. 1 at pages 9 10 54 where this text has been referred to and discussed

3 The author of this passage is not known

4 *Yājñavalkya* II. 176 See 11 I. A. 218 at p. 230

(33) Although the right of property is by birth alone in the estate of the father or the grandfather, we shall mention (later on) a special rule in the text (II 121) “ Land which was acquired by “ the grandfather &c ”

[Colebrooke Sect II]

5 (1) Now¹ with a view to expound, at what time, by whom, and how, partition may be made, the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 114

10 If the father makes a partition, let him separate his sons at his pleasure, and either separate the eldest with the best share, or (if he choose) all may be (made) equal sharers

Mitāksharâ — (2) Vibhāgam chet pitā kuryât, if (ever) the father wishes to make a partition, then ichchhayâ vibhajet, he may at his pleasure separate, sūtān, his sons from himself, whether one, two, or more sons

15 (3) The will being unrestrained and no rule being suggested, the Author adds, by way of restriction, **iyeshtham**
Special rule for the share of the eldest **wâ śreshthabhāgena**, and either (separate) the eldest with the best share. From this it is understood²
that he may separate the eldest with the best share, the middle-most
20 with a middle share, and the youngest with the smallest³ share
(4) This distribution of the best and other portions is propounded by **Manu**⁴. “ The additional share (deducted) for the eldest shall be
“ one-twentieth (of the heritage) and which is the best of all the
“ chattels, for the middle-most, half of that, for the youngest, a
25 “ quarter of it.”

1 तद्दर्शयन्—Tr while pointing out (as to, at what time &c —the Author says &c) This portion has been referred to in *Kalī Paśhad vs Ramcharan* 1 All 160 (F B) Where it has been held that “ The son has under the *Mitāksharâ* right to demand partition and part of his share in the ancestral immovable property during the life time of the father and against his will ’

2 अनुवर्तते : e it follows

3 : e as given in the text of *Manu* here immediately following

4 Oh IX 112

(5) The term *wā, either* is relative to the subsequent¹ alternative *ṛ sarve wā syuḥ samamśinaḥ, or 'all may be equal sharers, i.e. or all, namely the eldest and the rest should be made partakers of equal portions.*

(6) This unequal distribution, moreover is allowed in reference to property acquired by himself. But, if the wealth descended to him from a line of² ancestors, an unequal partition at his pleasure is not proper as equality of ownership (over such property) will³ be declared (further on).

(7) Under the text⁴ "If the father makes a partition &c.", when the father desires separation, that is one period for partition. Another period, also, is when, even when the father is living but is indifferent to wealth and disinclined⁵ to pleasure and when the mother is incapable⁶ of bearing issue — at such a time a partition is admissible merely at the option of the sons⁷ even against the wish of the father, as is shown by Narada,

* PAOK 77 who, premising partition subsequent to the demise of both parents by the text⁸: "Therefore let the sons divide the wealth equally when the father is dead", adds⁹ "Or when the menstruation of the mother has ceased, and the sisters are married, or when the father's sexual desire is extinguished and he has become indifferent to worldly interests. Here the words "Let the sons divide the wealth equally" are understood. Gautama¹⁰ likewise, having said "After the demise of the father let the sons divide his estate," states a second period, "or when the mother is just

1 यत्नम्—Hereafter to be stated.

2 Colebrooke translates "from his father" but the expression is पित्रात्मके पितृकर्मण्ये (Tr "descended from an unbroken line of male ancestors")

3 Yājñavalkya II, 1 1

4 Yājñavalkya II 114

5 क्षुण्णम्—is satiated or fed up with pleasures

6 Lit. It means—and when the mother has ceased to menstruate

7 The Sanskrit expression is गृह्यते at the mere option of the sons. The word गृह् is used in a collective as also in a distributive sense. It may therefore be at the option of one son or of more

8 Ch. XIII. 2

9 Ch. XIII. 3

10 Ch. XXV. III. 1

“child bearing,” and a third period has been indicated viz, “while the father lives, if he desires separation” So, even while the mother is capable¹ of bearing more issue, though the father be unwilling, if he be addicted² to vice or afflicted with a lasting disease a partition
5 is admissible by the choice of the sons. As says *Saṅkha* : “(Even) when “the father does not wish, partition of inheritance takes place if he be “old, disturbed in intellect, or diseased.” (114).

Śûlapâni

Now the Distribution

10

Yājñavalkya, Verse 114

The father, if he makes a distribution of his self-acquired property, then he may make the sons separate according to his wish, and not the wish of the son

As says *Viṣṇu*³ “If the father separates the sons, he may make the
15 “sons separate according to his wish in regard to property acquired by “himself. In regard to the grand-father's property, however, the ownership “of the father and the son is equal, partition cannot be according as he “may wish” Here ownership is the cause.

So *Devala* “When the father is dead, the sons may divide the
20 “father's property There will be no ownership of these when the father “is living and faultless” *Faultless*, i e not degraded

At some places *Nârada*⁴ mentions a division by the wish of the son even in regard to the father's acquisitions, thus “When the mother has “ceased to menstruate, and the sisters have been married, when the father's

1 स्रजस्कायाम्—(Lat) has (yet) the menstruation

2 The translation of Mr Colebrooke is retained here—but the expression in Sanskrit viz, अयमर्थिति “when his conduct is not in conformity with (the rules of) *Dharma*”—has a wider meaning and force Being addicted to vice is only one phase of “the conduct not being in conformity with *Dharma*”, and the son would thus have a wider range of circumstances under which he can ask of a partition

Moreover, in explaining the text of *San̥kha* in the next line Bâlabhattacharya gives अयमर्थिति as an equivalent of विपरीतचेतसि—which Colebrooke has translated as “disturbed in intellect” According to him the two expressions bear an identical meaning and would mean—“When the father has become irreligious,”

3 Ch XVII 1-2,

4 Ch XIII 3

"sexual desire is extinguished and he has become post (all) desires."
Sexual desire is extinguished i.e. when his capacity for sexual enjoyment is gone. Post (all) desires i.e. from the householder's position to that of the hermit.

Jyeghitham ud. Or the eldest &c. i.e., he should separate them with the largest share for the eldest. Or he may so make (the partition) that all may become equal sharers. So Narada¹ "By the father himself those who have been separated into equal or less shares of the property for them that itself is the law. Indeed, the father is the master of all." (114).

(8) Partition at the pleasure of the father has been stated to 10
of be of two sorts i.e. equal and unequal. In this connection, in the case of an equal partition the Author adds a particular rule

Yājñavalkya, Verse 115

If he make the allotments equal his wives² (such of them) to whom 15
no *Strīdhana*³ had been given by the husband or the father-in-law, must be made partakers of equal portions

Mitākṣhara :—(9) When, by his own choice the father makes all 20
his sons partakers of equal portions, then, the wives also should be made participants of shares equal to those of sons. *Yasam, such of the wives, bhartrā īwataraṇa wā strīdhanam na dattam t. whom no strīdhana had been given by the husband or by the father-in-law*. But if *strīdhana* had been given (to a woman) the Author directs further on⁴ (verse 148) half a share to be allotted to her (in the text) "or if any had been given, let him assign a half." (10) If however he make the 25
allotments by allotting the best share, &c., to the eldest &c., then the wives do not get the best or such other portions, but receive equal shares of the aggregate from which the special shares have been

1. Ch XIII 15

2 A The comments of *Īśvarāya* on this should be noted. "If equal shares are allotted by the father the widows of his sons and grandsons and his own wives to whom no *strīdhana* has been given by their husband or father in law or himself should be made partakers of their husband's share" (See *Īśvarāya* p 212 ll. 10-1). See also The *Dīya-krama-Saṅgraha* VI. P. 4, 432

subtracted, as also their special additional share as laid down by Āpastamba¹ "And the furniture in the house. The ornaments, are the "wife's (property) "

Śûlapâni

5

Yājñavalkya, Verse 115

Yad, 'If &c.' If the father, by his wish makes them (the sons) partakers of equal shares, then the wives also who are without sons should be made partakers of equal shares, to whom *Stridhana* has not been given by the husband or any other, by reason of the text "Or if any had been
10 "given, a half has been declared." If however *Stridhana* had been given, half should be given

Himself, however, if there be (only) one son, he should take two shares If he has more than one sons, less than two shares As say Śankha and Likhita "He, if he has one son, should make two shares for himself "

15 Similarly also "Two shares should he take for himself, when the father "makes a partition " This text² of Nârada is even to this effect also (115).

1 II 14-8-9

Mr Colebrooke translates "The furniture in the house and her ornaments are the wife's (property) —" this is in accordance with the published 'extracts' of the text of Āpastamba A reference to the text of Āpastamba itself, however points to a different state of things This text occurs in the 14th *Khanda* of the 2nd Book of Āpastamba's Dharmaśāstra This *Khanda* treats of the *Dāyavibhāga* or "Distribution of heritage" From § 1 to 5 the general line of heirs is mentioned, § 5 mentioning the king as taking by escheat Then from § 6 begin special rules of inheritance, and § 7 and § 8 give the special right of the eldest son to certain items of property, § 9 mentions the wife's claim to special property and § 10 modifies it to some extent The text quoted in the Mitâksharâ is part of § 8 and 9 Paras 7, 8, 9 and 10 run thus

"In some countries, gold, black cattle, black produce of the earth is the share of the eldest (7) The chariot, and the furniture in the house according to some § (8) The share of the wife consists of her ornaments, and the wealth of the *jñātū* That, however, is opposed to *Śāstra* (9) "

It will thus be seen that "the furniture in the house" in the passage from Āpastamba forms part of § 8 which (together with § 7) exclusively mentions properties which go to the eldest son, while it is in para § 9 alone that a reference to the ornaments of the wife is made The translation given above and the punctuation are in accordance with this reading of the text

(11) To the two alternatives before stated, *et c.*, "and either "separate the eldest with the best share or (if he choose) all may be (made) equal sharers" (II 111 p. 991 9 above) the Author propounds an exception

Yājñavalkya Verse 116 (1)

5

Of one who is able and who is not desirous of having any share the separation may be effected by giving (him) a trifle

Mitākṣhara —(12) To one who is himself competent to earn wealth, and *anīhamanasya. iho : n t desirous of having any share* from his father's wealth : *e.*, who does not wish to have any share any thing whatsoever : *e.*, *kiñchā*, a trifle an article of no value may be given and *prthak kṛtya, separation effected, i e.*, the division may be (thus) completed by the father so that the children, or other heirs of that son, may have no future claim of inheritance 10

(13) By the text "or the eldest with the greatest share" the distribution of greater and less shares has been shown. To forbid, in such a case an unequal partition made in any other mode than that which renders the distribution uneven by means of deductions (of the special shares) such as are dictated by *Śāstra*, the Author adds 15

Yājñavalkya Verse 116 (2).

20

A partition made by the father among sons separated with greater or less shares, if (it be) according to *Dharma*, is pronounced valid.

Mitākṣhara —(14) Of the sons *vibhaktanam, separated* *nyimadhika* with a greater or less share, if such an unequal partition be *dharmyaḥ made according to Dharma i e* as dictated by *Śāstra*, then that division *pṛkṣatḥ made by the father, is (regarded as) completely made,* and cannot be afterwards set aside, this is pronounced *smṛtāḥ*, by *Manu* and the rest. If, however (it be) otherwise it may be set aside even though made by the father. As says *Nārada* 'A father, who is afflicted "with disease, or influenced by wrath, or whose mind is engrossed by "sensual passion, or who acts contrary to what the *Śāstra* dictates, has no power in the distribution of the estate." 25 30

Vîramitrodaya

Now the Author begins the Chapter on *Dâyabhāga*. Its definition has been given by Nârada¹ "Where a partition of the paternal estate is instituted by the sons, it is called by the learned—partition of the

5 "*Dāya*—a title at law".

By the use of the two terms *patnya* 'paternal', *tanayah* 'sons', it is intended to show that it is indicative of only those relations by propinquity who are connected through his own seed *Vibhāga*, 'partition', i. e., where property is held in common ownership, and when by particular arrangement and the like, that is removed and a restricted ownership is super-imposed *Daya*, means 'wealth,' i. e., wealth which was acquired by reason of relationship to the owner. A share of that is *vibhāga*, 'partition'.

10

Here, the Author first states the partition when the father is

15 living

Yâjñavalkya, Verses 114, 115, 116

Pitā, 'the father', *chet*, 'if', *vibhāgam* 'a partition', i. e., of property of his personal ownership as being either his self-acquisition, or property (lost to the family and) recovered by him, *kuryāt*, 'makes,' then

20 *ichchhaya*, 'at his pleasure,' i. e., according as he may desire, by giving property more or less even, *sutān*, 'the sons,' he 'may separate,' *vibhājet*. That says Vishnu² "If a father makes a partition with his sons, he may "dispose of his self-acquired property as he likes" Manu³ also "When

25 "the father acquires ancestral property which was unrecoverable, the "property he need not divide with his sons if he does not (so) desire, it "is his self-acquired" The father may leave such recovered property (which was lost), but in regard to other property, when the father makes a partition, *sarve* 'all,' the sons, should be the participators of equal shares.

30 In regard to the eldest, 'with the eldest son's share' i. e., together with a tenth or a twentieth part, he should divide

Of the sons, moreover, the shares should be made equal to his.

On the other hand, however, of the father who makes the partition, of the wives for whom *bhartā wā śvaśurena wā* 'either by (their) husband or by (their) father-in-law,' *na stridhanam dattam*, 'no *stridhana* had been given,' those wives, and the wives who have *stridhana*, should be made participators of equal property, or should be given shares from the

35

divided property. If, however in pursuance of the text of Nārada' viz.,
"Two shares should be taken for himself, when the father makes a
'partition' or in pursuance of the text of Harita viz. "Or after
"dividing a small portion he should take the largest and remain he
(the father) takes a double or a very large share for himself then from
his own share itself they should be made partakers of equal portions 5

Śaktarya of one who is competent i.e., who is himself competent
to make acquisitions and from the ancestral property *anīhamāna ya*
'who is not desirous of having (any share), i.e. who does not wish
to such a son some small share such as a *prasthū* of rice or the like for
meeting the objections by his son should be given by the father and
by the brothers also *prīṭhak kṛiyā* the separation should be effected
i.e., the partition should be made. 10

Of those who have been separated with the assignment of more or
less i.e. unequal property even such a partition as made by the father is
pronounced to be legal *dharmaṇa*. Therefore one should not raise object
ions at a later time. As for the father, by reason of the same being
disliked by the people such a partition is certainly illegal. This is the
meaning *Vide Āpastamba*. After having gladdened the eldest son
"by some (choice portion of his) wealth during his life-time he should
"divide his wealth equally amongst his sons" "by some property i.e. by
a choice portion of his property. By the particular mention of *prasthū*
during his life-time he intends that after he is dead the wife does not
get a share (114-116) 15

Śūlapāṇi

Vājñavalkya Verse 116

23

Śaktarya "Able &c." One who by reason of his learning &c. is com
petent to earn and has no desire for the common property such a one
should be made separate by the brothers after giving him a trifle such as
a rice-field or the like for obviating any disagreement by his sons in
aftertime. 30

Of those, however who have been made separate with more or less,
by reason of its having been made by the father that itself is (according
to) law. In such a case no disagreement should be permitted in after
time (116). 35

“equally amongst his sons,” and by the text¹ “Some hold that the
 “eldest is the heir” having premised, as the opinion of some, the
 succession of the eldest to the entire estate, and having exhibited as
 the opinion of others the distribution by (the method of) deductions
 5 having regard to (the usage of) particular places *viz* ² “(In particular
 “countries), gold, black kine, and the black produce of the earth,
 “belong to the eldest The chariot and the furniture in the house are
 “the father’s, and according to some, ornaments, as also property
 “(received by her) from kinsmen belong to the wife,” has refuted it
 10 as being forbidden by *S’âstra*, and has himself pointed out the prohibi-
 tion in the *S’âstra* thus³ “It is recorded in Scripture, without dis-
 “tinction, that *Manu* distributed his heritage among his sons”

(7) Therefore, unequal partition, though noticed in the *S’âstra*,
 still as it is disapproved by the world and is contrary to Scriptures it
 15 should not be practised And for this reason the restrictive rule is laid
 down, *viz*, “(the brethren) should divide only in equal shares”

(8) It has been declared that sons may part the effects after the
 death of the mother and father There the Author states an exception
 in regard to the mother’s (separate) property

20 Yājñavalkya, Verse 117 (3rd quarter)

Of the mother’s (property) the daughters (shall take) the residue
 (after the payment) of debts

Mitâksharâ —(9) *Mâtur*, the Mother’s property, *duhitâro*, the dau-
 ghters shall divide, *ṛṇâchchhesham*, the residue of debt i e, the residue
 25 (remaining) after the discharge of the debts contracted by the mother
 Hence, the purpose (of the preceding part) of this text is, that when
 the mother’s assets are equal to or less than her debts, the sons may
 (take and) divide them. (10) The⁵ meaning is
 *Page 79 this A debt incurred by the mother, must be
 30 discharged by the sons only, and not by the daughters, but the

1 *Āpastamba* II 6 14 8 2 *Āpastamba* II 6 14 9 3 *Āpastamba* II 6 14 11

4 This is a passage from the *Taittirīya Veda*—Bālabhattacharya There is a mis-
 take in the print of the text, for ‘स मनु पुत्रेभ्यो’ read ‘मनु पुत्रेभ्यो श्रूयते’

5 See *Vithalrao vs Ramrao*, 24 Bom 317—2 Bom L R 154-156

daughters shall take the residue of her assets after the payment off of her debts. And this is proper. For by the rule¹ "A male child "is procreated if the male seed predominate, a female child by the prevalence of the female" as portions of the (body of the) female (parent) abound in the female children the *Stridhana* property goes to the daughters, and as portions of (the body of) the father abound in the male children the father's estate goes to the sons.

(11) Even² there, a special rule has been propounded by *Gautama*³ "The *stridhana* property goes to her daughters unmarried, and (failing them) to the unprovided. The meaning of this is thus. If there be a competition of married and unmarried daughters, to the unmarried alone goes the *stridhana* and if among the married daughters there be a competition between the endowed and the unendowed (daughters) it belongs exclusively to such as are unendowed. Unendowed means destitute of wealth.

(12) In answer to the question, "in the absence of daughters "who should take the residue of the mother's estate that may remain after payment of her debts"? the Author adds

Yājñavalkya Verse 117 (last quarter)

In their default, the issue (succeed)

Mitākṣharā —(13) Tābhya, in their absence, i. e., of the daughters (i. e., in default of daughters, anyway, the issue, i. e. the sons and the like others, should take. This, moreover was already demonstrated by the text⁴ "The sons should divide equally after the parents &c." but it is here expressly declared for the sake of greater perspicuity

1 Manu, Ch. III. 42

2. See *Bâṭamihatti* p. 14.

3 Ch. XXVIII-22

4 Cf. *Yājñavalkya* II. 117 p. 1002 (above).

Vîramitrodāya

Now the Author mentions the partition when the father is dead.

Yājñavalkya, Verse 117

5 *Pitroh*, 'of the parents' i. e., of the mother and the father, *rktham*,
'assets,' *rnam cha*, 'debt also,' *îrdhwam*, 'after them,' i. e., after the death
of the parents, *sutâh*, 'sons,' i. e., the issue *Samân vibhajeyuh*, 'should
divide equally'

10 *Mâtur*, 'of the mother,' the wealth, her *duhitaro*, 'daughters' also,
equally with the brothers, if a residue remains over after the discharge
of the mother's debts, then they should take The debts, the sons
alone should pay

15 *Dulutrâmrte*, 'in default of daughters,' i. e., in the absence of dau-
ghters, the daughter's sons, should get the share which would have been
obtained by their mother So says **Manu**¹ "But when the mother has
"died, all the uterine brothers and the uterine sisters shall equally divide
"the mother's estate. To the daughters of those (daughters), to those
"even according to proportion" "Should divide the property," is what
follows In the text of **Nârada** "Of the mother, the daughters, in the
"absence of daughters, the right for an equal share is of the maidens
20 "only." That has been stated by **Brahmaspati**² "*Strîdhana* shall belong
"to the children, the daughter also will be a sharer in it, if she be not in
"coverture, the married, however, gets just a trifle as a mark of honour."
'To the children,' i. e., to the sons. 'In coverture' i. e., married, 'as
a mark of honour' i. e., resulting as an indication of simply res-
25 pectful regard 'A trifle' such as a cloth &c **Gautama**³ "The
"*strîdhana* property goes to the daughters unmarried, and (failing them)
"to the unendowed" "'Unendowed' means childless, unlucky, and
"having a poor husband," so says **Ratnâkara Manu**⁴ "Whatever may be
"the separate property of the mother, that is the share of the unmarried
30 "daughter." *Yautakam* 'separate property,' at the time of marriage,
received from the father and others **Vasistha**⁵ "Now the distribution
"of *dâya* among brothers And those women who have no children, for
"them, until after they bear sons," 'women' here has connection with
(the word) 'brothers' Similarly of a widow about whom there is an
35 expectation for a son, a share for a brother's wife should be constituted.

1 Oh IX 192, 193

2 XXV 85

3 XXVIII 22

4, IX 139

5 XXVII 40-41

On a son being born to her that share shall belong to the son. Upon a certainty of the absence of a son, however that portion should be taken by the husband's brothers and the like.

After the father says Brhaspati¹ "In his absence however the
 "mother shall take an equal (share) to that of a son. The mothers shall
 "take equal shares with these, and the maidens a fourth part. Mother
 : c., one having sons. Mothers : c. the step-mothers without sons.
 These are all entitled to a share equal to a son's. Of these the sister
 : c., the unmarried daughter (of the father) becomes entitled to a
 fourth share in the father's property. This is the meaning. 5 10

Vyāsa 'The childless wives of the father however have been
 declared to be partakers of an equal share. (117)

Śūlapāṇi

The Author mentions partition after the father's death

Vājñavalkya Verse 117 15

When sons, all are of eminent qualities or of inferior qualifications
 then after the death of the mother and the father after making equal
 divisions of the father's property as also of the debts, should make the
 distribution.

What, moreover has been said by Manu² viz. "Of the eldest, the
 "twentieth (part) shall be the additional share" that has a reference to the
 youngest when of inferior qualifications. In the case of those with high
 qualifications, a prohibition for an additional share having been laid by
 himself viz. "There is no additional share from among (brothers)
 equally skilled in their occupations." 20 25

The property of the mother as may remain after discharging the
 debts the daughters should make equal (divisions) and take. Gautama³
 states a special rule. The Śrīdhana is of the daughters unmarried as
 well as the unendowed." Unendowed i.e. although married the
 childless, the moneyless, the widowed, as also the unlucky. 30

In the absence of these the issue, i.e. the sons sons sons, and the
 rest. (117)

[Colebrooke Sect. IV]

[Effects not liable to partition.]

(1) The Author mentions things not liable to partition

Yājñavalkya, Verses 118, 119

5 Without detriment to the paternal estate whatever else is acquired by a man himself, as a present from a friend, as also a nuptial present, shall not belong to the co-heirs (118)

10 Nor shall he, who recovers hereditary property which had been taken away, give it up to (his) co-parceners, nor also what was gained by learning (119)

Mitākṣharā --(2) Pitṛdravyâwirodhena, *without detriment to the estate of the father or the mother*, yat swayamarjitam, *that which is acquired by a man himself*, maitram, *a present from a friend*, i. e., obtained from a friend, audwâhikam, *a nuptial present*, i. e.,
15 obtained at the marriage, tat na bhavet, *that shall not belong*, dâyâdânâm, *to the co-parceners*, i. e., the brothers Any property, whatever, which had descended in succession, kramât, *from paternal ancestors*, hrtam and, *had been taken away* by others, and through inability or any other cause, had remained unrecovered by the
20 father and the rest, he among the sons, who recovers it with the consent of the rest, tad dâyâdebhyo na dadyât, *shall not give up to (his) co-parceners*, i. e., to the brothers or the rest, the recoveror alone shall take it (3) Here, if it be land, the recoverer takes the fourth part, but the remainder, however, belongs to all equally as says Śankha "If one alone
25 "recovers land (inherited) in regular succession and which had been "formerly lost, having first given him a fourth part, the rest¹ may

1 Including the acquirer himself—Bâlabhattachâri

The rule here stated "was intended to apply strictly to hereditary property of which the members of the family had been violently or wrongfully dispossessed or adversely kept out of possession, for a length of time — "Property unjustly detained which could not be recovered before" is the import of Manu IX 209," *Viśalatchy vs Ammasami*, 5 Mad H O R 150 at 157 See also West and Buhler on Hindu Law, p 71 (3rd Edn) Accordingly it was held, in *Bayaba vs Trimbal*, 34 Bom 106, where certain family property was allotted to a member of one branch of the family in virtue of a compromise and the same was purchased by a member of another branch with his own money not forming part of the joint family property, that the rule stated in the text here did not apply to such a case.

divide the remainder according to their proper shares. (4) In the expression, "In regular succession" the word "inherited" is understood (5) Likewise yallabdhām what ca gamed vidyaya, by leir ung i.e., by the study of the Vedas or by teaching or by expounding the meaning of the Vedas that also he need not give up to his co-parceners, but the acquirer himself should alone take

(6) Here, moreover the expression "without detriment to the paternal estate whatever else is acquired by a man himself" must be everywhere understood Without detriment to the paternal estate what was obtained from a friend without affecting the paternal estate what was obtained as a nuptial present without expenditure of ancestral property what was recovered of the hereditary property without use of the paternal wealth what is gained by learning and thus it is to be connected with each member of the sentence in this manner And hence, at the charge of the patrimony what is obtained from a friend as the return of an obligation conferred what is received as a nuptial present at a marriage concluded in the Ānava² form or the like, and what is recovered of the hereditary estate by the expenditure of paternal wealth, and what is gained by learning acquired at the expense of ancestral wealth, all that must be shared in by all the brethren and also by the father (7) Moreover³ from the very fact that the clause "without detriment to the paternal estate is in every

1 i.e. with all, सर्वत्र i.e., must be taken by implication to be predicated of each kind of individual acquisition enumerated immediately farther on

* At the Ānava form of marriage receipt of money by the father or his kinsmen from the bridegroom is the principal feature

3 The reading here adopted is in accord with that of the Sabdhām (see Collections Vol. II, p. 80 ll. 7-10). The commentator says that as these acquisitions (viz., friendly gifts &c.) made at the charge of the patrimony are liable to be shared, so anything obtained as a mere gift, pure and simple, and not being included among these acquisitions must be subject to partition though procured without the use of the paternal goods

The author of the Balamāhātī gives another reading of , न तथैव (na tathā-) "not thus" and according to this reading donations pure and simple will be excluded from the common partible property Even there, the Author notices the reading given and adopted in the text here (See Balamāhātī, Sk p. 144 ll. 10-20) अविच्छिन्नं वा

place understood, even what is obtained as a gift,¹ without waste of the patrimony, is liable to partition. But, if that were not understood with every member of the text, it (i.e., the text) need not have commenced by specifying "gifts from friends," "nuptial presents" and other similar acquisitions
 5 Page 80.

(8) It may be urged that the enumeration of friendly gifts and similar acquisitions is pertinent, as showing that gains are exempt from partition, even though
 An Objection obtained at the expense of the patrimony. To this the reply is.
 The Answer Were it so, it would be inconsistent with well-established usage,² and also would contradict the text of Nārada³ in regard to gains of science, viz., "He, who maintains the family of a brother while he was acquiring learning,⁴ shall take
 15 "a share in the gains of learning, be he ever so ignorant (himself)." Moreover, the definition of wealth, not participatable, as being acquired by learning is propounded by Kātyāyana⁵ thus "that wealth

1 प्रतिग्रह (Prati-graha)—is a gift pure and simple

2 समाचार—शिष्टाचार "the received practice of unerring persons" Colebrooke

3 Ch XIII 10

4 विद्यामधिगच्छत—अधिगम् is to acquire—a free translation would be—while he was receiving education. The meaning is that such knowledge would not be knowledge acquired exclusively by the acquirer alone, but jointly with the help of a brother who took care of his family. And this is a fair rule.

5 This definition of Kātyāyana is not exhaustive. See *Durga Dut Joshi vs Ganesb*, 32 All 305 at p 312 and also observations in Ghose's *Hindu Law*, Second Ed p 520-521. The result of the rulings on this text is—that the fruits of an ordinary elementary education could not be regarded as the gains of science acquired at the expense of ancestral wealth. *Metharam vs Revachand*, 20 Bom L R 566, 45 I A 41.

See *Pauker Valar Chetty vs Surya Chetty*, 1 Mad 262 s c 4 I A 109-118. *Lachmin Kuar vs Debi Prasad*, 20 All 435 approving *Lakshman vs Jannabai* 6 Bom 225 and *Krishnay vs Moro* 15 Bom 32.

The detriment to the paternal wealth must be of an appreciable character, the mere fact that some patrimonial wealth was used for some time will not convert self-acquisition into a joint property. *Bachcho Kunnear vs Dharma Das*, 28 All 347.

Gains of prostitution were held to be self-acquisition. *Boologam vs Suorman*, 4 Mad 330. A Vakil's gains were also held to be his self-acquisition. *Durvasalu Gandharudhu vs D Narasammah*, 7 Mad 47. See also *Dhanukdaree Lall vs Ganpat Lal* 10 Cal 122 and *Bhagirathi vs Sadashiv*, Bom H O P J (1880) page 126.

"which is gained by means of learning acquired from another with the
 "help of maintenance received from strangers is termed acquisition
 "through learning" (9) Moreover, if the expression "without
 "detriment to the paternal estate be taken as a separate clause any
 thing obtained by gift will be exempt from partition contrary to
 established usage (10) This very thing has been made clear by
 Mann's: "What one acquires by his labour without using the patri-
 "mony, he need not give up to the co-heirs nor what he has gained
 by science" (11) *by his war*—by service war or the like

(12) Indeed it is unnecessary to declare that effects obtained

as presents from friends and similar acquisitions
 made without using the patrimony are exempt
 from partition, since there was no rule directing a partition (of these).
 It is a well known rule that what is acquired by one belongs to him only
 and to no other person. While a prohibition (necessarily) implies a
 possible supposition of the contrary

(13) Here a certain writer suggests the existence of a previous
 supposition thus: "Whatever property the eldest acquires after the
 "father's death, a share of that belongs to the younger brothers, pro-
 "vided they have duly preserved learning" by interpreting this text
 to mean—that if the eldest, youngest, or middlemost (acquire property)
 whether after the death of the father or when he is not dead (a share
 shall accrue) to the rest whether younger or elder grounds do exist
 for inferring a supposition that gifts from friends and the like are
 liable to partition, whether the father be alive or dead and so this is
 prohibited.

(14) The argument is erroneous. Here there is no prohibition

The answer of anything arising by inference but an explana-
 tory repetition of what was demonstratively true

1 Ch. IX 209 Lord Sumner has summed up the entire case law in *Colebrook v. H. Inwood* 48 T. A. 10. See Act XXX 1920 under which all will acquittions have been made indivisible. The Act is according to B. (1), retrospective effect—*or things*—are things previously known or assumed as established.

2 Of Mann Ch. IX "61

3 *Id.*, the rule which may be set up as arising from inference or implications

4 *उपनिषद्*—An explanatory repetition of or reference to what is already mentioned.

for most of the texts in this chapter are merely¹ repetitions of what is already well-known to the world

(15) Or you may be satisfied with considering this as an exception to what is suggested by the text² “All the brethren shall be
5 “equal sharers of that which has been acquired by them in concert” And it is therefore a mere error to deduce such a suggestion from the word “eldest” and the like in the text³ before cited *viz* “What-
“ever property the eldest acquires after the father’s death &c.” Therefore this passage must be interpreted as an exception to the
10 general doctrine, deduced from texts concerning gifts from friends and the rest *viz* that they are exempt⁴ from partition, both before the father’s death and after his demise

(16) So, other things exempt from partition have also been enumerated by Manu⁵. “Clothes, a vehicle, an ornament, cooked food,
15 “water, and women, (property intended for acts which help) the “acquisition⁶ and preservation of property, as well as the common “way, are declared not liable to partition” (17) The indivisibility attaches only to *clothes* which are not worn What is worn by each person belongs exclusively to him. As to what was worn by the
20 father, these should be given by the brethren partitioning after (the death of) the father, to the Brâhmana who partakes of the food at his obsequies : As says Brâhaspati⁸, “The clothes, ornaments, bed, and “similar articles belonging to the father, as also his vehicle and the

1 लोकसिद्धस्यैव अनुवादकान्येव—Bâlabhattacha thus explains the two *एव* —“The first excludes the suggestion that it was established by the rule of Śâstra, and the second excludes the suggestion of a prohibition”

2 Of Brâhaspati Ch XXV 14 —Bâlabhattacha

3 : : , the text of Manu IX. 204, cited above, at p 1011

4 There is a mistake in the print of the Sanskrit on page 80 l 16 Instead of वा विभाज्यत्वेन read वाऽविभाज्यत्वेन

5 Ch IX, 219

6 योग is the acquisition of something not in the possession of the owner (अप्राप्तस्य प्रापणम्), and क्षेम is the preservation of that which has been acquired (प्राप्तस्य रक्षणम्) As sacrifices and other pious acts further such acquisitions and preservations, Colebrooke has translated the expression as sacrifices and pious acts This term has been explained by Vyāñāśvara himself further on (see p 1014 ll 9-25)

7 Eāśement *Shantaram Ballarishna vs Waman Gopal*, 47 Bom 389

8 Ch XXV 85

like should be given, after honoring him¹ with fragrant drugs and flowers, to the person who partakes of the funeral repast. But new clothes are indeed subject to distribution.

(18) And of the means of conveyance such as horses, litter and the like. Here also, that on which each person rides belongs exclusively to him. As for the father's (it should be disposed of) similarly as the clothes. If the horses and the like be numerous they must be distributed among each one who live by the side of them. If there cannot be a division on account of the unevenness of the number, they belong to the eldest. (17) The text of Manu² "Let him never divide a single goat or sheep, or a single beast with undivided hoofs. A single goat or sheep if it has been prescribed, belongs exclusively to the eldest." (19) As to ornaments also, that which was worn by each person is exclusively his. What was not worn is common and is indeed liable to partition. "Such ornaments as are worn by women during the lifetime of their husband the heirs (of the husband) should not divide among them, lest those who divide become degraded." By specifying particularly "such ornaments as are worn" it appears that those which are not worn are liable to a division. (20) *Colated food*—such as mixed rice, sweet cakes and the like—that also is exempted from partition (and) should be consumed according as circumstances allow. (21) *Water*—i.e., a reservoir of water such as a well and the like. And that being uneven³ must not be divided by regard to its value but is to be enjoyed by turns.⁴ (22) *Women*, i.e., *Dina* when uneven must not be divided by (regard to) the value but should be made to work by turns.

1. Colebrooke translates them. Meaning that the worship with fragrant drugs and flowers is to be offered to the things given and not to the person to whom they are given. It is latter that the worship is taken to be offered to the recipient of the things than to the things themselves.

2. Ch. IX 119.

3. Kulluka and other commentators of Manu add that not even the price of such is divisible. *अथैव न विभक्तं नु अथैव न विभक्तं नु अथैव न विभक्तं नु*.

4. Manu IX 300.

5. *विषम* Incommensurate. Indivisible in equal parts would give an accurate idea.

6. See *Geri* vs *Trimbh* 36 Bom. 473-477.

But women kept¹ in concubinage (by the father), such as adulteresses² and others, although even in number, must not be shared by the sons, *vide* the text of Gautama³ "Nor shall there be a partition of women connected (with the father or other members of the family)."

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*Page 81

(23) The term *Yogakṣhema* is a conjunctive compound word made of (the two words) *Yoga* and

Kṣhema. By the word *Yoga* is signified a cause of obtaining something not already obtained—i.e., a sacrificial⁴ act to be performed with fire consecrated according to (the rules of) *S'ruti* and *Smṛti*

10

By the term *Kṣhema* is denoted an auspicious act which becomes the means of conservation of what has been obtained, such as the giving of alms elsewhere⁵ than at the altar, or the making of a tank, or a garden and the like. Both these, though ancestral, or though accomplished at the charge of the patrimony, are indivisible as *Laugākṣhi*

15

declares: "The learned have named a conservatory act *Kṣhema*, "and a sacrificial one *Yoga*; and both these are pronounced indivisible, "as also the bed and the seat"⁶ (24) Some hold, that by the compound

term *Yogakṣhema*, those who effect sacrificial and conservancy acts are intended e.g. the king's counsellors, the stipendiary priests, and the

20

rest. Others say, parasols, cow-tails, weapons, shoes, and similar things, are meant. (25) *The Common way*, or road of ingress and egress to and from the house, garden, or the like, is also indivisible. (26) As to the exclusion of land from partition as stated by *Uśanas* (in the text) "sacrificial gains, land, written documents, prepared food, water,

22

1 अवरुद्धा—This term occurs later on at II-290 and *Vijñānesvara* explains it thus "A female slave kept in the house and restrained from having intercourse with other men as a safeguard against any breach in the service" दास्य स्वामिना शुश्रूषाहानिन्युदासार्थं गृह एव स्यात्स्वामित्वेव पुरुषान्तरभोगतो निरुद्धा अवरुद्धा. Also see *Mst. Haidari* vs *Narindra*, 1 Luck 184, and *Bar Monghibar* vs *Bar Nagubar*, 53 I A 153

2 स्त्रैरिष्याद्या See *Nārada* Ch XII 49-53

3 Ch XXVIII, 47

4 योगक्षेम—योग is obtaining something not secured (अप्राप्तस्य प्रापणम्), and क्षेम is the preservation of that which has been secured (प्राप्तस्य परिरक्षणम्)

इष्टपूर्त—The two kinds of acts which are the means of acquisition and preservation are called इष्ट and पूर्त and are thus defined

इष्ट—अग्निहोत्रं तप सत्य वेदानां चैव पालनम् । आतिथ्य वैश्वदेवश्च इष्टमित्याभिधीयते ॥

पूर्त—वापीकूपतडागादिदेवतायतनानि च । अन्नप्रदानमाराम पूर्तमित्याभिधीयते ॥

5 वह्निर्वह्निदानम् "Erecting an outer sacred wall" would also be another way of translating it and may suit the context

6 आसनम् —Colebrooke translates it as "chair"

"and women are indivisible among kinsmen even to the thousandth degree" that has a reference to sons of a *Pellissary* woman of the *A. 1700 17 17* or other caste. The text "and obtained by accept-
"ance of donation must not be given to the son of a *A. 1700 17 17* or of
"any other wife of an inferior tribe even if the father gave to such
"son on his death, the son of the *Pellissary* wife may retain it."
(27) *Samskara* is acquired by a *Scouting* at religious ceremonial
performances. (28) What is obtained through the father's favour
will be subsequently declared exempt from partition. The suppo-
sition, that any thing acquired by transgression, restrictions regarding
the mode of acquisition is indivisible has been already refuted.
(29) It is (thus) settled that what ever is acquired at the charge of
the patrimony is subject to partition. But in such a case the acquirer
shall have a double share under the text of *Vasishtha*. "And if any
one among them, has made himself alone an acquisition, he may
"take a double portion of it."

Viramitrodaya

Now the Author states property which is not liable to partition

Yājñavalkya Verses 118, 119

Without detriment to or without spending the property of the parents
what property otherwise is such as by trading in merchandise and like
means has been acquired by himself what moreover was received as a
friendly gift or obtained from a friend and also as *1700 17 17* nuptial
is obtained at a marriage that is not liable for distribution among
other *1700 17 17* co-parceners. Even property which had descended
in succession from the ancestors such as the father grandfather &c.
and having been taken away by others and was not recovered by the
father &c., owing to incapacity, the one who recovers by his own capacity
such property he should not give to the co-parceners. That has been
declared by *Kātyāyana*. With the help of maintenance preferred by

1 Of *Bhāṣṇa* Ch. XXV 30—*Bhāṣṇa*

"*1700 17 17* (c. 1700 17 17) by causing a sacrifice to be performed by another

2 II 123 (1) 4 See p. 147 II 2 etc 5 Ch. XVII 1

6 *1700 17 17* is then separating

7 In a recent case a special (half) share was given to a minor in view of his
important services to the family. *1700 17 17* vs *1700 17 17* (1175) Mad 410

“strangers when the learning was acquired elsewhere, wealth obtained on
“account of such learning is termed acquisition through learning.” Here
also, according to *Prakāśa*, the basis of indivisibility is the absence of any
connection with the paternal estate, that is not proper, because the
5 fault of uselessness would arise by the separate mention.

This, moreover, is not liable to partition when (his) family is not
maintained by the co-parceners during the period of the acquisition
of learning by him, if not, it is certainly divisible, vide this text of
*Kātyâyana*¹. “He, who maintains the family of a brother while he was
10 “acquiring learning, shall take a share in the gains of learning, be he
“ever so ignorant (himself)”.

By the use of the first *cha* is indicated what was obtained respect-
fully at the time of the *Madhuparka* (reception) as stated by *Manu*
By the use of the word *cha* a second time, however, are added “What
15 “was given by the grandfather, or by the father out of affection, that
“should not be taken away from him, as also that which may have been
“given by the mother”, as stated in this text of *Vyâsa*, as also that which
the Author will state hereafter By the use of the word *eva*, ‘only’, twice,
are excluded (both those kinds) by regard to their having no connection
20 with the paternal wealth By the use of the word *tu*, ‘however’, the co-
operation of any other co-parcener in the recovery is excluded (118,119)

Sūlapāṇi

The Author mentions property not liable to partition

Yājñavalkya, Verse 118

25 Without injury to the paternal estate, by husbandry and like other
means, what has been acquired elsewhere, acquired through friendship, or
received at marriage, that is not capable of distribution among the
sharers (118)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 119

30 Property descended from the father, grand-father &c, and lost by
the father through the absence of strength, he who recovers it back, need
not give it back to the sharers if he is unwilling Similarly what is
gained through learning he should also not give *Kātyâyana* mentions
gains of learning “With maintenance offered by another, when a
35 “man acquires learning, what is obtained in due course with this, that is
“called gains of learning” (119)

(30) The Author propounds an exception to this rule

Yājñavalkya Verse 120 (1)

But if the Common stock be improved, an equal division is ordained.

Mitākṣharā —(31) Among unseparated brethren, *samanyarthasya*, if the common stock *samutthane* be improved : *e.* augmented by any one of them through agriculture, commerce or similar means, an equal distribution nevertheless takes place, and a double share is not allotted to the acquirer

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Viramītrodaya

To this the Author mentions an exception

10

Yājñavalkya, Verse 120 (1)

In the money-earning business carried on by all the brothers together in common however such as in the form of agriculture trading in merchandise &c., all have an equal share By the use of the word *tu*, however the Author discriminates the indivisibility in the case of acquisitions made without the use of the paternal wealth. 120 (1).

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[*Colebrooke*, Sect. V]

[Equal rights of father and son in ancestral property]

(1) The distribution of the paternal estate among sons has been shown. The Author next propounds a special rule concerning the division of the grandfather's effects by grandsons

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Yājñavalkya Verse 120 (2)

Among claimants by different fathers the allotment of shares shall be by regard to the fathers.

Mitākṣharā —(2) Although grandsons have by birth a right of ownership in the grandfather's estate equally¹ with sons, still the distribution of the grandfather's property must only be adjusted² through their fathers and not with reference to themselves. The meaning here expressed is this when unseparated brothers die,

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1 *अविशिष्टम्*—Without any discrimination or distinction

2 *विशुद्धम्*—*i.e.* by regard to their father through whom they are connected with the remoter ancestor or with the family generally *द्वारम्*—means a door—medium³

leaving¹ male issue and one has two sons, another has three sons and a third has four sons, and thus the number of sons (of these) is unequal, then the two receive a single share which appertained to their father, the other three also take a single share appertaining to their father, and the (last) four also obtain one share due to their father. So, if some of the sons be living and some have died leaving male issue, the same method should be observed, the surviving sons take their own allotments, and the sons of their deceased brothers receive the shares of their own fathers respectively. Such is the adjustment prescribed² by the texts (120)

Vîramitrodaya

Now in the grandfather's property the Author mentions the share of the grandsons through different fathers.

Yājñavalkya, Verse 120 (2)

Where one has one son, another has four sons, there, two allotments should be made, and of these one share should be taken by (one who is) the only son of his father, while by all the four sons of the other together should be taken the other share. By the use of the word *tu*, 'however,' it discriminates the shares for the grandsons by their number 120 (2)

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 120

When, of the common stock, there occurs an increase by means of agriculture, trade in merchandise &c, then the distribution shall be equal. In such a case the apportionment of an additional share should not be made on the consideration that 'he has brought in much more', or the like. This is in regard to the unlearned, so says Manu³ "If the property belonging to those all of whom are unlearned be acquired by agriculture

1 Lit after procreating sons

2 i.e., This is the meaning of the text when the claimants are removed by more than one degree from the common ancestor, the division shall be by reference to the root of each group, and not by regard to the several individual claimants themselves. In other words the distribution will be *per stirpes* and not *per Capita*.

This text has been referred to in several cases, see *Gangu vs Chandrabhagabai* 32 Bom at 284 *Kalgouda vs Somappa* 33 Bom at 681 *Debi Prasad vs Thakurlal* 1 All at p 111 *Appaji vs Ramchandra* 16 Bom at 33, 34.

3 Oh IX 205

In such a case the distribution shall be equal in the property which is not paternal; this is the rule Agriculture i.e., tilling the soil. Not "paternal" i.e. in the property other than that acquired by the father

Anekuparāda i.e., those who are the sons of different brothers of these, although they be even or odd in number (still,) when the grand-father's property is being distributed, whatever was the share of their father that alone would be (their share) and not that the determination of the share be distributively for each. (120)

(3) If the father be alive and separate (from the grandfather) or if he have no brothers, (it may be urged that) the

An objection anticipated.

grandson would not have a (right to) partition in the grandfather's estate since it has been

directed that if the father be deceased shares shall be allotted in the "right of the father", or admitting a partition to take place (it may be urged that) it should be made according to the pleasure of the father, like a distribution of his own acquisitions: to obviate this doubt, the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 121

Land which was acquired by the grandfather, a corrody and also chattels in these the ownership of the father and also of the son is the same.

Mītākphara (4) *Bhūh*, land, a rice-field or other ground *Nibandha* corrody: i.e., from each bundle of leaves so many leaves² similarly so many nuts from an orchard of areca³—as has been defined⁴ (before). Drawyam, chattels gold, silver &c

* Page 82

(5) Such as was acquired by the paternal grand

father, through acceptance of gifts, or by conquest or other means *faṭra pātāḥ putraya cha swamyam*, in these the ownership of the father and of the son, is universally known,⁵ and bearing this in mind

1 *पितृव्यं पितृव्यं द्रव्यं विभक्त्यै कर्तव्यं*—which Colebrooke translates as "a partition of the grand-father's estate with the grandson would not take place."

2 Colebrooke translates this as "from a plantation of bottle pepper" —But the original does not specify any kind of leaves. The general word *parṣa* (पर्षा) is used

3 *अमृताफलं*—The word *अमृत* is not conjoined to the areca tree alone

अमृतं अमृतं यदमृतं अमृतं अमृतं। फले कार्ष्णििकापात्रे पट्टिकासीमृत्पयोः ।।" —अमृतिके

4 i. in com. on Yājñavalkya Achārādhyāya I. 318 p. 580 II 4-7:

5 See Telang J: in *Appaji Narkar vs Ramchandra* 16 Bom 29 (F.B.) at p. 27 and Bargaonā O.J. at pp 33-34; also *Kieruppi vs Senjara Narayan* 27 Mad at p. 312

a partition takes place, for, *hi, i e*, since, the right is *sadr̥sam*, *the same*, *i. e.*, equal (or alike); therefore it is not that partition can be made only by the father's choice, nor is there a double share for the father (6) Hence also it is ordained by the preceding text, (II. 120) that

5 "The allotment of shares shall be by regard to the fathers", although the right be equal (7) The text (II 114) "when the father makes "a partition" relates to property acquired by the father himself So also the text¹ "Two shares let the father keep for himself, when making a partition" relates to self-acquisitions The dependence of

10 sons, as affirmed in the following passage² "While both parents live, "the control remains, even though he³ has arrived at old age", must relate to effects acquired by the father or mother Similarly the text⁴ "They⁴ are not masters, while their parents are living" (8) Thus, while the mother is capable⁵ of bearing more sons, and the father

15 retains his worldly desires, even when the father does not desire partition, a distribution of the grandfather's estate does nevertheless take place by the will of the son (9) So likewise, if the unseparated father is making a donation, or a sale, of effects inherited from the grandfather, the grandson has even the right of prohibition But if

20 the effects were acquired by the father, he has no right of prohibition, as he is dependent on him On the contrary he must give his consent (10) Consequently the difference is this although he has a right by birth in his father's and in his grandfather's property, still, since in regard to the father's property, he is dependent on his father and since the father

25 has a predominant interest as it was acquired by himself, the son must give his consent to the father's disposal of his own acquired property On the other hand, as regards the grandfather's estate, however, the

1 Of Nārada Ch XIII 12 See also Brhaspati XXV 5

2 Author unknown Mr Colebrooke in a note in his translation remarks that Bālabhātṭa assigns it to Manu, but it is not found in the Bālabhātṭa (see Collections, vol 6, p 152), nor in Manu

3 Colebrooke translates it as "though *they* have arrived at old age," meaning the parents, but the reading of the Mitâkṣharâ is जरयाऽपि समन्वित—"even though he has arrived at old age"—*i e*, the son

4. ["They have not power over it—the paternal estate—*i e*, while their parents live" must be referred to the same subject] Colebrooke Tr

5. सरजस्कायां मातरि—when the mother has the periods of menstruation

(right of) ownership of both is without a distinction, and (consequently) the right of prohibition also exists.¹ (11) By the text²— “If the father recover ancestral property not recovered by his co-heirs, he shall not, unless willing share it with his sons, for in fact it was acquired by him”—while laying down that if the father recovers property which had been acquired by an ancestor and taken by a stranger but not recovered back by the grandfather he need not himself share it, against his inclination, with his sons, just as is the case with his self-acquisitions even *Mānu* shows that the father how ever reluctant, must divide with his sons, at their pleasure the effects acquired by the paternal grandfather

Viramītrodaya

In regard to the ancestral wealth on a partition with the father the determination of the share is not at the pleasure of the father but for the father a double, and for the sons there shall be an equal share so the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 121

Bhuk ‘land or gold and other kind of property’ *nibandho* a corrody i.e. something settled on by the king such as a cess from a ferryman or the like this whatever was earned by the grandfather *lāra* ‘there of the father and of the son i.e. of both’ *ubhayaśā sadṛśam sadṛśyam* ‘the ownership shall be equal’ and not that the partition shall be by the father’s option alone This is the meaning

Indeed In property acquired by the grandfather, immovable “as well as movable an equal share has been declared for the father and for the son also” in this text of *Bṛhaspati*¹ (there would) an equal share in contradiction to the text of *Nārada* stated before But in the text of *Bṛhaspati* however the meaning only is that the right to partition for a share is equal and not the equality of shares also The word *eva* ‘also’, follows the word *sadṛśa* ‘equal’ By the use of the word *cha* ‘and’ the Author adds that in the property acquired by the great-grandfather, the great-grandson has also the right of ownership (121).

1 These passages were referred to in the following cases: *Datt Prasad vs Gunderi Rao* 2 Cal. 410 *Kalgaruda vs Somappa* 33 Bom. at p. 681 *Sital vs Madho* 1 All. at p. 307 *Muttayan Chetti vs Sringiri* 8 Mad. at p. 380

2 Ch. IX. 209

3 Ch. XXV 3

4 Ch. XIII. 1

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 121

Nibandha, 'a corrody', such as in the case of a mine &c granted by the King and the like as a fixed grant of gold, &c In regard to these, &c the land &c of the father and of the son, the right of ownership is equal, therefore, the partition shall be at the desire of the son, and the distribution also shall be equal. So Brhaspati¹ "In property acquired by the "grandfather, immovable as well as movable, an equal share has been "declared for the father and the son also" (121).

[Colebrooke Sect VI]

[Right of a posthumous son and of one born after partition]

(1) How shall a share be allotted to a son born subsequently to a partition of the Estate? Anticipating this question the Author replies

Yājñavalkya Verse 122 (1).

When the sons &c have been separated, a son who is (afterwards) born of a woman of the same Varna (class) shares the distribution

Mitākṣharā:—(2) *Vibhakteṣhu*, among the sons² being separated, one born afterwards, *savarnâyām*, of a wife equal in class, *vibhâgabhâk*, shall share the distribution. What is distributed, is a distribution. The distribution is of the allotments of the father and mother. He shares that, and so he is a *Vibhâgabhâk* (one who is entitled to a share in the distribution) In other words, he obtains, after (the demise of) his parents, both their portions. The mother's portion, however, only if there be no daughter, for it is declared³ that "Daughters share the

"residue of their mother's property, after payment of her debts" (3) Sons by a woman of a different tribe, however, receive merely their own proper share, from the father's estate. And as for the mother's property (they get) the whole of it

(4) The same rule is propounded by Manu⁴. "A son, born after "a division, shall take the parental wealth only". The term *parental*, *pitṛyam*, must here be interpreted as "appertaining to both father "and mother", for it is ordained⁵ that: "A son born before (partition), "has no claim on the wealth of his parents, nor one begotten after "it on that of his brother" (5) The meaning (of this text) is this:

1 Ch XXV 3 2 See Dular Koenig vs Dwarakanath Misser 32 cal at p 241

3 Yājñavalkya II 118 at p 1008 ll 5-6

4 Ch IX 216

5 By Brhaspati Ch XXV 18—Bālabhattacharya p 154

one born previously to the distribution of the estate has no property in the share allotted to his father and mother who are separated, nor is one born of parents separated,¹ a proprietor of his brother's allotment. (6) Thus whatever has been acquired by the father in the period subsequent to partition belongs entirely to the son born after separation. For it is so ordained:² "All the wealth which is 5
"acquired by the father himself who has made a partition with his
"sons, goes to the son begotten by him after the partition; those
"born before it, are declared to have no right" (7) As for those how-
ever who re-united themselves with the father after partition the 10
son born after partition should share with these the goods of the
father after his death, as directed by Manu³ "Or if there are any who
"are re-united with him, he shall share with these"⁴ (1)

*PAGE 83

(8) When the sons have made a partition subsequently to the death of the father, how shall a share be allotted to one born 15
afterwards? Anticipating this question the Author says

Yājñavalkya. Verso 122 (2)

His allotment must be made only⁵ out of the visible estate corrected for income and expenditure.

Mitākṣhara —(9) A share allotted for one who is born after a 20
separation of the brethren, which took place subsequently to the death
of the father, at a time when the mother's pregnancy was not manifest,
is *tadvibhagah*, his allotment⁶

(It may be asked) but whence shall it be taken? (So) the Author 25
replies *drīyāt*, out of the visible estate, taken by the brethren. Of what
sort? *Aya-vyaya vidodhāt*, corrected for income and expenditure. Aya

1 i e. from their elder children—*Ṣiṣambhaṭṭi*

2 By *Bṛhaspati* Ch. XXV 19—*Ṣiṣambhaṭṭi*

3 *Kalpaṇḍa* vs *Saṃpāṇa* 33 Dom. at 684; *Kṛishna* vs *Sami* 9 Man. I

4 Ch. IX 216

5 Colebrooke translates "His allotment must absolutely be made &c." and in a footnote explains it by a reference to *Satodhīni*. *Satodhīni* however only states that the allotment should be made *only* from the visible &c. (दृश्यं वा दृश्यं वा दृश्यं), premising this by explaining *ya* as being used in a restrictive sense (यस्यचरतः वा शरीरवत्तरे) —see *Satodhīni*, page 63, ll. 31-32

6 His allotment—*तद्विभागः* i e., the share of such a one born after partition.

income, is that which is produced daily, monthly, or annually Vyaya expenditure, is the liquidation of debts contracted by the father Out of the amount of property which has been corrected for such income and expenditure, a share should be taken and given as "his allotment."

5 (10) The meaning here expressed is this Including in the several¹ shares the income thence arisen, and subtracting the father's debts, a small portion should be taken from the remainder of each of the shares respectively, and an allotment equal to their own portions, should (thus) be formed for the son born after partition

10 (11) This must be understood to be likewise applicable to a nephew who is born, after separation, of a brother² who was childless at the time of partition, when the pregnancy of his widow was not manifest (12) But if the pregnancy be manifest the distribution should be made after awaiting (her) delivery As says Vasishtha³ "Now
15 "(follow the rules regarding) the partition of heritage among brethren. "And (let it be delayed) until those widows who are childless, (but are "pregnant) bear sons." This text should be interpreted thus⁴. "Until "the delivery of those widows who are pregnant" 122 (2)

1 प्रातिस्विकेषु भागेषु : e, in each distributive share प्रातिस्विक is the unit or basic quantity of a share

2 Bâlabhāṭṭa notices another reading (see p 1551 4), viz, "अप्रजति" which connects it with the wife of the brother—there would, however, be no difference in meaning

3 Ch XVII 40—41

4 Mr Colebrooke adds the following note to this passage "The most natural construction of the original text is "Partition of heritage is among brothers and women who are childless, until the birth of issue" The authors of the *Kalpataṛu* & *Chintâmanî* follow that interpretation and conclude that "a share should be set apart for the widow who is likely to have issue (being supposed pregnant) and when she is delivered, the share is assigned to her son, if she bear male issue, but if a son be not born, the share goes to the brethren, and the woman shall have a maintenance" The author of the *Smṛti-Chandrikâ* acknowledges that to be the natural construction of words, but rejects the consequent interpretation, because it contains a contradiction, and because widows are not entitled to participate as heirs He expounds the text nearly as it is explained in the *Mitâkṣharâ* viz, "Among brothers, who have continued to live together until the delivery of the childless but pregnant widow, partition of heritage takes place after the birth of the issue, when its sex is known, and does not take place immediately after the obsequies" *Viśveśvara-Bhāṭṭa* in the *Madana-Pâriyâta* exhibits a similar interpretation "Partition takes place after awaiting the delivery of widows who are evidently pregnant"

Viramitrodaya

Now the Author states the share of a son born after partition

Yājñavalkya Verse 122

Vibhakteshu 'after partition, by the sons thereafter, *savarādyam*
patnīnm jñāta suto 'a son born of a wife of the same varṇa: *vibhaga-* 5
bhuk, 'shares the distribution i.e. from the property distributed in the
partition among all the brothers excluding the partition added by
accretion and also what was spent in the remaining property he
becomes entitled to a share as may be properly due (to him).

If however the son born after partition be devoid of any qualifica- 10
tion then *apīyamānāt* 'only out of the visible estate, such as the cow
the buffalo &c. *dyuṣṭyāvarīṇodhātū* 'corrected for income and expendi-
ture of him: & the one born after partition *vibhagāt syāt* shall the
allotment be

If it be argued that under the text of Nārada 'when the mother 15
'has ceased to menstruate and the sisters have been married' when
there is a probability for (the appearance of) a brother a partition having
been prohibited in terms how can it be possible for a son to be born
after partition? To that the answer is the desire of the father prepon-
derating the text of Nārada is set aside, otherwise *there would be the* 20
faul of the text under consideration being with no object (for its appli-
cation). This text under consideration is in regard to one who at the
time of the partition was in the womb

In regard to one born of the womb which had conceived after the 25
partition Manu² says "A son, born after a division, shall take the
'wealth of the father only; or those who become re-united with him, he
'may have a distribution along with them. The meaning of the word
ad, or is that after the death of the father he shall take the father's
share from those who had re-united with the father

Bṛhaspati¹ 'In the case of those of the uterine brothers who have 30
made a partition with the father or those who are well provided—such
'of those who are born latest, shall take the father's share." Similarly —
'Whatever has been acquired by the father after he had separated from
'the sons, all that belongs to the son born after the partition those born
'before have been declared to be not entitled. As in the case of
'(inherited) property, so also as to debts as also in regard to donations 35
'pledges and sales, they are each not entitled excepting as to the
'exequial rites and watery oblations." (122).

Vīramitrodaya

In the clause as "also what was obtained by learning", with a view to point out the additional property implied in the word *cha*, 'as also', the Author states that one separated cannot obtain property
5 from a brother to whom it has come as an affectionate gift

Yājñavalkya, Verse 123

Pitr̥bhyām, 'by the parents', this (expression) is indicative of the paternal grandfather also.

At a partition after the death of the father, not only that the
10 brothers are entitled to a share, but their mothers also, and also the step-mothers—the co-wives (of the father), so the Author says, *Pituh*, 'of the father,' *ūrdhvam*, 'after' i.e. after the death By the word *api*, 'also', are included the step-mothers (123)

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 123

By the mother and the father whatever has been given to their son, daughter, and the rest, such as an ornament &c that belongs to him alone even after the death of the father, that should not be distributed

After the death of the father, when the sons make a partition, the
20 mother also shall take a share equal to that of the son So following the rule as to a sonless man, says Brhaspati¹ "In his absence, however, the "mother gets a share equal to those of the sons" Vyāsa states a special rule "The sonless wives of the father have been declared to be entitled
25 "to an equal share, as also the grandmother, all these have been declared "to be equal to the mother" (123)

(3) If any of the brethren be uninitiated² when the father dies, (it may be asked) who is competent to complete³ their initiation? So the author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 124 (1).

30 The uninitiated (brothers), however, should be initiated by those brothers who have been initiated before

Mitākṣharā —(4) *Bhrātṛbhiḥ*, by the brethren, who make a partition after the death of the father, *asanskṛtāḥ*, the uninitiated, brothers *sanskāryāḥ*, should be initiated, at the charge of the common estate

1 Ch XXV 64

2 As to what is the meaning of initiation in the case of males and females see—*Sundarā* vs *Shiv Narayan* 32 Bom 81, at pages 86, 87—96 referring to and discussing the case in 27 Mad 206 See *Subbayya* vs *Ananta Ramayya* 53 Mad 84, where expenses for a daughter's marriage were allowed in a suit between a father and sons But marriage expenses of a male member cannot be allowed See *Ganesh* vs *Srinivas* 30 Bom L R 457

3 को अविज्ञिते को *Adhikṛyate*? Tr "who has the authority" (to perform the ceremonies of these)

(5) In regard to unmarried sisters, the Author states a special rule :

Yājñavalkya, Verse 124 (2).

And the sisters also, but by giving them, as an allotment the fourth part of his own share.¹

Mitākshara —(6) The meaning of the above passage (is this) Bhagwascha, and the sisters also who are not (already) married must be disposed of in marriage by the brethren. By doing what? By contributing a fourth² part of their own allotments.

* Page 84

Thus it appears, that daughters also participate after the death of their father. Here in saying "from his own share," the meaning is not that a fourth part shall be deducted out of the portions allotted to each brother and shall be so contributed but that the daughter of (a wife of) a particular caste shall be allowed to participate for a quarter of such a share as would be assignable to a son of the same caste as herself. The sense expressed is this if (c) the maiden be (the daughter of) a *Brāhmanu*, a fourth share becomes hers of so much as is (likely to be) the amount of an allotment for a son by a *Brāhmanu* wife.

(7) Thus, for example if a certain person had one wife viz., only a *Brāhmani*, and one son and one daughter then in such a case, the whole paternal estate should be divided into two parts, and one such part be subdivided into four and the quarter share being given to the girl the residue shall be taken by the son. When however there are two sons and one daughter the whole of the paternal estate should be divided

1 (1) Applying this text among others, the Calcutta High Court held in *Chavaman Sahu vs Gopi Sahu* 37 Cal. 1 that "It was competent to a Hindu widow governed by the Mitākshari Law to make a valid gift of a reasonable portion of the immovable property of her husband to her daughter on the occasion of the daughter's *gavana* ceremony (at which the marriage of the daughter would be completed and consummated) and that such a gift was binding on the reverendary heirs of her husband

Recently the Bombay High Court held in the Full Bench Case of *Jyotsnkarya vs Pankabai* 37 Bom. 251 at page 263 that this text did not justify the settlement of immovable property by an adopting widow in favour of her daughter attaining majority and assented to by the natural father of the adopted boy at the time of adoption,

into three parts, and one such part be sub-divided into four, and the quarter having been given to the daughter, the remainder shall be shared by the two sons. If, however, there be one son and two daughters, the father's property should be divided into thirds, and¹ one (of these) shares be severally sub-divided into quarters, and having given two (quarter) shares to the two daughters, the son shall take the entire residue. Thus should be applied the rule in the case of brothers and sisters of a like caste whether of an even or uneven number.

(8) When, however, there is one son of a *Brâhmanî* wife, and one daughter of a *Kshatriyâ* wife, then the paternal estate should be divided into seven parts, and the parts which would be assignable to the son of a *Kshatriyâ* wife should be divided into four parts, and having given such a fourth part to the daughter of a *Kshatriyâ* wife, the residue, the son of the *Brâhmanî* shall take. Or, if there be two sons of a *Brâhmanî* wife, and one daughter by a *Kshatriyâ* wife, the father's estate shall be divided into eleven parts, and from these, the three parts which would be assignable to a son by a *Kshatriyâ* wife should be divided into quarters, and having given such fourth part to the daughter of the *Kshatriyâ* wife, the entire residue, the two sons of the *Brâhmanî* wife shall equally divide and take. Thus the mode of distribution should be inferred in all cases of even or uneven number of brothers and sisters of different castes.

(9) Nor is it right to interpret the text "by giving the fourth part of his own share &c" as signifying giving money, sufficient for her marriage, by considering the word 'fourth' as having no special significance, as this would contradict the text of *Manu*³ "To the Maiden sisters, let the brothers give (portions) out of their own allotments respectively, each out of his own share a fourth part, those who refuse to give, shall become degraded" (10) The sense of this passage is as follows. Brothers of the *Brâhmana* and other tribes should give to their sisters of the *Brâhmana* and other tribes respectively portions out of their own allotments as prescribed (for them)

1 Mr Colebrooke has—"and two shares severally sub divided into quarters" As, however, the quantity of the distributive share allotted comes to be the same as given here, this variation in the reading does not make any difference.

2 अविवक्षया-विवक्षा is वस्तुमिच्छा—meaning, intention, purpose—It always signifies—a particular purpose. This is explained in Sanskrit by the significant word शक्ति: "power or force"

3, Oh IX—118.

having regard to their tribe—2 a, under the text¹ to be mentioned subsequently viz. “a *Brāhmana* should take four shares” &c., and should give to each a quarter out of their respective allotments. And it is not meant that a quarter should be given by deducting it from one's own share but that to each maiden should be given severally the quarter of a share ordained for (a son of) that particular class. The mode of adjusting the division when the castes are dissimilar as also when the number is uneven, has already been stated. And the allotment of such a share appears to be indispensably requisite, since the refusal of it is pronounced to be a sin in the text² “Those who refuse to give shall become degraded” 5

(11) If it be alleged, that here also, the mention of a quarter has no special significance and the allotment of property sufficient to defray the expenses of the nuptials is all that is meant to be expressed the answer is, no there is no support for the assertion that the allotment of a quarter of a share has no special significance in both³ the *Smṛtis* and moreover the withholding of it is pronounced to be a sin 15

(12) As for what is objected by some, that a sister who has many brothers would be greatly enriched if (it be understood that) the (text prescribing an) allotment of a fourth share were positively meant, and that a brother having many sisters would be entirely deprived of wealth,” such a conclusion already stands obviated by what has been said before. It is not here directed that a quarter shall be deducted out of the brother's own share and given to his sister whence any such consequence should arise. (13) Hence, the interpretation of *Medhātithi*, *Anahya*⁴ as well as of other writers is square and accurate, and not that of *Bhāruci*. (14) Therefore, after the death of the father a maiden is also entitled to a share. But if it be before, she obtains that only whatever it be, which her father gives since there is no special precept respecting this case. Thus all is unexceptionable. 20 25 30

1 Yājñavalkya II 125 p 1033 2 Of XI Manu 118 3 i e in text of Yājñavalkya & Manu.

4. Here there is a mistake in the print at p 84. l 27 for *अनाया* read *अनाय*. Colebrooke translates *अनाय* as ‘who has no compeer’ The Commentator of that name, however, is well known

Vîramitrodaya

In regard to a partition after the death of the father, the Author states another special rule

Yâjñavalkya, Verse 124

- 5 The brothers for whom the sacraments of initiation, marriage &c. have not been performed, should have the sacraments performed by the brothers on whom the rites have been performed.

- 10 *Bhaginyâscha*, 'the sisters also', *nijât*, 'of one's own', *ânśat* 'from the share', of the son in accordance to his share, *datwâ*, 'by giving', a share, *sanskâryâ*, 'should have the sacrament performed on them' By the first use of the word *tu*, 'however', is excluded any limitation as to the quantity of wealth for a ceremony, and by its use the second time, (is excluded) its absence

- 15 If the fourth of a share is not sufficient for the performance of the marriage ceremony of a sister, whatever is necessary for the marriage, so much wealth should be contributed by all in proportion to the property. "Of the unmarried damsels, they should perform the "ceremony (of marriage) according to the wealth," vide this text of *Viṣṇu*,¹ which has been included by the Author (124).

20

Sûlapâni

Yâjñavalkya, Verse 124

- 25 *Pûrasanskrutuh*, 'By the brothers of whom the sacraments had been performed', *piturûrdham*, 'after the (death of the) father', from the parental wealth also, 'the *uninitiated*' *asanskrutâh*, brothers, should have performed for them the rites such as the *jâtakarma* and the rest

- 30 *Bhaginyopi*, 'The sisters also', by giving a fourth part from one's own (share of the) property, with (the use of) that wealth itself, should have the ceremony of marriage performed for them *Brhaspati*¹ (in the text) "Their mothers shall get an equal share, and the daughters, the fourth of "a share", has stated a fourth of a share of the paternal estate, that also has been stated as for the purpose of a ceremony

- 35 When, however, a marriage is not possible with a fourth of a share *Devala* says "To the daughters also should be given wealth for their "marriage, of a son-less man, however, the daughter born according to "the law of the *Āryas*, shall take the wealth like a son." 'According to one's own wealth', so says *Vishnu*² "Of the unmarried daughters, the "ceremony should be performed according to the (magnitude of the) wealth" (124)

[Colebrooke Sect. VIII.]

[Shares of sons belonging to different tribes.]

(1) In this manner by the text¹ "If the father make a distribution &c." the mode of adjustment of a distribution among brothers of equal caste, whether made with each other or with their father, has been pronounced. The Author now describes the (mode of) partition among brethren dissimilar in class. 5

Yājñavalkya, Verse 125

* PAGE 85

The sons of a *Brāhmaṇa* (in the several tribes or *varṇas*) have four shares, or three, or two or one respectively according to the tribe (or *varṇas*) the children of a *Kṣatriya*² have three portions, or two, or one and those of a *Vaiśya*³ take two parts or one.⁴ 10

Mitākṣharā—(2) Under the text¹ "Three (wives) respectively according to the tribe of each &c." it has been pointed out that a *Brāhmaṇa* may have four wives, a *Kṣatriya* three, a *Vaiśya* two, and a *Śūdra* one. In such cases, (the expression) *Brahmaṇāmajaḥ*, the sons of a *Brāhmaṇa* means the sons begotten by a *Brāhmaṇa*. 15

(3) *Varṇajāḥ* according to the tribes or *varṇas* of each. By the word *varṇa* are indicated women of the different classes such as the *Brāhmaṇa*, and others. 20

The termination *Sas* (सः), subjoined to a noun in the singular number and locative⁵ (or other) case bears a distributive sense conformably with the grammatical rule⁶ viz.

"The affix *ias* (सः) comes optionally after crude forms denoting numbers and words denoting units of a coin in the singular number when a distributive sense is to be expressed and the word is a *Āśeṣa*"⁷ 25

1 Of Yājñavalkya II. 114 p. 994 before 2 is under similar circumstances.

3 This verse is the further development of the law as to intermarriage as laid down in verse 57 of the *Āchārādhyāya*. Mr Mandlik in a note to this passage observes—"Marriages with women of a dissimilar class have been prohibited in this *Āśeṣa* ago" and refers to *Nirṇayaśāstra* III. citing a text of *Nārada* "विप्रसमसंवाक्यं कर्मादसमसंवाक्यं" Tr "so also the marriage of a *daija* with a maiden of a dissimilar class." He observes in conclusion—"the text of Yājñavalkya has therefore no application now" 4 *Āchārādhyāya*, verse 57 p. 108 above

5 *अधिकरणकारक*—*Kāraka* (कारक) is the relation subsisting between a noun and a verb in a sentence or between a noun and other words governing it. There are six such *Āśeṣas* belonging to the first seven cases excepting the genitive viz., (1) उप (2) कर्म (3) कारण (4) संबन्ध (5) अवयव and (6) अधिकरण (for the locative).

6. — "संज्ञेकवचनस्य सौसप्तस्य" — *Pāṇini* 5-4-43 संज्ञा—words denoting numbers — that by which the sense of unit is expressed.

And hence, sons begotten by a *Brâhmana* (on women) in the several tribes, *shall respectively have four shares, or three, or two, or one, chatustridwyekabhâgâh syuh, i.e.* they shall be entitled to such shares

(4) The meaning here expressed is this. The sons begotten by a *Brâhmana* on a *Brâhmanî* take four shares apiece¹, similarly those begotten by him on a *Kshatriyâ* receive three shares each, on a *Vaisyâ*, two each, and on a *Sûdrâ* one each

(5) *Kshatrajâh, the children of a Kshatriya, i.e.* begotten by a *Kshatriya* on women of the several tribes — for that is here understood, — *tridwyekabhâgâh yathâkramam, have three shares, two, and one respectively,* in the order of their tribe *i.e.* the sons begotten by a *Kshatriya* upon a *Kshatriyâ* take three shares each, upon a *Vaisyâ* two each, and upon a *Sûdrâ* one each (6) *Vidjâh, those of a Vaisya, i.e.* begotten by a *Vaisya* — for here again the expression *Varnaśah* (respectively in the order of their tribes) is understood — have, respectively, two shares or one in the order of their tribes, *i.e.* those begotten by a *Vaisya* upon a *Vaisyâ*, take two shares apiece, and upon a *Sûdrâ*, one each (7) Since for a *Sûdra* one wife only is allowed² to him, he cannot have sons of a different class from his own, partition among his sons takes place in the same manner as has been mentioned before

(8) Although, the expression “shall have four shares, or three, or two, or one” has been used without any restriction, still, it must be understood to relate to (property) other than land obtained by the acceptance of a gift For it is declared³ “Land obtained by acceptance of donation, must not be given to the son of a *Kshatriyâ* or other wife of inferior tribe, even though their father give it to them, the son of a *Brâhmanî* may resume it when his father is dead”

1 The meaning here expressed may be thus illustrated Suppose a *Brâhmana* dies leaving behind him four sons born of wives of each class respectively Then his estate should be divided into 10 shares out of which

4	should be given to the son by the <i>Brâhmanî</i> wife
3	” ” ” ” <i>Kshatriyâ</i> ”
2	” ” ” ” <i>Vaisyâ</i> ”
1	” ” ” ” <i>Sûdrâ</i> ” and so on

2 Manu III 13 The text is अद्वैव भार्या अद्रस्य — “A *Sûdra* woman only must be the wife of a *Sûdra* man ”

3 By *Brhaspati*, Oh XXV 30 *Bâtambhatti*

(9) Since acceptance of donation¹ is here expressly stated land obtained by purchase or similar means appertains also to the sons born of a *Kṣatriya*,² or other inferior women. For the son by a *Śūdrā* woman is specially prohibited³ (in the text) "The son begotten on a *Śūdrā* woman by any man of a twice-born class is not entitled to a share of land."⁴ (10) Now, if land acquired by purchase and similar means did not belong to the sons of a *Kṣatriya* or *Vaiśya* wife, the special exception of a son by a *Śūdrā* woman would not be pertinent. (11) As for the text⁵ "The son of a *Brāhmaṇa Kṣatriya* or *Vaiśya* by a *Śūdrā* wife is not entitled to a share in the inheritance, whatever his father may give him, let that be his property"—that too relates to the case where something however inconsiderable has been given by the father in his life-time to his son by a *Śūdrā* woman. When, however no affectionate gift has been bestowed (on him by his father) he participates for a single share⁶. Thus there is nothing contradictory.

Vīramitrodaya

Now the Author mentions the shares of the brothers of different classes

Yājñavalkya Verse 125

Of a *Brāhmaṇa* the four sons born respectively of his four wives viz a *Brāhmaṇī* and the rest *chātusṭridvyekabhidgabhāyo* become entitled to four three two and one share (respectively). Of a *Kṣatriya* the three sons born of his three wives viz the *Kṣatriyā* and the rest, respectively are entitled to three, two and one share. Of a *Vaiśya*, however the sons born of a *Vaiśyā* and a *Śūdrā* wife are entitled to two and one share respectively this is the meaning.

This moreover, is in regard to property other than land received by the acceptance of a donation vide the text¹ "Land obtained by acceptance of a gift must never be given to the son of a *Kṣatriyā* or other (wife) even though their father may have given it to them, the son of a *Brāhmaṇī* may resume it after the death of the father

1 अङ्गिर—Is a prohibition and not a mere exception by omission

2 This also is a text of *Dharmapala* Ch XXV 3 —see *Bhambhatti* p. 160 l. 20 & *Dāyadhiga* Ch 9 p 22

3 Of *Manu* IX 165

4 Colebrooke adds in bracket (of the mortals). 5 Of *Dharmapala* XXV 30

As to the son of a Śūdrā wife, what has been stated in the rule as to one share for him, that applies in the case where he does not get what was given to him through affection by the father while living. Otherwise however, "The son of a Brāhmana, Kshatriya, or Vaiśya by a Śūdrā wife is not entitled to a share in the inheritance; whatever his father may give him, let that be his property." According to this text,¹ it should be understood that he is entitled to a share (125).

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 125

10 The sons procreated by a Brāhmana, upon his four wives such as a Brāhmani and the rest, shall take four, three, two and one shares respectively from the property after dividing it into ten parts. Those born to a Kshatriya upon his three wives, such as the Kshatriyâ and the rest, shall take three, two, and one respectively. This has an application
15 in regard to the married wives (125)

[Colebrooke Sect. IX]

[Distribution of effects discovered after partition]

(1) Something is here added respecting the residue after a general distribution of the estate. The Author directs the distribution
20 of property withheld by fraud of brothers &c

Yājñavalkya, Verse 126.

Effects which have been withheld by one co-heir from another, and which are discovered after the separation, let them again divide in equal shares, this is a settled rule

25 (2) Mitāksharâ — *Effects, drawyam, i.e.* the common property such as had been withheld by co-parceners from each other, and was also not known at the time of the general distribution of the estate, and vibhakte yaddrśyate, *such as have been discovered after the partition, of the patrimony, tatsamāih anīśaih vibhajeran, let them divide that in equal*
30 *shares, iti sthith, this* thus is the settled rule, *i.e.* the rule of the law.

(3) Here, by saying 'in equal shares', a partition with deductions has been forbidden. By saying 'let them divide,' it has been pointed out that the property is not to be taken exclusively alone by

the person by whom it was discovered (4) Thus, since the text is thus significant it does not imply that no offence is committed by embezzling the common property

(5) But (it is urged) Manu has indicated an offence only in the eldest, if he appropriate to himself the common property and not so on the part of the younger brothers? *Vide* the text! An eldest brother who from avarice "shall defraud his younger brothers shall no longer be honoured as the "eldest, shall be deprived of his additional share and be punished by the kings."

(6) (To this) The answer is, it is not so. For by pronouncing such conduct criminal in the case (even) of an elder brother, who is admittedly independent and is in a quasi parental position, it is more assuredly shown—under the rule in the maxim¹ of the loaf and the staff—to be (much more) criminal in the younger brothers, who are subject to the control of the eldest, and are held in tutelage as sons. And moreover such conduct has been declared to be an offence without exception in the *Śruti*² 'Him, indeed, who "deprives an heir of his right share he does certainly destroy, or, if "he destroy not him he destroys his son or else his grandson" (7) He who deprives an heir *i.e.* a person entitled to a share *i.e.* debars or excludes him from a share *i.e.* does not yield to him his proper

1 Chapter IX. 213 read in the text "लो-पेण"

2 *एवमपि कुर्यात्*—is the maxim of *the loaf and the staff* or *the stick and the cakes*! See note, on page 86 orig. San. kṛt—If a number of *cakes* are attached to a *staff* or *stick* and the stick is carried off or eaten by mice, it would not be expressly stated that the cakes have had the same fate—it is an inference which necessarily follows. This rule is the same as the *fortiori* reasoning of the West.

3 This is the quotation from the *Ātaryas Brāhmaṇa* II. (VI-7) in connection with that portion of the *Soma* sacrifice which deals with the animal sacrifice. The passage occurs in a discussion whether the *Īlik* *hairs* should have a portion at the sacrifice, one side suggesting that they should not be mentioned and must not have a share and the other side asserting that they *should* be mentioned, and as a reason in support of it is the text in the passage which in substance means that 'an unjustifiable deprivation of another's dues operates by reaction in his own life-time or in the generations following' (See *Anandāśrama Series* No. 32 Part I page 172 The discussion begins at p. 170; see also *Sāyana's Commentary*).

allotment, such a one who is thus debarred of his share, destroys or annihilates : *e* renders a criminal that person who so debars him of his right, or, if he do not immediately destroy him, he destroys his son or his grandson. (8) It is (thus) pronounced to be criminal in any person without any distinction as to the eldest (or youngest &c.) to withhold common property.

(9) If it is argued that blame is not incurred by one who takes the goods, thinking them (to be) his own, under the notion that the common property also becomes his

10 property and appertains also to him (individually). (10) The answer is, that is wrong For, though he took it thinking it (to be) his own, still he has taken the property of another person, contrary to the injunction which forbids his so doing,

The answer
and thus he certainly does incur blame (11) As¹, in answer to a proposed solution of a difficulty, "If an oblation of green kidney beans be not procurable," and black kidney beans be used in their stead by reason of the resemblance, the prohibition contained in the rule *viz* "black kidney beans are not fit to be used in sacrifices" does not apply, since they were used by mistake for ground particles of green kidney beans, it is on the contrary maintained, as the right opinion, that, "while the ground particles of green kidney beans be taken, the ground particles of black kidney beans are also actually employed as being unforbidden and the prohibitory command is consequently applicable in this case (by inference)" (12) Therefore
25 it is established, both from the letter of the law and from reasoning, that an offence is committed by taking common property.

1 The argument of the objector and the reply to it is sufficiently apparent from the text itself. According to the fixed rules of interpretation सादृश्य-*resemblance* is also a part : *e* अवयव of the thing itself. And the meaning here is that कृष्ण (the black kidney beans) having been prohibited generally, the prohibition extends to their सादृश्य also—which is a part of the *Mâṅṣa* itself and therefore, although mixed with other sorts, have to be avoided, and for this reason they must not be used as a substitute for the green ones. (See also Bālabhāṭṭi p 102 & Subodhini p 56)

Viramitrodaya

Thus even when a partition has taken place of the common stock everywhere, if any property has been taken away by any one in regard to that property no special right accrues to him individually as a distribution of that portion has not taken place; and so a fresh partition must be made of that property so the Author says 5

Yājñavalkya, Verse 126

Samah, 'in equal' i.e. equal to the share in the partition which had taken place before. The rest is clear (126).

Śālapāṇi

10

The Author mentions about a lapsed share.

Yājñavalkya Verse 126

What was kept concealed at the time of the partition, but was discovered afterwards, that should be made (into) equal (parts) and distributed. The meaning is that an additional share &c. should not be given to the eldest. This also holds in the case of a debt, so says Manu¹ "If after all the debts and assets have been duly distributed according to the rule, any property be discovered afterwards, one must "divide all that equally" (126). 15

[Colebrooke Sect. X.]

20

[Rights of the *Dvyaṁśhyāya*¹ or son of two fathers]

(1) Intending to propound a special allotment for the *Dvyaṁśhyāya* (or son of two fathers), the Author describes the nature of that relation —

Yājñavalkya Verse 127

25

By one who has no male issue, a son begotten on the soil of another man, under a legal appointment to both also, is such a one lawfully heir and giver of funeral oblations.

1 Oh. lx. 218

"As here described, the *Dvyaṁśhyāya* is restricted to one description of son viz. the *Kṣhetraja* or "son begotten on the wife"; but the term is applicable to any adopted son retaining his filial relation to his natural father along with his acquired relation to his adoptive father" Colebrooke See also *Basson* vs. *Lingayya* 19 Bom. 4-8 at pp. 454 and 472 (a case of Lingayya—based on custom), & *Mayne's Hindu Law* p. 178

Mitâkṣharâ —(2) Under the rule of the law contained in the text¹,
 “ To a sonless widow, one commanded by the *Guru* &c”, *aputreṇa*, by
 one who has no male issue, i e by the husband’s brother or the like,
parakṣhetre, on the soil of another, i e on the wife of another, *niyogotp-*
 5 *âditah*, son begotten under a legal appointment, from venerable persons,
ubhayoh, to both, i e the owner of the seed as well as that of the soil,
 he is *rikthi*, heir, i e successor to their estates and, *pindadâtâ*, giver of
 funeral oblations, *dharmatah*, according to law

(3) The meaning of this is as follows When the person who is
 10 duly appointed, such as the husband’s brother, or other person, and
 being even himself destitute of a male issue, proceeds to an intercourse
 with the wife of a childless man, for the sake of raising issue both to
 himself and for the other, the son, whom he so begets, is the child of
 two fathers and denominated *Dvyâmushyâyana* He is heir to both,
 15 and offers funeral oblations to both (after their death) (4) When
 however, the person appointed, has male issue, and has intercourse
 with the wife for the sake of raising up issue to her husband only, the
 child so begotten by him, is the son of the owner² of the wife, and
 not of the³ owner of the seed And, such a one by this restriction,
 20 is not heir of the owner of the seed, nor is he qualified to present
 funeral oblations to him, as has been so declared by *Manu*⁴, “Where by
 “a special compact a field is made over (to another) for (the sowing of)
 “the seed, then the owner of the seed as well as of the field are both
 “considered, in this world, as joint sharers of it (i e of the crop)”
 25 (5) *By special compact viz*, when the field is delivered by the owner
 of the soil to the owner of the seed, on an agreement in this form
 “Let the child which will be here produced, belong to us both,” then
 of the child begotten in that soil the owners of both the seed and the
 soil are considered by the mighty sages as joint sharers (6) So⁵.
 30 “If there be no special agreement with respect to the crop between
 “the owner of the field and the owner of the seed, the benefit clearly

1 i e of *Yājñavalkya* in *Achârâdhyâya* 68-70 p 187 above in which the husband’s brother, a sapinda, or a sagotra have been allowed to raise issue on the sonless widow of their deceased relative, and such a son is called the *Kṣhetraja* son

2 i e of the wife’s husband by marriage *Kṣhetra* (land) here means wife

3 i e creator

4 Ch IX-53

5 *Manu* Ch. IX-52

belongs to the owner of the field for "the receptacle is more important than the seed. (7) If there be no special agreement with respect to the crop" i.e. with a special agreement is "Let the child begotten here belong to us both" whichever child is begotten on another's ground that child verily is of the owner of the soil for the receptacle is more important than the seed; as is observed in the case of cows, mares, and the rest

* PAGE 87

(8) Even here however the appointment¹ for raising up issue is only in relation to a woman who had been betrothed since any other such appointment is forbidden by Manu.² For after premising an appointment thus "From a brother-in-law or from a *Sipahī* (i.e. means of a habitation with him) by a woman who has been duly authorized the desired offspring may be secured on failure of issue. The person, however so appointed to raise issue on the widow shall at night, anointed with clarified butter and silent beget one son (only), but never a second in any case" Manu³ has him self prohibited this practice: By "regenerate men, a widow must not be authorized to conceive by any other for any, who authorize her to conceive by another violate the primal law. The raising of an issue by appointment "is nowhere mentioned in the *mantras*⁴ regarding marriage nor is the re-marriage of widows mentioned in the rules concerning marriage. This practice which is reprehended by the learned *Dīkṣas* "as fit only for beasts, is referred to even in connection with men while King Vena held sovereign sway. He possessing the whole earth, and therefore eminent among saintly kings, formerly brought about a confusion of tribes when his intellect was infatuated

1 For Colebrooke translates "Communion" - See Balamhastī p. p. 160-168 where a dissent from this doctrine is noted and passages are cited showing that a father is free to dispose of his girl if after truth & duly plighted the husband die before the actual celebration of the marriage. In such a case she remains a damsel (*Kṛayā*) and may be disposed of by her father.

Ch. IX-260

3 Ch IX-61-69

4 i. hymns from the *Ieda* bearing on or chanted at nuptial rites.

5 A *Rajarshi* is a king who has all the characteristics of a saint. The compound is solved in Sanskrit to indicate "that he is a king as well as a saint.

“by lust. Since that time, whoever, through folly, appoints a woman
“whose husband is dead, to have intercourse for the sake of progeny,
“sages censure such a one”

- (9) Noi is an option¹ to be inferred from the contrast of precept
and prohibition, since they, who authorize the
5 An objection considered practice of appointment, are expressly censured
and disloyalty is strongly reprobated in speaking
of the duties of women, while continence is much praised As says
Manu²: “Better that she (the faithful wife) emaciate her body by
10 “living voluntarily on pure flowers, roots, and fruit; but let her not
“when her lord is deceased, even pronounce the name of another
“man”—By this text, having prohibited recourse to another man for
the sake of maintenance, Manu³ interdicts the recourse to another
man, even for the sake of progeny thus “Let her, until death, con-
15 “tinue patient (of all injuries), self-controlled and continent, and
“maintain before her vision that most incomparable rule of virtue,
“followed by women⁴ devoted to one husband only Many thousands
“of Brâhmanas, having avoided sensuality from their early youth,
“have gone to heaven (even) without continuing their race And
20 “like those Brahmachâris⁵ a virtuous wife, who, after the death of her
“husband settles herself in a uniform continent life, ascends to
“heaven, even though she has no son. But a woman who from a
“desire to have offspring violates her duty towards her (deceased)
“husband, brings on herself disgrace in this world and loses her
25 “place (with her husband) in the next world.” Therefore it is not

1 Mark the gloss of *Medhâtithi* on this verse He says that union with another man bad, but emaciating the body is also bad The text of Manu “Better that she emaciate the body &c” has an implied censure also for the emaciation of the body It only means that between the two evils the evil of emaciating the body may be preferred “कामशब्दप्रयोगोऽरुचिसंस्तनार्थम् । देहक्षपणमप्यकार्यम् । इदं त्वन्यदकार्यतरं यदन्तेन पुरुषेण सप्रयोगः” ।

2 Oh V 157

3 Oh V 158-161

4 एक पतिर्यस्या सा एरूपत्नी—vide the rule of Gr ‘नित्यं सपत्न्यादिषु’ (4-1-35) “In forming the feminine with the affix ङीप् (ङ) the word पति always takes the substitute न् in the words like ‘सपत्नी’ and the rest”

5. : e persons taking a lifelong vow of celibacy and living accordingly.

right to deduce an option¹ from the injunctions of affirmation and prohibition

(10) Thus *Atitaksharū* having been prohibited in the case of a wife sanctified by marriage, what then is a *Atitaksharū* sanctioned by law? so the (same) author says. The damsel whose husband shall die "after troth verbally plighted, the brother of the husband may take" 5
 "her according to the following rule: having espoused her in due form, she being clad in white garments, and pure in her conduct, let him privately approach her once in each proper season² until issue be had" 10

(11) It appears from this very passage, that he to whom a damsel was verily given, is her husband even without a formal acceptance on his part. If he die his own uterine brother whether elder or younger shall take her & marry her "In due form" i. e. as directed by the *Sūtra*: "having espoused her" i. e. wedded 15
 her and according to the following rule: namely the rule directing the besmearing of the body with clarified butter and the restraint in speech &c.—let him "privately" i. e. in secret approach her clad in a white robe and pure in her conduct" i. e. having a restraint on her mind speech and gesture once at each menstruation, until 20
 conception. (12) Such a marriage is nominal and a mere part of the

1 According to the rule of interpretation *तद्वत्तु* "when there are two contradictory texts an option is inferred." So the author says that no case for inferring an option arises on the ground that there are two injunctions of a contradictory character viz. one of affirmation and another of negation. An option (*विकल्प*) would arise if the two injunctions were of an equal character (*व्युत्पत्तिरिति*). But here while a censure is passed upon those who authorize such a practice none such is to be found in reference to those who forbid it. The *वैधर्म्य* (i. e. the affirmative injunction) and the *वैधर्म्य* (i. e. the injunction of a negative character) are therefore not equal, and therefore an option cannot be inferred (See *Ājām-bhāṣī* p. 165 ll. 6-10 *Bubodhini* Tr. p. 57 ll. 15-20).

2 *Atitaksharū*—is relating issue on the wife of a deceased person. See *Yājñ.* 1. 68-69 p. 187 Note 1 on page 1040 3 i. e. *Māna* Ch. IX 69-70

4 *विज्ञा*—"know her"

5 i. e. at each menstruation period.

6 The meaning is—that as the injunctions as to clarified butter and other observances are proscribed as mere forms in approaching an authorized widow so these espousals are a mere part of that intercourse and not a principal and substantive part, whence a regular marriage between the parties might be inferred. See Celebrooke citing *Ājām-bhāṣī* p. 167 & *Bubodhini* p. 57, ll. 23-2

form in which an authorized widow shall be approached, like the injunction of clarified butter &c It does not make her the wedded wife of her brother-in-law. (13) Therefore, the issue thus begotten belongs to the husband of the wife¹ and not to the brother-in-law By
5 special agreement, however, the issue may belong even to both.

Vîramitrodaya

Among the sons of the same *varna* or of different *varnas*, of twelve sorts such as the *Aurasa* and other sons, the Author mentions a partition among themselves, and in some cases a non division, but coupled
10 with (a right to) maintenance

Yājñavalkya, Verse 127

Parakshetre, 'on the soil of another', *aputrena*, 'by one who has no male issue', by the husband's brother, or by one of a different *gotra*, *niyogena*, 'under an appointment', by the elders, a son *utpâtita*, 'begotten', *ubhayaorâpi*, 'of both even', i e of the owner of the seed and of
15 the land also, becomes the heir entitled to take the entire heritage, and *pindâdâtâ*, 'the giver of funeral oblations' also, *dharmatah*, 'under the law,' i e. in accordance with the provisions of law

If to the owner of the seed, or to the owner of the soil, afterwards
20 an *aurasa* son be born of another wife, (then) according to the *Brahmapurâṇa* " *The Kshetrâya* son takes three parts, and *Putrikâsûta* "the fourth part " This is the meaning of the word *cha*, 'also' By the word *âpi*, 'also', is included the father by the seed, and of the soil (127)

Śûlapâni

25 Yājñavalkya, Verse 127

Niyoga 'appointment such as 'annointed' with clarified butter &c,' *Aputrena* 'by one who has no male issue', upon the wife of another, *niyogotpâtita* 'begotten under a legal appointment', *ubhayoh*, 'of both,' he is entitled to perform the funeral ceremony, as well as to take the
30 estate This is to be with the consent of both, so says Nârada² " With "the consent of the owner of the land he whose seed is sown in the land, "the issue of that is considered to be of both, of the owner of the seed and "of the soil " (127)

1 Lit Tr " owner of the soil " क्षेत्रस्वामिन् : e to the man who was her husband by marriage

2 Ch. XII. 58

[Colebrooke Sect. XI]

[Sons by birth and adoption.]

(1) A distribution of shares among sons, equal or unequal in class, has been explained. Next intending to show the rule of succession among sons principal and secondary, the Author first describes their characteristics—

Yājñavalkya Verses 128-132, 133 (1)

The *Aurasa* i. e. legitimate son is he who is procreated on a lawfully wedded wife equal to him is the son of an appointed daughter *Idriti sutah* A *hetvṛt* is one begotten on a wife by a *supra* relation of her husband or by another (128).

One secretly produced in the house is known as *śṛṅghaya* 'a secretly born son. A damsel's child *Aminī* is one born of an unmarried daughter and is considered as the son of the maternal grandfather (129).

A child born of a woman whose marriage had or had not been consummated, is called the son of a re-married woman *Pinurīthavath*. He, whom his mother or father may give (in adoption) shall be considered as the adopted son *Dattala*.

(130) A son bought, *Arta* is one sold by them. A son made by himself *Artrima* is one adopted by the man himself. One who gives himself is a son self given *Sacaymān*. One who was (along with his mother) accepted in marriage while he was in the womb is called a son received with the bride *Sahvithari*.

(131) He, who, having been deserted (by his parents) is taken (for adoption) is a deserted son *Ipamītha* [131 (1)].

Mitākshara —(2) The issue of the breast (*urasi*) is an *Aurasa* i. e. the legitimate son. Such a one, moreover *dharmapatnījah* is one, born of a lawfully wedded wife. A woman of equal tribe espoused in lawful wedlock, is "a legally wedded wife,"—and a son begotten on her is a true and legitimate son and is chief in rank. (3) *Tatsamah putrika*.

1 Is a daughter appointed to raise a son under the contract mentioned by *Yājñika* (XVII. 17)—see further on p. 1016 II 4-6.

2 Wife i. e. of the person with whom she was lawfully wedded.

3 This passage means that such a son would have preference when there is a competition between him and other kinds of sons and not that other kinds of sons are not heirs at all. See *Vīram* (vol. 1) Ch. II. Part II.

And according to *Yadava Parijata* the sons born of lawfully wedded wives although of different tribes are all legitimate. See vol. 1 *Brahm'kṣṇ* p. 160.

These passages were referred to in *Yadava Parijata* II Mal. 49 at p. 5* and *Tulsi Ram vs Dohari Lal* 12 AIL at p. 230.

- sutah*, equal to him is the son of an appointed daughter. 'Equal to him i.e. equal to the legitimate son.' The son (born) of a daughter (appointed) is a *Putrikâ-suta*. And accordingly he is equal to a legitimate son. As has been said by *Vasishtha*¹: "This damsel who
- 5 "has no brother, I will give unto thee, decked with ornaments; (so "that) the son who may be born of her shall be my son" Or that term may mean a daughter regarded as a son by reason of the fact that the daughter herself is to be regarded as a son. All the same such a one is also similar to a legitimate son, as she has more of the parts
- 10 cles of the mother's body and less of the father's. As says *Vasishtha*²: "The second is an appointed daughter herself" The meaning is that the second (kind of) son is the appointed daughter³ herself. (4) The son of two fathers (*Dvayâmushyâyana*) is inferior to the natural father's legitimate son, because he is produced in another's soil,
- 15 (5) *Kshetrajah kshetrajâstas tu sagotreṇa wâ*, the *Kshetrajah* is one begotten on a

1 Oh XVII 17

2 Oh XVII 15—The reading in the *Vasishtha Sûtra* is (third) तृतीय and not (second) द्वितीय

3 The *putrikâ-putra* is of four descriptions (1) The first is the daughter appointed to be a son (see *Vasishtha* XVII 15 पुत्रिकेति) (2) The next is her son. He is called "the son of an appointed daughter", without any special contract. He is, however, to be distinguished from the next: of the third class. He is not in the place of a son, but in the place of a son's son and is a *daughter's son*. Accordingly he is described as a *daughter's son* in the text of *Śākhya* and *Likhita*. "An appointed daughter is like unto a son, as *Prâchetasa* has declared her offspring is termed a son of an appointed daughter. He offers funeral oblations to the maternal grand-fathers and to the paternal grandsires. There is no difference between a son's son and a daughter's son in respect of benefits conferred" (3) The description of a son of an appointed daughter is the child born of a daughter who was given in marriage with an express stipulation as stated by *Vasishtha* XVII 17. He appertains to his maternal grandfather as an adopted son. (4) The fourth is a child born of a daughter who was given in marriage with a stipulation in this form "the child who shall be born of her, shall perform the obsequies of both". He belongs as a son to both grandfathers. But, in the case where she was in thought selected for an appointed daughter, she is so without a compact, and merely by an act of the mind (*Manu* Ch IX 127 and 136), *Hemâdrî* quoted in *Colebrooke*. See also *Thalw Jesbnath Singh vs Court of wards* L R 2 I A 163-166. *Rahi vs Govinda* 1 Bom 102, and in particular *Karuppi Nachiar vs Sanlara Narayana Chetti* 27 Mad 300 at p 312 sqq, and *Jamiatram vs Bai Jamna* 2 Bom. H O Rep 11 at p 17.

(9) He, who¹ is given by his mother under her husband's direct-

The adopted son, ion, while the husband is absent on a journey or is dead, or who is given by the father, or by both

(parents) to a person of the same class, becomes **dattakah**, the adopted son, of him to whom he is given As says **Manu**² "He, whom his mother or his father, in a time of distress affectionately give with (a libation of) water and who is of the same class, is called a son given "

(10) By specifying distress, (it is intimated that) the son should not be given unless there be distress This prohibition regards

the giver³ (11) So an only son must not be given, *Vide* the text of **Vasishtha**⁴ . " But let him not give or receive an only son " (12) Nor,

though a numerous progeny exist, should an eldest son be given, since he alone is the principal among those who fulfils the office of a son as is shown by the following text⁵ " By the eldest son, as soon as " born, a man becomes 'the father of male issue' "

(13) The mode of accepting a son for adoption is propounded by

Mode of acceptance **Vasishtha**⁶ : " One who desires to adopt a son, shall

" assemble his kinsmen, announce his intention to " the king, make burnt-offerings in the middle of the house, reciting

*PAGE 89

" the Vyârhitis and take (as a son) an - un-remote kinsman, just the nearest among his relatives " 7 "

1 These passages have been referred to in a number of cases, of which the following may be noted — *Rangubai vs Bhagunthibai* 2 Bom 380, *Shri Balusu Gurulinga Swami vs Shri Balusu Ramalakshamma* 26 I A 113 2 Ch. IX 168

3 And not the taker See *Bâlambhatti & Subodhini* p 58 l 11 Tr 146 l 26

4 Ch XV 3

5 Of *Manu* Ch IX 106

6 Ch XV 6 See *Raja Makund Deb vs Sri Jagannath Jenamon* 2 Pat 469 at p 485 for essentials of adoption It is only one who is devoid of issue, who can adopt Thus the existence of a disqualified son is a bar to an adoption *Bharmappa vs Ujjangauda* 46 Bom 455 A contrary view has been taken in Madras, see *Nagammal vs Sankarappa Naidu*, 54 Mad 576, see also *Radha vs Dinlerao* 39 Bom L R 147 at pp 150, 151

7 Note the following very important remarks of West and Bühler in connection with this (3rd edition pp 884-888) Say the learned authors

" The gradual abolition of grosser means of supplementing a family in favour of the system of adoption is itself a striking evidence of progress in civilization The appointment of a daughter held an intermediate place between this and the coarse materialism of the earliest modes of substitution It is no longer recognized, but traces of the institution still remain in the existing law From it on the one hand has been derived the right of succession of the daughter and the daughter's son for adoption As an imitation of a real son the adopted son ought to be born of some woman, whom the adoptive father could have (*Contd - on next page*)

(14) By the expression—'an un-remote kinsman'—the adoption of one very distant by country and language is forbidden.

(*Concl. from last page*)

married. This excludes the son of a daughter and such is the law generally received amongst the higher castes and sub-divisions of the great Śādra class almost everywhere, and amongst some of the higher castes by their customary law the daughter's son is deemed fit for adoption and even the most fit on account of the place he might formerly have taken as a son by appointment, as well as of the blood connection on which the system of appointment itself was founded.

* The passage of Vasīṣṭha which directs that a man desiring to adopt shall make his selection from amongst near relatives and for choice take the nearest is so obscurely expressed as to admit of various interpretations. How the ingenuity of commentators has been exercised upon it may be seen in Colebrooke's note to the Mit. Chap. I Sect. 11 Para 13. The Samakāra-Kaustubha and the Nīrṇaya-Sindhu, construing the direction most liberally approve the adoption, falling a Śaṅkṣa Saplada of a daughter's or a sister's son. The Śāstris, following the Vyavahāra-Mayukha, are almost uniformly opposed to this, except in the case of Śādras. They rely on the impossibility of a real paternal and filial relation between the fictitious father and a son so born; and the decisions in Bombay must be considered perhaps to have confirmed the Śāstris' view but customary law seems in a measure at least to have been represented by the doctrine of the two works referred to. These were no doubt written under the influence of ideas which shaped the customary law and they afford an example in their divergence from the more generally received authorities of parallel growths of doctrine springing from the same original source, yet taking quite different lines of development according to the medium in which they were placed. The real nearness of daughter's son once procured real acceptance for the doctrine of appointment, and this in its turn has facilitated the admission of the daughter's son as fit for adoption. The Śāstra had however to be interpreted accordingly and this interpretation setting aside the ordinary doctrine of a necessary difference in the families of birth of the real mother and the adoptive father paved the way for the admission of the sister's son. In the South of India the Brāhminical law was for the most part apparently accepted only with this qualification adapting it to previously existing customs as in the case of marriage between the children of a brother and a sister rejected by the stricter law of the North, but allowed in the South, because it could not be prevented.

On this passage observe the learned judges of the Madras High Court: "The divergence between the generally accepted authorities and actually existing customs and the survival of the customs sanctioned by the earlier law appear to be accounted for in the above passage on sound historical principles, and the conclusions therein arrived at to receive confirmation from what we find to be established by evidence in the case before us." *Vayachanda vs. Appu* 9 Mad. at p. 64

(15) The same (ceremonial) should be extended to the case of sons bought, self given, and made: for parity of reasoning requires it. (131).

(Contd from last page)

*The following is the note of Mr Colebrooke referred to in the above passage —

"*Raghunandana*, in the *Udvâhatatwa*, has quoted a passage from the *Kâlikâ-Purâna*, which, with the text of *Vasishṭha*, constitutes the ground-work of the law of adoption as received by his followers. They construe the passage as an unqualified prohibition of the adoption of a youth or child whose age exceeds five years and especially one whose initiation is advanced beyond the ceremony of tonsure. This is not admitted as a rigid maxim by writers in other schools of law, and the authenticity of the passage itself is contested by some, and particularly by the author of *Vyavahâra-Mayûkha*, who observes truly that it is wanting in many copies of the *Kâlikâ-Purâna*. Others following the text to be genuine, explain it in a sense more consonant to the general practice, which permits the adoption of a relation, if not a stranger, more advanced both in age and progress of initiation. The following version of the passage conforms with the interpretation of it given by *Nanda-Pandita* in the *Dattaka-Mīmāṃsâ*. "Sons "given and the rest, though sprung from the seed of another, yet being only "initiated (by the adopter) under his own family name, become sons (of the "adoptive parent). A son having been regularly initiated under the family name "of his (natural) father, unto the ceremony of tonsure, does not become the son "of another man. When indeed the ceremony of tonsure and other rites of initiat-"ion are performed (by the adopter) under his own family name, then only can "sons given and the rest be considered as issue else they are termed slaves. "After their fifth year, O King, sons are not to be adopted. (But) having taken a "boy five years old, the adopter should first perform the 'sacrifice for male issue' "

'The *Putreshtis* or 'sacrifice for male issue,' mentioned at the close of this passage is a ceremony performed according to the instructions contained in the following text of *Veda*. "He who is desirous of issue should offer to fire, "parent of male offspring, an oblation of kneaded rice roasted upon eight pots- "herds, and to Indra, father of male offspring, a similar oblation of rice roasted "on eleven potsherds. fire grants him progeny, Indra renders it old "

(Colebrooke).

"Nearest among his relation"—*Bandhu-Sannikṣṭam* is the expression in the text. There are also other readings variously noticed regarding this passage viz by *Nanda Pandita* in his commentary on *Viṣṇu*. "*Adârabândhavam asannikṣṭam eva*"—which gives an entirely different rule viz "one whose kindred dwell in a country not far off, and one not connected by affinity" *Viṣṇûśvara* himself explains the term *Adârabândhavam* in the next line by the remark that by this expression the adoption of "one very distant by country and language, is forbidden. And *Bâlabhattacha* (page 172) after referring to the text of

(16) *Kṛitāḥ the son bought* moreover, is one who *tābhyam*, by them, i.e. by both mother and father or by either the mother or the father, *vikṛitāḥ was sold* and as before excepting an only son or an eldest son, in a time of distress and belonging to the same class. As for the text of Manu ¹ *et*—He is called a son bought, whom a man, for the sake of having issue, purchases from his father and mother whether the child be equal or unequal to him—it must be interpreted as whether like or unlike in qualities not in class since the Author concludes² by saying This law is propounded by me in regard to sons “equal by class.” (17) *Kṛtrmah syāt swayamkṛtāḥ, the son made is one adopted by the man himself*—The son made however is the son adopted as a son himself by the man who is desirous of male issue and enticed by the show of money and land, and being an orphan without father and mother for if they be living, he is subject to their control³ (18) *Dattatmā, the son self-given* is one who being bereft of father and mother or abandoned by them, presents himself saying ‘Let me become thy son’ (19) *Sahodhajaḥ the son received* with the bride is one who being in the womb, is accepted (in the course of the marriage) when a pregnant bride is accepted. He becomes the son of the husband (131)

(20) *Apaviddhāḥ a son deserted*, is one who having been deserted *utgrāhāḥ* by his father and mother is taken (for adoption) *grāhyat*. He is the son of the taker

In all cases he must be of the same class (as with the adoptive father)

(Contd. from last page)

Paṇḍita (XV 7-8) remarks If possible—he should take a *bandhusman kṛtām* i.e. — A woman nearly related — e.g. a brother's son or the like; on failure of such a one he should take *adārabandhavam* one whose lineage are not remote i.e. whose means of livelihood is in a near place whose father and whose relations are near and whose family and character are consequently known. Mr Colebrooke also notices the other readings *et*... those given in *Kaṣṭhāra* and *Latāṭara* viz. *Adāro bandhavam* *acamarāṅgama*

¹ Ch IX 174

² See farther on II 132 (1). p 1037 l. 37

³ The consent of both is the only requisite. No ceremonies nor a document is necessary. *Kaṁla Prasad vs Maruti* 13 Pat. 550

4 If a woman be married while pregnant, the child born of that pregnancy is a *Sahodh* son; such a one is to be distinguished from a *Kṛtma* (son of an unmarried damsel) because he is not born of a damsel. It is not clear how he can be distinguished from a *Gṛdhra*, unless a too technical construction is placed on the suffix, born since after the marriage he is no longer one “secretly born.” Whereas the chief element of a *Gṛdhra* viz the concealment of the individuality of the progenitor from whom the woman has conceived still remains there.

Śûlapâṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 128

- "A son begotten by oneself upon a wife married according to
"sacrament, one should know him to be the *Aurasa*," under this text of
5 **Baudhâya**,¹ one begotten by oneself upon a married wife of one's own
caste is the *Aurasa* son Equally entitled for a share like the *Aurasa*,
is the *Putrikâputra* **Manu**² describes a *putrikâ* thus "One having no
"issue, may make his daughter in this manner an appointed daughter viz
"The child which may be born of her, shall be one entitled to offer
10 "funeral rites to me "

- On the wife of another who is without an issue, and who was
appointed by the elders, and under the ceremony of *Niyoga* such as the
annointment with clarified butter &c, a son begotten by a *sapinda* or by one
of a superior *varna* is (known as) the *Kshetaja* son As says **Viṣṇu**³
15 "Upon one who was appointed (to beget), a son begotten by a *sapinda* or
"by one of a superior *varna* is the *kshetaja*, the second" (128)

Yājñavalkya Verse 129

- In 'the house', *grhe*, of the husband, *prachchhanna*, 'one secretly', born,
is the *Gâḍhaja* son, so declared by **Manu** and others
20 Upon an unmarried daughter while residing at her father's house, one
secretly begotten by a man of the same *varna* is the *Kâṇina* son, declared
to be the son of the mother's father As to what has been stated by
Manu⁴ viz "While in her father's house, the son which a daughter
"causes to be begotten in secret, that one should know as the *Kâṇina* son,
25 "and belonging to the husband (after marriage) as a son born of the
"maiden", that has been declared by **Viśvarûpa** to be applicable when
there exist the *Aurasa* and like other sons (129)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 130

- Upon a widow who has had sexual intercourse, or one who had no
30 regular intercourse, and who was married again, a son born is the
Paunarbhava son, becomes the son of the progenitor Similarly says **Kâtya-
yana**⁵ "After abandoning an impotent or a degraded husband, when a
"woman secures another husband, a son born upon her is the *Paunarbhava*
"son, is clearly of the same class as of the progenitor "
35 One whom the mother and the father give up and offer, such a one is
the *Dattaka* As says **Manu**⁶ "That (boy) equal (by caste) whom his
"mother or his father affectionately give with (a libation of) water, in
"times of distress, such a son is the *Dattima* son" (130)

1 Dh S II II 3 14

2 Oh ix. 127

3 Oh xv 3

4 Oh ix 172

5, Verse 860,

6 Oh IX 168

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 131

One who is sold by the mother and the father and taken up as a son such a one is a *Kṛta* son. Vide the text, such a one whether of a "different *corpus* or a similar

Manu¹ describes the son self made. But when one makes another "as his son who is similar (in caste) and is acquainted with the right "and the wrong and who is endowed with the qualities of a son, such a one should be known as a *Kṛtṛma* son."

Manu² describes the *Dakṛma* son thus. He who is without his parents, or one who has been abandoned without a (proper) reason, gives himself (to a man) is called the son self given *Śvayamdatta*.

Garbhama has been described by Manu³. Where a pregnant "woman is taken in marriage either (with her pregnancy) known or "unknown, (the child in) the womb belongs to the man who weds her "and he is called *Sahodhī*" (131).

(21) Having thus premised sons, chief and secondary the Author explains the order of their succession to the heritage

Yājñavalkya Verse 132 (2)

Among these, in the absence of the preceding each next succeeding is a giver of the funeral cake and the inheritor of a share

Mīṭākṣhara —(22) Of these aforementioned sons of twelve kinds, in the absence of the preceding, each next in order as enumerated must be considered to be the *pṛyadaḥ*, giver of the funeral cake &c performer of the *Śrāddha*, and *antakarāḥ*, the inheritor of a share &c successor to the effects.

(23) If there be an *Aurasa*⁴ (legitimate) son and a *Pautrikaya* (son by an appointed daughter), Manu propounds⁵ an exception to the seeming right of the *Aurasa* son to take the whole estate. "A daughter having been appointed, if a son be afterwards born, the division

1 ix 169

2 IX 177

3 LX 173

4 The reading in the *Mīṭākṣhara* is *Aurasa-pautrikaya samamaye i* &c when the legitimate son and the son of an appointed daughter co-exist. Mr Colebrooke translates—"If there be a legitimate son and an appointed daughter —and adds in the foot-note "so this passage is interpreted by *Vīṭasthara* & *Baṭamāḥṭṭa*. But *Baṭamāḥṭṭa* distinctly refers to the passage as it occurs in the text &c. (see p 174 L 16) *Aurasa-pautrikayor mīṭākṣhara* *Samamaye* *ityarthah*. While *Vīṭasthara* has (p 68 L 17) *Aurasa-pautrikaya pautrikayateka addhāve* *ityarthah*. "Tri p. 147 L 8

- "of the heritage must in that case be equal since there is no right of
"primogeniture for a woman" (24) So also, even in the case of
others, a quarter share to inferior sons, even when the superior ones
exist, has been ordained by Vasishtha² "When a son has been
5 "adopted, if a legitimate son be (afterwards) born, the adopted son
"shares a fourth part" (Here) the mention of 'the son adopted' is
indicative also of others such as the son bought, the son made, and the
rest by reason of the context³ (25) Accordingly Katyâyana⁴ says
"If an *Aurasa* son be born, the other sons take a fourth part,
10 "provided they belong to the same tribe, but if they be of a different
"class, they are entitled to food and raiment only" (26) "Those
"who belong to the same tribe" *e g* the adopted and the *Khetriya*
sons and the like, these when an *Aurasa* son exists, share a fourth part
But those who belong to a different class *e g* "the damsel's son,"
15 "the son secretly born," "the son received with the bride" and
"the son of a remarried woman," these when an *Aurasa* son exists,
do not take a fourth part, but are entitled to food and raiment only.
(27) Although there is a text of Vishnu *ut* "Exceptionable sons are,

1 This passage is obscure and is not in a line with the logical accuracy and perspicuity which are the invariable characteristics of *Bhatta Vijñānśwara* Taking the text of *Manu* by itself it says that a female is not entitled to the rights of primogeniture *Bālabhattacharya* (p 171 l 17) explains it by suggesting that it is meant to meet a position which may be taken on the strength of the rule that the appointed daughter herself is a son (गृहिणी पुत्र इति द्वितीयायामनेन) while *Vijñānśwara* refers to the text of *Manu* for showing that when an *aurasa* and a *pautrikeya* compete, it may be urged that the entire estate should go to the *Aurasa* had it not been for the rule of *Manu* in IX 131

The *Subodhini* (p 58 l 17-23), has attempted to explain the passage thus "By this text of *Manu*, the oldest does not get the preference share allowed to him "in the text (of *Manu* Oh IX.112 see above p 187 ll 5 7) Indeed, under this text "he is only entitled to an equal portion Ordinarily an *Aurasa* alone is entitled to "the entire heritage, but by the text of *Manu*—"The division must be equal"—the "Aurasa does not take the entirety and thus the *Pautrikeya* takes a share This seems to be the only way in which the two passages can be connected together"

2 Oh XV 9 स चतुर्थभागभागी स्यात्—"he (the adopted son) shall be the partaker of a fourth share"

3 *v l* गृहीतृणां विशेषात् Tr "for they are equally adopted as sons" *Colebrooke* prefers this reading 4 Verse 807

5 This reading is followed in the *Madanapārijāta*, and *Vīramatodaya* But the *Kalpataaru*, *Ratnākara* and other compilations read a "third part" Vide *Jimûta Vâhana* O 10§ 13 *Colebrooke*

"a damsel's child, a son of concealed origin, one received with a bride and a son by a twice-married woman these never share the funeral cake nor the inheritance still it is intended to prohibit a fourth share when an *Aurasa* son exists. But if there be no legitimate son or other (preferable claimants), even the damsel's child and others succeed to the whole of the paternal estate under the text "In the absence of the preceding each next succeeding &c."

(28) Similarly although there is a text of *Manu* "The *Aurasa* son alone is the (sole) heir of his father's wealth but, as a matter of compassion he may give maintenance to the rest, that too must be considered as applicable to a case where the son adopted and the like are hostile to the *Aurasa* son and devoid of good qualities (29) Here a special rule regarding a *Khetraya* son has been propounded by the same Author. Let the *Aurasa* son when dividing the paternal heritage, give a sixth part, or a fifth, of the patrimony to the *Khetraya* son": i. where there is hostility as well as want of good qualities then a sixth part, but if only one of those defects exist, a fifth part, and thus the two cases should be discriminated

(30) Although *Manu* having premised two sets of six sons, has declared the first six to be heirs and kinsmen, and the last six to be not heirs but kinsmen vi.. The *Aurasa* son as also the son begotten on a wife the son adopted and also a son made a son secretly born, and so a son cast off, are the six heirs, and kinsmen (159). The damsel's son, the son received with the bride the son bought, as also the son begotten on a remarried woman, the son self-given, and the son born of a *Sikṛī* woman are six not heirs, but kinsmen (160); (31) that too must be expounded as signifying that the first six may take the heritage of their father's *apuvṣas* and *amvīnodakās*, if there be no nearer heir but not so the last six (The tie of) kinship (*bhūṭha ratnam*) however is alike in the case of both by reason of their being *Samānagotra* and *Sapinda* and thus being capable of performing the duty of offering libations of water and the like (32) It must be thus expounded; for the mention of a given son in the following

passage¹ is intended for any adopted succedaneous son: "A son
 "given away must never claim the family and estate of his natural
 "father. The funeral cake follows the family and the estate, and of
 "him, who gives (away his son), the funeral offerings fail" (33) The
 5 right of inheriting then father's estate, however, is, without exception
 equal in the case of all in the absence of sons mentioned next above
 each, in the order of precedence, as the text² "Not brothers, nor
 "parents, but sons are heirs to the estate of the fathers," purposely is
 intended as affirming the succession of all subsidiary sons other than
 10 the *Amasa* son, the right of the *Amasa* son having been already
 propounded by the text³ "The *Amasa* son alone is the (sole) heir
 "of his father's wealth", and the word heir (*dāyāda*) being well-
 known as used to signify any successor other than a son as in (the
 expression) "The heirs also should be made to give &c" (34) The
 15 variation which occurs in the institutes of *Vasishtha*⁴ and others

1 *Manu* Ch IX 142 2 of *Manu* Ch IX 155 3 of *Manu* Ch IX 163

4 See *Subodhini* (pp 60-61 Tr p 151 ll 32-38 p 152 ll 1-34) Referring to this passage in the *Subodhini* Mr Colebrooke adds the following note. *Manu* declaring the appointed daughter equal to the legitimate son, includes her under legitimate issue (IX 165) and proceeds to define the remaining ten succedaneous sons (IX 166-178) But *Vasishtha* states the appointed daughter as third in rank (XVII-166), which is a disagreement in the order of enumeration. The same must be understood of other institutes of law viz *Viṣṇu* 15 2-37 *Nārada* (13-44 45) *Devala* &c. How then is the succession of the next in order on failure of the preceding reconcilable? The author proposes this difficulty with its solution. His notion of the mode of reconciling is this. *Manu* declaring that the first set of six sons by birth or adoption is competent to inherit from collateral kinsmen on failure of nearer heirs, but not so the second set afterwards proceeds to deliver incidentally definitions of those various sons. It appears therefore, to be a loose enumeration, and not one arranged with precision. Accordingly *Manu*, in saying, "Let the inferior in order take the heritage," does not limit this very order but intends one different in some respects, and the difference is relative to good and bad qualities. The same must be used with the variations in other codes. Moreover what is ordained by *Yājñavalkya* is consistent with propriety. For the true legitimate son and the son of an appointed daughter are both legitimate issue and consequently equal. The son of the wife a son of hidden origin, the son of an unmarried damsel, and a son by a twice-married woman, being produced from the seed of the adoptive father and from the soil appertaining to him, have preference before the son given and the rest. The son received with a bride, produced from soil which the adoptive father accepts for his own is placed in the second set by the authority of the text, or because the mother did not appertain to the adoptive father at the time when the child was begotten. The whole is therefore unexceptionable.

respecting some one in both sets must be understood as founded on the difference of having been¹ or not been endowed with qualities (35) But the assignment of the tenth place to the son of an appointed daughter in *Gautama's* text² is relative to one differing in tribe Therefore this is established that in the absence of those (mentioned) 5 in the preceding order those following next in order will be entitled to the inheritance

(36) As for the text³ If among (several) brothers sprung "from one (father) one have a son *Manu* has declared them all as "fathers of a male offspring on account of that son that also is 10 intended to forbid the adoption of others, if a brother's son can possibly be adopted, and not for setting up a claim as a son as that would be inconsistent with the subsequent text (*Yājñ* II 135) Their sons, the *Gotraṅgas* and the *Isiṅg* is &c.

Śūlapāni

15

Yājñavalkya Verse 132

He becomes entitled to offer *pṇti*, *śrīṣṭi* and the like and also is entitled to take the wealth.

When however the brother's son exists, the *Kṣātr* and the like others substitutes of a son are not entitled as says *Manu* "If among 25 "brothers born of one father one have a son, all these (others) through that one are (regarded) as having a son so *Manu* has declared." Then also, in the absence of brother's sons, should be made the sons such as the *Kṣātr* and the others

Of the co-wives of one husband also who are without a son the son 30 of a co-wife is the son himself as says *Manu*⁴ "Of all the wives of a "one if one have a son, *Manu* declares them all (to be) mothers having "sons through that son. Wives of one &c of one husband (13*)

(37) The Author next adds a restrictive clause by way of conclusion to what had been stated 35

Yājñavalkya, Verse 133 (1)

This law is propounded by me in regard to sons equal by class

Mitākṣhara—(38) Only among sons equal by class, *ayam vadhū* this law, i. e (the one) expressed in the text "in the absence of the

1 *गृह्य* &c (p 90 l 14) have a reference to the sons and are adjectives qualifying that term.

2 *Ch. XXVIII. 31*

3 Of *Manu* *Ch. IX. 182* 4 *IX. 182* 5 *IX. 183* See *Vishnu* also *XV. 41*

* PAGE 91

Mitāksharâ—(2) A son begotten by a *S'uhita* on a *dâsî* (female slave), obtains a share *kâmatâh*, *by choice*, i. e. by the option, of the father. But, after (the death of) the father, if there be sons of a wedded wife, then these brothers should make that son of the *dâsî* (female slave), a half-sharer, i. e. they should give him a half from their

(Contd from last page)

In *Sarasuti vs Manni* 2 All. 131 the off-spring of a kept woman or a continuous concubine was held to be on the same level as to inheritance as the issue of a *dâsî* (female slave) by a *Sûdra*, and he was held capable of succeeding to the occupancy holding of his father as a "male lineal descendant" within the meaning of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901. *Ramiah vs Jerru* 20 All. 508. In *Jogendra Bhupati vs Nityanand* 11 Cal 713 and 18 Cal 151 (P. C.) 17 I. A. 128, both the High Court and the Privy Council recognised the right of an illegitimate son as a coparcener with his legitimate brother in the ancestral estate and he was held to be entitled to take by survivorship even in the case of an Impartible estate. He does not, however, require a joint interest in the property with his father in the ancestral family property. It is only after the father's death that his right commences, so that if the property is disposed of by the father during his lifetime, he cannot claim a share in it after his death. *Ram Saran vs Tolchand* 28 Cal 195. Nor does the illegitimate son become a coparcener in the fullest significance of the term, and therefore he is not entitled to claim by survivorship against the collateral relations of the father. *Krishnayyan vs Multusami* 7 Mad 407. *Parvathi vs Thirumalai* 10 Mad 331.

In a case of disputed succession among *Sûdras* to an Impartible estate where the claimants were sons by two wives of the same caste, but of different grades, the son by a wife though junior, but of a superior grade, was held to be entitled to preference. *Ramasami vs Sundaralingasami* 17 Mad 422.

The *Dâsiputra* is entitled to maintenance among the regenerate classes. It does not cease when he comes of age. But he is not entitled to his marriage expenses. *Motichand vs Chandrabai* 20 Bom L. R. 488.

1 And this is made clearer by *Bâlambhatta* (p. 182 ll. 22-23) & *Subodhini* (p. 61 l. 26) "From the entire estate, a half of what would be regarded as his share i. e. one half of the amount allotted to a legitimate issue."

He is entitled to one-half of the share to which he would have been entitled had he been legitimate. The widow by marriage and the sole illegitimate son take equally. *Kamulmal vs Visvanatha Sreami Naicker* 25 Bom L. R. 577 = 50 I. A. 32. See 18 B. L. R. 70 = 40 Bom 309.

Members of legitimate descent cannot claim heirship to a line of illegitimate descent. *Maharajah of Kolhapur vs Sundaram Ayyar* 48 Mad 1.

own allotment. However should there be no sons of a wedded wife the son of the *dīś* (female slave) shall take the whole estate, provided there be no daughters of a wedded wife, nor their sons. But if there be such, the son of the *dīś* (female slave) participates for half a share only. (3) From the mention of a *Sūdra* in this place, moreover, (it follows that) the son begotten by a man of a regenerate tribe on a *dīś* (female slave) does not obtain a share even by the father's choice nor even a half, much remote (is the chance of his claiming) the whole. But, if he be docile he receives a bare maintenance [133-134.]

Vīramitrodaya

The Author states the characteristics of the twelve sons, by the verses beginning with *Aurasa* etc.

Yājñavalkya, Verses 123-134

Dharmapāni: a lawfully wedded wife i.e. of the same *varṇa* married according to (the dictates of) law of her born from the husband is the *Aurasa* son. Here (the condition of) belonging to the same *varṇa* by reason of its relating to the twice-born is intended as spoken of as referring to the three *varṇas* such as the *Brahmana* and the rest. Otherwise according to *Pārijāta* sons of the *Aṣṭatriya* and 'Vaisyā' wives married to a *Brahmana* and born of him may not be included among the twelve kinds of sons. By reason of his being procreated from the breast (*uras*) of the husband, he is (called) the *Aurasa*.

He who is born of her that son shall be my son, under this rule of an agreement stated by *Vasishtha*,¹ a maiden who has been married is called the *Putrikā* a son born of her is the *Putrikāśulak* thus his characteristic has been stated as derived from a parity of expression. Such a one, moreover, is equal to an *Aurasa*, is entitled to take the heritage of the maternal-grandfather and to offer exequial rites to him. In this connection *Manu*² states a special rule "To the mother first should the *putrikāśulak* offer a *piṇḍa* the second, however to her father, and the third to the father's father."

One born from one appointed in regard to the land of another, whether of the same *gotra* or of a different *gotra*, is the *Kṣetrāja*, the son of the owner of the land. Where, however, an arrangement has been made

as e.g. "Whatever issue is begotten on this shall belong equally to both of us", there, he is the son both of the owner of the seed as well as of the soil. This is the meaning of the last verse. That has been stated by Manu¹ "Where by a special compact a field is made over to another

- 5 "for (sowing) the seed, of that (i. e. , the produce of the seed) the "participators in this world are considered to be both the owner of the "seed as well as of the soil" (128)

- Gr̥he*, ' in the house ', upon the wife by another *prachchhanna*, 'secretly', i.e. even without an appointment, as the result of a conception from a secret (sexual) connection *utpannah*, a son (thus)
10 'produced,' such a one, however, is declared to be *Gūdhaja*, ' one secretly born '. In this connection Manu² (says) " One in whose "house a son is born, and it is not known by whom he was begotten, "such a one being born secretly in the house, belongs to him on whose
15 "wife he is born " *Talpa*, ' wife ', i. e. the wedded wife.

- On a maiden i. e. on an unmarried daughter, the son born is the *Kanina*, such a one is the son of the mother's father. vide *Viṣṇu* .
" By him, the mother's father becomes ' the father of a son ', he should
"offer (to him) *pinda* and take (his) property ". If upon marriage
20 the husband be without an issue, even of him such a one is (entitled to be) a son, vide this text of the *Brahmapurāṇa* " If from one who "has been taken in marriage, a son was born (while) in the father's "house from one of the same *varṇa*, such a one is the *Kanina* son again "of him to whom she is given (in marriage) (129)."

- 25 One who is married again is ' a remarried woman ' *Punarbhūh*; upon her whether deflowered i. e. consummated, by the previous husband, or undeflowered i. e. not consummated, a son born is called *Paunarbhava*, ' the son of a re-married woman ' Here *Kātyāyana*³ .
" One born from her is the *Paunarbhava*, and it is clear he is the son
30 " of the progenitor ".

- The father, or in his absence under his permission, the mother, the son whom he (or she) may, out of affection, give with (the libation of) water to another, such a one becomes the *Dattaka* ' adopted ' son of the acceptor. As says Manu⁴ . " The heritage and the *gotra* of the
35 "genetive father the son given shall not take, the (right of offering) "pinda follows the *gotra* and the (right to) inheritance, from one who "gives away, the exequial rites recede " *Swadhā*, ' the exequial rites ' i. e. the *śrāddha*, the funeral and allied rites. (130)

Tdbhyām 'by the two i.e. by the mother and the father *vikṛitah* sold that son who was *kṛita* i.e. bought becomes (the son) of the purchaser

Kṛtṛimah 'a son made under a request made by ones If m. 'be my son and agreed to thus viz. I am thy son on accepted is a *kṛtṛima* 5
i.e. 'a son mad By the use of the word *cha* 'and, is added that it was with the consent of the mother and the father since while they are living he is dependent on them

Even without a request in the absence of the mother and the father or one who has been abandoned one who *śraṇ* im himself offers 10
as a son such a one is *Śrayamdaṭu* 'a son self-given is the son of the acceptor

While in the womb by reason of the mother's marriage only one who becomes the son of the parents (thereafter) married becomes the son of the husband and is called *Sahodhaja* a son received with the bride 15
That has been stated by Manu¹ Where a pregnant woman is married either knowingly or unknowingly to the husband who weds (her) 'belongs (the child in) the womb and he is also called *sahodha* 'the son "received with the bride" (131).

One however who by his parents *atśrāhto* has been abandoned, 20
or owing to their inability to maintain him has been given up and by another is taken up as a son such a one (becomes) the son of the acceptor known as *Apaviddha* a deserted son (132)

Eṣāṁ of these twelve sons *lpūrcapūrcdbhāre* in the absence 25
of the one preceding *paraḥ paraḥ* each one next succeeding becomes *piṇḍadāḥ amīaharaścha* the giver of the (*piṇḍa*) funeral cake and the inheritor of a share also.

The word *amīa*, share In the case of a *putrikā* and *kṣhetṛiṇya* means the entire share under the text of Likhita and the Brahmapurāṇa and also vide the text of Kātyāyana² When an *aurasa* son is born the 30
(other) sons of the same *varṇa* are entitled to a third share; while those not of the same *varṇa* receive food and raiment.

Even in regard to other sons of the same *varṇa* *savarṇa* viz. the *dattaka* *kṛtṛima* *guhḥotpanna* and *apaviddha* the word *amīa* has the 35
sense of the entire share The *aurasa* son alone shall be the owner of the paternal estate as for the rest, in order to avoid bareness,

"one may give maintenance," thus text of Manu', it should be understood, has application where the *Aurasa* son is endowed with good qualities and the others are worthless [132 (2)]

5 *Ayam vidhuh*, 'thus law,' i.e. 'in the absence of the one preceding, each one next succeeding' etc. *sajatiyeshu*, 'in regard to (sons) equal by caste,' i.e. the sons of the (first) three *varnas*, *mayoktah* 'has been propounded by me' In regard to those not of the same *varna*, even if there be a *putrikāputra*, the *leshetrāja* son of the same *varna* is entitled to the inheritance, thus should be observed the arrangement in regard
10 to the rule, in consonance with the text of Kātyāyana cited above [133 (1)]

Sūdrēna, 'by a Śūdra' however, *dasyām*, even though upon a *dāsī*,
i.e. upon a *sūdrā* woman not married, the son *jatah*, 'born', *kamalah*, 'by choice', i.e. at the option of the father, may be made the partaker of a
15 share equal to other sons

Mrite putrān, 'after the death of the father', when a partition is made, *bhātarāh*, 'the brothers', i.e. the sons by the married wife, *tam*, 'him', i.e. the son by the *dāsī*, should make a partaker of a half share. The *dāsīputra*, when there are no sons by a married wife, and
20 in the absence of the sons of the daughters of the father, i.e. of the daughters' sons, and by the *a fortiori* reasoning, in the absence of the daughters, *sarvam*, 'the entire' property of the father, *harct* 'may take', [133 (2), 134]

S'ūlapāṇi

25

Yājñavalkya, Verse 133

This law which has been propounded in regard to the *Aurasa* sons and others, should be understood as applicable to sons of the same caste, with the exception of the 'son bought'

Dasyām, 'upon a *dāsī*', *sūdrēṇa jatah*, 'one begotten by a *sūdra*,' at the
30 desire of the father becomes entitled to a share like other sons (133)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 134

Mrite tu putrān 'when the father, however, is dead', the sons of the father by a wedded wife, should make the son by a *dāsī*, the partaker of a half share. If sons of that description, or if a daughter's son of that description
35 do not exist, then he alone should take the entire patrimony (134)

[COLEBROOKE-CHAPTER II.]

[Section I.]

[Right of the widow to inherit the estate of one who leaves no male issue]

(1) That sons, principal and secondary take the heritage has been shown. In the absence of them, the order of succession in the case of all¹ is next declared.

Yājñavalkya² Verso 135 136

(2) The wife, and the daughters also, both parents, brothers' likewise, and their sons, gentiles, cognates, a pupil and fellow students. (135)

On failure of the prior among these the next in order is indeed heir to the estate of one who departed for heaven leaving no male issue. This rule extends to all classes³ (136)

1 The uses of the word *Days* have been peculiarly illustrated in this sentence of *Tijlani*. In the first clause he observes that it has been shown that son principal and the secondary take the *Day* (heritage), meaning thereby what has been said from the commencement of this chapter to this stage. Then in the following clause he observes, "now follow the order of succession of those who take the *Days* (*dayada*) in the absence of those—the sons." This shows how the word *Days* has been used both for what a member of a joint family takes by survivorship as also for what an heir takes by the right of inheritance.

This part of the text was referred to in the following cases: *Rala vs Gornala* 1 Bom. 104 *Gowth Vagvel vs Ben Jaleb* 24 Bom. 10... *Moolji vs. Curandas* 4 Bom. 563 *Surya vs Lalala narasimha* 5 Mad. 91 *Nachappa vs Chinnaagami* 90 Mad. 453 *Chinnamma Pillai vs Amiya Pillai* 35 Mad. 152

2 Note the following cases among others in which this passage was referred to

Sekharan vs Sitabai 3 Bom. at 300 *Kholebhai vs Bahadur Dole* 6 Bom. 341 *Moolji vs Curandas* 4 Bom. at p. 568 *Indrapati Dutt Jha vs Jayant Narain* M. L. A. 132

3 The word brothers is interpreted in *Bijambhatti* as including both brothers and sisters. Moreover the word brother has been interpreted to have been used for brothers of the whole as well as of the half blood. See *Muthanna vs Muthanna sarni* 16 Mad. at p. 25

4 The expression (पुत्र) their sons has been interpreted in *Bijambhatti* as including daughters of brothers also and there is an elaborate note as to the right of daughters (see *Bijambhatti* p. 90)

5 Both *Bijambhatti* and *Hitratambhatti* observe that the word *all sorts*, is not to be taken as adjectival of the word *classes*, but independently *पुत्र* *पुत्र* *पुत्र* *पुत्र* (see *Bijambhatti* pp. 187-88 *Bhobhini* p. 62 11)

Mitāksharâ :—(3) He who has no son, of any (sort) among the twelve descriptions above stated¹ is **aputrah**, *one having no male issue*. Of such a man *having no male progeny*, **aputrasya**,² and **swaryâtasya**, of one *who has departed for heaven* i.e. who has departed for another world,
 5 **dhanabhâk**, *the heir or successor to the property*, is that person, **eṣhâm**, among such as have been here enumerated viz., the wife and the rest, **uttara uttarah**, *who is next in order*, **pûrvasya abhâve**, *on failure of the first mentioned* respectively Such is the connection (of words in this sentence)

(4) **Āyam vidhih**³, *this rule*, about the taking of heritage or the
 10 order of succession, must be understood **sarveshu varṇeṣhu**, *as extending to all tribes*, whether the *Mundhâvukta* and others in the direct series of classes, or *Sûta* and the rest in the inverse order, and as comprehending the several classes, the Brâhmanas and the rest

(5) Among these, first, the wife takes the estate **Patni, Wife**,
 15 (4) The wife signifies a woman espoused by the performer of the nuptial rites, conformably with the etymology⁴ of the term as implying a connexion with religious rites, moreover, the singular number has been used with a view to include

1 i.e. in verses (128-132) above on page 1045 above

2 The word 'son' *putra* is used here in an extended sense See *Buddha Singh vs Lattu Singh* 34 All 670 See *Bâlabhatṭa* p 187 l 27 "अत्र पुत्रग्रहणं पौत्रपौत्रयोरप्युपलक्षणम् "

3 The verses 135 and 136 of *Yājñavalkya* given above indicate the general rule of succession to the estate of one who leaves behind him no male issue *Yājñavalkya* first explains generally all the words in these verses After that, he takes the case of each claimant, and after examining other texts for and against the right of inheritance in each case, deduces a conclusion which is to be accepted as his The division by Mr Colebrooke of this portion of the *Mitāksharâ* into several sections has been from this point of view Thus §§ 5-39 of sect I (pages 91-95) cover the discussion as to the right of a wife, (*patni*)

Sect II of the daughter & daughter's son

III The Parents

IV The Brothers

V The Gotrajas

VI The Bandhus

VII The Ulterior heirs

4 i.e. as contained in *Panini's* rule (at 4-1-33) 'पत्युर्नो यज्ञसंयोगे' " The substitute ण replaces the final इ of पति before the feminine affix (ङीप् इ,) when the word so formed indicates "a wife, who takes part in the sacrifices of her husband" Thus it would appear from a strict interpretation of this rule that if a man has



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the wives of all castes. And, hence if there are many, and these of the same and also of different tribes they take after dividing the estate according to their respective shares.

(6) Vṛddha-Manu also declares the widow's right to the whole estate "The widow¹ of a childless man, keeping unsullied her husband's bed and persevering in religious observances shall herself present his funeral oblation and also obtain his entire share. Vṛddha Viṣṇu also (ordains) "The wealth of him who leaves no male issue goes to his wife on failure of her it devolves on his daughters in their absence it goes to the father (and) failing him it devolves upon the mother. So also Kātyāyana² A wife succeeds to

(Contd. from last page)

more wives than one only the eldest or the one who joins with her husband in the performance of sacrifices would be called a *Patni* and not the rest. But it is not so. It is the capacity to take part in a sacrifice and not actually officiating at it that determines the title for the *Patni*. Moreover the wife of a Śūdra may never have this title as the husband not being entitled to perform a sacrifice there would be no occasion for the wife to join with him at it. The term however is extended to a Śūdra also. It would thus appear that the term applies to a lawfully wedded wife as distinguished from a Concubine. Strictly speaking and considered from the Hindu theological point of view it is only the first marriage whether of a man or a woman that is considered as one intended to accomplish the foremost of the four objects of a man's life: the *Dharma*; the other three being *Artha*, *Kama*, & *Moksha*. Any other marriage is considered as being for either the second or the third of these *Puruṣārthas*. All the same the relation between a man and the woman who have become lawfully wedded would be that of a husband and wife (*Pati* and *patni*.) And so the author of *Mitaksharā* adds generally that the union of the two by the performance of nuptial rites establishes between them the relationship of husband and wife (see also *Deamblediff & Subedien*) see also observations in *Dravidiana et Palkhian* 1 Mad. at pp. 72-76 &c

He also adds that the singular number is used to indicate the group of heirs indicated by the collective term *Patni* so that if there are many wives from different castes all take as wives but the share of each is to be determined by the caste to which she belongs.

This portion is not found in Colebrooke's translation probably because his copy did not contain the reading found here.

1 See *Ponnappa vs. Papparayyanar* 4 Mad. at p. 81 & *Vedammal vs. Vedanayyanar* 31 Mad. 100

2 Verse 926

“the wealth of her husband, who is not¹ unfaithful, and failing her,
 “the daughter (inherits) if unmarried ” And again : “Of a man (who
 “has died) leaving no male issue, the wife born in an Ārya² family,
 “or even³ the daughters, failing her the father, the mother, the
 5 “brother⁴ and⁵ his sons are pronounced to be the heirs” Also Brhaspati⁶
 “Notwithstanding there be kinsmen, a father, a mother or a uterine
 “brother be present, the wife of a deceased man, who left no male
 “issue, shall take his share ”

(7) Passages, adverse to these⁷, likewise occur Thus Nārada⁸ has
 10 stated the succession of brothers, though a wife were living, and has
 directed a bare maintenance to the widows thus “Among brothers, if
 “any one die without issue⁹, or enter a religious¹⁰ order, let the rest of the
 “brothers divide his property excepting the *śrīdhana* (of his wife) They
 “should make provision for the maintenance of his wives till their death,
 15 “provided they preserve unsullied the bed of their lord. They may

1 Colebrooke translates, “ provided she be chaste ”

This also includes by implication the other condition that she should not be
 opposed to the husband (see Bālabhattacharya p 189 l 13)

2 As opposed to one born in a non-Āryan family Bālabhattacharya (p 189
 l. 15) also observes that “birth in an Ārya family ” does not mean mere birth, but
 it means birth in a good family when the marriage was in the Anuloma form It
 is to be noticed that both *Viṣṇuśāstra* and *Bālabhattacharya* admit by implication that
 wives from other castes were also entitled to be called *Patnis* Colebrooke trans
 lates *आर्यकुलजा* as “ of honest family ”

3 By the use of the word (*Ap*) “ even ” daughter’s sons are also included
 (Bālabhattacharya p 189)

4 The word “ brother ” also includes the sisters (Bālabhattacharya p 189)

5 The addition of (*Cha*) ‘ and ’ brings in (their) daughters also
 (Bālabhattacharya)

6 Ch XXV 648

7 These : are the passages cited above (*Subodhin*) Colebrooke tr “ adverse
 to the widow’s claim ”

8 Ch XIII 25-26

9 : is without male issue Bālabhattacharya

10 The Sanskrit word is *pravrajeta* : is become a *Sanyāsi* and thus enter the
 fourth and last of the orders viz ब्रह्मचर्यं, गृहस्थ्य, वानप्रस्थ्य and संन्यास

"however cut it off in the case of those who behave otherwise" That the estate of a sonless man goes to the father or the brother has also been shown by Manu² "Of him, who leaves no son, the father shall take the inheritance or the brothers." "Of a son dying childless, the mother shall take the estate and if the mother also be dead, the father & mother shall take the heritage" by this text³ he has likewise shown the mother's right to succession, as well as the paternal grandmother's: thus Śākha also: 'The wealth of a man who departs for heaven, leaving no male issue, goes to his brothers failing them

"his parents may take it, or his eldest wife" has thus declared the right of succession in order (of succession) of the brothers, the father and also of the eldest wife By Kātyāyana⁴ also (has been said) "If a man die while separate and there are no sons, let the father take his property, or the brother the mother or the mother of his father successively"

(8) An adjustment⁵ of these and other⁶ contradictory texts has been drawn out by Dharmasara thus the texts⁷ which lay down the rule that 'a wife shall take (the estate) have reference to the widow

1. अर्चय (Āchhādyah) : s should either not allow if the wives are unchaste or put a stop to the allowance after they become unchaste This passage may be marked in connection with the maintenance of those widows who subsequently become unchaste

* This passage also occurs in the Dīyabhiga XI. 1. 48 where the word *Stri* has been used in reference to women who were actually espoused, but had not the rank of wives," while Vājñineśvara uses it pointedly with reference to wives using the word *pāṭnī* See *Ponnappa vs Papparayyengar* 4 Mad. at p. 3; *Gangy vs Chaulraibhagabai* 32 Bom. at p. 288; *Lallubhai vs Carabai* 5 Bom. 12; *Savitribai vs Laxmibai* 2 Bom. 612 89 *Sabramanyu Pannya Chetia Talwar vs Sita Sabramanyu Pillai* 17 Mad. 300

3 Ch IX. 185

4 Ch IX. 217 5 Verse 9th

6. This is in accordance with the general rule that when there occur passages which are of equal weight but which are contradictory the application must be adjusted, as otherwise the rule of option might follow अथवातिसिद्धिर्वा विवक्ष्यते See note on विवक्ष्यते & विवक्ष्यते (on p. 35 n. 4 ante.)

7 i. e. the texts cited above and those texts following viz *Gautama, Manu, Varāhmiha Nārada & Yājñavalkya*.

8 (i. e. of) *Yājñavalkya, Bṛhadarīṣṭha, Kātyāyana* and *Bṛhaspati* cited above pp. 1067, 1068

of a separated brother, and that also provided she be solicitous of authority for raising up issue to her husband¹.

Whence² is it inferred, that a widow succeeds to the estate provided she seek permission for raising up issue, but not if she remained alone by³ herself? From the text⁴ (above cited) viz. "The father shall take the inheritance of him, who leaves "no son," and other similar⁵ passages For here a rule of adjustment and a reason for it must be stated⁶ but no other rule of adjustment or reason exists And also on the authority of the text of Gautama⁷

1. *Niyoga* means raising up an issue to the deceased husband by appointment, see Yājñ II. 127 above and notes (p 1039 ll 26-28)

2 This is the doubt raised by *Dhāreśvara* the solution of which is given immediately by him *Dhāreśvara's* view is " that a widow is entitled to inherit " her husband's property only when she obtains authority to have male issue raised " up to her husband by means of *Niyoga* (levirate), that if she obtains no such " authority, she cannot inherit but is merely entitled to maintenance, and for this " *Dhāreśvara* relies on the above quoted text of Nārada and also that of Yājñavalkya (II 142) *Vijnānesvara* combats this view and shows further on that *Dhāreśvara* has misapplied these texts See observations of Chandavarkar J in *Gangu vs Chandrabhagabai* 32 Bom 275 at p 282 sqq

3 *Na swatantrāyā* "and not if she remain independent " Colebrooke translates " but not independently of this consideration " But the word *Swatantrā* qualifies the widow (see Bālabhatti & Subodhini p 62 ll 17-18)

4 : c of *Manu* Oh IX, 185

5 : c of *Nārada* (XIII, p 25-26) &c " from passages " : c on account of the contradiction appearing in these texts

6 Colebrooke " Sought "

7 Oh XXVIII 21-22 *Dhāreśvara* does not properly quote the text of *Goutama* nor has he properly interpreted it The text properly reads thus " पिन्डगोत्रपितृन्या रित्य भजेत् स्त्री राजपत्यस्य (21), स्त्री वा त्रिषेत् (22) " There are two *Sūtras* combined here *Sūtra* No 21 says " Let kinsmen related by pinda &c. take the heritage, or the widow of one dying without issue The *Sūtra* (22) says " Or she may seek to raise up issue to him. " But what *Dhāreśvara* does is that he stops after the classes of kinsmen &c , and begins with the ' widow ' and joins that portion of this *Sūtra* to the next, converting the whole into a conditional clause *Vijnānesvara* has interpreted *Goutama's* text properly further on (p 1075 ll 3-7) while he is refuting *Dhāreśvara's* position

- “who takes care of his deceased brother's estate, and¹ his widow, such a
 “one after raising up a son for his brother, shall deliver that property
 “even to that (son)²” By this text he indicates this . that even when
 a brother who was separate in estate dies, his wife's claim to his
 5 estate is only through³ an issue, and not otherwise. So in the case
 of undivided property likewise (the same Author⁴ says) : “Should a
 “younger brother have begotten a son on the wife of the elder
 “brother, the division must then be made equally thus is the law
 “settled”⁵ (11) Vasishṭha⁶ also by the text “An appointment shall
 10 “not be made through covetousness for the estate”, forbidding an
 appointment to raise up issue to the husband if sought through
 covetousness for the estate, thereby intimates that the widow's claim
 to the estate is only through an appointment, and not otherwise
 (12) in the absence of an appointment, however, a widow is only
 15 entitled to a bare maintenance, *vide* the text⁷ of Nārada. “They
 “should make provision for the maintenance of their wives till their
 “death” (13) The same, it is pretended,⁸ will be declared later
 on by the Lord of the Yogis⁹ “And their childless wives, conducting
 “themselves aright, must be supported; but such as are unchaste should
 20 “be expelled, and so, indeed, those who are perverse” (14) Moreover,
 since the wealth of a regenerate man is designed for religious uses, the

1 *Cha* (च) is found in the text of *Manu*, and it seems was also the reading in the copy adopted by Mr Colebrooke It is better reading than *uā* (आ) - ‘or’ *Kullūla* in his gloss on this verse adds that this text has a reference to the estate of a separated brother as the one in IX 120 obviously contemplates a joint estate (see also *Subodhūm* p 62 l 25 & Bālabhaddi p 190 l 31)

2 : *e* the son so begotten

3 ‘Through’ - *Dvārā* (द्वारा) : *e* she has no independent right in herself

4 : *e* *Manu* Ch IX 120 (see note above)

5 : *e* the objector says that even *Manu* has laid down the adjustment of the conflicting texts

6 Ch XVII 65

7 Ch XIII 26 (see above p 1068 ll 11-14)

8 *Kīla*—This particle is used in many senses Here it indicates disapprobation

The same sense is maintained in the next quotation of an unnamed writer whom *Yājñaneśvara* refers to as *Kenāpi* (केनापि)—which the author of the *Subodhūm* notes as ‘an indication of disrespect’, (p 52 l 29 also Bālabhaddi p 191 l 8)

9 : *e* *Yājñavalkya* II 142

succession of women to such property is unfit because they are not competent to the performance of religious rites : accordingly it has been declared by some¹ author wealth was produced for the sake of "solemn sacrifice, and they who are incompetent for the celebration "of these (rites) are not entitled by any property² but (may) receive food and raiment. Wealth has been ordained for sacrifices. Therefore it should be allotted to places concerned with religious duties "and not to women fools or the irreligious."³

(15) That⁴ is wrong for authority to raise up issue to the husband is neither specified in the⁵ text, "The wife the daughter &c" nor is it suggested by the premises.⁶ Besides, it may be here asked is the appointment to raise up issue a reason for the widow's succession to the property, or is the issue borne by her, the cause of her

1 Name unknown See note above. *Halambhāṣṭa* remarks that by the use of the expression *Kṛmāpi* disrespect for the writer is indicated; and it should be noted that therefore the name of the writer has not been mentioned (p 191 l. 13).

2 The word in the text is *R* like which means heritage or inheritance.

3 Here ends the summary of *Dharmasra*'s argument

The argument of *Dharmasra* in short is this (1) The wife's capacity to take her husband's estate depends on her desire to begot issue for him and in support of this he cites *Mān.* IX. 188 146 150 *Chandogya* Ch. 29th—*Varāṇasī* 17-15 *Nārada* 13-26 and () As the wealth of the twice-born is intended for the performance of religious rites and as women are incompetent for the same the devolution of wealth upon the wife is conditional as above

4 *Vijñāneśvara*'s refutation of it commences from "That is wrong" He does it in several ways, taking each text and explaining its meaning until he arrives at the conclusion at the end of his argument viz. "Of a man dying without issue separate and unrequited, his married wife leading a continent life takes the whole estate" (see further on page 1087 ll. 9-11).

For a lucid analysis of the whole position see *Sabedhi* (63 ll. 9-18 Tr p. 157 ll. 30-34)—Indeed for the succession of a wife to her husband's estate, is the appointment the cause, or the issue begotten thereby or is it a special reason and again of the special reason is appointment the principal cause or the issue or are both of equal importance—these are the six ways in which this question may be looked at, &c " see Tr P 157 ll. 30-34

See the observations of *Matinswamy Aiyar J* in *Mari vs Chinnammal S. Mad.* 44, pages 118-127 and also *Krishna vs Smt D. Mad.* at p. 74 &c.

5 i. e. of *Yājñavalkya* II. 135 (p. 1085 above).

6 i. e. Nor it is pertinent or relevant.

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succession ? Of these, if the appointment alone be the reason, it would follow that, even without having borne a son, she has a right to the estate, and the right of the son (thus¹) born to the estate would not follow. On the other hand if the offspring alone be the cause (of her claim), then in that case as the son alone has a right to the estate, the law (of inheritance) should not be stated beginning "with the wife &c"

(16) As to what is said that women have a title to property, either through the husband, or through the son, and not otherwise, that also is wrong, for it is inconsistent with the following² and other similar texts, viz "What was given before the nuptial fire, what was presented in the bridal procession, what was given in token of affection, what was received by the woman from her brother, her mother, or her father, are denominated the sixfold property of a woman"

(17) Moreover, on failure of sons of all descriptions, the law (of succession) has been stated commencing with "the wife, daughters &c." Now here, by affirming the right of a widow, who³ has been appointed to raise issue, the right of the *kṣhetraja* son himself to succeed to the estate is virtually affirmed. But that had already been declared⁴ and therefore the wife ought not to be mentioned in the law of succession to (the estate of) one who leaves no male issue

1 Colebrooke translates "subsequently produced", but the expression in the text is *Upannasya* which would mean "born". Having regard to the context there would be much difference in meaning in the two interpretations. As the assumption would concede to the widow the right of succession on the ground of appointment, she must be one who has already taken a step in the matter of the appointment, and who would be anticipating the birth of the issue. And her taking a step in the matter of begetting a son for her husband would be a condition precedent for the estate to vest in her. See the answer in refutation by Viṣṇūśaṅkara viz नियुक्ताया घनसन्ध वदता &c

2 Manu Ch IX. 194

3 In the original, the expression has been used as qualifying the widow—a sort of a condition precedent to her succession appears to have been laid down. It means—"by declaring the right of succession of a widow on the ground of her appointment &c"

4 The right of succession of sons of all sorts has been independently treated in a separate place and in that connection the right of succession of the *kṣhetraja* son also has been examined (see p 1046 l 15 &c above). It would therefore be inconsistent to suppose that the author wanted to treat the right of that son again here. (See Bālabhāṭṭa 191-192 and Subodhini 92)

(18) But it is alleged, the right of the widow who is authorized to raise up issue to her husband, is deduced from the text of *Gautama*¹. Of a childless man, let kinsmen, connected by *pinda*² by family name, or by descent from the same patriarch share the heritage or the widow or she may seek to raise up offspring (to him) This too is erroneous for it cannot be inferred as the meaning of this (text) that, if she seek to obtain offspring (then alone) she may take the goods of a childless man" but that, "persons connected by *pinda*, by family name or by descent from the same patriarch, share the effects of one who leaves no issue or his widow takes the estate and such widow may either seek to obtain progeny or may remain chaste" This is only an alternative course prescribed for (being adopted or not by) her. In other words, an alternative cannot be converted into a conditional. For the particle *vā* denoting an alternative course does not convey the sense of *yadā* if. Moreover it is fit, that a chaste wife alone should succeed to the estate, and not one who has sought appointment, as she has been censured by the law as well as by (the opinion of) the people. The succession of a chaste woman alone has been expressed in the text³. The widow of a childless man keeping unsullied her husband's bed, and persevering in religious observances, shall herself present his funeral oblation and also obtain his entire share."

* Page 98

A continent wife preferred.

And an (authority to raise up issue by) appointment has been condemned by *Mānu* by the following⁴: "By regenerate men a widow must not be authorized

1 Ch. XXVIII. 21 22 note above p 1069; see *Vedamśai* vs *Vedamśaya* *Aśvār* 81 Mad. 100 at p 106 *Genapet* vs *Tularum* 86 Bom. 88-90-18 Bom. L. R. at p. 869

2 See note above on this at p. 1071

3 *धृम*—continent, leading a strictly chaste life

4 i. e. two modes of conduct are suggested to her. She may either seek male issue by means of appointment, or she may remain chaste (see *Bāṣṇabhaṭṭi* p. 192 l. 30 *Subodhini* p. 64 ll. 6-7). Colebrooke translates, "This is an instruction to her &c."

5 of *Vṛddha-Mānu* see p 1069 ll. 4-7 above)

6 Ch. IX. 64

“to (conceive by) any other (than her husband), for they who
“authorise her to (conceive by) another, violate the enternal law,”
and similar other texts.

- (19) As for the text of Vasishtha¹ “An appointment shall not
5 “be made through covetousness for the estate” This also must be
interpreted to mean that, “if the husband die unseparated from his
“co-parceners or re-united with them, she has no right of succession to
“the estate, and therefore an appointment to raise up issue must not
“be resorted to for the sake of securing the succession to her offspring”
10 (20) As for the text of Nârada² “And they shall allow maintenance for
“his women till the end of their lives,” since in the text³ “The shares
“of re-united brethren are considered to be exclusively theirs,” the re-
union of co-parceners had been premised, that too⁴ must be understood
as only suggesting a maintenance for the childless women of these⁵
15 Nor is tautology to be objected to the text⁶ “The share of re united
“brethren &c” on the ground that the previous passage⁷ viz. “Among

1 Ch XVII 65 2 Ch XIII 26 3 of Nârada Oh XIII 24

4 i.e. the text of Nârada, in Oh XIII 26 5 i.e. of the re-united co-parceners

6 of Nârada Oh XIII 24 see note below The two passages are not
tautologous, because, while the first declares that the *Strîdhana* property of
women should be exempted from partition, the second lays down a clearly separate
rule whereby provision for the maintenance of the women of such a member is
made There would therefore be no fault of tautology (see Bâlabhâṭṭi p 194
l. 10 and Subodhini p 94 ll 12 and 13)

7 Nârada XIII 25 The full texts are as follows —

“सत्पुत्रानां तु यो भागस्तेषामेव स दृश्यते 24

“भ्रातृणामप्रजा प्रेया फश्चिञ्चेत्प्रव्रजेतु वा । विमजेरन् धन तस्य शेषास्तु स्त्रीधनं विना ॥ 25

“भरणं चास्य कुर्यान् स्त्रीणामा जीवनंश्चयात् । रक्षन्ति शय्या भर्तृश्रेद्वाच्छिन्द्रयित्वास्तु च ॥ 26

Tr “That portion which belonged to re-united coparceners is declared to be
absolutely theirs” 24

“If among several brothers one should die childless, or become a religious
ascetic, the others shall divide his property, excepting the *Strîdhana*” (25)

“They shall make provision for his women till they die, in case they remain
faithful to the bed of their husband. Should the women not (remain chaste) they
must cut off that allowance” 26 [Sacred Books of the East Vol XXXIII Pages
195-196]

See Pannappa vs Pappuvayyanganar 4 Mad at pp 31 and 32, and Subramanya
Pandya vs Siva Sabramanya Pillai 17 Mad. at pp 326-327 where, referring to

(Contd. on next page)

"brothers, if any one die without issue &c." (already) had a reference to re-united members. For by this explanation of what had been said before, women's separate property is exempted from partition, and a mere maintenance for their widows is at the same time ordained (21) As for the passage "And the childless wives of these &c." that will be explained (further on) as having a reference to the wife of an impotent man and such others. 5

(22) As for the argument, that the wealth of a regenerate man is designed for a sacrifice³ and women not being competent to the performance of a sacrifice, their succession to the property is unfit, that is wrong. For if every thing which is wealth be intended for sacrificial purposes, then charitable purposes, burnt offerings, and similar matters, must remain unaccomplished. Or again, if it be alleged that since sacrifice here signifies religious⁴ duty in general, and 10

(Contd. from last page)

this and other passages the court deduces the right of survivorship by which under the Mitākṣharā the surviving members of a joint family become entitled to an estate which would have become the absolute property of the deceased member had a partition been made during his life-time.

It may be noted that the *Dupahla* does not interpret the term "woman" used in this passage as including a wife but women actually espoused, but not having the rank of a wife, see *Dāyabhāga* Ch. XI, sect. 1 § 46 also 4 *Mad.* at p. 32. A distinction among wives by marriage & गृहीती स्त्रियाँ &c. will be found to have been referred to in *Rameswami vs Soodaralingaswami* 17 *Mad.* 422 at p. 437 and *Brideoona vs Radhemeni* 12 *Mad.* 72

1 i. of the male members of the family 2 Yājñavalkya II. 142.

3 Colbrooke translates "for religious uses" but the word in the original is (यज्ञ) *Yajña*, and in the discussion which immediately follows in the *Mitākṣharā* the author has used this word in contradistinction from religious purposes generally

4 i. e. the word sacrifice includes by implication all religious purposes in general; यज्ञ is that which implies something which has not been actually expressed, implication of something in addition or any similar object where only one is mentioned "सन्निविष्टस्य सति लेतापसिक्तस्य च"

The three words (यज्ञ इत्यमरः) *Yajña* or *Yāga* (sacrifice), *Dana* (donation), and *Homa* (burnt offering) are explained in (*Subodhini* p. 64) thus:—The relinquishment of a thing in favour of a deity is a *Yāga* or consecration the same object terminating with an offering in the fire is a *Homa*. *Bālabhāṭṭa* adds a further technical distinction—when the offering is with the accompaniment of यज्ञ it is *Yāga*; without it, it is a simple *Homa*. And a *Dana* or donation, or gift, is that by which the proprietary right is created in another by terminating one's own right of property in the thing transferred.

charitable donations, burnt offerings and the rest are acts of religious duty, the applicableness of wealth to those uses is uncontradicted, thus then the other¹ two objects of life viz *Artha* and *Kāma* which (also) are to be secured by wealth would remain unaccomplished, and in that case there would be an inconsistency in the following passages of Yājñavalkya, Gautama and Manu viz, "One² should not neglect religious duty, wealth or pleasure (such as he can accomplish) according to his capacity," so³ "To the utmost of his power, a man should not let morning, noon or evening be fruitless in respect of religious merit, wealth and pleasure" and also⁴ "These (i.e. the organs⁵ of perception) cannot effectually be so restrained by 'abstinence'"⁶ (23) Moreover, if wealth be designed for sacrifices (only) the argument would be reversed, by which it is shown, that the

1 The four objects or purposes of a man's life (पुरुषार्थः *Puruṣārtha*) in this world are (1) *Dharma* (धर्म) religious merit, (2) *Artha* (अर्थ)—attainment of riches or worldly prosperity, (3) *Kāma* (काम) desire for sensual enjoyment, and (4) *Mokṣa* (मोक्ष), final emancipation or deliverance of the soul from recurring births

These are the four objects which a man has to accomplish during his life in this world. And the objector says that if all the wealth were appropriated towards *Dharma* only, the other two viz *Artha* and *Kāma* would remain unaccomplished, and thus there would be a breach of the supreme duty of attaining all the four objects of life

2 Yājñavalkya Âcârâdhyâya 115 p 310 above. The passage in the text of Yājñavalkya reads differently from the quotation here given by Vyāṇaśvara viz धर्मयुक्तमन्त्रे काले यथाकिया Tr "should not neglect religious duty &c in their proper season" This is made further clear in the passage of Gautama next cited, which when freely translated would read thus "Let him not pass idly (any part of the day, be it) morning, midday, or evening, (but) according to his ability (he shall make each useful) by the acquisition of spiritual merit or of wealth, and by taking his pleasure" And generally, the mornings are prescribed for the first and the last i.e. (*Dharma* & *Mokṣa*), the midday for the *Artha*, and evenings for the *Kāma*

3 Gautama Ch IX 46

4 Manu Ch II 96

5 These organs are enumerated in Verses 89, 90, 92 of Ch II by Manu. In Verse 91 ten of these are classified into two groups viz "Organs of sense" (बुद्धिन्द्रियाणि), "and organs of action" (कर्मेन्द्रियाणि), and verse 92 declares mind as "the eleventh organ, which by its quality belongs to both kinds" The meaning is, that these organs cannot be so effectually restrained by a [course of abstinence as they would be by a sense of satiety generated by enjoying them

6 Non-use (असेवया) See note above,

careful preservation of gold under the text¹ : Let gold be "preserved" is intended not for religious ends but for human purposes. (24) Moreover if the word sacrifice import religious duty in² general, the succession of women to estates is most proper since they also are competent to the performance of auspicious³ and conservatory acts (25) As for the last text which declares the dependence of women : A woman does not⁴ deserve independence, let there be dependence but where is the objection for the acceptance of property ?

(26) How then are the texts such as⁵ 'Wealth was produced for the sake of (the performance of) solemn sacrifices and others to be interpreted ? The answer is that that text is to be interpreted to mean that wealth which was obtained⁶ for the (express) purpose of (performing) a sacrifice must be appropriated exclusively to that purpose even by sons and other successors, as it has been declared to be an offence even in the case of sons and other successors, generally⁷ in the text⁸ He who "having received articles for a sacrifice, disposes not of them (for "that purpose) shall become a kite or a crow

1 This is from the 18th Tīpā (Addition) of the 4th Section (Paṇḍa) of the 3rd Chapter (Adhyāya) of Jaimini. The passage in full from the Veda is as follows.— *सुवर्णं यत्नतः संरक्ष्यते श्रेष्ठं यत् । सुवर्णं न सृजति ।* Tait. Br. II. II. 4. 0. This passage enjoins the careful preservation of gold lest it lose its brightness and be tarnished. The question raised on it is whether the observation of the precept be essential to the efficacy of sacrifice or serve only a human purpose and the result of the reasoning is that the precept refers to the person and not to a sacrifice. Vyāsaśāstra says that this demonstrated conclusion or *Siddhānta* (निष्कर्ष) would be contradicted if it were assumed that gold is intended only for a sacrifice (see Babodhini pp 55 60 Tr. p. 159-163 and Bāṣambhaṭṭi p. 195 Anandāśrama No. 4 p. 161).

2 See note above p. 1077 n. 4

3 *सुवर्णं* &c see note on p. 1014 n. 4 above

4 *अङ्गी* 4. is not fit to be independent. See *Nathubai vs Jachar* 1 Bom. 121 at pp. 123 and 124 as regards the capacity of a woman to hold property and to enter into a contract without the husband's consent & ratification. But it would be otherwise if the property be immovable, or be a property producing a periodical income. See *Bharu vs Raykrant* 30 Bom. 329 at pages 239-240

5 See above p. 10 3 II 3-8

6 Acquired : a. in charity e. g. by donation &c see Bāṣambhaṭṭi p. 195 II. 5-7 Babodhini p. 96 II. 6-8

7 4. without particularisation (सर्वत्र) . 8 See *Manu* Ch. II 25

(27) Even as to what has been said by Kâtyâyana "Heirless property goes to the king, deducting however a subsistence for the females as well as for the funeral charges, but the goods belonging to a venerable priest¹ let him bestow on venerable priests," *i. e.* heirless property or wealth which is without an heir to succeed 'goes to the king' *i. e.* becomes the property of the sovereign 'deducting, however, a subsistence for the females as well as for the funeral charges', it means that after excluding or setting apart a sufficiency for the food and raiment of the women, and as much as may be requisite for the funeral charges such as the funeral repasts and other obsequies in honour of the (deceased) owner, the residue goes to the king. Such is the construction of the text. An exception is added: "but the goods belonging to a 'venerable priest,' deducting, however, a subsistence for the females as well as the charges of obsequies, 'Let him bestow on a venerable priest.'" (28) But even this relates to women² kept in concubinage, for the term employed is "females"³ The text⁴ of Nârada likewise relates to women of the harem, since the word used is women⁵ "Except⁶ the wealth of a Brâhmana, but a king, who is attentive to the obligations of law⁷ should allot a maintenance to the women of such a person. Thus has been declared the law of inheritance." (29) But since the term *patni* is here⁸ employed, the succession of a wedded

1 A *Srotriya* is a learned Brâhmana "One is a Brâhmana merely by birth, he is called a *durva* after the performance of rites, he becomes a *vima* by learning, and is designated a *Srotriya* when he has all the three "

"जन्मना ब्राह्मणो ज्ञेयः संस्कारैर्द्विज उच्यते । विद्यया याति विप्रतः त्रिभिः श्रोत्रिय उच्यते ॥"

It is such a one whose wealth has been unanimously declared to be unfit to be taken by the king

Bâlbhattacharya reads as *Srotriya-yopapâdayet* : *i. e.* "should devote it for the use of " a *Srotriya* Brâhmana

2 अवरुद्धास्त्रीविषयम् See further on Yājñ II 290 and the *Mitâkṣharâ* thereon

3 The word is *Yojit* which is derived from युज् 'to serve'

4 Oh XIII 52

5 The word is *Stri*. It is derived as स्त्रियायति गर्भोऽस्याम् The text of Nârada refers to women generally

6 The last portion of verse 54 is ["In default of all, that (wealth) goes to the king" and V 55 begins with the exception to this last clause

7 धर्मपरायण — *i. e.* intent on following the dictates of *Dharma*

8, Here : *i. e.* in Yājñ II 135 see pp 1065 l 9 above,

wife, who is chaste, is not inconsistent with those passages. (30) Therefore it is established as the right interpretation (of this passage) that when a man who was separated (from his co-heirs) and not re-united (with them) dies leaving no male issue, his wife takes the estate in the first instance. For¹ partition has been discussed,² and re-union is to be subsequently considered.

(31) It must be understood that the explanation proposed by Śrīkara and others restricting (the widow's succession) to a small portion of property is refuted by this³. For even where there are

* Page 94 legitimate sons it is provided, whether the partition be made in the owner's lifetime or after his decease, that the wife shall take a share equal to the sons. "If" he "make the allotments equal his wives must be made partakers of equal portions." And again "Of heirs dividing after (the death of) the father let the mother also take an equal share. Such being the case it is a mere error to say that the wife takes nothing but a subsistence from the wealth of her husband who died leaving no male issue."

(32) But if it is argued that under the terms of the texts (above cited) "his wives must be made partakers of equal portions" and "Let the mother also take an equal share" a woman takes only as much wealth as is sufficient for her maintenance that is wrong. For the words *amā*, share or portion and *sama*, equal would thereby be deemed meaningless.

(33) Or again it may be argued that if the wealth be great, she takes precisely enough for her subsistence, but if small, she takes a share equal to that of a son that too would be wrong, for variable

1 What the author means is this: that the widow succeeds to all description of property except those which form the subject of partition in verses 114-126 above and also those which form the subject of re-union in verses 138 & 139 *Jasod Koor vs Shao Prasad Singh*, 17 Cal. 33 at p. 36

2 From Verse 114 to 127 above

3 i. e. by the argument which follows—See *Bāṇambhaṭṭi* p. 197 l. 16 and *Bodhidhīni* p. 66 ll. 25 etc

4. *Yājñ.* II. 116 p. 997 ll. 14-16 5. *Yājñ.* II. 123 p. 1097 ll. 11-12

6. For a lucid explanation of this passage see *Bodhidhīni* p. 66 Lines 25 to 32 and p. 67 ll. 1-2 and *Bāṇambhaṭṭi* p. 197

ness¹ in the precept will be the consequence Since if the estate be considerable the texts (above cited) viz "his wives must be made partakers
"of equal portions" and "let the mother also take an equal share", would
be construed, regard being had to another text² also which lays down
5 a bare maintenance, to suggest a share adopted for a bare support
But if the estate be inconsiderable, the same passage would (have to
be construed to) indicate the assignment of a share equal to a son's.

(34) Thus, in the instance of the *Châturmâsya*³ sacrifices, in the
disquisition (of the *Mīmâmsâ*) on the passage
10 An objection *Dwayoh pranayanti*, where it is maintained by
the opponent that the rules for the preparation of the sacrificial fire
at the *Soma-Yâga* extend⁴ to these sacrifices, and as a consequence of
it, the injunction "not to construct a Northern Altar (*Uttara Veda*)
"at the *Vaiśvadeva* sacrifice nor at the *S'unâśīrya* sacrifice, must be
15 "understood as a prohibition of such altar⁵, but it is answered by an
"advocate⁶ of the right opinion, that it is not a prohibition⁷ of that
"altar at the first and the last parts as suggested
The answer "by extending to these sacrifices the rules for
"preparing the sacrificial fire at the *Soma-yâga*, but an exception to

1 It is a rule that "a single sentence once uttered carries only one meaning" सङ्कटुच्चरितं शब्दं सङ्कटुदेवार्थमवगमयति, and if the texts cited above were to be interpreted to have one meaning in case where the estate is large, and quite another meaning where the estate is small, that would be contrary to the universal rule of interpretation stated above i.e. it would lead to the वाक्यभेद दोष (See Subodhini p 97 ll 5-10 Bâlabhattacharya p 197 ll 26-30)

2 Viz Nârada Oh XIV 26 "And should provide for the maintenance of his women till their death" (See p 236 l 21 above) भरणं चास्य कुर्वीरन्स्त्रीणामा जीवनं संयात् (Subodhini p 67 l 9 Bâlabhattacharya p 197 l 29)

3 *Châturmâsya* is the name of the sacrifice performed every four months viz at the beginning of *Kârtika*, *Fâlguna*, and *Âshâdha* It consists of four parts in order viz (1) The *Vaiśvadeva*, (2) the *Varuna-Praghâsa*, (3) the *Sâlamodha*, and (4) the *Sunâśīrya*

4 An *Atidesa* (अतिदेश) is an extended application, or an application by analogy See note 4 on page 1077 above The argument here is that the general practice prevailing at the *Soma-yâga* may, by analogy, be applied here

5 i.e., the Northern altar

6 Mark the expression It is the position of the follower or apologist of the right opinion, and not the right opinion itself, which is given at the end of the discussion

7 *Pratishedha*—a prohibition, a cutting down, delimitation

the express rule prepare an *Uttara-rehī* at this sacrifice bringing in the construction of the *Uttara-rehī*, it is urged in reply by the opponent that (even then) variableness in the precept must follow.

An objection again. since the same precept thus authorizes the occas-

sional construction of the altar, with reference to a prohibition of it, at the first and last of the (four) periods of sacrifice and commands a construction of it at the two middle periods independently¹ of any other maxim. But it is finally shown as the

Final conclusion right doctrine for the purpose of obviating² the

objection of variableness in the precept, that the

prohibition of the northern altar at the first and last of the periods of sacrifice is a *Nūjñaurāda* and that regarding the injunction *Dwayoh³ pranyanti* as an *Arthavākya*⁴ the injunction "prepare the *Uttara-rehī*

1 i.e. without reference to any particular maxim but quite by a reasoning on general principles.

2 Mark the word *śānti*—apprehension. It is such alectics very critically conceived and expressed which demonstrate the high position of *Vijñānara*. Even the remote apprehension of a variableness in the precept is to be avoided, and for this any other minor blemish may be accepted.

3 अथैव an explanatory repetition of or reference to what is already mentioned; a supplementary repetition as distinguished from an injunction or *vidhi*.

अथैव is a declaratory assertion whose purport is either praise or blame (अथैवविशेषणार्थं अथैव). *Arthavākya* passages are of two kinds, being either complements of *vidhi* passages or complements of *śānti* passages. It is again of three kinds viz: *Goparada*, *Asura* and *Dhātārtharada*.

विधि उपपत्तिः साधनविशेषिते । उपपत्तिरुपपत्तिरुपपत्तिरिति ॥

4 The above discussion is based on what is known as the "*Dwayoh-pranyanti*" Maxim of the *Mīmāṃsā*. For a lucid exposition of the passage in the text of the Maxim and its bearing on the text, see Subodhini pp. 67-68 and Bijambhāṣī which as usual elaborates the points in the Subodhini. The following, in short is the summary of the discussion.

General remarks: The two sacrifices referred to in this discussion are the *Soma yaga* and the *Chāturmasya*. The *Chāturmasya* sacrifice has been explained in note 3 on page 108 above. The principal sacrifices are the *Soma*, the *Darśa-Pāṇamam* and the *Agnihotra*; these are known as the *Pratyis* (प्रति), or Principal Sacrifices. The *Chāturmasya* is a special sacrifice and falls under the *Darśa-Pāṇamam*. Such a one is called a *Vijñi* (विज्ञि), or 'a special rite'.

Pranyanam is the carrying of the fire from the *Garhaspathya* altar to the *Akroṣṭya*.

(Continued on next page)

"at this sacrifice" Commands the construction of the northern altar at the two middle periods only viz the *Varunapraghâsa* and *S'âkamedha*

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Lastly, the construction of the 'Northern altar' has been ordained in the *Soma* Sacrifice only, and not in the *Darsa Pûrnâmâsa* sacrifice

These are some of the general rules of practice ordained at the sacrifices

Then there are the following texts of the *Veda*, in reference to the *Châturmâsya* sacrifice, viz ,

(१) उपात्र वपन्ति 'Upa atra vapani,' Tr "In this (: c the *Châturmâsya* sacrifice) the Northern altar is to be established "

(२) न वैश्वदेवे उत्तरवेदिमुपक्रियन्ति न सुनासीरिये—'Na Vaisvadeve uttaravedimupaliranti na Sunâsîriya' Tr "The Northern Altar is not to be established either in the *Vaisvadeva*, or in the *Sunâsîriya* portion

(३) उत्त वा एतौ यज्ञस्य यद्गृह्यप्रज्ञास शाकमेधश्चेति द्वयोः प्रणयान्ति—'Uttâ vâ etau Yajñasya yat Varuna Praghâsah Sâkmedhascheti Dvayoh Pranayanti "

Tr " The two legs (: c mainstay), of the *yajña* are the *Varuna Praghâsa* and the *Sâkamedha*, the two must have fire kindled in them

Taking these texts and having regard to the general rules of sacrifice according to which the *Pranayana* in the case of the *Soma* alone has been laid down in the *Śruti*, while there is no provision for the same in the case of the *Darsa-Pûrnâmâsa*, the objector or *Pûrva-Pakṣa* says that the procedure to be adopted for a *Pranayana* should be that prescribed for the *Soma* inasmuch as it is स्वर्गक and not the अवर्गक one in the case of the दर्शपूर्णमास

Of the three texts quoted above, No 1 lays down that the 'Northern Altar' which is invariably connected with fire-kindling, should be consecrated in the *Châturmâsya Yûga* This is in the nature of a *general rule* or *Vidhi* which has been cut down by No 2, according to which the 'Northern Altar' is not to be consecrated either at the first or the fourth quarter of the *Châturmâsya* sacrifice, viz. in *Vaisvadeva* and *Sunâsîriya*

No 3, has some praise for the 2nd and 3rd quarters viz *Varuna-Praghâsa* and *Sâkamedha*, and then it says that the fire-kindling should take place in the two (: c these two) Shortly stated the position is this

(1) The Northern Altar should be established

(2) But not in the case of the first or the fourth quarters

(3) In the 2nd and 3rd quarters fire should be kindled

These rules have been construed to yield the following plain result The first is a "general rule" or a *Sâmânîya Vidhi* The second is an exception to it and the third is a necessary deduction following as the combined result of Nos (1) and (2) Further, the third is in the nature of an *Arthavâda* showing the reason why the second and the third are not subjected to any exception in respect of fire-kindling.

(Contd on next page)

(35) Again as to the doctrine that from the text of Mann¹ 'the father shall take the inheritance or the brothers.'

"Of him who leaves no male issue" as well as from that of Śākhya "The wealth of a man, who departs for heaven, leaving no male issue goes

Another position
based on certain
texts.

"to his brothers, in their absence his parents shall take or his eldest wife" The rule is deduced that the wealth of a man leaving no male issue goes to his brothers and from the text² Let them provide for "the support of his women for life" it also becomes established that the wife obtains (as much) wealth (as is) sufficient for her maintenance. Thus being so (it follows that) if a rich man die leaving no male issue,

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The above construction harmonises the three texts and does not introduce any conflict such as would result in an option.

But the opponents argue thus. We concede that the first is a general rule or *I dhi*; and the second is a special negative *I dhi* by way of an exception. But the exception is as regards the Northern Altar and not as to the kindling of fire which may be kindled under the general procedure laid down in the *Soma* sacrifice and thus they further contend that the clause *Dasyah Prapayanti* in No 3 is to be construed as being intended to apply also to the first and the fourth quarters of the sacrifice by the *I dhi* and the *Soma* sacrifice.

In short, what they maintain is that all that No 3 lays down is that the Northern Altar should not be established in the case of the *I dhi* and the *Soma* quarters. This does not prohibit the kindling of the fire which has been presented quite generally in No 3. Thus they say here there is a virtual conflict between the text, and thus there is scope for the rule of option (*I dhi*) to prevail, and taking advantage of this, they contend that the northern altar should be constructed in the *I dhi* and the *Soma* quarters.

To this the *Riddhantins* or the upholders of the correct opinion reply that this method of argument involves the fault of "variableness in the precept (*I dhi-I dhi*)", and cannot therefore be allowed. For the opponents once construe No 1 as a "general rule of *I dhi*" with No 3 as an exception. They construe it again as a "general rule" side by side No 3 which they now construe as an absolute rule creating contradiction. They get the fire by the first view and altar by the second which is faulty and cannot therefore be allowed.

As stated at the beginning of this note the reader will find a very lucid exposition of this in the short but clear statement in the *Sukodhā* pp. 67-69 Tr pp 168-174.

According to this maxim, it would be wrong to construe a rule in one way in one place and in quite another way in another place.

the wife takes as much as is adequate for her subsistence, and the rest the brothers take, but (that) if the estate be barely enough for the support of the widow, or less than that, then to provide (for the case of) a conflict (which might arise) viz whether the wife alone should take or the brothers also, the text¹ “the wife, the daughters &c” has been propounded to demonstrate the potentiality of the (claim of the) first

Answer (claimant) This opinion too the Reverend Teacher² does not tolerate For he interprets the text³: “Of

- 10 “him who leaves no male issue the father shall take the inheritance, or his brothers” as laying down an option, and not as laying down an order (of succession), but only as indicating the right (of persons) in the matter of inheritance, and that, that text becomes applicable when the group of heirs such as the wife and the rest fail, and also that the text of *Saṅkha* relates to re-united brothers
- 15 (36) Moreover, it does not appear either from this text or from the context, that it is relative to an inconsiderable estate If (the concluding portion of the text viz) “on failure of the first among these, “the next in order is heir” be restricted to the case of a small property,⁴ by reference to another passage, in two instances (viz of)
- 20 “the widow and the daughters,” but (be understood to) relate to wealth generally in the case of ‘the father and the rest’ the consequent defect of the variableness in the precept referred to above affects this interpretation So this is⁵ a mere trifle (37) As for the text of *Hārīta*. “If a woman, become a widow in her youth, be ill-
- 25 “behaved⁶, maintenance must in that case be given to her for the ‘support⁷ of life,” that too is intended for a denial of the right of a

1 Of *Yājñ* II 135 see p 1065

2 i e Visvarâpachârya (Subodhini & Bâlabhattri)

3 Of *Manu* Ch. IX 185

4 On page 94 l v for वाक्यान्तरमपेक्षाल्पधनविषयत्वम् read विषयत्वम्

5 Viz “They should provide for their maintenance &c” *Nârada* Ch f XIII 26 See n above 236 and p 21

6 This यत्किञ्चिदेतत् does not appear in the translation by Mr Colebrooke

7 कर्कशा *Karkasâ* Colebrooke translates “head-strong” Mr Mandlik translates as “If a woman becoming a widow in her youth, come to be suspected of unchastity &c (p 79 ll 9-10)” Bâlabhattri renders it as क्रूर cruel The dictionaries translate the word as “ill-conducted, unchaste, unfaithful” when used in

widow suspected of incontinency to take the whole estate (moreover) from this very passage¹ it is apparent that a widow not suspected of misconduct has a right to take the whole property (38) And with this same view it has been said by Sākhya² "Or his senior wife"

*Page 95 Being senior i.e. senior or superior in qualities, and unsuspected of incontinency she takes the whole wealth and like a mother maintains any other (wife of her husband who is) ill-conducted. This all is unexceptionable

(39) Therefore it has been established that a wedded wife takes the whole estate of a man, who, being separated (from his co-heirs) and not subsequently re-united (with them) dies leaving no male issue

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reference to a woman. This sense is also to be found in the following couplet from the lexicon *Pratya* (प्रत्य) cited in the *Pratya* (Pratya) (1113-17).

असिद्धं तस्य वत् इति सिद्धं इति तस्यैव वत्तत्त्वमिति

It is derived from the two words असिद्ध (असिद्ध) and वत् (वत्) असिद्ध वत्तत्त्वमिति. He who is aggressive as well as harsh. The translation given above would thus be appropriate. I have given an explanation of this term in "Suspected of incontinency" and not "In-continence". The suspicion being caused by her general behaviour and manners.

In *Sarvabhai vs Lurmitai* Bom. at 109 W. 1899 O. J. while considering this text doubted whether this text applied to maintenance. See also *Id.* vs *Ganga* 7 Bom. at p. 88.

1 असिद्ध वत्तत्त्वमिति—There is a special meaning in the expression असिद्ध—वत्तत्त्वमिति (1st para) is derived from the word असिद्ध (to waste). Mark the expression which indicates that the allowance is to be given to her not so much for the support of life with a view to its extension or prolongation but it is to be given till the life wears away. The meaning is: "Let her have a subsistence till the end of her life wears away."

असिद्धां निर्दिष्टां अनिर्दिष्टां अनिर्दिष्टां अनिर्दिष्टां. These expressions must be construed in the sense of indigent, as opposed to possessed of means irrespective of the sources of provision or non provision. See *Mauli Ameer vs Kumbhar* 47 All. 403 following 23 Bom. 249 and the cases in 2 All. 561 and 4 All. 443.

It is from this it is clear that the rule that a chaste wife takes the whole inheritance is also approved of by this writer. *Bijankhaji* p. 331-3.

See *Vinayalax vs Lurmitai* 1 Bom. II O. Rep. (O. O. J.) 11 at p. 144.

[Colebrooke Sect II]

[Right of the Daughters and Daughter's Sons]

- (1) On failure of her, the daughters (inherit). The plural is used in "the daughters" to suggest the equal or unequal participation of daughters alike or dissimilar by class (2) Thus¹ Kâtyâyana says: "A wife takes the estate of her husband, *ie* such a one as does not lead an incontinent life, and in default of her the daughter, if she be unmarried then " And also Brhaspati² "The wife is pronounced (to be) the successor to the wealth of her husband, and, in her default, the daughter As a son, so does the daughter of a man proceed from his several limbs. How then should any other person take her father's wealth?"

- (3) Here, however, if there be a competition between a married and an unmarried daughter, the unmarried one takes the succession under the specific provisions of the text above cited, *viz* "In default of her, the daughter (takes) if she be unmarried then " (4) Moreover, if the competition be between an enriched and unprovided daughter, the unprovided inherits, and on failure of such, the enriched one succeeds For the text of Gautama³ *viz* "A woman's *strîdhana* goes to her daughters, unmarried or unprovided" is equally applicable in the case of the father's estate (5) Nor, must it be supposed that this relates to the appointed daughter for, in treating of the male issue,

1 According to the Mitâkṣharâ, the right of a daughter is based on consanguinity and not religious merit, as is the case under the Dâya-Bhâga, under which no daughter could inherit unless she was capable of bearing male issue, who would then offer funeral oblations to the maternal grandfather, so that widowed daughters having no male issue, or daughters who have an incapacity for bringing any but daughters into the world, are excluded under the Dâya-Bhâga (See Ch XI 2 1) *Pramila Devi vs Chandia Sekhar* 48 All 450 in this respect the Smṛti-Chandrikâ in giving the reason of this rule appears to adopt the same line of reasoning (See Ch XI sect II p 12) But the Madras High Court held this to be a merely moral precept and has followed the Bombay ruling in *Adayappa vs Rudraiva* 4 Bom 104 at p 111 in *Simmani Ammal vs Muttammal* 3 Mad 265 at p 269 See also *Vedammal vs Vedanayaga* 31 Mad 100 at p 108, and also *Vinayakrav vs Luxmibai* 1 Bom H O Rep (O O J) at p 125

Daughter's daughter's son is preferable to the sister's son *Kalimuthan Pallai vs Ammamuthu* 58 Mad 238

2 Ch XXV 55-56

3 Ch XXVIII 22

“(a husband of) an equal class, the maternal grand-father becomes
“the grandsire of a son’s son, he shall offer the funeral cake and
“take the estate”

5

[Colebrooke Sect III]

[Right of Parents]

(1) On failure of these (heirs) the two parents *i.e.* the mother and the father are successors to the property

(2) Although¹ the order, in which parents succeed to the estate, do

(Contd from last page)

“in the case of a succession to the father’s estate, the son, grandson, his son,
“widow, daughter, daughter’s son, daughter’s daughter &c would be the order
“inferable by analogy, having regard to (the doctrine of) propinquity *Vijñāneśvara*
“also having referred to the text of Gautama (Oh XXVIII s 22), viz “a woman’s
“stridhana goes to her daughters whether married or unmarried” as being
“equally applicable in the case of the father’s estate, this right of the daughter’s
“daughters to succeed is also approved by him. Otherwise, the daughter’s
“daughters having been referred to first (*i.e.* in the succession to the mother’s
“property) and there being no reference to them, nor their inclusion here, it
“would come to their entire exclusion as heirs at all” And so *Bālabhāṭṭa*
maintains that the daughter’s daughter is also an heir immediately after the
daughter’s son. And this is proper

West and Buhler in their *Hindu Law* [third Edition p 130 (c)] have a note on this subject. It does not refer to this line of reasoning of *Bālabhāṭṭa*, and is unconvincing as a ground for excluding daughter’s daughter. Further on, at p 477, a precedent from Thanā has been quoted, in which the answer simply states in general terms that the second cousins and the grand-daughter are not heirs.

The exclusion of this class of heirs *viz.* daughter’s daughter from their proper place in the order of succession would thus appear to be not based on sound reasons. Act II of 1929 has now definitely placed her in the line of heirs.

1 Mark the following passage from the *Subodhinī* which serves as a very good introduction to the passage in the *Mitâksharâ*. See *Subodhinī* p 70 ll 31-33. Indeed, in the absence of the daughter or the daughter’s son, the parent’s right of succession is laid down. However, as the term ‘parents’ *Pitarau* is in the *Ekāśeṣha*-uniresidual-compound form *i.e.* retaining the one member of the compound and omitting others, the question would arise whether the parents take conjointly or severally, and again whether the order of succession is optional or regulated and fixed.

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- in the sentence¹ in which the compound is resolvable, and also (since) in the case where the *ekasheśha* (compound) is not used, *i e* in the regular² compound expression (*mâtâpitarau*, *i e* mother and father), the word mother is stated first, it follows from the order of the
- 5 terms and that of the sense which is thence deduced, and according to the series thus presented in answer to an inquiry concerning the order of succession, that the mother takes the estate in the first instance, and, on failure of her, the father (3) Besides, the father is a common parent to the other sons also, but the mother is not so, and since her
- 10 propinquity is consequently greatest, it is just that she should take the estate in the first instance, conformably to the text³ "to him who "is the nearest among the *sapindas*, the inheritance shall belong".
- (4) Nor is the claim in virtue of propinquity restricted to *sapindas*⁴

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Mâtâ cha pitâ cha, only one word viz *pitâ* is retained and it is expressive of the other which is dropped अग्रौ, अन्तर, are other instances. It may be noticed thus, that according to strict grammatical interpretation any plural form is an instance of *ekasheśha*, *e g* रामा = रामश्च रामश्च &c. This *ekasheśha* is optional, and the regular form may be retained *e g* instead of *Pitarau* (*okasheśha*), it may be *Mâtâpitarau* (*dwandwa*) See Pânini I 2-70

1 *Vigraha* is the dissolution of the compound, and a *vigraha-wâkya* is the sentence in which the dissolution of the compound is brought out. The compound expressions *pitarau* as well as *Mâtâ-pitarau* are both resolvable into the component elements in the same way: *e* *Mâtâ cha pitâ cha*—"Mother as well as the father"

2 See Pânini II 2 34. This Sâtra states the rule that a word-form which has fewer vowels is placed first in a *dwandwa* compound and the *Urtika* on this enumerates several cases in which certain word forms are placed first *e g* names of seasons and stars consisting of equal syllables, a word consisting of light vowels, a word expressive of the more honourable of the two (अग्रहैतत्) &c, are placed first, and this last class is illustrated in the *Mahâbhâshya* of Patañjali and in the *Kâshikâ Vṛtti* of Wâmana by this very compound word viz *Mâtâpitarau*

3 Of Manu Ch IX 187. See *Babulal vs Nankulal*, 22 Cal 339 at p 346 *Chinnasami Pillai vs Kunju Pillai*, 35 Mad 152 at p 158, 159

4 *Sapinda*. See note (1) on p 1071 (*Supra*). Colebrooke translates "Kinsmen allied by funeral oblations," and *Samânodaka* as "kindred connected by libations of water." See *Umair Bahadur vs Uday Chand* 6 Oal 119 at p 125 (*F B*) as regards the meaning of the terms *sapinda* see pages 124 to 127 where the Court observes at p 127 "These considerations leave no room for doubt that the author of the *Mitâksharâ* has used the word *sapinda* here not in the sense of 'connection by funeral oblations,' but of connection by particles of one body as defined in the *Âchârakânda* (Verse 52 &c)" See also *Lakshmanammal vs Tiruvengada* 5 Mad 241 at p 245

- (2) As to what has been argued by Dhârêśwara¹, that 'under
 Dhârêśwara's
 argument
 'the following text of Manu² "Of a son dying
 "childless, the mother shall take the estate, and, if
 "the mother also be dead, the father's mother shall
 5 "take the heritage", even while the father is living, if the mother be
 'dead, the father's mother & the paternal grand-mother, shall take
 'the succession, and not the father because wealth taken by the
 'father may go even to sons dissimilar in class, but what is inherited
 'by the paternal grand-mother, goes³ to such only as appertain to the
 10 'same tribe and that therefore the paternal grand-mother takes the
 estate.' (3) This even the Holy teacher⁴ does not assent to, because the
 heritable right of sons even dissimilar in class has
 Not approved of
 by Viśvarûpachârya
 been expressly ordained by a passage above cited.⁵
 "The sons of a Brâhmana (in the several tribes)
 15 "have four shares, or three, or two, or one etc"

(4) As to the text of Manu⁶ "The property of a Brâhmana must
 "never be taken by the King, this is the settled rule", that intends the
 sovereign, and not a son⁷ (i.e. of the late owner by a woman of the
 Kshatriya family)

(5) Among brothers also the uterine¹ brothers take the inheritance in the first instance under the text's "To him, who is the nearest *sapin la*, the inheritance shall belong", since the non uterine brothers are remote through the difference of the mothers.

(6) If there be no uterine brothers, those by different² mothers inherit the estate

(7) On failure of brothers also, their sons³ share the heritage in the order of their respective fathers.

1 Colebrooke translates half-blood and whole-blood for सुतृप्त and मृत्तु. Colebrooke adds in bracket (or whole); the expression in the Mitākṣharā is *Sakara* (i.e. persons (born) of the same uterus) and the question would be of importance in the case of those among whom re-marrying of women is allowed by law. For in such a case there might exist brothers who are uterine but not of the whole blood.

* of Manu Ch. IX. 187

See *S. Subramanyam vs Sita Subramanyam* 17 Mad. at p. 3. *Pitambar vs Pannoo* - Bom. L. R. 1 1-137 = *4 Bom 317 and *Shayam vs Warab* 10 Bom. L. R. 389 = 3 Bom. 300 where this passage has been referred to.

3 According to the *Mayilla*, the brother's son comes in after the brother. He does not agree with the opinion of the Mitākṣharā as here expressed (see Mandlik p. 80 ll. 29-36) see *Haridas vs Panchooda* 5 Bom. L. R. 516. But this rule does not go beyond brother's children. *Chankila Bhat vs Vuna Kwar* 4 All. 73 (1 C) The stricter rule of the Mitākṣharā was applied in *Keshi vs Kalka I* 3 All. 511 (F D) where an uncle of the half blood was given preference to the son of an uncle of the whole blood.

4 This expression has received considerable judicial notice especially in Madras and Allahabad the opinions expressed in the two courts differing from one another.

According to the view expressed in Madras the expression 'his son' does not include 'grandson'. See *Swamy vs Lakshminarasamma* 5 Mad. 701. *Chinnaswami Pillai vs Annas Pillai* 35 Mad. 16 and this view seems to be in agreement with *Sabodhini* (see p. 74 ll. 3 20; see also Mr. Mandlik's note p. 360). A contrary opinion has been expressed in Allahabad; see *Kalish Rai vs Panchnadra* 1 All. 18. *Bhat Singh vs Lattu Singh* 34 All. 663 at pp. 667 and 675. See also *Aashitai vs Moreswar* 35 Bom. 389 = 13 Bom. L. R. 63. In the judgment of this case the word line has been interpreted to extend to 6 degrees and reference is made to *Dhyan Ram Singh vs Dhyan Ugar Singh* 14. M. L. A. 373 at p. 391 following what is known as the Harrington theory. As to the theory thus propounded by Mr. Harrington see Mandlik pages 350-383. Its practical working out is not free from difficulty (see West and Dahler's *Hindu Law* 3rd Edition p. 121 seq.) The remark

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(8) In case of competition between brothers and brothers' sons, the brothers' sons have no title to the succession, for the right of inheritance of brothers' sons is declared to be on failure of brothers

5 (9) When¹, however, a brother has died leaving no male issue, and the estate has devolved on his brothers generally, if any one of (such) brothers die even (yet) before a distribution of then brother's estate takes place, his sons do, in that case acquire a title through their father, and it is fit, therefore, that a share should be allotted to them, in then father's² right, at a distribution of property between
10 them and the surviving brothers

[Colebrooke Sec V]

[Succession of kindred of the same family name (agnates) termed
Gotrajas or Gentiles]

(1) If there be not even the brothers' sons, the *Gotrajas*³ take

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in 35 Bom at p 392 extending the 'line' to six degrees was not called for by the facts of that case, and it cannot be said that the rule in Bombay has been settled. As an illustration of the consequences of this dictum, see *Khandacharya vs Gouindacharya* 13 Bom L R 1005. Also see Telang J in *Rachava vs Kalingappa* 16 Bom 716 at p 719. And this claim is determined by reference to the paternal ancestor, any distinction based on the ground of blood having no place beyond cases expressly specified. See *Vithlrao vs Ramrao* 24 Bom 367. *Kesri vs Ganga Sahai* 32 All 541 (F B)

As between a nephew and a grand-nephew no right of representation exists, and the former excludes the latter. *Sher Singh vs Basdev Sidgh* 50 All 904

1 See *Devi Purshad vs Thokun Dial* 1 All 105 at p 112 and *Jasoda Koer vs Sheo Pershad* 17 Cal 33 at p 37

2 See the rule of Yājñavalkya II 120 (2) on p 1017 ll 23-24

3 *Gotrajas*—this word is made up of the two parts *Gotra*=gens or family, and *Ja*=born. Persons born in or belonging to the family. Colebrooke has translated it as 'gentiles', while in 2 M I A at p 151, it has been rendered as 'More distant paternal Kinsmen'. It should be remembered that the word has a special technical meaning attached to it, and as is generally the case with such terms, they are better understood in their original form than by any equivalent of it in the same or other language.

The term *Sagotra* may also be remembered along with this term. Generally both signify the same thing, but strictly and literally there would be a slight difference between the two. For, the first means and indicates those who are *born* in the

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the estate. The *Gotrajas* are the paternal grand mother the *Sapindas* and the *Samvodalas*. (2) Among these, the paternal grand mother takes the estate first. Because (although) the paternal grand mother's succession immediately after the mother was seemingly suggested by the text "And if the mother also dead the father's mother shall take the heritage" no place however is found for her in the compact series of heirs from the father and others to the nephew; and the text "The father's mother shall take the heritage" is intended simply to indicate her (general) competency for in

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(same) family while a *sapinda* is one belonging to the same family. And this distinction becomes important in the case of the female *Sapindas* some of whom are of the same family i. e. (*sapinda*), though they may not be born in the same family e. g. a mother a wife a daughter-in-law while others are *Sapindas* born in the family (*gotras*) though they may not continue to be of the same family (*sapinda*) e. g. daughter a sister. See *Lal Bahar vs Chandra B Datta* 110 (p. 10) at pp 111-112. A. L. p. 231-36 where the terms *Sapinda* &c are retained in their original form. *Gotra* is not exactly on a par with the Roman *Usus* though the general principle underlying the two are the same. In the case of the terms *Sapinda* and *Gotraja*, their literal meaning and technical significance should be particularly borne in mind. Thus e. g. the father's mother who has been pointed out by *Śrīkṛishṇa* as the first in the line of the *Gotrajas*, is a *gotraja* under the technical acceptance of that term i. e. *Sapinda*, but if its literal meaning (*gotra* + *ja*, one born in the family) be taken she is not. So per contra, a daughter or sister though by reason of their birth are *gotrajas* (born in the family) under the literal significance of that term, still according to its technical acceptance are not *gotrajas*, because by reason of their marriage they are not *sapindas*—of the same family.

1. *Sapindas* and *Samvodalas*. These two terms have been explained further on in the text of Mitāksharâ quoting from Nishan Manu (p. 1100 ll 8-13). The *Sapindas* referred to here are *gotrajas* or *sapindas* explained and not any *Sapindas* covered by the definition of that term as given by Vijñāneśvara. See note 1 on p 1071 (*supra*). 2. Of Manu Ch. IX. 17 (see p 1091 ll 4 & 6 *supra*).

3. Compact series of heirs i. e.—The expression in the Mitāksharâ is *Dakṣakṛama* "(Those) whose order (of succession) has been fixed (as in a phalanx)". The meaning is this—The mother takes as an heir named in the expression *Pitaram* parents i. e. mother and father and so immediately after her comes the father by virtue of the compound expression. Through the breach made by the father the whole settled phalanx of heirs ending with the *Tatrit* comes in leaving no room for the grandmother to enter and thus it is that she necessarily has to wait till a gap is left for her to enter. See *Mahabharata vs Arishambas B Datta* 597 at pp 602 & 603.

heritance. She takes immediately after his son¹ in the line² of succession; and thus there is no contradiction.

1 *Tatsuta*—i.e. the son of the brother See note 3 on p 1095

2 'The line'—The original word is *santāna*—which literally means something which is going on continuously (*sam + tana*) How far this 'line' extends has been the subject of much discussion, and recently, this question has attracted considerable attention in Courts in India, especially in Allahabad and Madras, and in one case the Bombay High Court appears to have expressed a view in line with the Allahabad view, the Court in that case extending the 'line' to seven degrees

According to the *Subodhini* the 'line' would appear not to extend beyond the 'tatsuta,' the expression used by the *Mitâkṣharâ*, and Mr Mandlik in an elaborate note has maintained this view, which would appear to be the proper view See note above on p 1095 See also the following cases *Rahi vs Govind* 1 Bom 105, *Vithalrao vs Ramrao* 24 Bom 317 = 2 Bom L R 157 *Budhasingh vs Laltusingh* 34 All 663 at pp 667–675 *Chinnasami Pillai vs Kunja Pillai* 35 Mad 152 at p 158 *Kasiba vs Moreshwar* 35 Bom 389 = 13 Bom L R 552 *Lallubhai vs Cassiba* 5 Bom 121 *Surayya vs Lalshmunarasayya* 5 Mad 295

Shidramappa vs Neelawabar 57 Bom 377

In the appellate decision of *Budhasing vs Laltu Singh* 42 I A 208 the Privy Council have held that the word *Putra* as used here must be understood in a generic sense, as in the case of the lineal descendants of the deceased, and thus held that the grandson of an uncle had priority over the son of a granduncle In a later case *Soobramiah vs Nataraja* 53 Mad 61 the Madras High Court, adopting the ruling in Budhasing's case limited the extension of the line of the *gotrajas* to three degrees only In the recent case of *Appaji vs Mohanlal* 32 Bom L R 709 (F B) the same point came indirectly for a decision, but no direct ruling has been given The point which still requires a clear decision is upto what degree should the word 'line', *suta*, be taken to extend? see *Lala Harihar Pratap Bakhsh Singh vs Raja Bajrang* 9 Luck 211

Utkarṣhe tatsulânantaram—in the line of a succession immediately after the *tatsuta* There are variations in the reading of the passage in the *Mitâkṣharâ*, these are noticed by Bâlabhattacha (See p 211 ll 20–22)

The compact series of heirs ends with the brother's son and does not include brother's grandson Therefore a daughter-in-law has preference over the brother's grandson *Appaji vs Mohanlal* 32 Bom L R 709 (F B), 54 Bom 564

Act II of 1929—According to this Act, the son's daughter, daughter's daughter, sister, and sister's son, are declared as heirs immediately after the father's father and before the father's brother

The Lucknow High Court in interpreting this Act has held that the *Mitâkṣharâ* has been superseded by this Act, as regards sisters both where they were regarded as heirs before, as also where they were not so regarded *Bhagwan Devi vs Radha* 8 Luck 646 It has been held that the Act applied to estates of those who died before the Act came into force if the estate vested in a female who was alive when the Act came into force i.e. 21st February 1929, and the question of inheritance by reversion opened after that date, *Shrimati Shakuntala Devi vs Khushalya Devi* 17 Lah 354 356.

(3) In the absence of the paternal grand mother, however, the *sapindas* born¹ in the same *gotra* (with the deceased), such as the paternal grand father and others, inherit the estate for *sapindas* of a different *gotra* are indicated by the term *Bandhus*. (4) Among these moreover on failure of the father's line² the paternal grand mother the paternal grand father the paternal uncles and their sons, are successively heirs to the estate.

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1 See note above and *Lalubhāri vs Castibai* 5 Bom at p 122-7 I. A. 236 *Sayana vs Sedasht* 26 Bom. 710 at p 713 *Umaid Bahadur vs Udashand* 6 Cal. 119 (F B) at p 120 *Kalliamra vs Ramchandar* 24 AIL 128 at p 131 See observations in 13 M. A. I. A. at p 378

2 Colebrooke translates, In the absence of the paternal grand-mother the *gotrajas*, kinsmen born in the same family with the deceased and *asapindas* connected by funeral oblations, namely the paternal grand mother &c Bālabhāṭṭa insists that the grand-father takes before the grand mother (See p 211 ll. 23-33). But the Mayākha does not support him here as in the case of the parents Bālabhāṭṭa's reasoning, however is not convincing

"The commentator takes occasion to censure an interpretation which corresponds with that of the *Mitāksharā* as delivered in the following section (B 6 § 1), and according to which the cognate kindred of the man himself, of his father and of his mother are the sons of his father's sister and so forth because it would follow that the father's sister's son and the rest would inherit, although the man's own sister and sister's sons were living Bālabhāṭṭa, however repels this objection by the remark, that the sister and sister's sons have been already noticed as next in succession to the brother and brother's sons: which is indeed Nanda Pandita's own doctrine.

"He adds, after the heirs above mentioned, the *śakhyas* or distant kinsman is entitled to the succession: meaning 'a relation in the fifth or other remote degree.

"This whole order of succession, it may be observed, differs materially from that which is taught in the text of the *Mitāksharā* On the other hand, the author of the *Prasāradāya* has exactly followed the *Mitāksharā*; and so has *Kamadhara*; and it is also confirmed by *Āśādhara*, in the *Vyavahāra-Mādhyama*, as well as by the *Smṛti-Sāhitya*

"But the author of the *Vyavahāra-Mayākha* contends for a different series of heirs after the brother's son: 1st, the paternal grand-mother; 2nd, the sister; 3rd, the paternal grand-father and the brother of the half blood, as equally near of kin; 4th the paternal great-grand father the paternal uncle, and the son of a brother of the half blood, sharing together as in the same degree of affinity He

(Contd. on next page)

(5) On failure of the paternal grand-father's line, the paternal great-grand-mother, the paternal great-grandfather, his sons and their sons (inherit) In this manner must he understood the succession of *sapindas*¹ of the same *gotra*, as far as the seventh (ascendant)

5 (6) If there be none such, the succession devolves upon the *samânodakas*, and these must be understood to be seven (in degrees) beyond the *sapindas*: or else, as far as the limits of knowledge as to birth and name extend As says **Brhan-Manu**² "The relation of the
10 "*sapindas* ceases with the seventh person; and that of the *samânodakas* "ceases (after extending) as far as the fourteenth (degree), or as "some affirm, (it reaches) as far as the memory of birth and name "(extends), after that is indicated by (the term) *gotra*"

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has not pursued the enumeration further, and the principle stated by him—viz nearness of kin—does not clearly indicate the rule of continuation of this series—" Colebrooke

Having regard to the importance of the point involved and having regard to the divergence of views expressed in India in quite recent time, the necessity of a definite decision on this point will soon arise, when the authorities referred to above will be of use

1 *Samânogotra-sapindas*—are those *sapindas* who belong to the same *gotra* as that of the deceased

2 To the same effect is **Manu** Oh V 60 It runs thus

सपिण्डता तु पुरुषे सप्तमे विनिवर्तते । समानोदकभावस्तु जन्मनाम्नोर्वेदने ॥

The Vyavahâra-Mayâkha refers to this passage, Tr "The *Sapinda* relationship ceases with the seventh person [in the line], and that of *Samânodakas* (i.e. those connected by an oblation of water) ends when births and names are no longer known " Mandlik p 82 ll 10-13

Relying on this and other texts it has been held in *Bai Deolore vs Amritram Jamnatram* 10 Bom 372 at p 379-380—that the word *Samânodaka* includes descendants from a common ancestor more remotely related than the thirteenth degree from the propositus

See also *Umaid Bahadur vs Uday Chand* 6 Oal 119 (F B) *Maru vs Chinmam-mal* 8 Mad at p 128 *Ram Barun Lal vs Kamla Prasad* 32 All 594 at pp 597-598 where it was held that a *Samânodaka* is a nearer heir than a *bandhu*, and *Bhyah Ram Singh vs Bhagat Ugar Singh* 13 M I A at p 380 *Kalgaua vs Somappa* 33 Bom 669 at p 683 See also *Jadunath Kuar vs Bisheshar* 59 I.A 173 at pp 189-190

[Colebrooke, Sect. VI.]

* PAGE 97

[Of the succession of cognate kindred or Bandhus.]

(1) On failure of the *Gotrajas*,¹ the *Bandhus* succeed to the estate. Bandhus moreover, are of three kinds, the *Ātma-bandhus* (or his own bandhus), the *Pitr-bandhus* (or his father's bandhus), and the *Mātr-bandhus* (or his mother's bandhus), as has been declared² (by the following text) 'The sons of his own father's sister the sons of

1 *Gotrajas* and *Bandhus*.—See note above. Both are *Sapindas*, but the former are *Sapindas* of the same *gotra* or *Sapota-Sapindas* while the latter are *sapindas* of a different *gotra* or *bhūtagotra sapindas*. Mr Colebrooke translates these terms as; "gentiles and cognates." See *Mathurami* vs *Savitribade Mathuramaramami* 23 I. A. 83-89-19 Mad. 405

N B In Bombay Widows of *gotraja sapindas* succeed after the males in each line. These take *her capita* and not *her stirpes*. *Kallara vs Vithabai* 3 Dom. L. R. 905

Bijambhaṭṭa assigns this text to *Ṛddha Śatapaṭha* (see p 214 l. 28), but it is ascribed to *Bandhavyas* in *Pyarabara-Madhara* (see p. 354 Bibliotheca India Series.)

Bandhus.—The enumeration of *bandhus* given here is not exhaustive but only illustrative. *Girdhara Lal vs The Bengal Government* 12 M. L. A. 418 *Mohandas vs Krishnabai* 5 Dom. 597 at p 601 *Lakshmanmal vs Tirumengada* 5 Mad. 11 at p *45. A contrary view was expressed in *Varanama vs Vengaymal* 13 Mad. 10 at p 13 but having regard to the decision of the Privy Council in 23 All. 83 and 19 Mad. 405 cited above, the reasoning of the decision in 13 Mad. 10 would seem not to apply now even to Madras nor does it "determine the order of succession as between several lines within each of the series of *bandhus*" per Jenkins O J in *Sayana vs Sedashiva* 4 Dom. L. R. 52 at p. 530-26 Bom. 710

In *Gajadha vs Gauri Shankar* 54 All. 608 (F B), however the Allahabad High Court has held otherwise. According to it the classes cannot be added to (p. 704). In order to succeed as a Bandhu it must be proved that a mutuality of relationship as Bandhus was established (705). Therefore a father's sister's son's daughter's son was held not to be a heritable Bandhu (Ibid.) See also pages 701-718 and 719-735

The *sapinda* relationship of a *bandhu* ceases after five degrees from the common ancestor. *Ramchandra Martand Varla vs Vinayak* 42 Cal. 384

The son of a half-sister of the father has preference over the son of a sister of the mother because the former confers greater spiritual benefit than the latter. *Jotindra Nath Roy vs Legendra* 33 Bom. L. R. 1411 (P O).

The step-son of the step-sister of a male is not an heir. *Saminatha vs Angammai* 45 Mad. 257

Father's brother's grandson succeeds before the brother's great-grandson. *Venkatarama Rao vs Adinarayana* 58 Mad (323)

“his own mother’s sister, and the sons of his own maternal uncle,
 “should be considered as the *Ātma-bandhus* (or his own bandhus)
 “The sons of his father’s paternal aunt, the sons of his father’s
 “mother’s sister, and the sons of his father’s maternal uncle, should
 5 “be known as his *Pitr-bandhus* (or his father’s bandhus) The sons
 “of his mother’s father’s sister, the sons of his mother’s mother’s sister,
 “and the sons of his mother’s maternal uncle should be known as his
 “*Mâtr-bandhus* (or his mother’s bandhus¹)”

(2) Here also, by reason of near affinity, first the *Ātma-bandhus*
 10 succeed to the estate, on failure of them, the *Pitr-bandhus*, and on
 their failure the *Mâtr-bandhus* (succeed) This must be understood
 to be the order (of succession here intended).

[Colebrooke Sect VII.]

[²Of the succession of strangers upon failure of the kindred]

15 (1) On failure of the *bandhus*, the preceptor³, and on failure of
 him, the pupil (succeeds) according to the text of *Āpastamba* ⁴ “On
 “failure of the sons, the nearest *sapinda* (inherits), on failure of
 “them, the preceptor, on failure of the preceptor, the pupil (shall
 ‘take the wealth)” (2) If there be no pupil, the fellow-student is

1 The three kinds of *bandhus* mentioned here are not mentioned in *Aparârka*
 (see p 745 *Ānandâśrama* No 45), see however *Mayâkha* (Mandlik, Sk p 55
 Eng Tr p 82 l 28 &c)

2 *N B* Now follow the principles of succession of strangers It may be
 noted that this line cannot be resorted to unless and until all the *sagotra* and other
 relations are exhausted See *Lakshmanammal* vs *Tirunengada* 5 Mad 241 at p
 245 See also *Umed Bahadur* vs *Uday Chand* 6 Cal 119 16 Bom

3 *Āchârya* is the word in the text for the English word preceptor There
 are other terms indicative of the same, such as *Guru*, *Upâdhyâya*, *Ritvi* &c, but
 there are minute distinctions in their import See *Yājñavalkya* I 34, 35 Tr
 pp 126, 127 *Manu* Ch. II 140-145, where all these terms are explained and the
 importance of each is indicated See also *Amarakośa* II-7-(6-7)

4 *Dharmasûtras* II-6-14-(2-3)

the successor He, who received his investiture, lessons¹ (in the scriptures) with their meaning, and thus aquired knowledge proceeding therefrom from the same preceptor is a fellow-student

(3) If there be no fellow-student, some learned² and venerable priest should take the property of a *Brāhmana*, according to the text of *Gautama*³ “*Śrotrīyas* or venerable priests, should share the wealth of a *Brāhmana* who leaves no male issue.” (4) For want of such a successor any *Brāhmana* (may be the heir) As says *Manu*⁴ : “ But on failure of all (the heirs), *Brāhmanas* (shall) share the estate such (*Brāhmanas*) as are versed in the three Vedas, (and are) pure and self-controlled thus the law is not violated ”

(5) Never shall a king take the wealth of a *Brāhmana*, *vide* the text of *Manu*⁵ The property of a *Brāhmana* shall never be taken by a king this is settled law ” It has also been said by *Nārada* “ If for the wealth of a *Brāhmana*, on his demise, there be no heir it must be given to a *Brāhmana*, (acting) otherwise⁶, the king becomes tainted with sin ”

(6) The wealth of a *Kṣatriya* and others, (however), in the absence of heirs down to the fellow-student, the king may take, and not a *Brāhmana*. As says *Manu*⁷ : But, (the property) of other classes, on failure of all (heirs), the king may take.”

1 The expression in the text is *Adhyayana*—study The study of the Vedas is the most important part of a Man's education and an *Adhyayana* necessarily includes their study In fact *adhyayana* means *per excellence* the study of the Vedas.

2 *Śrotrīya*—a learned *Brāhmana* and not a mere *Brāhmana*. Note the following
जन्मना ब्राह्मणो ज्ञेयः श्रोत्रवेदविद्विज्ज्ञ रचयते । विद्याभयसी महेक्षित्वा भोविष्यद्विद्विरेव हि ॥

The derivation of the word is explained by reference to two rules of Grammar by Pāṇini 5-2-84 and 4-2-59 the result of which is that the term is applicable to such a *Brahmana* as has mastered the whole Vedic lore.

3 Ch. XXVIII. 39

4 Ch. IX. 188

5 Ch. IX. 189

6 Otherwise—i. e. if he takes it himself (see *Bāṇamāhātī* p. 216 l. 7)

7 Ch. IX. 189

Vîramitrodaya

Now, in the absence of the twelve sorts of sons, the Author discusses those who would take the property

Yājñavalkya, Verses 135-136

- 5 *Āputrasya*, 'Of one without issue,' i.e. without any of the twelve sorts of sons, and without a grandson or a great-grandson, *swanyātasya*, 'one departed for heaven' i.e. who has died, of the wife and those others stated, in the absence of the one prior 'each one next in order' *uttarottarah*, becomes *dhanabhāh*, 'entitled to the property' Thus this
10 *vidhi*, 'rule', regarding the succession to the property of one dying without issue is equal 'in all classes', *sarva-varneshu*

- There, first the wife is entitled to the property, such a one, however, is to be understood to be one who has been consecrated by the sacrament of marriage, vide the rule¹ "the substitute ३ replaces the
15 "final ३ of ३ before the feminine affix ३ when the word so formed "indicates 'a wife who takes a part in the sacrifices of her husband'." Here *Kātyâyana* states a special rule "A wife takes the property of her "husband, who is not unfaithful failing her, however, the daughter, "if she be unmarried then" If the wife, however, be unfaithful,
20 *Nārada*² states a rule "In the absence of the son, however, the daughter, "as she has been declared to be equal to a son"³ "When the wife "does not exist, the unmarried daughter of the same class as that of the "father, succeed to the property", vide the aforestated text of *Kātyâyana*

- Some say that this has a reference to the appointed daughter
25 That is not proper, since even when the wife is living she is entitled to the property, since under the text of *Vasishtha*⁴ viz "The third is the "*putrikā* herself", has been regarded as a son. Also this text of *Brhaspati*⁵ "From his several limbs is produced, like the son, the "daughter of a man, when she herself is living how can any other take
30 "the property? (56) Equal in caste (to her father) and married to a man "of the same caste as her own, virtuous and devoted to service, whether "she be appointed or not appointed as a son, she has been considered "as entitled to take her father's property" (57) Here, moreover, the marriedness is qualitative of the appointed only, and not also of the not
35 appointed even, vide the text of *Kātyâyana*, so hold the **Southerners** As a matter of fact, however, the meaning of the word daughter here viz 'not impotent, not appointed, mentally regarded as a daughter' is without including her among the sons in an equivocal manner

1 Of Grammar, IV I 33

2 Oh XIII 50

3 Dr Jolly reads तुल्यसत्तानकारणात्

4 Oh XVII 15. 5, Oh XXV 56, 57.

From the original text, women are not entitled to an inheritance "as they are without vigour" and by the contraction and limitation of the text of Manu¹ "Of a sonless man the father shall take the property or the brothers even" this way would be in pursuance of the usage of the Maitihilas.

Pitaras the parents i.e. the mother and the father. These by reason of the two texts viz. 'Weak' etc. and also by reason of the order in the text of *Kātyāyana* viz. Of him (dying) without issue the wife of a good family or the daughters also in their absence the father the mother and also the sons, have been declared (to be heirs) although (the property goes) to the father and in his absence the mother takes the wealth it is clear that this is so under the text of *Vishnu*² viz. Of a sonless man the property goes to the wife failing her to the daughter "in her absence to the father and in his absence to the mother

Thus therefore the statement of *Mitāksharā*³ "That because in the 'solution clause of the compound the word mother happens to be placed first, and also because as compared with the father she does not happen to be the parent of a child born of another mother and thus having a common propinquity is doubtful."

Failing the mother the uterine brothers in their absence the brother's son and in his absence the *gotraja sapindas sakulyas* and the rest according to the nearness of their relationship. In the absence of these the *Bandhus* technically described as The sons of one's father's sister the sons of one's mother's sister and the sons of one's maternal uncle are to be known as one's own *Bandhus* *Ātmabandhus*. Failing these *Śiṣhyak* 'the pupil in his absence the *Sabrahmachāri*, co-student, i.e. one who received his initiation and the study of the *vedas* from the same preceptor

Here, by the use of the word *cha* also is included the right of a step-brother in the absence of the uterine brother by the use of the word *tathā*, 'similarly' in the absence of the *Ātmabandhus* those of the *Pitrbandhus* and in their absence of the *Mātṛbandhus* as technically defined and in their absence also that of the Preceptor's right to succeed. By reason of the nearness of relationship also under the text of *Āpastamba*⁴ In the absence of the preceptor the resident student is the statement in short. *Nārada*⁵ Even on failure of all the "heirs the *Brāhmaṇas* shall share the estate such as are versed in the 'three Vedas (and are) pure and self-controlled thus the law is not 'violated. The property of a *Brāhmaṇa* shall never be taken by a King "this is the settled law but of other classes on failure of all the King may take (135-136)

1 Tait. S. VI. 5. 8

2 Ch. IX. 185

3 Ch. XVII. 4-8

4. See p. 1092 l. 7 above

5 Text p. 95 l. 18

6 Dh. S. II. 6. 143

7 See Manu Ch. IX. 188, 189

S'ûlapâni

Now the Author mentions the distribution of the property of one without a son

Yâjñavalkya, Verses 135-136

- 5 *Aputraysa*, 'Of one without an issue,' dying, among 'the wife' and the rest, in the absence of the one preceding, the one succeeding, becomes (the heir) So *Viṣṇu*¹ "The wealth of one without a male "issue goes to his wife, in her absence to the daughter, in her "absence to the mother, in her absence to the father, in his absence
10 "to the brother" and so on This moreover is applicable to those who are equal So *Brhaspati*² "Although the *Sakulyas*, the father, "the mother, and the uterine brothers exist, of one who has died without "issue, the wife is entitled to take the estate " This right of the wife even when the brothers exist, has reference, however, to the wife endowed
15 with eminent good qualities And the quality consists in the (performance of the) *śrâddha*, maintaining (unsullied) the bed and such other vows So (says) *Vṛddha Manu* "The widow of a childless man, keeping "unsullied her husband's bed, and persevering in religious observances, "shall herself present his funeral oblation and obtain the entirety of his
20 "estate " In this manner also "Of one who has died without issue, the "property goes to the brothers, in their absence the parents shall take, or "the senior wife," this text of *Paithînasi*, has reference to a wife who is devoid of qualities and who is guilty of adultery The text of *Śankha*³ *uz* "They should make provision for the maintenance of his wives till
25 "his death, provided they preserve unsullied the bed of their lord They "may, however, cut off in the case of those who behave otherwise," should also be taken as applicable (in this manner also) to this subject

- "In the absence of the sons, however, the daughter as she is equally
"regarded as in the line the son, as well as the daughter, both are effective
30 "in perpetuating the lineage," this text of *Nârada*⁴ has a reference to the *Putrikâputra* So *Brhaspati*⁵ "Equal in caste (to her father) and married to "an equal, virtuous and submissive Whether (she was) appointed or "not appointed as a son, the daughter shall take the father's property "

1 Ch XVII 4-8 *Viṣṇu* cites this as the text of *Brhadviṣṇu* see p 1067, ll 8-11 (above) 2 Ch XXV 48

3 In the *Mutâlâkṣharâ* this text has been cited as of *Nârada* see above p 1068, ll 9-15 and *Nârada* XIII 26

4 See *Nârada* XIII V 50 where the reading is तुल्यसत्तानकारणात् It should be noted, however, that this text occurs in the *Smṛti* of *Nârada* in the chapter in which in an earlier stage (Verse 2) the order of heirs given is, sons, mother, daughters, in their absence, their sons *Śûlapâni* takes it as having a reference to the *Putrikâputra*

5 Ch XXV 57

The meaning is, whether she was intended to be made an appointed daughter or not.

"The parents, and brothers likewise"—(in this) the right of the parents when the brothers exist is in regard to the property acquired by the father grandfather &c. For what was acquired without detriment to such ancestral estate, even when the parents exist, such property belongs to the brothers. As says Devala "Thereafter the property of a sonless man, the uterine brothers shall divide or even the daughters equal (in caste) or if he be living the father also" Among these *i e* the wife and the rest, in the absence of the one prior to the one next in order Gone to heaven viz. dead. (135-136)

(Colebrooke Sect. VIII)

[On¹ succession to the Property of a Hermit or an ascetic]

(1) It has been declared that sons and grandsons² also take the *dāya*, and that on failure of them, the widow and others (succeed)

1 This is an exceptional rule stated specially to be applicable in the case of hermits &c see *Gajraj Pari vs Achamber Pari* 16 All at p 196 Mayne on Hindu Law § 506 West and Buhler's Hindu Law p. 532 In *The Collector of Dacca vs Jagat Chander Goswami* 28 Cal. 608 an application was made for letters of administration to the estate of a deceased disciple. It was opposed by the Collector of Dacca on behalf of Government. But the report does not give the grounds of the opposition nor does it give any details. The High Court (Maclean O J and Banerjee J) confirmed the order granting the Letters as prayed for. On this passage Mr J O Ghose observes at p 88 (2nd Ed.) "With all respect to the learned judges it should be observed, that according to Hindu Law the ordinary case of succession should apply to that strange individual the married ascetic. Indeed, according to ancient law ascetics who have resumed worldly ways, are slaves of the King and their property in strictness belongs to him (citing *Narada*.) The report does not give good ground for these observations nor it is submitted, are the observations justifiable on the general customary law prevailing among the hermit sects such as the *bairagi* *gomvis* &c. See also *Chakrapur vs Datta* 20 All 109 at p 162

2 Mr Colebrooke adds after grandsons in bracket, ("or great-grandsons") relying upon Bāṣambhaṭṭa, who suggests the inclusion of great-grandsons on the strength of the conjunction *CAs*, also. Upon this translation it has been observed at p 278 of 13 M. L. A. *Bhagat Ram Singh vs Bhagat Ugar Singh* "This incorporation of the words or great-grandsons in the text of the Mitākṣharā shows that the translator (whose authority is of the highest order) considered that the inclusion of the great-grandson, among immediate heirs was the approved doctrine of the later class of the expositors of the law of Benares."

The Author now propounds an exception to both these

Yājñavalkya, Verse 137

Of a hermit, of an ascetic, and of a life-long celibatist, the heirs to the property are, in their order, the preceptor, the virtuous¹ pupil, the spiritual brother and associate in holiness.

(2) Mitâksharâ —Wanaprasthasya, *or a hermit, yateh, of an ascetic,*² and brahmachârinascha, and *of a life-long celibatist, kramena, in then order, i.e. in the inverse*³ order, âchâyah⁴, *the preceptor, sachchhishyah, a virtuous pupil, dharmabhrâtraikatîrthî cha, and a spiritual brother and associate in holiness also, are successors rikthasya, to the property, i.e. of the wealth.*

(3) The Life-long celibatist must be a professed⁵ or perpetual one, of a temporary student, however, the mother and the other heirs alone take. And the preceptor is declared to be the heir to a professed student as an exception⁶. (4) A virtuous pupil, however, takes the property of a *yati* or ascetic. Sachchhishyah, *a virtuous pupil,*

1 The condition of being virtuous is a general requisite for a pupil. The preceptor and the spiritual brother become successors only if they are virtuous, and so the qualifying clause has been placed in the middle (see Subodhini p 74) and so Viṇṇânesvara observes further on that even a preceptor, if ill-conducted does not become entitled to a share

2 The terms 'hermit' and 'ascetic' are severally used for the two words 'Vânaprastha' and 'Sannyâsi' which indicate two distinct orders

3 See Bâlabhattacharya p 244

4 For the full significance of this term आचार्य and its distinction from the other terms of similar import see Yājñ I 34 and 35 and Manu Oh II 140-145 (see note 3 on p 1102 above)

5 i.e. *Naiṣṭhika* as distinguished from the *Upakurvâna*
It is derived as निष्ठा मरण तत्पयन्त ब्रह्मचर्येण निष्ठति (निष्ठा-ठक्)

A perpetual religious student who continues with his spiritual preceptor even after the prescribed period, and vows life-long abstinence and charity. See Yājñavalkya I 49 pp 140-141 above in Part I

An *Upakurvâna*—is only a temporary student. He is in a state of pupilage for a limited time, wishing to pass on into the state of a householder (*grhastha*)

6 i.e. to the claim of inheritance of the mother and other heirs (see Subodhini p 74 l 32 Bâlabhattacharya p 244 l. 24).

- (8) The answer is. As for the *Vânâprastha*, a hermit may have property, under the text¹ “He (a hermit *i.e.*, *Vânâprastha*) may make a board of property sufficient for a day, a month, six months or a year, and in the month of 5 “Āśvin he should abandon what has been collected,” he certainly may have property. The *yati* or, ‘ascetic’, too, under *PAGE 98 the text² “Or he should wear clothes to cover his privy parts, and he may also take the requisites for his austerities,³ “as also sandals”, may possess clothes, books and other requisites. 10 The professed student also can have clothes and other property for his bodily sustenance (9) And it was therefore proper to explain the distribution of such (property)

Vîramitrodaya

- 15 After mentioning the successors to the property of a householder, the Author mentions those of hermit etc

Yājñavalkya, Verse 137

- Under the text¹ “one should amass wealth, and the wealth thus amassed, one should give over in the month of Āśvin”, the property which a *vânâprastha*, ‘hermit’, possesses, and under the text² “one may 20 “take the requisites for the *yoga* practises, as also sandals”, the property of a *yati*, ‘an ascetic’, and the property of a *Brahmachârî*, ‘a celibate student’, such as clothes and such other things for covering (the body), the sharers of that are respectively the *âchârya*, ‘preceptor’, and the rest *i.e.* in the absence of the prior, the next one etc in order. 25 *Âchârya*, ‘the preceptor’, *sachchishyah*, ‘a virtuous pupil’, *i.e.* a pupil capable of listening attentively and assimilating the knowledge of the soul, *ekâtîrthî*, ‘a co-student’, one who has received his learning from the same preceptor, and the same also a brother in religious practises, as the preceptor who is equal to a father, was the same 30 (for both) (137)

1 Of Yājñavalkya Prâyaschîtâdhyâya 47 (p 196 ll 15-16) also Manu Ch VI 15

2 of a Smṛti—author not known

3 *Yogasambhârâbhêdâh*—the different articles required for practising *Yoga* *i.e.* the works treating of the same (See Subodhinî p 75 l 6 Bâlabhattach p 245 l 15)

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 137

Dharmabhrū 2, a spiritual brother as also *ekāntī* an associate in holiness — thus it is a *karmadhāraya* compound. *Ekāntī* an associate in holiness i. e. one who has a common preceptor The rest is clear (137). 5

[Colebrooke Sec. IX]

[On the union of kinsmen after partition]

(1) The Author next¹ propounds an exception to the rule that the wife and certain other heirs succeed to the estate of one who departs for heaven leaving no male issue" 10

Yājñavalkya Verse 138 (1st, 3rd and 4th quarters)

A re-united, however, shall keep the share of his re-united² (*parcener*) who is deceased or shall deliver it to one born.

(2) *Mitākṣharā*.—Effects which had been divided and which are again mixed together are termed re-united He, to whom such appertain is a *sambhū*, a re-united *parcener* (3) Re union,³ moreover, cannot take place with any person indifferently, but only with a father, a brother or a paternal uncle as *Byāspati*⁴ declares He who being "once separated, dwells again through affection with his father " brother or paternal uncle is termed re-united (4) *Tasya Sāmbhūmah*, 20
of such a re-united *parcener* the share or allotment must be given by

1 Next i. after laying down the special rule of succession in the case of hermits &c the Author propounds another rule which is also of a special nature and is thus an exception to the general course of succession given in Yājñavalkya II 135 and 136 (p. 1065)

2. The construction here is terse and also involved. The first and the second quarters make in themselves independent clauses. But these again are severally connected with the two verbs *dadat* and *paśyati* in the third quarter which again are alternatively connected with the two qualifying expressions *jetarṇya* and *ajetarṇya*

The translation given here is as adopted by Colebrooke The *Mitākṣharā* takes the first quarter by itself and the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarters together separately So that, as put by Vjñāneśvara, the translation would read thus

(Verse 138 1st quarter) " Of a re-united, however the re-united.

(2nd, 3rd and 4th quarters)—" Of a uterine brother however a uterine, shall deliver as well as keep the share (to) one who is born or (of) one who is deceased.

3 Re-union—Must be proved as a fact. Therefore according to the *Mitākṣharā* parties to re-union must be those who were parties to their full partition and also that only father brother and uncle could re-unite *Ram Narain Chaudhary vs Pankaj* 37 Bom. L.R. 144 (P O)—14 Patna 368 *Basanta Kumara vs Jopendra Nath* 33 Cal. 371.

4 Ch. XXV 72 (Sacred Books. of the East Vol. XXXIII. p. 351)

the surviving re-united parcener, to a son subsequently born, in the case where the widow's pregnancy was unknown at the time of the distribution. 'On failure of male issue, the re-united parcener¹ alone shall take the inheritance, and not the widow or any other heir

- 5 (5) The Author states an exception to the rule that "a re-united member shall keep the share of his re-united parcener"

Yājñavalkya, Verse 138 (2nd quarter)

But an uterine² brother of his uterine brother

- 10 (6) Mitākṣharā —The expressions "of a re-united, a re-united" are to be (taken as) understood here Hence, the allotment of an uterine re-united brother who is deceased, shall be delivered by the surviving uterine re-united brother to a son born³ of the re-united On failure of him, he shall retain it This is the construction as before Thus, if there be uterine and non-uterine brothers together, the uterine re-
- 15 united brother alone will take the estate of a uterine re-united parcener, and not the non-uterine one, even though re united This, thus, is an exception to what has been said before

Sūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 138

- 20 The re-united has been described by Br̥haspati⁴ "He who being "(once) separated dwells again through affection, with his father or brother "or paternal uncle, such a one is termed re-united" *Samsr̥ṣṭinah*, 'Of the re-united,' such as the brother &c who is dead, *samsr̥ṣṭin*, 'the re-united,' such as the brother &c shall take the property *Sodarasya tu*, 'Of the
- 25 uterine brother, however,' *i e* (who was) re-united, *sodarah*, 'the uterine-brother,' re-united alone shall take, and not a step-brother If the re-united die after conception was produced, then upon the birth of the child in the womb, his property one should give to him alone also

1 The singular number is indicative of the whole class of re-united parceners

2 Colebrooke adds in bracket (or whole)—but the expression in the text is *sodarāh*—meaning he who was born from the same womb The term 'uterine' may mean the same as 'whole' in those cases where women marry only once But it cannot be an universal equivalent, as it is possible for a woman to have several sons from different husbands, and such sons although they would be uterine brothers or *sodarāh*, will not be 'whole' brothers

A uterine brother, though not re-united, succeeds to his brother who had separated and had re-united with the father *Bindra vs Mathura* 6 Luck. 450 (F B)

3 *i e* born subsequently to the death of the coparcener, the widow's pregnancy not having been noticed then

4 Ch XXV 72

This (rule as to the) right of the re-united is (applicable) in the absence of the son wife father and mother as says Bhaspati "If any one die or enter the fourth order on any account his property will not lapse his re-united brother not being a step-brother shall take his property" (133)

(7) Next, in answer to an inquiry who shall take the succession when a re-united parcenter dies leaving no male issue and there exists a half brother re-united, and an uterine brother non-re-united, the Author delivers a reason why both shall take and divide the estate

Yājñavalkya Verse 139

A half brother being re-united may take the succession, but not a half brother not re-united but one united (*1/2 d. 1/2*) *4th u. 1/2 d. 1/2* may obtain the property though not re-united and not (*1/2 d. 1/2*) the son of a different mother

Mitak haram (8)—Anyodarya *1/2 d. 1/2* a brother born of a rival wife being *samśṛjhi* a re-united parcenter takes the estate as anyodarya dhanam harat *samśṛjhi* but *1/2 d. 1/2* (that) a non uterine brother *1/2 d. 1/2* the *1/2 d. 1/2* re-united. Thus by the tests of the affirmative and the negative reasoning re-union has been shown to be a reason for a half brother's succession to the property

(9) The term 'not re-united' is connected also with what follows and hence even one who was not re-united may take the wealth of a (deceased) re-united (relative). Who is he? (so) the Author says *Samśṛjhi* *1/2 d. 1/2* one united by the identity of the womb, in other words an uterine brother. By this it has been declared, that relation by the identity of the womb is the foundation of the (right of) succession of an uterine brother though not re-

1 Ch. XXV 4

This text also admits of several constructions.

3 In an copy of the rule in *Mādhyaṃga Vyasa* or the maxim of the central jewel or *Aśāṅgi Vyasa*—like a crow looking two ways

4 Upon this passage the author of the *Subodhini* remarks in like manner a father though not re-united with the family shall take a share of the property of his son and a son though not re-united shall receive a share of the estate of his father from a re-united parcenter and in support of this conclusion he relies upon the passage *Mān IX 8* "The husband enters into his wife and there having transformed himself into a son the wife becomes a mother &c." (See p. 111-3). But *Mānabhatta* refutes this (at p. 247 ll 16-20) and he refers in the end to the *Mitak haram* itself which makes (1) "3" its own meaning clear by adding at the end that by it is meant the uterine brother

For *Māyāka* see text pp. 65-67 & Tr. pp. 118-120 *Gharapada* editions

united in coparcenary (10) The term "united" likewise is connected with what follows, and there the term 'united' signifies one who is 're united' (as a coparcener)

5 *Nānyamâtrjah*, *not the son of a different mother*, this expression must be interpreted by supplying the affirmative particle *eva*, 'alone', understood *i e* although re-united, one born of a different mother cannot exclusively take the wealth of his re-united parcener

(11) Thus, by the occurrence of the word *api*, 'though', in the expression "though not re united" (above p 1113 l 10), and by the
10 denial implied in the restrictive affirmation *eva*, 'alone' understood in the expression "*one united* (by blood, though not by parcenary), *and* "*not the son of a different mother*" (above p 1113 ll 10-11), it is shown that the property should be divided and distributed to a whole brother not re united, and a half-brother who is re-united; [for the reasons of
15 the right of succession of both subsist at the same time (and independently)]

(12) This very thing is made clear by *Manu*¹ who after premising partition among re-united parcnens "If brethren, once divided
"and living again together as parcnens, make a second partition, etc."
20 "declares, "should the eldest or youngest (of several brothers) be "deprived of his allotment at the distribution, or should any one of "them die, his share shall not lapse But his uterine brothers², and "such brothers as were re-united, and also his uterine sisters shall "assemble together and divide his share equally "

25 (13) Thus, among re-united brothers, if the eldest, the youngest or the middlemost, ~'at the distribution'—during
* PAGE 99 the distribution—(for under the rule of grammar) the indeclinable termination *tas* denotes any case *i e* at the time of making the distribution—*be deprived*, *i e* forfeit, his own share, on
30 account of his entrance into another order, or by the offence of Brâhmicide, or by any other like cause, or if he be dead, his share shall not lapse, but shall be set apart, and not that the re-united parcnens shall take exclusively This is the meaning

1 Ch IX 210-212

2 Colebrooke translates 'uterine brothers and sisters' The expression is *sodaryâh*, which may admit of sisters, but these have been again mentioned in the last clause

The Author states the appropriation of the share so set apart¹
‘his uterine brothers shall divide it &c.’ That share so set apart,
his uterine brothers i.e. those born of the same womb even though
not re-united, “having assembled together”—i.e. even though they
had gone to a different country, still returning thence and assembling
together, they should share it Equally” i.e. not by any measure
of greater or less shares. Likewise those brothers who are non uterine
(but) re-united, and also the uterine sisters, all these should divide
(and take) equally Having divided equally they should take
This is the clear meaning

Vīramitrodaya

It has been stated that of one who has departed to heaven with-
out issue, the successors to the property are the wife etc. the Author
mentions an exception to it

Yājñavalkya, Verses 138 139

Saṁyuktā ‘the re-united He who being once separated dwells
again with his father brother or paternal uncle, is termed re-united
thus stated by Bṛhaspati’ one who has property in re-union should
take the property of another member re-united who has died without
a male issue and not the wife etc. of the re-united.

Jātasya of one born i.e. one who was in the womb at the time
of the death of the re-united and who was born afterwards to such a son
of the re-united one should give the share i.e. the property² belonging
to his father

Of one however with whom the uterine as well as the non-uterine
brother have re-united the wealth of such a one however the uterine
re-united brother alone will take and not the non-uterine re-united
brother Here the reason is that although non re-united a uterine
brother alone takes the property of one who has died without leaving a
wife and daughter and not that when they are living a non uterine
brother Moreover the meaning is that this particular rule is based on
propinquity by relationship even though it is not particularised by a
state of re-union.

1 See above page 1114 l. 23

2 Oh. XXV 73

3 मयिदुतंमयिदुतं

By the expression *api cha*, 'even moreover', the Author adds the exception to the rule established before by the text of *Vasîṣṭha viz.* 'When, of an unseparated brother a uterine brother exists, the wife "and the rest shall not take the property". By the word *tu*, first used

5 the Author discriminates the right of the wife etc to take the property, by the second use, the right of the re-united paternal uncle etc. to take the property, and by the third use, the absence of the right of the non separated non-uterine brother to succeed to the property. By the use of the several *chas*, 'ands', the Author adds the right of the re-united even

10 if the wife etc be existing, and of the uterine re-united brother alone although a non-uterine re-united brother be living, and although a re-united co-parcener be living, the right to the property to be given to the son born after re-union (138-139).

Śûlapâṇi

15 Yājñavalkya, Verse 139

A non-uterine re-united (brother) shall not take the property of a non-uterine (brother)

Asamsr̥ṣṭhyapi, 'even though un-reunited' a uterine brother alone shall take, not, however, a re-united step-brother Some expound the word

20 *samsr̥ṣṭha*, 're-united,' as 'united in the uterus,' i. e. a uterine brother

In the reading 'not a non-uterine shall take the property' the meaning is that if he be a non-uterine brother, he shall not take the property This¹ is with the object of declaring the right of an un-re-united uterine brother Therefore it is not open to the fault of tautology

25 After re-union, if a partition takes place, the share shall be equal, as says *Manu*² "If brethren, once divided and living again together "as parceners, make a second partition, there the distribution of shares "shall be equal, in such a case a deduction for the eldest does not exist "

*Br̥haspati*³ states a special rule "If among reunited coparceners,

30 "any one should acquire additional property through learning valour, or "other such means, to him an additional share must be given, and the "rest shall be equal sharers" (139)

1 Note here the difference of opinion between *Śûlapâṇi* and *Viññāneśvara* according to whom a non-reunited uterine, and a re-united non-uterine brother take together Thus he does by implying एत after नान्यमावृत्त (see p 1114 1 5 above) While *Śûlapâṇi* does not imply एत and takes the expressions excluding the non-uterine brother entirely

2 Ch IX, 210

3 Ch XXV, 77 .

[Colebrook Sect. X.]

[Of exclusion from inheritance].

(1) What has been said respecting the succession of the son, the widow and other heirs, as well as the re-united parcener, the Author states an exception to that

5

Yājñavalkya Verso 140

An important person, one degraded and his issue, one lame, a mad man, an idiot, a blind man, and a person afflicted with an incurable disease and (like¹) others, must be maintained, excluding them from any share.

(2) Mitākṣhara — Kṛtāḥ, an impotent person² i.e. one of the third gender Patilāḥ, one degraded³ i.e. a Brāhminicide or a like other Tajjāḥ, his issue i.e. one born⁴ of an outcaste Paṅguḥ lame i.e. one deprived of (the use of) his feet. Ummālakāḥ, a mad man, i.e. one affected by any of the various sorts of insanity proceeding from air, bile or phlegm, from delirium, or from planetary influences Jadhāḥ an idiot i.e. a person deprived of the internal⁵ faculty, meaning one incapable of discrimi

10

15

1 Adya. Colebrooke translates "as well as others (similarly disqualified)."

Whether naturally so or by castration" Colebrooke citing Bāṇabhaṭṭa. Vāreḍa gives several varieties of impotency see Ch. XIII 10-13 and Bāṇam. p. 30

3 So a widow who became a mohammedan and re-married, was held to have forfeited her interest in the husband's property *Lata Tayaramma vs Chataunda Sirayya* 41 Mad. 1078 (F B)

4 i.e. of one who has not performed the requisite penance or expiation (Bāṇabhaṭṭa p. 250 l. 13)

It should be observed that each disability excepting that of being degraded is personal. Each of the persons specified here is mentioned as being personally incompetent to inherit, except the degraded in whose case alone it has been stated that his incompetency extends to his issue See observations at pages 28-283 in *Ganga vs Chandrakagabai* 3 Bom. 73 See also *Ram Sahya Bihari vs Lalla Lalji Sahya* 8 Cal. 149 at p. 15 and note.

5 The distinction between a madman *ummatā* and an idiot *jadhā* is nearly the same as these words convey by their import in the English language. A *ummatā* or a madman is one whose intellect has become completely overpowered by some external force or influence which has established absolute sway over his faculties. Such a man has no interval of sanity at all while a *jadhā* or an idiot is not absolutely insane but he is one who has become so dull in intellect as not to be able to discriminate things which are advantageous to him from things which are of no advantage at all (See Bāṇabhaṭṭa p. 250 l. 14).

Insanity need not be congenital. *Jethanami vs Veerammal* 43 Mad 464

nating right from wrong *Andhah*, a blind man,¹ i.e. destitute of the visual organ. *Achikitsyarogah*,² afflicted with an incurable disease, i.e. affected by an irremediable distemper such as marasmus and the like

(3) Under the expression "Like others" *Ādya*, are comprehended one who has entered³ into another order, an enemy⁴ to his

1 The blindness referred to here means the blindness which is congenital See Bālabhāṭṭi p 250 ll 15-16 and the judgment of Westropp O J in *Morari Gokuldas vs Parvatibai* 1 Bom 177, where the opinions of *Sāstris* recorded in West and Buhler's Hindu Law on the subject are examined, as also the original texts in the *Mitâkṣharâ* and the *Mayûlha*

So deafness must be congenital *Savitribai vs Ganesh* 51 Bom 50 and it must be shown to be incurable

And dumbness if congenital will exclude *Bharmappa vs Vijjangauda* 46 Bom 455

But see *Mt Dilaj Kuari vs Rikeshwar Ram* 13 Pat 712 congenital Blindness does not exclude The rule has become obsolete *Surayya vs Subbarama* 43 Mad. 4

2 *Achikitsyaroga*—*chikitsâ* is the treatment of a disease after determining its cause &c

Leprosy, which is not congenital, does not debar the vesting of the birth-right and therefore when a leper is the sole surviving member of a joint family the property shall vest in him absolutely, so that on his death it will go to his heirs and not as a reverter to the heirs of the last competent holder *Mool Chand vs Chokita Den* (1937) All 825 (F B)

Leprosy, however, to exclude must be of the sanious or ulcerous and not of the anæsthetic type *Karali Charam vs Ashutosh Nandi* 50 Cal 604, 51 I. A 177 at pp 178-180 and must be considered to be incurable *Kayachhana vs Subbaraya* 38 Mad 250 and in *Vithaldas vs Vadilal* 38 Bom L R 257 it was held that non-congenital leprosy does not disentitle one to be a coparcener, nor does he lose his right in the coparcenary property

3 The expression in the original is simply *Āśramāntargata*—which literally means, "one who has entered into another order" An *Āśrama* is a stage or period in the life of a man, and there have been laid down as four viz (1) *Brahmacharya* or the celibate life—the life of a student, (2) *Gṛhasthya* or *Grhastha-śrama*, the life a house holder, (3) *Vānaprastha*, the life of an anchorite or hermit, and (4) *Sannyāsa*, the life of absolute renunciation Mr Colebrooke translates as, "one who has entered into an order of devotion", but in the note the expression used by him is "another order"—and in the explanation is added—"Into one of devotion" He mentions further on as orders of devotion, the *Brahmacharya*, *Vānaprastha*, and *Sannyāsa* It would appear, however, from the expression used by *Vijñāneśvara* that the exclusion would apply as soon as a change from one order into another took place (see also Bālabhāṭṭi p 250 l 18)

4 An enemy to his father—the 'enmity to father' referred to here would appear to consist both of an active commission of an act of hostility, as well as in

(Contd. on next page)

father, a sinner in an inferior degree, and a person deaf dumb or wanting in an organ. Thus, says Vamphā² "They who have entered into another order are debarred from shares. By Nārada³ also (has it been declared): "An enemy to his father an outcaste, an impotent person, and one who is a sinner in an inferior degree, take 5
"no shares of the inheritance even though they be *Auras*⁴ (sons)
"whence then (could) the *Kṣhetrayas*" Manu⁵ likewise ordains "Impotent

(Contd from last page)

the omission of the necessary duties enjoined upon a son towards his father *Ashtaka* in his commentary on this verse of *Nārada* (XIII 1) observes विरिधौ द्वेष्टि स विरिद्धिः । द्वेषश्च विरिधौ मरणविचारः । पुत्रे मृत्युदोषे यत्कश्चिद्विधानमात्रम् ।

Tr "He who hates his father is an enemy to his father Hatred or enmity consists in the desire to kill the father or to do similar acts, as also the absence of a desire to offer oblations of water &c. to him after his death "

Dr Jolly observes on this passage as follows, (Sacred Books of the East Vo) XXXIII. p 194 N 21).

"The Commentators are at variance as to the precise meaning of the term hostile to his father Thus the *Sarvanvayika* declares it to denote one who forgets himself so far as to say He is not my father The *Dakṣinamūrti* says it means one who beats his father According to the *Jagadnātha* and the *Rāmānanda* it means one who attempts his father's life or commits other hostile acts against him, and who fails to offer the customary funeral oblations to his father after his death ' See Colebrooke's Digest V 4 320 1

1 *A pāṇinikā* शीतपतिः Colebrooke translates this word in two different ways in § 3 viz. as a sinner in an inferior degree and as addicted to vice The second translation has been subjected to comment at Aikhabod in *Dei Singh vs Musammat Dind* 32 All 165-168 where the learned judges questioned the correctness of the reading शीतपतिः itself and reference was made to Mr J O Ghose's *Hindu Law* p. 230 where other readings are given शीतपतिः would appear to be a better reading and has been given in the *Nārada Smṛiti* edited by Dr Jolly

It should be noticed that the commentator on *Nārada* XIII. 21 notices शीतपतिः and explains it as उग्रपक्षिद्विनेन रुक्मसप्तर्षिः ।

2 Ch XVII. 52

3 Ch. XIII 1

4 Colebrooke translates—*Auras* as legitimate and *Kṣhetrayas*—"as sons of the wife by an appointed Kinsman. The two terms have been explained by *Y Jasselsky* and *Pijānatsara* while treating of several kinds of sons (see p 1045 &c.) From a consideration of the law as stated there it would be more convenient to use the original terms rather than their English translations

5 Ch. IX. 201

“persons and outcastes are excluded from a share¹, and so are persons “born blind and deaf, as well as mad men, idiots, the dumb, and those “who have lost an organ².”

(4) *Nirindriyâh*, ‘those who have lost an organ’—any person,
5 from whom (the use of) an organ has disappeared on account of disease or other cause, is said to have lost that organ

(5) These persons—the impotent and the rest—are excluded from a share They do not participate in the heritage They must be supported by an allowance of food and raiment only. And if
10 they are not maintained, the penalty of degradation is incurred. For *Manu*³ says “But it is fit, that a wise man should give all of them “food and raiment without stint, to the best of his power for he, who “gives it not, shall be deemed an outcaste.” ‘Without stint’ signifies ‘for life’

(6) They are debarred of their shares only if their disqualification
15 arose before⁴ the division of the property, but not one who had already been separated. (7) (And) if the defect be removed by medicaments⁵ or other means, even though at a period subsequent to partition, the right of participation takes effect, by parity of reasoning with the rule (in the text⁶) . “When the sons have been separated, a son who is (after-
20 “wards) born of a woman equal in class, shares the distribution.”

1 The original is *Anamśa* अनांश “without a share”—this may mean a share on partition or from inheritance

2 निरिन्द्रिय *Nirindriya*—Colebrooke translates ‘those who have lost a sense (or a limb)’,—see however, *Yājñatīśvara*’s explanation in the next paragraph

3 Ch IX 202 *Bâlabhattacha* observes by reference to the texts of *Devala* and *Baudhâyana* that although these writers except ‘an outcaste and his offspring’ from those entitled to maintenance, still the exception applies to those offences only which are inextinguishable, and not to those with reference to which expiation is possible See *Bâlabhattacha* p 250 ll 29-35 and p 251 ll 1-2

4 i.e. excepting those who were disqualified for natural defects *Bâlabhattacha* p 251 l 2

The right of a member is only under suspense during the disability

5 See *Jaimini* VI 1 41 अगृहीतश्च तद्धर्मा p 308 जैमिनीयन्यायमालाविस्तारः

6 *Yājñ* II 122 (1) See above p 1022 ll 15-16,

(8) In speaking of an outcaste and the rest, the masculine gender is not here used¹ restrictively. And hence it must be understood that the wife the daughter, the mother or any other (female), being disqualified for any of the defects which have been specified is likewise excluded from participation.

5

Viramitrodaya

The Author mentions an exception at some places, to the right of the son wife and the re united to take property

Yājñavalkya Verse 140

By the use of the word *atha* and so is included one deaf from the time of birth. By the use of the word *adya*, and like others are included the dumb the enemical to the father and like others vide the text of Manu². Excluded from a share are the impotent and the 'degraded, and so are persons born blind and deaf; as well as mad men 'idiots the dumb and those who have³ lost an organ and also vide the text of Nārada⁴ vi. An enemy of his father an out-caste an 'impotent person and one who is a sinner in an inferior degree these 'even though they be the *Aurasa* (sons) do not get a share; whence "shall the *Ashvairajas*?"

10

15

Tajjah 'born of him i.e. born of the degraded *Panguh* 'lame, i.e. deprived of the use of his feet. *Jarah* idiot i.e. having a weak intellectual perception. (140)

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 140

Tajjah, his issue i.e. begotten by the one degraded *Jarah*,¹ an idiot a dullard one not enthusiastic in the performance of a religious duty *Andho*, blind i.e. congenitally blind. From the text of Manu² viz. Born deafmutes also there is no room for a dispute

25

These i. e. the impotent and the rest, should be maintained for their life-time with subsistence and covering (being offered to them). They are not entitled to a share (140).

30

1 अविश्रुति *avishrutita* i.e. has been used without any special significance That is to say the incapacity attaches to all persons alike without regard to sex.

Ch. IX. 201

3 *Avishrutigah*.

4 Ch. XIII *1

5 Mark the difference in the angle of vision of the Author of the *Mitakshara* and *Śūlapāni*. For while the *Mitakshara* takes a practical view of it as one who is incapable of discriminating right from wrong, *Śūlapāni* takes as the text of a *ṛṣi* the want of a desire for religious performance.

(9) The exclusion from a share of the impotent and others¹ seeming to imply the exclusion of their sons also, the Author observes thus

Yājñavalkya, Verse 141 (1)

The Aurasa and Kshetrāja sons, however, of these, if free from defects are entitled to allotments

(10) Mitâksharâ —Eṣhām, of these, i e of the impotent and others, the Aurasa or Kshetrāja sons, nirdoshâḥ, if free from defects, i e which should bar their participation, such as impotency and the like, bhâga-hârmaḥ, are entitled to allotments, i e become rightful partakers of shares.

(11) Of these, an impotent man is likely to have a Kshetrāja son, the others may have the Aurasa sons even. The specific mention of the Aurasa and the Kshetrāja sons is intended to exclude² other kinds of sons

* PAGE 100

(12) The Author delivers a special rule concerning the daughters of the impotent and other disqualified persons

Yājñavalkya, Verse 141 (2)

The daughters likewise, of these, must be maintained³ until they are wedded to⁴ their husbands

(13) Mitâksharâ :—Eṣhām, of these, i e. of the impotent and others, Sutâḥ, the daughters, i e the female issue, until they are initiated by

1, i e the impotent and others enumerated above in II 140 at p 1117 ll 7-9

2 i e along with their disqualified parents Bâlabhattacharya adds (p 251 l 23) "A putrikâ also gets a share as being equal to an aurasa", and she too has been included in the word Aurasa" see note further on Yājñ II 142 and the observations of Chandavarkar J in Ganig vs Chandrabhagabai 32 Bom 275 at pages 282-283 and notes

3 Maintenance—includes residence, food and raiment Charandas vs Nagubai 31 Bom L R 1126

4 भर्तृसाकृता—Colebrooke translates, "Until they are provided with husbands" The suffix सात् used with the root कृ means—"join to" or "consigned to" e g

अग्निसाकृता, भस्मसात् &c

A married daughter will not be entitled to claim maintenance after her marriage She must seek her maintenance from her husband's family. See Bai Mangal vs Bai Rukhmini 23 Bom. 291 at p. 295

marriage, so long must they be supported. Under the suggestion of the word *cha*, likewise the expenses¹ of their nuptials must be also defrayed.

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 141

5

Eṣām of these as may be possible *Aurasaḥ*, the *Aurasa* and the *Kṣetraya* sons should be made the partakers of the shares of their fathers. Their daughters also so long as they have not been given away in marriage should be maintained (141).

(14) The Author adds a distinct rule respecting the wives of disqualified persons 10

Yājñavalkya, Verse 142

The sonless² wives likewise of these conducting themselves aright, must be supported,³ but such as are unchaste⁴ should be expelled and so indeed those who are perverse.

15

(15) *Mitākṣara*.—*Eṣām*, of these i.e. of the impotent and others *aputrāḥ the sonless wives, sadbhavritayah conducting themselves aright*

1 The original expression is *Saṁsāryachakṛa* संसार्याचक्रः i.e. should have the ceremonies performed with reference to them. These ceremonies have been enumerated by Yājñavalkya in *Acārādhyaya* in verses 10-12 pp. 33-41 above and as regards women he adds a special rule i. 13 () thus.— These rites (are performed) silently for women their marriage however (is performed) with Mantra texts. See also *Manu* II. 6-63 & II. 66-67 for the *Saṁsāra*¹ for women.

2 Colebrooke Tr. 'childless' but the expression in Yājñ. is *aputra* *Aputra* and not *aputra* *Aputra*.

Discussing this text among others Chhandavarkar J. has held that "the widow of a disqualified person is not excluded from inheritance merely by her husband's disqualification whether she claims as heir to a deceased person through her husband or otherwise. If she is herself free from any of the defects which exclude from inheritance," *Gangā* vs *Chandrabhāgabai* 3 Bom at 5.

3 Brother in law is bound to maintain a deceased brother's widow if father's self-acquired property descends to him. *J i A vi vs Samrat* 4 Luck. 401 (F B).

4 If she lives in adultery and persists in it, a wife is not entitled to maintenance. *Dab Saran Shukul vs Daulata* 30 All. 431.

But where a wife is found to have lapsed, but to have changed her ways subsequently she was given a starving allowance. *Sethgobhama vs Acharya* 30 Mad 658.

1 e if they are correct in their conduct, *bhartavyâh*, must be supported, or maintained *Wyabhichârinyah*, the unchaste, however, *nirwâsyâh*, should be expelled, *pratikûlâstatharva cha*, and so indeed those who are perverse, 1 e they deserve to be expelled But they must be supported, provided they be not unchaste For, (it is) not that even a maintenance must not be given solely on account of perverseness

Vîramitrodaya

The impotent and the rest being declared to be not entitled to a share, the incapacity of their sons also may follow, as also (might follow) the non-necessity for the maintenance of their daughter, wife etc The Author refutes that

Yājñavalkya, Verses 141, 142

Teshâm, 'Of those', 1 e of the impotent and the rest, *Kshetrajâh*, the 'Kshetrâja sons', and also the *Aurasa* sons of the impotent and the rest, if they are free from the defect of impotency and the like, become 'entitled to a share', *bhâgaharinah*

Eshâm, 'Of these', 1 e of the impotent and the rest, the *Kshetrajâh*, and of others than the impotent, the daughters, as long as they have not been joined to their husbands, 1 e made over to a bridegroom, so long should they be 'maintained' very properly 1.e similarly like one's own daughters.

Eshâm, 'Of these', 1 e of the impotent and the rest, *Yoshitaścha*, 'the wives also', who had been married by reason of the impotency not having been determined, *Sādhuṛttayah*, 'conducting themselves aright', 1 e. if well behaved, then *bhartavyâh*, 'should be maintained'

Vyabhichârinyah, 'the unchaste', as also those who are extremely *pratikulâ* 'perverse', *nirwâsyah*, 'should be expelled,' 1 e should be driven out of the home By the first *cha*, 'and', is added by inclusion that 'they should have the sacrament performed for them', and by the second, 'those who indulge in drinking liquor,' etc By the use of the word *eva*, 'also', the Author excludes the right of maintenance (141-142).

Sûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 142

Their sonless (wives) etc The meaning is clear (142)

[Colebrooke Sec. XI]

[On the separate property of a woman]

(1) 'After briefly propounding the division of wealth left by the

1 From here begins the law regarding a woman's property. The author of the *Mitāksharā* does not appear to be inclined to lay down any particular limit to the word *stridhana*. He has distinctly laid down further on that the term *stridhana* is to be understood according to its literal meaning and no technical significance has any scope. The introductory remarks are very significant. The author says that after having briefly described the division of wealth left by the parents generally and after having described the devolution of wealth of a male the sage Yājñavalkya propounds the devolution of wealth obtained by a female. Taking this as it stands and reading it in connection with the special remarks of Vijñāneśvara about the meaning of the term *stridhana*, it would appear that according to him all property acquired by a woman was to be regarded as her *stridhana* and this would appear to be in agreement with the general sense in which that term is understood in Western India, or more particularly in the Bombay Presidency. See observations of West J in *Bhagirathi vs Kankajir* 11 Bom. 285 (F B) at p. 99 also *Bhaskar Trambal vs Mahadeo* 6 Bom. H. O. B. (O O J) 1 at p. 18 and the observations of Candy J in *Gandhi, Nagendra vs Bai Jadhav* 24 Bom. 192 at pp. 194-206. The application of the principle of *Stridhana* to questions about the *stridhana* has worked strange results. For whereas there may be good authority in Bengal and the allied provinces for the proposition that 'a woman is incapable of acquiring any property' there is equally good authority for the proposition that 'whatever a woman acquires is her *stridhana*' and at least in the Bombay Presidency not only that there would be nothing strange or new in such a proposition but any other statement of the law would be received with surprise. By a strange combination of circumstances however the doctrine that a woman as a rule takes a limited estate viz. only *derivate interests* has come to be engrafted upon the general law of this Presidency and this on account of the merest accident that cases first went in appeal to the Privy Council either from Bengal or Madras, the appeals from Bombay being of a comparatively later date. The Board in England had before them questions wherein the meaning and significance of passages from the *Mitāksharā* had to be discussed, and the conclusions once drawn were engrafted upon decisions and cases in other parts of India without much regard to the accepted sense of the people of that particular province. It would thus appear that the principle of *Stridhana* has no application in cases of this nature inasmuch as there have been no cases as such to give scope for the application of that doctrine. The most recent instances of the strange results of this general interpretation of the texts for all the Provinces will be found in the language of the judgment of *Devi Mangal Prasad Singh vs Mahadeo Prasad Singh* 34 All. 234 (P O) and *Shree Shamlal Lal vs Devi Sahai* 25 All. 468-30 L. A. and *Shree Parikh, Bahadar Singh vs Allahabad Bank* 25 All. 46-30 L. A. 209.

husband and wife (in the text¹) “The sons should divide (equally “both the assets and the debts) of the parents &c.,” the distribution of a man’s goods has been described at large The Author, now intending to explain fully the distribution of a woman’s property,
5 begins by setting forth the nature of it

Yājñavalkya, Verse 143

What was given (to a woman) by the father, the mother, the husband or a brother, or² was received by her at the nuptial fire, as³ also that which was presented to her on her husband’s marriage to another wife
10 or any other, is denominated (*stîdhana*) a “ woman’s property.”

(2) Mitāksharâ —That which *pitr-mâtr-patibhrâtr-dattam*, was given by the father, the mother, the husband, as also by a brother, as also that which was presented (to the bride) by the maternal uncles and the rest at the time of the wedding, before the nuptial fire, and *âdhivedanikam*,
15 that which was presented to her on her husband’s marriage to another wife, as a gratuity on account of supersession, as will be subsequently explained (in the text⁴). “let him give to a wife who has been superseded &c ”, and as indicated by the word *âdya*, any⁵ other, also

1 Yājñ II 117 p 1002 ll 7-8

2 i. e. other than the gifts received by her and otherwise described

3 The original is *cha* Colebrooke translates ‘ Or ’

The *Âdhivedanika* is that kind of a woman’s property, which is given to her as a solace for the grief of supersession by another wife Yājñavalkya has enumerated the circumstances under which a wife could be superseded, see the *Âchârâdhyâya* Verse 73 and 74 (pages 194 196 above) and in Verse 75 (p 199), he lays down a penalty for the supersession of an obedient wife and gives her a third of the husband’s share See for this *Vijñâ* II 148 and the *Mitāksharâ* thereon See also *Subodhini* p 71 ll 30-31

4 Yājñ II 148

5 *Âdya*—Any other This is a very important term in the Smṛti literature, inasmuch as the Smṛti writers and commentators have freely made use of it for taking on such provisions to the existing law as they thought necessary The word *Âdya* here, as in Yājñ II 140, has been utilized to introduce provisions which were not stated in the Yājñavalkya Smṛti Another term of which similar use has been made is *cha* ꣳ, and it is under cover of this term that the ‘ daughter’s son ’ has been introduced by *Vijñanesvara* as an heir (see above page 1067)

(5) Definitions of **adyadhyagni**, 'presents given before the nuptial fire,' and the rest have been delivered by **Kâtyâyana**¹, "What is given to
" a woman at the time of her marriage near the (nuptial) fire, is
" celebrated by the wise as 'women's property', *strîdhanam*, 'bestowed
5 " before the nuptial fire' *Adhyagm* "

"That, again, which a woman receives while she is being conducted,
"from her father's house² is instanced as the property of a woman under
"the name of 'gift presented in the bridal procession' *Adhyâvâhanîkam*."

10 "Whatever has been given to her through affection by her
"mother-in-law or by her father-in-law, as also³ what is received by her
"at the time of saluting the feet of the elders is denominated 'an
"affectionate⁴ present' *Prîtidattam* "

15 "That which is received by a married woman, or by a maiden,
"in the house of her husband or of her father, from her brother or
"from her parents,⁵ is termed *Saudâyaham*⁶ 'a kind gift' "

1 Verses 895-897

2 Mr Colebrooke adds a note The *Ratnâlara* and *Chintamani* read "from the parental abode" The original expression there is नियमाना हि पैतृकात् and it would make no difference whether it is पितृगृहात् or पैतृकात् both the expressions having the force to indicate "the abode of her father i. e. the parental abode" It may be noticed that the expressions are used in contradistinction with the 'husband's abode' (मनृगृह) The corresponding Marâthi word माहेर would make this quite clear, the idea being that she is being carried from the house of her birth to the new house by marriage.

Property bequeathed by the maternal grand-father is her *saudâhyâ* *strîdhanam*, which she can alienate without the consent of the husband. *Venkaraddi* vs *Hanmantpouda* 34 Bom L R 1144=57 Bom 85 *Muthukarupa Pillai* vs *Sellathammal* 39 Mad 298

3 Mr Colebrooke mentions a reading in the *Smṛti-Chandrikâ*—"given to her at the time of making an obeisance at her feet," while no such reading is available either in the Sanskrit Text of the *Smṛti Chandrikâ*, or the translation by Mr Kṛishnaswamy (IX 2) The *Smṛti-Chandrikâ* simply quotes the text of *Kâtyâyana* as here and adds 'पादस्पर्शनम्-पादस्पर्शनाद्यमरे दत्तम्' The *Pâdâvâdanîyam* (means)—given at the time of the salutation of the feet And the पादस्पर्शन is generally made by the newly married bride going for the first time to her husband's abode

4 See note above The *Smṛti-Chandrikâ* and the *Vîramitrodaya* follow this reading But the *Ratnâlara* *Chintamani*, and *Vîrâdi-Chandra* read "denominated in acquisition through loveliness *Iâvanyârjyam* (लावण्यार्जितम्) " Colebrooke

5 The Bengal reading is सस्रागात् "from her husband" instead of भ्रातृ सस्रागात्

See Bâlabhattacharya p 274 ll 7-8 He notices the interpretation by the 'Easterns' (पश्चात्) on this term and adds at the end, that this is (in addition to and) different from all the property referred to above 6. Verse 901

Śūtapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 143

Adhyakṣa at the fire in the fire at the time of the wedding by the father and others *dattam* was given *Idhu k lām* as a solace for her agony &c at the time of the second marriage what was given to the former wife 5

By the use of the word *idhu* or any other after *bandhubhūḥ*, are included in the *śrāvanika* and others vide *katyayana* that again "which a woman receives while she is (being) conducted from her father's house is called *adhyakṣa dānam* a kind of *śrī dānam*." (143). 10

(6) Besides, (the Author says)

Yājñavalkya Verse 144 (1).

That which has been given to her by her kindred *Bandhudattam* as well as her fee or gratuity *Sūktam* or anything bestowed after marriage' *Anrudhacyakam*. 15

Mītākṣara:—Bandhubhūḥ by her kindred &c by the *mitrabandhu* as well the *mitrabandhus* of the daimel, *yad dattam*, what has been given

1 अद्विष्टा ॥ the pain caused to her on account of the husband marrying another wife As for the *अद्विष्टा* and the mutual right and liabilities of the wife and the husband in that connection see *Acharya Udaya* 1 recs X 3 74 and 76 Text pages 18-19 and tr pp 191-200 above (Part I).

Verse 891

3 "Her kindred—i.e. her kindred through her parents before marriage and her kindred through her husband after marriage These are—the parents and the husband—are the *śūtra* through whom her kindred is to be determined. The kindred of a person—whether male or female—are those who are directly related to such person individually or mediately through others who are kindred of that person In the case of a male the three kinds of kindred or *bandhu* have been enumerated above The case is somewhat different in the case of a female. For (1) after marriage her *bandhus* are those of the husband if the marriage be in an approved form. It is only when the marriage is in an unapproved form that her kindred are those in her own individual right, and these would be her children &c. and those relations connected through her parents

(2) Before marriage her kindred are either her father's kindred or her mother's kindred which would again mean her father's kindred alone unless her mother's marriage was in an unapproved form See further on under verse 145 and also the observations of Chandraśekhara J in *Jangladeri vs Jetha Appaji* 32 Bom. 409 at p 413; *Tularam vs Ramasandra* 36 Bom. 330

ie by these *S'ulka*,¹ the gratuity or fee, that after the receipt of which a girl is given in marriage *Anvâdheyakam*, what is bestowed after marriage, *anu*, following, ie subsequently to the marriage, what has been *âhitam*, deposited, ie given

- 5 (7) It has also been said by *Kâtyâyana*² "What is obtained by
"a woman from the family of her husband at a time subsequent to
"her marriage, is called an *Anvâdheya* or 'gift subsequent', and so also
"that which is similarly received from the family of her father"—is
termed "a woman's property." thus is this passage connected with
10 that which has gone before

Vîramitrodaya

- Thus having in details stated (the law relating to) the property of a male, the Author treats of *stridhana*, 'the woman's property', with a view to discuss the 'mother's wealth' stated before in the text³ "Of
15 "the mother's (property), the daughters (shall take) the residue after
"(the payment of) debts, in their default, the issue (succeed) "

Yājñavalkya, Verses 143, 144 (1)

- By the father and others, given through affection, *adhyagni*, 'in the presence of the fire', ie near the fire, at the time of marriage, what was
20 obtained from even an outsider' *Âdhivedanikam*, 'on the occasion of supersession', as may be hereafter stated in the text 'To a superseded wife one should give' etc

- By the *bandhus*, 'kindred', such as the maternal uncle and others, *dattam*, 'given', through affection, *sulkam* ie wealth settled by the
25 father and others intended to be given to the bride and the bridegroom, *Anvâdheyakam*, 'gifts after marriage', such as stated by *Kâtyâyana*⁵ viz

1 Bâlabhattacha (p 254 ll 14-15) states that according to the interpretation of *Kalpataru*, this refers to the property of a sister married under the *Âsura* form. He also states the interpretations put by *Kâtyâyana* and *Vyâsa* on the term *cha*

2 Verse 899

3 Yājñ Verse 117 (3rd quarter) p 1004, ll 21-22

4 Yājñ II 148

5 Verse 898

"mother, that has been declared as *Anvâdheya*, as also that which was
"obtained from the father's family."

This property as also the property of a woman married under the
Āsura and the like form, who has died without a child, such property
5 of her as was given by the kinsmen and others, her relations i.e. the
brothers shall take As says *Gautama*¹ "The sister's *śulka* goes to the
"uterine brother after the mothers, some hold, even before" 'After the
mother' i.e. after her death When the mother and the father, however,
are living, then it goes to these only, vide *Manu*² "That property of
10 "hers as may have been given to her in marriages like the *Āsura* and the
"rest, upon her death without progeny, such property is intended to be
"for the mother and the father" (144)

(10) The kinsmen have been declared generally³ to be competent
to succeed to a woman's property The Author now distinguishes different
15 claimants according to the diversity of the marriage ceremonies

Yājñavalkya, Verse 145

The property of a childless woman, married according to any of the
four⁴ forms such as the *Brâhma* and the others, goes to her husband, it
will go to her daughters, if she leave progeny; and in other⁵ forms of
20 marriage, it goes to her parents

(11) *Mitâksharâ*—*Aprajasah striyâh*, of a childless woman, as before⁶
stated, and who had obtained⁷ the *status* of a wife by any of the four

1 Oh XXVIII 23-24

2 Oh IX 197

3 See *Janghubai vs Jetha Appaji* 32 Bom at p 414

4 i.e. according to the first four forms which are considered as the 'approved forms' of marriage, viz the *Brâhma*, *Dauva*, *Ārsha*, and *Prājâpatya* See *Mitâksharâ* further on

5 i.e. the last four forms called the unapproved forms viz the *Āsura*, *Gândharva*, *Râkghasa* and *Paisâcha*

6 i.e. in *Yājñ* II 144 i.e. without any of the five descendants mentioned above *Bâlamhatti* p 256

7 *Bhâryâtoam prâptiâyâh* (भार्यात्प्रप्राप्ताया) Literally "who has obtained wifehood" Colebrooke translates—"who had become a wife"

modes of marriage denominated *Brāhma*, *Dāsa*, *Ārsha* and *Prāyaputa*, (and) who has died *dhanam*, the *property*,¹ as before described devolves² in the first place *bhartar* on her husband. On failure of him, it devolves on the *sapindas*³ nearest to him. But *Śepheṇu*, in other forms,⁴ of marriage i. e. (those denominated) the *Āsura*, *Gāndharva*, *Rikṣasa* and *Puśācha*, tat, it, i. e., the property of a childless woman *pūrgam*, goes to her parents. The words *Mātā* (mother) and *Pitā* (father) when combined make up the compound *pitarau* (both parents). That which goes to these two is *pūrgam*. Although the mother has

5

1 i. e. the whole property (Bālabhāṭṭa p. 256 l. 22)

2 *Bhartarīkṣanti* (भर्तृक्षति) *Lāḥ* becomes the husband's (property).

Strīdhana—succession where it was held that marriage in the *Kurus* form was well-recognised in a community in the sense that it was 'approved' the husband's heirs were held entitled to the *Strīdhana*. *Kishan Devi vs Shree Palka* 48 All. 126 and in this case the court held (p. 185) that where a particular form was not regarded with disapprobation, the other side must prove that it was not of the approved kind.

To the *strīdhana* property of a woman a son by adoption along with another co-wife, and a son born of another wife succeed equally as husband's *Sapindas*. *Gangadhar Boyla vs Hirulal* 43 Cal. 944

The *strīdhana* of a remarried girl goes equally to the son of her first husband and by the second husband. *Bapu vs Krishnakā* 36 Bom. L. R. 140

Under the V *Mayūkha* the non-technical *strīdhana* goes to a son in preference to a son's son. *Ben Roman vs Jagjirendra* 19 Bom. L. R. 639—41 Bom. 618. As between a legitimate son and an illegitimate daughter born in prostitution the son is entitled to succeed. *Vasumathi vs Mervendi*. 38 Mad. 1144

3 Colebrooke translates, 'It goes to his nearest kinsmen (*Sapindas*) allied by funeral oblations.' This definition or description of a *Sapinda* may be correct under the law in Bengal. The *Mitākṣharā* understands that term quite differently (See Yājñ I. 52 pages 150–151 and *Lakshmi vs Amankoverbi* 2 Bom. 388 at p. 423. See also Telang J in *Goyabai's* case in 17 Bom. 114 at p. 117 and *Paramappa vs Shiddappa* 30 Bom 601—8 Bom. L. R. 685. See also note 1 on page 1071 above.) This translation therefore of the term *sapinda* is not good so far as the *Mitākṣharā* is concerned, and has been criticised in several cases the most recent of which is *Naras Pillai vs Sivabegutthachi* 36 Mad. 116 and cases cited there. As regards the succession of the husband's *sapindas* see *Krishnakā vs Shripati* 30 Bom 333—8 Bom. L. R. 12. *Bei Kesari vs Hunsary Morari* 30 Bom. 431 (p. c) at p. 443. And generally also *Janghubai vs Jetha Appaji* 32 Bom. 409 at pp. 412–413; and *Tularam vs Narayan* 36 Bom. 339 at p. 345 (F. B.).

4 i. e. the remaining four called the unapproved.

already been indicated in the elliptical¹ compound, still her prior (right of) succession has already been² specifically mentioned before. On failure of them the (right of) succession is that of their³ nearest relations⁴ by propinquity.

- 5 (12) Indeed in all forms⁵ of marriage, if the woman be *prasûtâ*,
 leave progeny, i e if she leave issue, *tat, it, i e* her
 Course of inheritance property, *duhitrnâm*, will go to her daughters. Here,
 by the term 'daughters', 'daughter's daughters'
 are⁶ expressed, since the daughters themselves have been expressly
 10 mentioned in the (preceding⁷) text "Of the mother's (property) the
 "daughters (shall take) the residue &c." (13) Hence also, upon the
 death of a mother, the daughters first take the mother's property.⁸
 And there also, in the case of a competition between the married and
 the unmarried, the unmarried (take). But on failure of these, the
 15 married (take). And there also, in the case of a competition between
 such as are endowed⁹ and those who are unendowed, the unendowed

1 Called the *Ekasheṣha* uni-residual *Dvandva*. In this compound only one word is retained and the others are dropped, the one word remaining having the capacity to express the others dropped. See note 3 on p 1091.

2 : *e* p 1091 l 3

3 Their, : *e* of the parents. See note 3 above on page 1129. For a fuller discussion on the meaning of the pronoun *तत्र* see *Tukaram* vs *Narayan* 36 Bom 339 (F B).

4 *Tatpratyaśannârâm*—*Pratyaśannas* are those relations whose claim is based on propinquity. Colebrooke translates "their next of kin."

5 *Sarveṣṭheva*—: *e* as regards the right of succession of the issue, they take precedence in all cases, irrespective of the particular form of marriage. But the issue or progeny here means her own issue and not the issue of a co-wife. The particular case of the succession of the daughter of a co-wife of a superior class would not otherwise have been specially mentioned. See also *Bhīmacharya* vs *Venkappacharya* 33 Bom 452, where the husband was allowed preference over a step son. *Bālabhāṭṭa* notes several readings. See p 257.

6 *Uchyaṇte*—उच्यन्ते : *e* are expressly signified, and not merely to be inferred.

7 Of *Yājñavalkya* II 117. See p 1004 ll 21-22.

8 *Mâtrdhanam* : *e* the *Strîdhanam* of the mother.

9 *Pratiṣṭhita*—: *e* well established in life, well provided for. Comparative poverty is the only criterion in cases of competition between the married daughters, and it is not intended that an inquiry should be held going into all the

(Contd. on next page)

take (the succession first); and on failure of them those who are endowed. As says Gautama¹ "The *Stridhana* property goes to the 'daughters unmarried' and (failing them) to the men loved" Here the use of the particle *ch* and makes it devolve on the endowed also "Unendowed" are such as are without issue or are destitute of wealth

Exception & *Ille* (14) But this (rule holds) with the exception of the *Sūlla*. For the *Sūlla* goes to the uterine brethren only. *Wile* the text of Gautama² "The sister's *Sūlla* belongs to the uterine brothers after (the death of) the mother"

(*Contd. from last page*)

minute details of income &c See Haradatta J. in *Tara* vs *P. ara* 3 Dom 9
 "When however the difference in wealth is marked the law requires that the whole of the property should go to the *g* o daughter. *Ille* and also are cited on pages 10 and 13 of the report. The *Ille* endowed as explained forth on as being those who are without issue or are destitute of wealth

In *Dayara* vs *P. ara* 36 Dom 1411 118 it was held in the case of a male that a posthumous daughter was entitled to succeed

1 Ch. XXVIII 2

2 The unmarried exclude the married. *Śaṭra* vs *Dom* 1411, 81 vol 18

3 Ch. XXVIII, 13 1

4 *Sūlla*—Colebrooke translates this as "the fee or gratuity" This is in accordance with the explanation given in *A. lpatara* and quoted by Bāmbhaṭṭa on (p. 254-14), *अनुपतिवर्तमाना अतिरा वत्* Tr. The property of a sister married according to the *Arara* or similar forms of marriage is the bride price. To the same effect is Haradatta on Gautama's text. Bāmbhaṭṭa notices two other definitions or descriptions of this kind, of *Stridhana*, viz. those given by Kātyāyana and Vyāsa — *Kātyāyana* defines it as

यदापि यदापि दत्तं भाग्यवत्तम् । दत्तं वा न दत्तं विदुष्यन् न दत्तं विदुष्यन् ॥

Tr. "Whatever is obtained as the equivalent of household utensils of least of burden of milch cattle or ornaments is declared (to be) *Sūlla* ; and this has also been cited in the *Vyavahāra-Māyāka* and *Dīyadhīga* IV 3 10-0

Iyasa defines it as *यदापि यदापि दत्तं भाग्यवत्तम्* and Bāmbhaṭṭa explains it as *यदापि यदापि दत्तं भाग्यवत्तम्* is presents &c given to induce her to go to her husband's house and thus it is very much like the *Adhyakṣanika*. See *Dayadhīga* IV 1. 6

5 This interpretation is according to that given in *Haradatta* (p. 77 18), Bāmbhaṭṭa (p. 71 22), and *Kalpataṛa* explain it similarly and so also Haradatta. The *Dīyadhīga* however interprets it differently. According to

(*Contd. on next page*)

(15) On failure of all the daughters, the daughters' daughters take under this text¹ 'It will go to the daughters if Daughter's children "she leave progeny, &c"

5 (16) If there be a multitude² of these (and if they be) children of different mothers, and unequal in number, shares should be allotted to them through³ their mothers, as directed by Gautama⁴: "Or, according "to the mothers,⁵ let the special share (be adjusted) in each class"

10 Daughter's daughters (17) If there be daughters as well as daughters' daughters simultaneously⁶, a trifle only should be given to the daughters' daughters As has been directed by Manu⁷ "Such of the daughters of those (daughters) "as may exist, even to those, something⁸ should be given, as may be "fit, from the property of the grand-mother, on the score of affection."

15 Daughter's sons (18) On failure also of the daughters' daughters, the daughters' sons are entitled to the succession As says Nārada⁹ "(Let) daughters (divide) their mother's (wealth),

(Contd from last page)

the Dâyabhâga, first the uterine brothers &c —and then after them, and in their absence, the mother, and then the father &c take (see IV 27-29) Bâlabhattacha explains 'Mother' here, to be the woman herself : & the sister herself (See Bâlabhattacha p 757 l 23) 1 : & Yājñ II 145 (3rd quarter)

2 *Samavâya* (समावय) —is a collecting together of persons with conflicting claims

3 The principle of the rule enumerated here is the same as laid down in regard to the property of a male, where several persons lay claim *through* their respective *male* ascendants : & that laid down in Yājñ II 120 (p 1017 ll 23-24)

4 Oh XXVIII 15

5 : & the share of a particular claimant is to be determined by regard to the number of her mother's sisters as well as that of her sisters, in other words, *per stirpes* first, and then *per capita*

6 Here the word *Samavâya* does not predicate any claim on behalf of the daughters' daughters It only indicates their co existence along with the daughters

7 Oh IX 193

8 *Something*, किञ्चित्—Kullûka holds that the grand daughters should be unmarried *Sarvajña Nârâyana* says, "When the married daughters are dead their daughters shall be presented at will by their maternal uncles with the share which their mothers would have received as a token of respect," *Rāghavānanda* too thinks that "on the score of affection" means 'at the pleasure (of the heirs)' But *Nandana* deduces from the same term the absolute necessity of the gift. Buhler

9 Oh XIII 2,

"or on failure of daughters, their (male) issue."¹ For, the pronoun *ta*, it,² refers to the continuous term daughters

(19) If there be no daughters³ sons, sons take (the property) for it has already been declared⁴ "In their default, the (male) issue (succeed)."⁵ Mann⁶ likewise shows the right of daughters as well as of sons to the mother's effects: "But, when the mother is dead, all the uterine brothers shall equally divide the mother's property and also the uterine sisters."⁷ (20) The maternal estate, all the uterine brothers should divide equally and also the uterine sisters should divide equally such is the construction And the meaning is not that uterine brothers and sisters share together⁸, for since the abridged⁹ form of the conjunctive compound has not been employed reciprocation¹⁰ cannot be (construed to have been) indicated

1 तद्वत्पुत्रः—The *Smṛtyakadrikā* interprets this as the female issue स्त्रीपुत्रः पुत्रवत्पुत्रिणीमात्र इति च मन्ने (See p. *36 l. 3). Colebrooke translates as "(male) issue

2 See Bāṣambhaṭṭi p. 258 The result as to the order of succession on account of this note of the Mitākṣharā is as follows:—

"After the mother her daughters take the *strīdhana*, in the absence of the daughters from those among her issue the daughter's daughter take first, then the daughter's son, &c

Jīmāta Vāhana seems to have understood the pronoun *it* as referring to the word "mother" See Dīyabhāṣa IV 2-13

3 Colebrooke translates If there be no grandsons in the female line.

4 Yājñ II. 117 (p. 1030 l. 20 above). See Bhāṣaśāstra vs Rāmācārya 33 Bom. 452 at p. 456

5 Ch. IX. 192. The *Kalpataṛu* reads: *Sarve putrāḥ sahodarāḥ*. (See Bāṣambhaṭṭi p. 259 l. 18)

6 *Samāhāra*—i. e. together at a time. The meaning is that the two sets of heirs viz the uterine sisters and uterine brothers, do not take together but that each set takes separately

7 See notes on p. 1091 1092 (*supra*) as regards the several meanings of *cā* and the characteristics of an *Ekāśeṣa* compound.

8 If reciprocation were meant to be indicated in the text of *Māna*, the word *Bhrātṛ* 'brother' would have been used inflected, however in the dual number to denote 'brother and sister' (*Pāṇini* I. 2-68), or else *chikīṣa* or some generic term, would have been employed in the plural (*Pāṇini* I. 2-64). But the text is not so expressed; consequently reciprocation is not indicated See *Subhāṣi* p. 77 ll. 19-25 Bāṣambhaṭṭa.

the (conjunctive) particle *cha* can even be construed to have been used with reference to the person making the partition. As in the example, "Let Devadatta practise agriculture, and Yajñadatta also" (21) "Equally" is specified to forbid the allotment of deductions
 5 "Uterine"² is used (with a view) to exclude the non-uterine³

(22) The *Śrīdhana* of a childless woman belonging to an inferior⁴ tribe, however, the daughter of a co-wife⁵ of a superior tribe takes
 Step-daughter though springing from a different mother

* PAGE 102

10 On failure of her, her issue (shall succeed). *Vide* Manu⁶ "What-
 "ever property of a woman may exist, such as had been in any
 "manner given to her by her father, let the daughter of a Brâhmanî
 "co-wife take, or let it belong to her offspring" (23) The mention
 of a Brâhmanî includes by implication (the daughter belonging to) any
 superior class. Hence the daughter of a Kshatriyâ⁷ co-wife takes the
 15 goods of a childless Vaiśyâ co-wife

1 As has been laid down in the law regarding the property of a male *e g*
 See Yājñ II 114 p 994 l 10 *supra*

2—3 Colebrooke translates—whole blood. The expression in the text is *sodara*—belonging to the same uterus. The expression used by Viṣṇûsvara in this same passage is *Bhinnodara*—which has been translated as *non-uterine*. Colebrooke translates as half-blood which is not sufficient (See note p 1098 *supra*)

4 This is in accordance with those provisions under which intermarriages among several *varnas* appear to have been in force. See Yājñavalkya Âchârâdhyâya Verses 57 (p 168), 88 p 236, 90 (p 241) and Vyavahâra Verse 125 p 1033

5 This word is derived as follows समान एक पतिर्यस्या सा सपत्नी—She whose husband is equal : *e* the same (as the other) is a co-wife. The form is based on the rule नित्य सप्त्यादित्थु (Pânini IV 1 35) "In forming the feminine with the affix ङीप्, the word पति always takes the substitute न् in the words like सपत्नी and the like *e g* वीरपत्नी, एकपत्नी &c. Colebrooke translates as 'a rival wife'

6 Oh IX 198 'Her offspring' or 'issue' (Colebrooke) *Apatya* (अपत्य)—here refers to the daughters alone. See *Sarvyñanârâyana*. Most of the commentators on Manu agree that the property does not go to the brothers of the wife concerned. It goes in the first place to the daughter of a Brâhmanî wife, and in her absence to her offspring : *e* the female offspring

7 This inference is contested by Śrīkrishna in his commentary on the *Dâya-Bhâga* of Jîmâtâ-Vâhana. Colebrooke

(24) On failure of sons, grandsons inherit their paternal grand-
mother's wealth. For Gautama¹ says "They, who
Sons sons "share the inheritance, must pay the debts" and
the grandsons are bound to discharge the debts of their paternal
grand mother for the text² expresses "Debts must be paid by sons
"and sons sons."

(25) On failure of grandsons also, the husband and other relatives
Husband and others above mentioned³ are successors to the wealth.

Viramītrodaya

Thus by discussing the *strīdhana* has been discussed the mother's
property Of a woman who had no issue born or of one all of whose
sons and daughters are dead there being an absence of motherhood
which is the counterpart of a living (child), who shall take the pro-
perty? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya Verses 144 (2), 145

Apratyakṣam, (when) without issue : *e* without a living daughter
and son or any of them *atītyakṣam* (when) she passes away *tat* that
i.e. the *strīdhana* *bāndhavaḥ* 'the kinsmen : *e* her relations, *andh-*
nyuk shall get

Here moreover this is the special rule in the case of a woman
married according to the (four forms) *Brāhma Datta Arāka* and *Prājā-*
patya the *strīdhana* of a childless woman goes to the husband. In the
case of the remaining four forms of marriages—by the use of the word *api*,
'even even when there is no marriage—her property goes to the father
If however she be offered in marriage and is devoid of a son or a
daughter then that property becomes of the daughters as their own.
In their absence moreover the daughter's son mentioned before by the
word 'issue' becomes entitled to the property as under the text of Manu

1 Oh. XII 40 Cf Yājñ II. 51 p 796 *ante*

2 See Yājñ. II. 50 p 792 l. 7 *Supra* The two texts run thus:

(1) The sons and grandsons should pay off the debts &c

(2) Those who take the inheritance, must pay the debts. From these
an inference follows that the sons and grandsons take the inheritance.
(See *Sambodhina* p 77 ll. 30-31 and *Bālabhāṣī* p. 200 ll. 14-15). For such an
inference, however one more promise is wanting viz. those who pay the debts,
take the inheritance.

3 *i.e.* in Yājñ II. 144

stated above even when the daughter is living some portion is indicated for the daughter's son.

Here in the case of the *Brâhma*, *Daiva*, *Ārsha* and *Prâjâpatya* forms of marriages the property "which a woman dying without issue
5 "leaves, that is intended for the husband only", by this text of *Manu*¹ it should be noted that in the case of a *Gândharva* marriage the share of the husband and the father is equal (144, 145).

Sûlapâṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 145

10 In the case of marriages like the *Brâhma* and the rest, the property of a childless woman, goes to the husband If, however, there be daughters born of her, then (it goes) to them In the case of the remaining *i. e.*, the *Āsura* and the other forms, it belongs to the mother and the father alone

The right of the mother's sister and the rest to the property in the
15 absence of the husband and the rest, has been stated by *Bṛhaspati*² "The mother's sister, the wife of the maternal uncle, the wife of the paternal uncle, father's sister, the mother-in-law, and the wife of an elder brother—all these have been declared to be like mothers. When of these
"an *aurasa* son does not exist, or a daughter's son either, or their son also,
20 "then the sister's son and the rest³ shall take their property" (145)

(26) On the occasion⁴ of treating of *Strîdhana*, the Author adds something concerning a betrothed maiden

Yājñavalkya, Verse 146 (1)

He who after having given his daughter, takes her⁵ (back), shall be
25 punished⁶ and should also (be compelled to) make good the expenses together with interest

1 Ch IX. 196

2 Ch XXV 88-89

3 These words include other relations of the husband or father Sec 33I A 176 at p 197 These do not necessarily take in the order of enumeration, 'The question of priority is determined by the rule of propinquity—per Chandaraup J in *Hansraj vs Bai Moghubai* 7 Bom L. R 622/631, 33 I A 176 The Madras High Court has ruled that this text has no application to the right of succession to a maiden's property *Sundaram vs Ramasami* 43 Mad 32, at p 36

4 *i. e.* as having a reference to the subject under discussion &c

5 Colebrooke translates, "For *detaining* a damsel, after *affiancing* her" &c. *datôâ* *i. e.* having given or offered, and *haran*—*i. e.* 'taking back'

6 *Dandya*—*i. e.* is liable to a penalty, which may be in the form of a fine, imprisonment, or any other form of punishment Colebrooke translates "should be fined,"

(27) Mitākshara — Kanyam dātva, a damsel verbally having given, apaharan, one who takes her (back) shall be punished by the king by regard to the amount of the property or the magnitude of the offence, and similar other circumstances. This, moreover (is applicable) if there be no (sufficient) reason for the retraction. But, if there be good cause he shall not be punished since retraction is authorized in such a case (by the text¹): "A damsel although given, one may even take back if a better bridegroom presents himself"

5

(28) Whatever has been expended on account of the espousal by the (intended) bridegroom for the gratification² of his own or the damsel's relations, must be repaid in full with interest, by the affiancer³ to the bridegroom.

10

(29) Should a damsel anyhow⁴ affianced die before the completion of the (marriage) ceremony what is to be done in that case? So the Author replies

13

Yājñavalkya, Verso 146 (2)

If she die (after troth plighted) the bridegroom should take back the gifts which he had presented, after deducting the expenses on both sides.

(30) Mitākshara:—If a betrothed damsel die then whatever had been previously given by the bridegroom such as a ring and similar other presents the bridegroom shall take back *pariśodhyobhayavyayam* deducting the expenses on both sides the expenses of both i.e. of himself and of the person who offered the bride *pariśodhya*, after deducting, i.e. taking⁵ account of that, the balance (thus remaining) he may take

20

What, however was given to the damsel by the maternal grand father, or other relation⁶ such as the head ornament and other gifts,

25

1. Yājñavalkya I 166 p. 184

2. *Upacharartham* (उपचारार्थं) i.e. by way of offering hospitality to.

3. i.e. the parent or guardian of the bride

4. i.e. either by proper religious rites, or by taking by hands, or in any other manner (See Bālabhāṣya p. 370 l. 16).

5. *Vigrahyam* Bālabhāṣya considers this as a bad reading. He prefers *Vigrahyam* "removing" or "discharging" (p. 370 ll. 19-20)

6. Such as the paternal uncle. Bālabhāṣya.

as well as property inherited by her in her right of succession, (all that) her uterine brothers shall take For Baudhâyana¹ says "The wealth of a deceased damsel, let the uterine brethren themselves take. "On failure of them it shall belong to the mother, and in her absence, 5 "to the father"

Vîramitrodaya

On the occasion of (treating of) the strîdhana, the Author mentions the disposal of property taken by the father and others for the marriage of a woman in the *Āsura* form who was promised by word of mouth

10 Yājñavalkya, Verse 146

Kanyâm, 'a maiden', having by a word of mouth, *datva*, 'promised to give', *haran*, 'one taking her back' i. e. does not give to him, such a one *dandyaḥ*, 'should be punished' by the King, by regard to the amount (invested) and other circumstances *Vyayam*, 'expenses', i. e., the amount 15 of money spent by the bridegroom for the purpose of the marriage. *Sodayam*, 'together with interest', *dadyāt* 'should give'

The person giving the promise by word in the case of the death of the maiden under a misfortune, after having corrected for the expenses of both i. e., of oneself and of the bride's father and others, such a one 20 i. e. the bridegroom may take back what was given by himself such as clothes, ornaments, gold etc., not however interest By mentioning correction, it has been pointed out that where there is an absence of an excess over what was spent by the bride's father, nothing should be taken. By the use of the word *cha*, 'also', is intended the simultaneity 25 of the expenses, gift, and the penalty (146)

1 Appendix B 7 p 125 (Leipzig Edition 1884)

"This is a special solitary text which has necessarily to be supplemented by other texts such as those quoted in *Dâyakrama* (D K S II 1-2), or from the general law of *Strîdhana*, and where this law also fails, from the still more general law of succession (*Mitâkṣharâ* II 11-19-25) The special rules of *Strîdhana* succession have thus to be expressly or impliedly supplemented from *Parîthinasî* or *Nârada* (*Vîramitrodaya* 241)" per Jenkins O J in *Gandhi Maganlal vs Bai Jadbai* 24 Bom 192 at pp 211-212 (F B), See also the observations of Chandavarkar J in *Janghubai vs Jetha Appaji* 32 Bom 400 at pp 411-412

Sūlapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 146

He who by a word of mouth *Kanyāṁ datuḥ*, after having given his daughter *kanyā* takes her back, without a cause becomes *danḍgo* liable to be punished.

5

Whatever had been given by the bridegroom such as gold etc. that the father of the bride shall pay back with interest.

When a maiden who by a word of mouth has been promised to be given whatever was respectfully given by way of customary presents to the relations of the father and the relations of the bridegroom, after deducting both these, whatever may remain as the residue of the *śulka*, all that, the bridegroom may take. (146)

10

(31) It has been declared, that the property of a woman dying without issue goes to her husband. The Author now shows that, in certain circumstances, a husband is allowed to take his wife's goods in her lifetime, and even though she have issue

15

Yājñavalkya, Verse 147

A husband is not liable¹ to make good the property of his wife (when it was) taken² by him in a famine, or for (the performance of) a religious duty or during illness, or while under restraint.

20

(32) Mītākṣhara.—*Durbhikṣhe*, in a famine, for the maintenance and preservation of the family *Dharmakarye*, for a religious duty which must necessarily be performed and also *vyādhan*, during illness, or *sampatirodhake*, while under restraint, or confinement in prison or under corporal penalties, being destitute of other funds, and therefore taking his wife's property *bhartā na [punar] dātumarhati*, the husband is not liable to repay. But if he seize in any other manner he must pay

25

(33) With the exception of the husband, the property of a woman must not be taken in her life-time by any other kinsman or heir since

1 See Bāṁbhātī (p 270 l. 20). There is no obligatory rule of the law that he must necessarily pay (back). Otherwise it would have been said "he should not pay" अयदस्तेकस्मिन् निवसे कस्मिन्निवसः । अथवा न देवस्मिन्निवसे भूयात् ।

2 यत्किं IL 148 Taking, means taking and using. Therefore when property is not used, it should be returned. *Acemalwar vs Thayarammal* 50 Mad. 911.

- punishment is denounced¹ (against such conduct) “ Their kinsmen,
 “ who take their goods in their life-time, a virtuous king should chastise
 “ by inflicting the punishment of theft.” Similarly, it is pronounced
 an offence ² “Such ornaments, as are worn by women during the
 5 “life-time of their husband, the heirs of the husband shall not³ divide
 “among themselves, they who do so are degraded from their tribe ”

Vîramitrodaya

- The heir to the *strîdhana* of a deceased woman has been discussed
 before The Author mentions who may take her property during
 10 (her) life-time

Yājñavalkya, Verse 147

- Sampratirodhake*, ‘while under restraint’, such as when he is under
 imprisonment or the like. By the use of the word *cha*, ‘and’, is added
 the general qualitative condition *viz.* when the husband’s property does
 15 not exist The rest is easily intelligible (147).

Sûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 147

Sampratirodhake, ‘while under restraint,’ the meaning is, {what was
 taken by one of a higher *varṇa* causing obstruction for meals etc (147)}

20 PAGE 103*

(34) A present made on her husband’s marriage to another wife
 has been mentioned as a kind of *Strîdhana*. The Author describes
 such a present

Yājñavalkya, Verse 148

- 25 To a superseded wife, let him give an equal sum for the supersession;
 (1. e) to her to whom no (*Strîdhana*) separate property has been given, but
 if any have been assigned, let him allot³ a half

1 Bâlabhattacharya ascribes this text, to *Nârada*, but it is not found in the
 published edition of that writer by Dr Jolly The text, is found however, in
Manu at Oh VIII 29 See the observations of Medhâtithi on this verse The
Chauradanda (चौरदण्ड) or “punishment of theft” referred to here has been given
 later on by *Manu* at Oh VIII. 334

2 *Dosha*—a dereliction, a transgression *Manu* Oh IX 200

3 प्रकल्पयेत् is a better reading, the reading प्रकीर्तितम् adopted in the print is
 not good Bâlabhattacharya characterises it as a bad reading (अप्राप्त), and rightly
 That would necessarily require it to be in the neuter gender

(35) *Mitākshara* —She over¹ the marriage of whom (another) marriage is contracted is a *superseded*, *adhivannî*. Such a one who is a wife is a 'superseded wife' To her *adhivannastriyai*, i. e. to a *superseded wife*, *âdhivedanîkam*, for the supersession, i. e. on account of the supersession. An amount *samam*, equal, to what is expended on the second marriage to such an extent, should be given, *yasyai stridhanam na dattam*, to her (i. e.) to whom no separate property has been given, by her husband or by her father-in-law. But if *datte*, any *stridhana* had been assigned, *ardham* half the sum expended on the second marriage should be given. Here however the word 'half' (*ardha*) does not intend an² exact moiety. So much therefore should be paid as will make the wealth already conferred on her equal to the prescribed amount of compensation. Such is the meaning.

Viramitrodaya

The Author expounds the *Âdhivedanika stridhana* mentioned before 15

Yājñavalkya, Verse 143

Adhivannî, 'superseded', i. e., a woman over whom a co-wife has been brought in to such a one *Âdhivedanîkam*, pertaining to supersession, i. e., on account of marriage with a co-wife, *ghanam* wealth equal to the property given to the one who is being married, should be given to the (former) wife to whom *stridhana* had not been given. If however *stridhana* had been already given before, then half of the property given to the (new) wife who is being taken in marriage has been declared to be given to the superseded wife. (143).

1. *Adhivannî* is derived from *Adhi* i. e. over and *vann* i. e. married (from *vid* to marry) *अधिवन्ति*. The compound is formed after the rule in Pāṇini V 2 137 —'असं सप्तम्' Manoy which was obtained on account of the *Adhivedana* or Supersession is the *Adhivedanîkam* under the rule *असं सप्तम्* (Pāṇini V I. 38).

2. The word *ardha* (half) is used here in the masculine number and therefore not necessarily equivalent to half; it signifies a portion in general. See *Amara* I. 3 16 *Sabodhinî* p. 78. See also *Bhāmahatya* p. 271 ll. 19-21, where *Bhāmahatya* has established that in whichever gender the word be taken, it indicates a portion rather than a complement of the amount already received to make a half, and not a half exactly.

Śûlapâñi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 148

To a wife for whom a co-wife has been brought, on account of the supersession an equal amount should be given. The meaning is, that as much as is given as a respectful gift to the new wife after her marriage, so much (should be given). If *Strîdhana* had been given, then a half should be given (148)

[Colebrooke Sec XII]

[On the evidence of a partition]

(1) Having thus explained the law of distribution of the heritage, the Author next propounds the evidence by which it may be proved in a case of doubt

Yājñavalkya, Verse 149

When partition is denied, the fact of the partition may be ascertained by the evidence of kinsmen, relatives, and witnesses, and by written proof, or by (proof of) separate possession of houses or fields.

(2) *Mitâksharâ*—If a partition be denied or disputed (then) *vibhâga-bhâvanâ*, the fact of the partition, i. e. the certainty of the partition may be obtained by the testimony of *jñâtibhih*, kinsmen, i. e. of the *Putrbhandhus*, *Mâtrbandhus* such as the maternal uncle and the like; *sâkshibhih*, witnesses viz possessing the qualifications (of witnesses) as mentioned before,¹ or by the evidence of a writing, e. g. a record of partition. It may also be ascertained by *yautakâh*, separate, i. e. partitioned houses and fields

(3) The practice of agriculture or other business pursued apart from the rest, and the observance of the five² principal daily

1 Yājñ II 68-69 p 846 *supra*

2 पञ्चमहायज्ञादिधर्मनिष्ठानम्—see Manu III 70, 71

अध्यापनं ब्रह्मयज्ञं पितृयज्ञस्तु तर्पणम् । हेमो दैवो बलिर्भैतो नृयज्ञोऽतिथिपूजनम्

A unilateral declaration or communication is enough *Gurjabai vs Sadashiv* 18 Bom L R 620. Thus when a notice containing the intention was despatched on the 4th August, but it reached the addressee on the 9th August, the declarant's death on the 5th August did not affect severance *Nyapati Narayana Rao vs Mudhanapalu Punushottam Rao* (1938) Mad p 315, or filing a suit *Dattatraya vs Prabhalal* 39 Bom L R 94

Vīramitrodaya

Thus having discussed distribution, the Author mentions the determining factors when there is a doubt about it

Yājñavalkya, Verse 149

5 “A partition has not taken place between us”, when in this way a partition is denied, the determination of the separation *i.e.* prior partition should be ascertained *i.e.* determined by the Chief Judge or the like, by the evidence of kinsmen, born in the father’s family, of cognate kindreds, *i.e.* relations other than these, by the evidence of witnesses
10 of the qualifications stated before, and by other evidence as would be helpful in establishing the desired point, such as documents of partition of houses, lands, partition *i.e.* which had become the exclusive property like the *yautaka*

15 By the use of the word *cha*, ‘and’, are included the signs of a partition stated by Nārada, *viz* “Those whose income and expenditure of “wealth is separate, and who mutually lend at interest to each other, “those also who exchange merchandise, these are separated, and no “doubt”, and also of the Ordeal (149)

20 Thus ends the Chapter on **Dāyavibhāga** in the commentary on **Yājñavalkya**

Sūlapāṇi**Yājñavalkya, Verse 149**

25 When a partition is denied, the partition should be established by the kindred by the (proof of) separated houses and lands So Nārada “Those whose receipts and expenditure are separate, and who mutually “lend at interest to each other, and who carry on business transactions “separately, these are certainly separated, there can be no doubt” (149)

Here ends the Chapter on **Partition**

CHAPTER IX On Boundary Disputes

The Author now describes the rules for determining boundaries &c.

Yājñavalkya Verses 150 and 151

In a dispute about the boundary of a field, the neighbours, the elders and others, the herdsmen, the cultivators on the boundary and all persons moving in the forest (150), should determine the boundary marked by signs by means of observing the following marks, i.e. mounds, char-coal, chaffs trees, water-embankments and hills, slopes, bones heaps of stones and similar other marks (151)

Mitakharā — Appertaining to two villages kṣhetrasya simno virade in a dispute about the boundary of a field, as also in a dispute regarding the boundaries of a field falling within one village samanta, the neighbours, and others mayeyuḥ, should determine or fix the simānam, boundary marked by signs upalakṣitām sthalaḥgāradibhiḥ by means of observing the mounds, char-coals &c. i.e. the boundary marks made before

A boundary is a line delimiting a field and the like. It is of four kinds. The boundary of a country the boundary of a village the boundary of a field and the boundary of a house. Each of these has generally five characteristics according as may be possible. As has been mentioned by Nārada: 'A boundary is known to be of five kinds: one having a flag-mark, one marked by the fish one "known by a deposit, one which is undisputed, and one created by the "king's command" Dīcayina, "one having a flag-mark" i.e. marked by trees &c. (standing on it), trees &c. having a resemblance to a flag-staff, as they are openly visible. Matsyina, "one marked by the fish", i.e. one with water in it. Because the word fish indicates (the existence of) water which is its support. Naudhāni, "known by a deposit" i.e. one containing the fire of the husk deposited after digging, since it resembles a deposit on account of its being interred after digging Bhayavaryatā, "one which is undisputed", i.e. one which was created by the mutual agreement of the plaintiff and the defendant. Rājāsānanetā, "one created by the king's command", i.e. in the absence of signs for recognition created by the will of the king'

PAGE 104*

1 Not found in the published edition of Nārada. * See verse 153 further on

In reference to a boundary as described above, six varieties of disputes are likely to arise as says Kâtyâyana¹.

Six-fold disputes

"Excess or deficiency as to a part, existence, or

"absolute non-existence (of the right itself), possession without previous

5 "possession by any other, and a boundary, are the six causes (that lead)

"to a dispute regarding land" For example, in a claim by some one

to the effect "My land here is more than five nivartanas²", an

answer to the effect, "It is only five nivartanas and nothing more"

10 it would be a dispute 'regarding excess' Where in an assertion by a

party that his land was five nivartanas, the answer is, "it is not so, it is

"indeed less than that", it would be a dispute 'regarding a deficiency'

In an assertion by a party that his share in the land measured five

15 nivartanas, a reply that he had no share at all, would constitute a

dispute 'regarding the existence or absolute non-existence' Where

in a suit, the plaintiff asserts "This is my land and is in my possession

"without any one being in prior occupation", and the defendant denies it,

and says that his possession was indeed long and continuous, that would

give rise to a dispute where 'possession without previous possession'

is the point to be determined When there is a dispute whether *this* is

20 the boundary limit or *that*, it is a dispute 'regarding boundary' In

this way a dispute of this kind is likely to be of six varieties Although

the sixfold dispute be regarding land, still as the boundary also is deter-

mined either under an express or implied text, (the consideration of)

that has been incorporated in the chapter on 'Boundary disputes'

25 Those who belong to the neighbourhood are *neighbours*, Sâmantâh,

and those, belonging to different contiguous villages on the four sides,

are residents on each (point) of the boundaries For a text of

Kâtyâyana declares that "A town is the neighbour of a town, a field

"is said to be the neighbour of a field, a house has been indicated to be

30 "that of a house on account of its being situated in the neighbourhood"

By the words 'a town &c', are indicated persons residing therein *e.g.*

in the expression 'the town was routed' The use of 'neighbours' is

also indicative, by implication, of those contiguous to them Kâtyâyana

also has said "Those who are closely contiguous are called neighbours,

35 "so also are those who are contiguous to these, and those who are

"contiguous to the contiguous resembling a lotus in their formation."

1 Verse 732

2 A measure of land = 20 rods

Sthavirāḥ the elders, i.e. old men. By using the word others *Adāyah*, are included the *Maṇḍas* and *Ullhartas*. The definition of old men and others has been given by the Same Author thus: Those "who have witnessed anything being brought about, are considered "as old men being endowed with the qualities of them, quite apart "whether they are actually aged or no. 5

"Those who lived before as neighbours and afterwards migrated "to another region, are called by the sages the natives or *Maṇḍas* "of the place, as they had their (domicile of) origin in that place.

"Those moreover who, since they bring out a fact of old, as being borne out by tradition, by any act of peaceable possession and by special episodes relating to it, are known as the *Ullhartas* or the antiquarians. 10

Gopāḥ, herdsmen, i.e. those who tend the kine *Simakṣhaṇaḥ*, cultivators on the boundary i.e. tillers of the fields lying contiguous to the boundary. *Serve cha vanagocharaḥ* and all persons moving in the forests, i.e. the foresters such as hunters &c. These moreover, have been mentioned by *Mann'* "Hunters, fowlers, herdsmen fisher- "men, root-diggers, snake-catchers, gleaners and other foresters." 15

Sithalam, a mound, a raised portion of ground *abgārāḥ* char-coal the refuse of fire *tūṣhāḥ*, chaff, the coating of corns, *drumāḥ* trees, like the (Indian) fig² tree *setuh* a water-embankment, of a dam to a flow of water *chakṛya*, a heap of stone i.e. an embankment of stone or any other material. By the use of the word *Adya*, any others are included bamboos, sand &c. 20 25

There³ moreover are of two classes according as they are visible, or not visible. *Vide Mann'* "Let him mark the boundaries (by) trees "such as the *Nyagrodhas*⁴ *Asvatthas*, *himsakas*, cotton-trees *Sikas*, "Palmyra palms and trees with milky juice (246). By clustering shrubs and bamboos⁵ of different kinds, *Samis*, creepers and raised 30

1 Ch. VIII. 260

2 *Ficus Indica*

3 i.e. the boundaries

4 Ch. VIII. 46-48

(1)

5 *Nyagrodha*, *Ficus Indica*. *Asvattha*—*Ficus Religiosa*. *Himṣaka*—*Butea Frondosa*. *Sāla-Shoka Robusta*. Trees with milky juice i.e. *Arka*—*Calotropis Gigantea*; *Udumbara*, *Ficus Glomerata* &c. *Sami*—*Azadirachta*.

6 *Bālamidāṣṭa* notices also another reading viz. *Nyagrodha-gulma*. *Nanda paṇḍita* reads *hulyaka*.

“mounds, reeds and thickets of the kubjâka¹ so that the boundary
“(mark) will not vanish (247) Tanks, drinking reservoirs, wells,
“and fountains should be built on boundary junctions, as also temples,
“(248)” These are visible (marks)

- 5 “ Having¹ seen that through men’s ignorance of the boundaries
“trespasses constantly occur in the world, let him (i e the king) cause
“to be made other marks of boundaries which remain hidden (249)
“Stones, bones, cow’s hair, chaff, ashes, potsherds, dry cowdung,
“bricks, cinders, pebbles, and sand (250) And whatever other things
10 “ of a similar kind the earth does not corrode (even) after a long
“time, these he should cause to be buried as invisible signs where
“boundaries join (251) By these signs the king shall ascertain the
“boundary (of the lands) of two disputing parties” These are
(boundaries) with their marks hidden

PAGE 105*

- 15 By means of these visible and invisible marks pointed out by the
neighbours and others, the king should determine the boundary of
the two disputing litigants

Vîramitrodaya

- Now the Author states the method of the delimitation of the
20 boundary

Yājñavalkya, Verses 150, 151

- In a dispute regarding the boundary between two villages, the
neighbours and those others stated before marked i e identified by
means of mounds, char-coals &c should determine i e fix, the boundary
25 Kâtyâyana states the characteristics of neighbours thus “A town is the
“neighbour of a town, a field has been declared to be that of a field, a
“house has been pointed out to be that of a house on account of its being
“situated in the neighbourhood.” That village which by its encircling
i e, surrounding, is situated on the four quarters is the neighbour of
30 that village The meaning is that in this manner also is of the land,
house, etc (to be taken) By the word *grâma*, ‘town’, are spoken of
the people residing there, *sthavirâh*, ‘elders’, i e, ‘old men By the word
âdi, ‘and others’, are included the *maulas*, *uddhrtas* and others

The characteristics of *vṛddhas* &c. have been mentioned by Kātyāyana thus : "Those by whom was seen the transaction men possessing these qualifications, whether they are old or not old are declared as *vṛddhas* "Those who were formerly residents at the place and afterwards had 'gone to another region these as they originally belonged to that place "are called *maulas* by the sages Those, who marked with the characteristics of knowing (the boundary) from hearsay possession transaction "tradition, (help to) bring out the decision are therefore known as "*vṛddhāḥ* "

Gopāḥ 'cowherds those who tend the kine. *Simā-kṛśhāṇāḥ* cultivators on the boundary i.e., cultivators of the field on the boundary *sarva vanachakṛāḥ*, 'all persons moving in the forest i.e. the hunters fowlers the forest-guards and the like By the use of the word *cha* also twice are included fishermen, gleaners and the like as also root-diggers snake-catchers and the rest. So also Manu' "Hunters fowlers herds men fishermen, root-diggers snake-catchers gleaners and other "foresters"

Sikāḍṅgāro, 'the hard charcoal i.e. the remnant of the wood from the fire. *Sikāḍṅgāra* is the reading in some places In that case it should be explained as *sikāḍam* 'a mound' meaning a raised portion of the ground. *Tuṣhāḥ* 'chaffs i.e., the coating of corn *drumhā* 'trees such as the *Plakṣha* or the like trees *setuh* 'embankment *valmikaḥ* 'the ant hill' an elevated place well known in the Central Provinces as *Dīdā ubhinda* निम्न नमि *nimnam* slopes such as pits, etc. *asthi* 'bones are well-known *chaityah*, a monumental village tree. By the word *adya* are included pebbles etc. That has been stated by Manu' "Stones bones, cows hair, chaff ashes potsherds dry cowdung bricks, cinders, pebbles and sand (250) And whatever other things of a 'similar kind the earth does not corrode (even) after a long time these "he should cause to be buried as invisible signs where boundaries join 251 (150-151).

Śūlpani

Yājñavalkya, Verses 150 151

In a dispute about the boundary of a field the *Simāntāḥ*, the local inhabitants *vṛddhāḥ* the old By the use of the word *ādī* and like others the hunters etc., are meant. By visible signs such as immovables etc. hidden marks, such as charcoal etc. the marked boundary they should determine. (150 151)

When, however, the marks do not exist, or being in existence are ambiguous by reason of the non-determination of any mark thereof, the Author lays down, a rule for deciding the dispute

Yājñavalkya, Verse 152

5 Men of the neighbouring villages, or of the same village, being in number either four, eight, or even ten, having put on garlands of red flowers, and red dresses, and taking some of the earth, shall determine the boundary

Mitākṣharā --Sāmāntāh, men of the neighbouring villages,¹ i. e. as has been described before¹. Samagrāmāśchatwāroṣṭau daśāpi wā, or of the same
10 village being in number four, eight, or even ten, thus being of an even number and belonging to the neighbouring villages,² putting on chaplets of red flowers, and clad in red garments, and with lumps of earth placed on their foreheads, shall determine—i. e. point out—the boundary.

The alternative suggested in the expression *Sāmāntā uā* "men of
15 "the neighbouring villages or", has a reference to the witnesses mentioned in other Smṛtis. For Manu³ has said "The settlement of a
"dispute regarding boundaries shall depend on witnesses" Here therefore the decision by (means of) the witnesses is the chief course
Failing that, by the Sāmāntas. So it has been laid down by Manu⁴: "In
20 "the absence of witnesses, men from the four neighbouring villages,
"who are pure, shall make a decision concerning the boundary, in the
"presence of the king" Failing these, the neighbours of these shall decide, as says Kātyāyana "When the men from the neighbouring
"villages are (suspected to be) corrupt on account of personal interests,
25 "undoubtedly the decision must be obtained from men of the other
"neighbouring villages, regard being had to the importance of the
"interests at stake When even such neighbours of the neighbours are
"found to be faulty, it has been laid down that the neighbours of these
"should be selected, but the king, knowing well the law, should never
30 "engage men who are vitiated "

1 i. e. on page 1149

2 *Samagrāmāh*—Both Mandlik and Borrodaile translate *Samagrāmāh* as "of the village in which the disputed land is situate" The expression simply means "of the same village", and may be interpreted as has been done by the two eminent writers named above, or may be taken as adjectival of and qualifying the *Sāmāntas*, as has been done by Bālabhattacha (see p 275 l 18) Aparārka notes a different reading altogether viz "सामन्ता वा समा ग्रामा &c "

3 Oh VIII 253.

4 Oh VIII 258

In the absence of the Samantas and others men who are natives of the place (*Varuṣa*) should be selected. Since Kātyāyana has laid down the order: "In the absence of these the *Samantas*, the *Mṛudās*, the *Īḍṛas*, the *Udḍṛas* and like others should be selected even in the sixfold disputes regarding immovables." These Samantas and others are selected according to the preponderance of their number or merit, *viz.* the text: "The first (means to be resorted to for a decision) are the Samantas should they be free from any blemish the next if possessed of good qualities should be double and those next to them, if similarly qualified should be triple (in number)." 5 10

Moreover, these witnesses (referred to above) as also the neighbours and others should determine the boundary after they are duly sworn according to the form prescribed for each *viz.* the text of Manu: "Let them putting earth on their heads, wearing chaplets of flowers, and putting on red dresses being sworn each by (the rewards for) his meritorious deeds, settle (the boundary) in accordance with the truth." The plural in (the expression) they should settle is used with a view to obviate the engagement of two, and not of one. Since Nārada¹ has permitted one to settle a boundary thus: "Should a single man undertake to fix the boundary he must do so after having kept a fast wearing a garland of red flowers and a red robe and having placed the earth on his head. As for the text: "One man should not determine the boundary though he be a reliable person regard being had to its importance this business should be entrusted to a plurality of persons" and the prohibition which it contains against one that prohibition extends to one other than that who is approved of both (the suitors), and who is conversant with the law. Thus there is no conflict. 15 20 25

Even when the marks such as a mound &c. are not available Nārada² has mentioned a special mode of finding out the boundary by 30

1 of Kātyāyana Bāṇadatta p. 161 the Manu

2 Ch. VIII 56

4 Ch. XI 10

3 Dr Jolly gives a reading अत्र न पठेत् 'having kept a fast and in a collected frame of mind.'

6 of Nārada Ch. VI 1

7 Ch. XI 6

the witnesses, the neighbours &c. thus : “When a piece of ground has
 “been carried off by a stream and¹ thus the boundary marks have been
 “uprooted or destroyed, (they shall fix the boundary) according to the
 “inference to be drawn from (an inspection of) the spot, and according
 5 “to the measurements, and according to the traces of possession” *i. e.*
 they should determine (the boundary), by noting in those boundary
 regions where a down-flowing river has carried off or washed away
 the marks, and which have thus either been uprooted from their places,
 or been destroyed (altogether). There, (the expression) ‘according to
 10 the inference to be drawn from the spot’ means according to the
 inference as to the old spot, the marks whereof have either been up-
 rooted or annihilated ‘According to measurements,’ *e g* ‘The field lies
 on the west of this village measuring 1000 rods commencing from the
 village’, and the like, or according to the evidence of long and immemor-
 15 rial possession within the knowledge of and adversely to the opponent.
 PAGE 106*

A special rule has, moreover, been laid down by Brhaspati² in this
 connection “Those persons will be proper witnesses in disputes of
 “this nature who know the origin of the title, the evidence regarding
 “it, the duration of possession, the name, and also the character of the
 20 “(particular) piece of ground”

These witnesses, Sâmantas and others, moreover, being sworn
 according to the oaths of each, should be questioned by the king in the
 presence of *Kulas*³ &c. As says Manu⁴. “The witnesses (giving evidence)
 “regarding a boundary, shall be examined concerning the land-marks
 25 “in the presence of the *Kulas* of the village, and also of the two
 “litigants” The witnesses &c thus examined should give a unanimous
 decision of all together regarding the boundary

The boundary thus determined by these, together with all the
 marks pointed out by them, with the names of witnesses &c specified,
 30 should be noted on a document that it may not be forgotten It has

1 Dr Jolly interprets अगृह्य, नष्ट and उत्सृष्ट as separate results following from
 the actions of separate agents and translates thus “or abandoned (by the owner),
 or the boundary marks have been destroyed &c—” 2 Ch XIX 14

3 See Yājñavalkya II 30 & the Mitākṣharâ thereon pp 746-747 &c, above

4 Ch VIII 254

also been said by Manu¹ "As they being examined declare the marks
'of the boundaries (to be), even so the king shall justly cause them all
'to be fixed between each village."

If within an interval of three fortnights from the day of the
making of (a decision regarding) the boundary, no calamity either from
the king or God fall on the ¹ i.e. the witnesses Samantas and others
then a proof of that would establish the decision as to the boundary.
This interval about the calamity from God or king has been laid down
by Katyayana "In decisions regarding a boundary in the case of the
'ordeals by heat and of the touching of the (body) feet the interval
'for (the visitation of) a calamity from God or king is respectively
'three fortnights, a fortnight and seven days."

Viraamitrodaya

When however the aforesaid marks do not exist or are ambi-
guous by reason of their being or not being (regarded as) marks then
the Author states the means for a decision

Yājñavalkya Verse 152

Samantā men of the neighbouring villages as have been de-
scribed before; *samagrāṇāṃ* men of the same village ¹ i.e. of the
immediately adjoining villages *chaturbrukṣaṇa* four eight or
ten, who themselves are sure of the boundary with red flowers and
clothes on and with clods of earth placed on their heads *simlā*
nayajuh, should determine the boundary ² i.e. should definitely fix
The adverbs *api* and also, or are indicative of option. In the
expression 'or the samantas the word 'or intends witnesses as says
Manu³ 'In the determination of a boundary the testimony of wit-
nesses (may be availed of) Similarly' In the absence of witnesses
'four men from the four neighbouring villages shall make a decision
concerning a boundary in the presence of the king *Kātyāyana* also
(same as p 1154 ll 23-30 above) Similarly in regard to witnesses
the same author says In the absence of the *śamantas* the *manāt*
'*uddhyatas* and like others." Manu⁴ "Placing earth on their heads"

1 Ch. VIII 61

2 *समग्र*—is a better reading than *समन्त* which would read when translated
and fixed by name'

3 Ch. VIII 31

4 Ch. VIII 25

5 Ch VIII 31

“wearing chappels of flowers, and putting on red dresses, being each
“sworn by his meritorious deeds, let them settle (the boundary) in
“accordance with the truth”

After the determination in this manner, if any calamity owing to
5 the act of the King or of God does not occur to the *sumantas* and the rest,
then the boundary determined by them should be (finally) fixed by the
King, vide this text of Kât'yâna “In the matter of the settlement of
“a boundary, in the ordeals by the *kosa*, as also by the touching of the
“feet, (the occurrence of) a calamity from the King or God within three
10 “fortnights, one fortnight, or seven days (respectively) is regarded” (152).

Śûlapâni

Yâjñavalkya, Verse 152

15 If there be doubt as to the marks themselves, then the inhabitants of
the neighbouring villages, four, eight, or ten, even in number with red
flowers on heads and clad in red robes, affirmed in the oaths stated
before, placing clods of earth on their head, should determine the
boundary (152)

When, however, of those who gave evidence as witnesses, any
disease &c is noticed within the interval of three fortnights, or when
20 their evidence conflicts with the testimony of witnesses other than
those cited by the defendant, and who are entitled to more weight by
their qualifications and number, then those (former) deserve to be
punished for their false evidence The Author states the rule as to that

Yâjñavalkya, Verse 153 (1)

25 In case of a falsehood, they should severally be punished by the king
under the middling amercement

Mitâksharâ — *Anrte, in case of a falsehood, i.e. for telling a lie which*
was the basis of the decision, all the *Sâmantas* shall each be punished
*madhyamasâhasena, with the middling amercement,*¹ i.e. with a fine of five
30 hundred and twenty four panas² That this penal provision refers to

1 There are three grades of *Sâhasas*, प्रथम, मध्यम and उत्तम, see Nârada

2 A *pana* is a coin either of copper or of gold The ordinary *Pana* is equal
in value to 80 cowries i.e. about 3 or 4 pies

the *Simant* is inferable from the fact that a separate provision of punishment has been made in other *Smritis* for the witnesses *Vaid* &c. For says *Manu*: If they determine (the boundary) in the manner "stated, they are guiltless (being) veracious witnesses but if they "determine it unjustly, they shall be compelled to pay a fine of two "hundred (*paras*)" *Narada* also having laid down the middling amercement for the *Simant* in "Should however the neighbours speak "falsely when called upon to decide a question of this sort they shall all "be punished severally by the king each having to pay the fine of the "middling amercement, has prescribed a punishment of the first degree 10 for the neighbours of these. Should the rest of those engaged in a "dispute regarding land tell a lie these are (considered as) sinners "and shall be punished with a fine of the first amercement" The same punishment has also been laid down for the *Vaidas* Elders &c. "The *Vaidas*, the Elders and the rest shall also each be severally 15 "punished with a penalty they shall have to pay the fine of the first "degree if they make false statements" By the use of the expression *Adi* and the rest are included, the cowherds, bird-catchers, hunters and other inhabitants of the forest. Although, by reason of their being engaged in a sinful avocation the use of the bird-catchers &c is 20 made only in pointing out the marks and not in the actual determination of the boundary its if still the imposition of a penalty is proper as it is likely that a false statement may be made even in the pointing out of the mark or sign

The rule as to punishment laid down in "In the case of a falsehood, 25 'they should be severally punished,' has a reference to (statements made through) ignorance, since *Kātyayana* has laid down a separate punishment for those who do so by design thus "If of those many 'assembled together all do not declare a decision either through fear 'or out of avarice, they shall be punished with the highest amercement." 30 Similarly the same punishment has been prescribed by the Same Author in case where there is a discrepancy among the witnesses "If there be a discrepancy among those examined, they shall be "punished with the highest amercement"

1 Ch VIII 17

* Ch XI 7

3 By *Nārada* Ch. XI. 8

Having thus punished the witnesses &c for speaking falsehood through ignorance or other cause, a fresh proceeding should be commenced for determining the boundary. For the **same Sage** having observed "After having punished in the case of a statement with-
5 "out knowledge, the (question as to the) boundary should again be in-
"vestigated", has laid down the procedure for determining the boundary thus "Having excluded such of the neighbours as are (found to be)
"faulty, he should select others, and joining them together with the
"Mandās &c, the king should have the boundary determined, this is
10 "(the rule) known to those who are conversant with law"

Vîramitrodaya

When, however, within the interval of three fortnights, a disease etc is seen, then a punishment should be inflicted on them, so says the Author

15 Yājñavalkya, Verse 153 (1)

Amte, 'in the case of a falsehood' i e, if they (are found to have) told a lie, for that reason, *te*, 'these', i e, the *sāmantas* and the rest should each be punished with twenty-five *panas*, the penalty for the middling amercement.

PAGE 107*

20 When, however, the *Sāmantas* and others conversant (with the locality) or the marks do not exist, how should a decision be made? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verses 153 (2)

25 In the absence of persons knowing, or of marks, the king should determine the boundary

Mitākṣharâ — In the absence of persons knowing, such as the *Sāmantas* and others, and also of marks, such as trees &c, *râjâ sîmnah pravartitâ*, the king himself shall determine the boundary, i e shall cause it to be determined. The causal is here understood. The land, the
30 subject-matter of dispute, lying between two villages, should be divided equally, and should be assigned to the two litigants, after specifying thus "this is the land of this man", "this land is to go to

that man", and boundary marks should be made at the spot intervening between the two. When the land appears to be of immense use to one of the two litigants, then the whole land of the village should be given to him alone as says Manu: "If the boundary cannot be ascertained (by any evidence), the king knowing the law should himself assign the land to such (of the two) to whom it would be most serviceable. This is the law" 5

Vīramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya Verse 153 (3)

If the persons who know or the signs do not exist then Rājā the king *pramāṇāt* should determine the cause to be determined the boundary in pursuance of his own wish. Here the causal is implied As says Narada: When however there do not exist persons who "know nor is there any mark in the boundary then the king should himself determine the boundary of the two after a personal inspection" 10
In the Mitāksharā this has been explained as "the boundary should be determined by the King by an equal division of the land under dispute."

Bṛhaspati: When land has been taken away from one and added to another village, either by (the inundations of) a big river or by the king how should the investigation be in such a case? (16) The land abandoned by a river or granted by the king belongs to him to whom it (so) came. Otherwise men will not receive any benefit from the king or through fate (17). Loss and gain and also the life of men depend upon the fate and the king, therefore in all transactions what has been brought about by them should not be disturbed (18). Where between two villages a river has been fixed as the boundary that should not be removed on account of diminution or accretion any one removing it will be liable to punishment (19). The falling off of the banks on one side produces an increase in the land elsewhere that increase must not be taken away from him (20). The meaning is that the land which was produced by the encroachment upon the bank belongs to the owner of the other side 20

When land is carried away by the swift course of a river over flowing a cultivated piece of land the previous owner shall recover "it" (21). The meaning is that the land which has been carried by the overflowing of a river by crossing over another land, remains as of the ownership of the previous owner (153). 25

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 153

- If a false declaration be made, they should be punished by the king, each separately, with the middling amercement In the absence of marks
5 for identification, the king should himself make the boundary (153)

With a view to demonstrate that this text is founded on justice, even though there is no room for supposing that it is not so, the Author mentions an extension¹ of the rule (stated in the last two verses)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 154

- 10 The same rule should be understood (to apply) in (the case of) a garden, a ware-house, a village, a watering-place, a pleasure-garden, a house, a rain-watercourse and the like

- Mitâkṣharâ — Ârâmah, a garden, a piece of ground intended for growing and gathering flowers and fruits Âyatanam, a ware-house,
15 i. e. a house, or a plot of ground set apart for storing husk or straw. Grâmah, a village, is well-known The use of the word village, moreover, is indicative of a town, by implication Nipânânam, a watering place, i. e. a drinking place, such as a well, a pond and the like. Udyânânam, a pleasure-garden, i. e. a pleasure bower Veśma, a house, i. e. a dwelling
20 place In (the case of) these i. e. the garden &c, this very vidhih, rule, i. e. as characterised by the (rule about) sâmantas, witnesses &c, should be known (to apply) Similarly (should be the rule) in the case of water-courses arising from excessive rain-fall i. e. in disputes of a kind where it is alleged that "the course of water flows by the
25 middle (line) of these two houses or those two" By the use of the term Âdi, 'and the like', the same old rule should be known to apply in the case of mansions also For Kâtyâyana also says "And also in "the case of a field, a well, a tank, and even a meadow, or a garden, "a house, a mansion, a resting place, the abode of a king and the
30 "temple of god"

1 An अनिदेश is an extension or an extended application of a rule to things not directly covered by the rule itself For an explanation of this passage see Bâlabhattacharya pp 277 and 278 and note 5 on p 982

Viramitrodaya

With an eye to brevity in the treatise, the Author extends the afore stated law to another subject

Yajñavalkya Verse 154

Ardmah a garden i.e. a pleasure garden *dyaanam* 'a warehouse 5
a piece of land set apart as for stocking husk straw etc. *grdmah* a village, is also indicative of a town by implication *nīdnam*, 'a watering place, such as a well a reservoir etc. *udyanam* a pleasure bower i.e. a piece of land set apart for sport *icima* a house, i.e. a dwelling place *varshadmbupradha* a rain water-course i.e. a channel of water produced 10
by the monsoon showers for these *cāha* etc., this same i.e. as stated in regard to the boundary, is *vidhi* rule i.e. the method of determination By the word *ddi* and others are included a field, door etc.

Brhaspati : From since the time of its foundation a house a pool
"a shop or the like whatever has been occupied by a man in whichever 15
manner and upto whatever period that must not be disturbed from 'him' (24). Windows, water-course as also a projecting¹ balcony a channel for the outward flow of water from a quadrangle constructed 'before must not be removed' (25). *Iraddi* 'a water-course *nirvaha redikā* a projecting balcony a balcony made of elephant tusks 20
chatusidlam a quadrangle a house with four doors *syandanikā* channel for water, i.e. a portion of the floor known as *osari* *भाषि Kātyāyana* One should not let rain water drop nor construct a "gutter in another's house" *Brhaspati* A privy a fire-place a pit a receptacle for leavings of food and other (rubbish) must never be made 25
'very close to the house of another person. Similarly² : A passage 'through which men and animals go to and fro unprevented is called *sarasaraya* and must never be obstructed by any one. *Kātyāyana* "One should construct a ring³ for discharging ordure, urine and filthy water, a fire-place and a pit after leaving a space of a couple of cubits 30
from the wall of another" *Chakram* ring, for oil etc. Similarly⁴ Of trees springing up in the midst of the boundaries of two fields the fruits and the flowers produced therefrom should be made over to the owners of the fields i.e. to the owners of the two fields Of the trees 'which have sprung up in one man's field, where the branches become 35
'embedded in another's field that one should be regarded as the owner 'of these in whose field they have become embedded 'these i.e. the branches (154).

1 Oh. XIX. 24-5

2 निर्गन्धिका Dr Jelly translates "a peg projecting from a wall (used to hang them on)."

3 चतुर्भागे रक्षयिका मरुतिविन न चामयेन—Dr Jelly Tr "a square of four buildings, and a channel for the exit of water.. must not be blocked."

4 Verse 753

5 द्विज—another reading is द्विज—a window commanding a view

6 Oh XIX. 6 7 Brhaspati Ch XIX. 7

8 Verse 764 9 ऋ—another reading is ऋ—a mound. 10 Verse 60-761

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 154

As to these 1 e the gardens etc this same rule 1 e as characterised
bn the *Sâmantas*, witnesses etc should be understood By the word *âdi* are
5 included fields etc (154)

Having stated (the rule regarding) the decision of a boundary,
the Author states, in that connection, the punishment for destroying
the boundary marks and the like (acts)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 155

- 10 For breaking up the boundary, for encroaching beyond the boundary,
likewise, and for usurping the lands, the punishments are the lowest¹, the
highest, and the middlemost (respectively).

- 15 *Mitâksharâ*.—The common (plot of) land separating many fields, is
a *maryâdâ*, boundary, for breaking that up with force, *sîmâtikramane*, for
encroaching beyond the boundary, *ie* for encroaching
Penalties for break- beyond the boundary and ploughing, and also
ing a boundary &c for usurping a land by a show of fear &c, the
punishments, respectively, of the lowest, the highest and the middlemost
Sâhasas should be understood The use of the word "land" (*kshetra*)
20 here, is intended to include by implication, a house, a garden &c

- When, however, he usurps land &c, under a mistaken notion of (the
same) being his, then a fine of two hundred (*panas*) should be understood.
As says *Manu* ² "He who by intimidation usurps a house, a tank, a
" garden or a field, shall be fined five hundred (*panas*), (if he does so)
25 " through ignorance, (the fine shall be) two hundred (*panas*) " Having
regard to the magnitude of the land or the property usurped, even the
highest amercement may sometimes be prescribed And it is for this
that it has been said³ "Corporal punishment, confiscation of the entire
" property, banishment from the town, and branding, as well as ampu-
30 " tation of that limb (with which the crime was committed), is declared
" to be the punishment for a *Sâhasa* of the highest degree."

1 See Nârada Ch XIV for a detailed description of *Sâhasas* or offences

2 Ch VIII 264

3 By Nârada XIV 8 The edition of Nârada by Dr Jolly reads one more
line before the two quoted by Viṣṇûânesvara It runs thus

उन्मै साहेसे ण्ड सहस्रावर दण्यते
Tr "For *sâhasa* of the highest degree, a fine of not less than a thousand
(*panas*) is ordained "

Vramitrodaya

On the occasion (of discussing) the boundaries while mentioning the penalty for a transgression thereof the Author states the same penalty in another connection also with a view to brevity of the treatise

Yājñavalkya Verse 155

The common plot of land disconnecting the fields etc. is *maryaddā* 'the boundary'. For a forcible breaking of that and for transgressing the boundary and beyond that by tillage etc. usurping the land of another by a show of fear etc., the punishments of the lowest, highest and the middlemost ameracements should respectively be administered. By the use of the word *tukṣa* likewise immediately connected with the word 'land' are included the houses gardens etc. By the word *tu* 'however', is excluded the breaking up of a visible mark (155).

Śūlapani

Yājñavalkya Verse 155

For the breaking up of a boundary i. e. for transgressing a boundary for taking away land respectively the punishments are the middling and the highest ameracements (155)

Moreover when after obtaining the permission of the owner of the field either by request or by payment of money a man wishes to erect a dam for water or sink a well and if the owner of the field obstructs him the owner himself is punishable. So the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 156

An embankment however producing benefit should not be prohibited, where the injury is slight, (as also) a well which occupies but little space, but has abundance of water which deprives another of his land.

PAOF 108*

Mitakṣharā — *Setub* an *embankment*, i. e. the construction of a dam to a waterflow should not be stopped by the owner of the field even though it *deprives*, i. e. destroys another's land, provided that it causes little injury and is productive of much benefit (to many). A well, moreover as it occupies a small portion of land causes little injury and is beneficial on account of the abundance of water (in it), (so it) should never be stopped. The use of the word well, moreover is indicative by implication, of a small well, a water-pond and the like others. From this it necessarily follows that when, however it occupies the whole field and thus causes much injury or being in a field in the vicinity of a

river or similar other water-place, is productive of very little benefit, it may be stopped. The two-fold character of an embankment has been mentioned by Nârada¹ "There are two sorts of dykes (or water-courses),
5 "one called *kheyā* (i.e. one which may be dug into the ground), and
"another called *bandhya* (i.e. one which may be built up). It is
"called a *kheyā*² when it lets (out) water to flow, and it is called
" *bandhya* when it stops water from flowing "

When, however, any one wishes to repair a dyke prepared by another and destroyed by delapidation or any like cause, then he
10 should do so only after asking the permission of the former owner or his descendant, or of the king. As says Nârada³ "If a man were to put in
"repair a dyke erected long ago but decayed, without asking the permission of the owner, he shall not have the (use and) profits of it (20).
"When, however the owner is dead, and also all his human progeny,
15 "he may ask the (permission of the) king and may set the dyke in
"order (21) "

Vîramîtrodaya

The Author mentions an exception to the fine stated for usurping a field

20 Yājñavalkya, Verse 156

If to the owner of a field the injury be slight, if such an embankment, i.e., dam is productive of great benefit to others, then the constructor of the embankment should not be prohibited i.e. stopped, by the owner of the field. The clause "which deprives another of his land"
25 is connected to both. In a small field a well with abundant water should not be prohibited. By the use of the word *tu*, 'however', is excluded an embankment which would cause injury to many on account of its injuring the whole field (156)

Sûlapâni

30 Yājñavalkya, Verse 156

If in another's field, an embankment which is being constructed by another be useful for many, and cause slight injury to the owner of the field, then such a one should not be prohibited, similarly a well also (156)

1 Ch XI 18

2 See Nârada Ch XI 19. Where the necessity of both these kinds is explained viz too much water destroys a crop and therefore it is to be let out (*kheyā*), so also too little causes the crop to wither, and so also water has to be stored (*bandhya*). See Bâlabhattacharya p 278

3 Ch XI 20-21

The rule as to the owner of the soil has been laid down (in the last verse). Now the Author mentions a rule regarding one who constructs a dyke

Yājñavalkya Verse 157

If a man construct a dyke in a field without even informing the owner (of the field) the right to the produce is that of the owner, and in his absence that of the king

Mitrāk hara :—Without asking the permission of the owner of the field, or in his absence of the king he who parakṣetre setum pravartayati constructs a dyke in another's field (that man) will not be entitled to enjoy the produce. But in the produce reared therein, the right of enjoyment is that of the owner of the field, or in his absence that of the king. Therefore the purport is that the permission of the owner must be obtained either by request or by payment of consideration, and in his absence, of the king and then a dyke should be set up.

Viramitrodaya

One desiring to construct an embankment or a well in another's land should obtain the permission of the owner of the field by a request or by money payment or when that is not possible should obtain the permission of the king and then should he construct it. Intending this the Author proceeds

Yājñavalkya Verse 157

As regards the crop produced from it when there is abundance of harvest the (right of) enjoyment will be of the owner of the land and not of the one who erects when however, the owner does not exist then the (right of) enjoyment of the produce goes to the king. The word eva 'even' goes with the word owner thereby the constructor of the embankment is excluded (157)

Śūtapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 157

Without informing the owner of the field, if any one constructs an embankment (then) after the embankment is completed, the owner of the field has the right to the enjoyment of the embankment. In his absence (the right is) of the king (157).

It has been said that the owner of a field should not obstruct the construction of a dyke. Now, the Author mentions another rule which has a close bearing in the same context

Yājñavalkya, Verse 158

He who does not cultivate himself, or through another, a field, even when it was broken by the ploughshare, should be made to pay the produce obtainable from the land, and the field should be got cultivated by another

Mitâkṣharâ --He, however, who having undertaken in the presence of the owner of the field "I shall cultivate this field", afterwards gives it up, nor gets it cultivated by another, then, even when that field *phâlâhatam*, was broken by the ploughshare, i.e. was dug up a little by the plough, and therefore was not properly prepared for the production of a good crop, still of the land so dug up, the produce i.e. such as was likely to be produced from it as determined by the neighbours &c. should be made to be paid by that cultivator, and the field also should be taken away from the former cultivator and should be got cultivated by another

Here ends the chapter on **Boundary Disputes**.

Vîramitrodaya

On the occasion of the (discussion about) the field, the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 158

'I will till this land' thus having undertaken with the owner of the land, one who afterwards does not cultivate himself, nor cause it to be cultivated by another when it was furrowed with the plough, such a one should be compelled to pay as much as may be determined by the *Sāmantas* or others as the likely yield of the land. And the land also should be taken away from him and should be got cultivated by another (158)

Thus ends in the Commentary called **Vîramitrodaya** on the **Yājñavalkya Smṛti** on the Chapter **Boundary Disputes**

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 158

In some places the reading is *halâhatam*, 'broken by the plough'

A field even though broken by the ploughshare, after accepting it, if one does not perform the sowing operation nor does he either cause it (to be performed), such a one should be made to pay, even as from the uncultivated field, the quantity as may have been produced if cultivated, and it should be got cultivated by another (158)

Thus ends the Chapter on **Boundary Disputes**.

CHAPTER X

Of disputes between the Owners of cattle
and their Herdsmen.¹

The several titles of *Yagnashri* are not related to each other as cause or the thing containing the cause and therefore no particular order of enumeration was intended in the text². Of these the first is "payment and recovery of debts &c." Therefore by inverting the order (of enumeration) the Author now states the rules regarding disputes between the owners of cattle and their herdsmen.

Yājñavalkya Verse 159

A female buffalo doing damage to the crop shall be fined eight *mā* has a cow half of that, and a goat or a sheep, half of that
PAGE 109*

Mīlakshara —A female buffalo causing damage to a stranger's crop shall be fined eight *mā* has a cow half of that i.e. four *mā* has (goats as also sheep, shall be fined two *mā* has. Since the female buffalo and the rest are incapable of owning wealth, the person who owns these is intended. A *mā* ha, moreover is here intended to signify the twentieth part of a copper *pana*. For Narada³ has stated "A *mā* ha "is considered as the twentieth part of a *pana*."

This rule, moreover, applies where the trespass has been without the knowledge (of the owner). When, however, the trespass is by design, the rule laid down in another Smṛti should be observed i.e. : "Two quarters of a *pana* for a cow and double that for a female buffalo, similarly for a goat, a sheep and calves, a quarter has been laid down as the fine. What, however has been laid down by Narada⁴ For (a trespass by) a cow he should inflict a fine of one *mā* sha, for (a mischief by) a female buffalo, two *mā* shas and in the case of a goat, a sheep and calves, the fine shall amount to half a " *mā* sha " has a reference to crop which had ripened into sprouts, and which has been eaten up leaving only the roots.

1 See Digest Book III, Ch. IV pp 83-100

2 Manu Ch. VIII. 47 ref. made to Shrota & p. 616 ll. 15- 3; see also YAJ. I 26 763 and commentaries.

3 App 58

4 Ch XI 21

Vîramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 159

- The she-buffalo should be fined eight *māshas* A cow destroying the crops should be fined half of that i.e. four *māshas* The goat and the sheep when the crops are damaged should be fined two *māshas*, thus the connection of words is in the inverse order Here, as the she-buffalo etc. are devoid of money, the fine is impossible (to be recovered), and therefore their owners should be (held liable) *Māsha*, moreover, here is the silver one, stated before and equal to two silver coins, should be taken, vide the text of the *Bhâshyakâra* " In matters of fine " the calculation of the amount is to be made by golden *maṣhas*, in case " of trespass by the beasts on crops, however, by other, i.e. the silver "*māshas* " *Pana* means the *kârṣhâpana*, a quarter of that i.e. the fourth part. According to *Ratnâkara* . " In the case of goats etc the quarter " should be the penalty when the crops are eaten at night " " For a " cow, a *māsha* should be ordered as the fine to be paid, so, for a she- " buffalo two *māsha*, and for the goats, sheep and calves, the fine shall " be half a *māsha*" this text of *Nârada*¹ is applicable when the residue of the roots fit to be developed into sprouts had been eaten (159).

20

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 159

- Māsha* here is the twentieth part of a *pana*. By the words she-buffalo etc are expressed their keepers For the destruction of crops on account of the she buffalos the keeper shall be fined eight *Māshas*, on account of a cow, four, on account of a goat, or a ram, two each (159)

The Author mentions a double fine in certain circumstances having regard to the magnitude of the injury

Yājñavalkya, Verse 160 (1)

- For cattle eating and lying in the field, the fine is double of that mentioned (above.)

Mitâksharâ —If the cattle after eating the crop in another's field (are allowed) also (to) sleep there unwarded, then *yathoktât dwiguṇo*

daṇḍo a fine double that mentioned above should be understood. Of cattle eating and lying with their calves, moreover a fine four times that mentioned above should be understood *vide* the text: "Of those resting (there) a double fine has been laid down, and of those accompanied by their calves, a four fold (*fine*)."

5

Vīramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 160 (1)

When after eating the crop in another's land and being fully satiated (are allowed to) rest down there without being warded off then the she-buffalo and the like should be fined with double the amount of that stated before. For those with their calves and resting down the fine should be imposed four times of that stated before *vide* the text. Of those resting (there) a double fine has been laid down and of those accompanied by their calves a four-fold (*fine*) 160 (1).

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The Author mentions an extended application of this rule in regard to other fields and cattle

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Yājñavalkya, Verse 160 (2)

The fine for these is equal as in the case of lands where grass or fuel is stored and the fine for an ass or a camel is the same as for a female buffalo.

Mītākṣharā — *Vivṛtaḥ*, i.e. the portion of land where grass and fuel are stored in abundance, and which is enclosed and guarded. In the case of a trespass upon that also *samāna daṇḍam*, a fine equal, to that in the case of other fields should be understood in the case of those *ephām* i.e. of the female buffalo and the like.

20

The asses and the camel (joined together make the compound expression), an ass or a camel *kharophṛam* that should be regarded as the same as for a female buffalo. Wherever and by whichever penalty a female buffalo is punished in those places and by a similar penalty shall the ass and the camel be each severally punished. In the matter of obstructing the (growth of the) crop the ass and the camel are each equal to a female buffalo, and the fine also has been prescribed according to the extent of the injury and thus in the compound expression *Kharophṛam* the conjunct compound is not intended

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Vîramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 160 (2)

- 5 *Vivdam*, land with profuse quantity of grass intended as a pasture ground for the cows and other cattle and guarded by another There, for the she-buffalos and other grass-eating beasts, on these a fine *samam*, 'equal,' i.e. equal to the land, to as much as was consumed of the crop, should be laid An ass and a camel make up the compound expression 'ass and camel' *kharoshtram*, that *mahishu-*
10 *samam*, 'equal to a she-buffalo,' i.e. as much fine is laid for a she-buffalo for the destruction of a particular quantity of crop, so much fine shall be for the ass and the camel also This is the meaning [160 (2)]

Sûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 160

- 15 After consuming and being seated at their pleasure, the penalty to be inflicted should be double of that stated above Of these i.e. of the she-buffalos and others, in regard to the pasture land the punishment shall be the same By the word *vivita*, pasture-ground, is meant the portion of land preserved for grass etc For the destruction of the crops etc by asses and camels, the punishment should be the same as for a she-buffalo (160)

- 20 For destroying the crop of another, a fine has been laid down for the owner of a cow (&c) Now, the Author states the rule according to which he should also be made to pay (the value of) the crop to the owner of the field

Yājñavalkya, Verse 161

- 25 As much crop as may be destroyed, so much gram shall be paid to the owner of the field, the herdsman shall be chastised, but the owner of the cattle incurs the fine already mentioned (before)

- 30 Mitâksharâ:—*Sasya*, crop, is used to denote generally the produce of fields *Yâvat*, as much, straw, grain or the like, as is destroyed by cows or other cattle in a particular field *tâvat kshetrâphalam*, so much produce of the field, shall *swâmi*, the owner, of these be compelled to pay to the owner of the field i.e. according to the valuation determined by the *Sâmantas* in this form "From such land, the produce would be so much"

Gopastu, but the herdsman, shall only be beaten, he shall not be compelled to pay for the produce. The chastising of the herdsman, accompanied by the pecuniary fine above mentioned, must be understood to apply in the case of an injury to the crop by the fault of the keeper rule the text¹. If a cow straying through the fault of the keeper do damage to the crops no penalty is in that case exacted from the owners (of the cattle) the herdsman (alone) is punishable "(for the damage done).

Again, the owner of the cattle incurs only the fine already mentioned and not a corporal punishment, if the crop is damaged on account of his own fault. But in every case the produce must be made good by the owner of the cattle alone inasmuch as he participates in the produce of the field by means of the milk obtained from female buffaloes and the like, fed and fattened on the produce of the field.

PAGE 110*

The produce, such as straw &c. remaining after the quantity consumed by the cows and the like should be taken by the owner of the cattle alone. Since he has purchased it as it were by paying the price adjudged by the arbitrators. And so Nārada² (observes) "When a man claims back the Crop consumed by cattle that quantity of grain should be given to him (by the owner of the cattle) which would have been produced³ from the field in the estimation of the Sāmantas. The chaff shall be paid to the owner of the cattle and 'the corn to the cultivator'⁴."

Vīramitrodaya

On a destruction of crops not only is he to be punished but he must be compelled to render the produce to the owner of the field so says the Author

Yājñavalkya, Verse 161

Yatrat sasyam as much crop as may be destroyed on account of being eaten by the she-buffalo and the like the value of so much produce

1 Of Nārada Ch. XI. 35

2 Ch. XI. 38-39

3 ससिन्धु from सू to sow as also to reap. The latter meaning better fits the context, and therefore has been selected. See Bāṣambhaṭṭa p. 280

4 Bāṣambhaṭṭa adds: 'the owner of the field is not to get anything'

Digest Vol. II. p. 100

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as may be reasonable should the owner of the field be getting from the owner of the she-buffalo etc. This is the meaning By the use of the word *tu*, 'however', the Author discriminates the produce of the crop of that portion of the field which has been left out of the damaged part

- 5 The cowherd, however, is to be chastised only, and should not pay the produce of the field, for the reason, it appears, that the owner enjoys the result of the consumption of the crop in the form of milk etc Chastisement, moreover, is an extension of the aforestated penalty. vide the text¹ "If a cow straying through the fault of the keeper, do
10 "damage to the crop, no penalty in such a case should be imposed upon "the owner, the keeper deserves the punishment" *Gomî*, 'the owner of the cow' This is only an indication The owner of she-buffalos etc. also incurs the penalty as stated before By the word *tu*, 'however', the Author discriminates chastisement (161)

15

Sûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 161

- As much of the crop as is destroyed on account of the trespass by the she-buffalo etc., so much only as may be determined by the *sāmantas* etc shall the cultivator obtain from the cowherd When that is not possible,
20 the cowherd should be chastised, while the owner of the cows incurs the penalty as stated before *Uśanâh* mentions an offence for demanding the grain eaten by the cow "If a man demands back the corn eaten by "the cows, his ancestors will not eat that food, nor will the heavenly "divinities consume it" (161)

25

The Author mentions an exception in the case of particular fields

Yājñavalkya, Verse 162

- There would be no trespass if without any intention (on the part of the owner) the cattle stray by a road, or in a field in the neighbourhood of the village store But in the case of a wilful trespass he deserves punishment like
30 a thief

- Mitâksharâ —Pathî*, by a road, i e adjoining the village In a field situated in the neighbourhood of the village store, if the crop is consumed by the cattle without any design on the part of the owner, there would be no fault either of the herdsman or of the owner The statement
35 as to the absence of any guilt, is made with a view to indicate the absence

of any punishment, as well as to prohibit the payment of the value of the crop.

Kamachāre, in the case of a wilful trespass, i. e. if the cattle are designedly made to stray *chauraval, like a thief* i. e. that punishment which is meted out for a thief such a punishment *arhahi he deserves* 5

This rule moreover is with reference to an open¹ field. Since absence of punishment has been stated by Manu² in reference to an unenclosed field: Where (the field containing) a crop is unenclosed, "and if cattle destroy it, the king shall not, in such a case, inflict a "punishment upon the keepers of cattle." If however it is enclosed 10 then a trespass does occur even in (reference to) a field on the roadside &c. The same Sage has laid down the preparing of a hedge³ thus "He (i. e. the owner of the field) shall make there a hedge over "which a camel cannot peep and stop every gap through which a "dog or a boar can thrust his head." 15

Śūlpaṇī

Yājñavalkya, Verse 162

Palhi in the way i. e. in the vicinity of the village pasture grounds. *Kṣhetre* in the field i. e. without (any) intention (on the part) of the keeper etc. when the crop is consumed by the she-buffaloes, etc. there is no fault of the keeper etc. 20

For purposely (causing) the eating however the penalty would be as aforesaid (16*)

The Author states another rule where there would be no penalty even in the case of particular beasts 23

Yājñavalkya Verse 163

A big bull beasts let loose, beasts recently delivered straggling beasts, and like other beasts over whom there is no keeper and beasts distressed⁴ by (the acts of) God or the king should be set free.

1 अग्रज i. e. Unenclosed.

2 Ch. VIII. 238

3 Manu Ch. VIII. 239

4 Colebrooke interprets ईश्वरवर्जित as the cause of the disturbance by the beasts, and translates, For they are impelled by God and the king

Mitākṣharâ —A bull and (one which is) a big one is a 'big bull', mahoksha, i e, sprinkler¹ of seed Utsrshatapaśavaḥ, beasts let loose, i e, let loose in honour of a deity according to the rites for consecrating bulls or the like Sūkâ, a beast recently delivered, i e within ten days of then calving Âgantukâḥ, straggling beasts, i e, wandering away from its own herd, and coming from another (part of the) country These should be mochyâḥ, set free, should not be fined even when another's crop is consumed Also those over whom there is no keeper, even these daivarâjapariputâḥ, being distressed by (the acts of) God and the King, i e being overpowered by God and the King, shall not be punished by the owner of the field wherein the crop has been damaged

By the use of the term âdî, 'and like others', are comprehended also the elephants, horses, and the like These, moreover, are mentioned by Uśanas² "The (owners of the) elephants and horses shall "not be fined, for they are looked upon as the protectors³ of (king's) "subjects, so (also) are not punishable beasts with one eye, or hump-backed beasts, as also those which have been once branded So is "unpunishable a stray cow, or a cow which has (recently) calved or "which is unmanageable So also are the cows exempt from punishment in times of festivity, or on an anniversary day"

Here, in the case of beasts which are let loose and so are without any owner, there is no possibility of a punishment, and these have been referred to as illustrative, i e as consecrated beasts cannot be punished, so a big bull and the like (should be left unpunished)

Vîramitrodaya

The Author states the penalty etc in special cases of fields, and animals

Yājñavalkya, Verses 162, 163

On the way, in the fields adjoining the village pasture-grounds when crops are eaten by a cow etc, the fault is of the owner of the cow, even if it was without the wish of the cowherd The fault of the cowherd,

1 A bull specially reared for impregnation

2 Of also Nārada Ch XI 32

3 Aparārka adds प्रजापाला इति वचनात् राजसीयानामेव हस्त्यश्वादीनामण्ड ।

moreover does not come in for a penalty. When however the cows etc. are deliberately made to graze the attendant at the grazing deserves punishment like a thief. This absence of a fault moreover is to be observed when the field is uncovered and the eating thereof has been for a short period vide the text of Manu¹. Where the crop is unenclosed and if the cattle destroy it the king shall not in such a case inflict a punishment upon the keepers of cattle and also vide the text of Viṣṇu². On the road at the end of the village pasture ground there is no fault "except during the harvest time".

Vahukaḥo a big bull : a sprinkling bull *utsrakṣapataro* 'aban-
doned animals such as at the exequial rite of dedication of a bull and
the like dedicated animals such as a bull a belfer and the like *sutikā*
recently delivered one who has not come out of the tenth day after
delivery *agantukāḥ* stragglers such as detached from their own herds
and coming from another region only. By the word *ad* and others are
included unpunishable are the elephants and the horses for they are
declared as protectors of the subjects stated in this text of Another
Smṛiti *Moḥyadh* should be set free i.e. should not be punished. Such of
the cows etc. whose keepers are immersed in calamities due to the act
of king or God these should be let off as helpless. In the case of those
that are dedicated no punishment is possible as there is no owner and
it should be understood that their mention is only by way of giving an
illustration. By the word *iv* however are excluded from being released
all others than those mentioned (162-163).

Sūlapani

Yājñavalkya, Verse 163

"The great bull such as intended for the God a bull dedicated after
being branded and marked with a disc. A recently delivered cow is
one which has not completed ten days after delivery and stray ones also.
By the word *ad* another like are to be taken those mentioned in the
text¹ : "Unpunishable are the elephants and horses, for they have been
declared as the protectors of the subjects so also are not punishable beasts
"with one eye or humpbacked beasts, as also those bulls which have been
"branded with a discmark". Of these those for whom there is no watch
man, should be let off. The herdsman should be punished this is the
meaning. Similarly those destroyed by the fate or by theft (163).

1 Ch. VIII. 38

2 Ch. V. 146

3 Of Uṣṇas & Nārada see p. 1176 note 2

The rules as to the owner of a cow have been stated, now the Author prescribes (a rule) for the herdsman

Yājñavalkya, Verse 164

5 Let the herdsman restore the cattle every evening in the same condition in which they were entrusted (to him) For such as have perished or vanished through (his) fault, he should be compelled to pay if he had stipulated for his wages

Page 111*

10 Mitāksharâ.—As the cattle were made over in the morning by counting by the owner of them, in the same manner should the herdsman, in the evening time, restore the beasts to the owner after counting (thereof) For cattle perishing or vanishing *pramâdena*, through fault, *i e* through his fault, a herdsman who *krtavetanah*, has stipulated for his wages, *i e* whose wages have been fixed, should be made to compensate the owner The (rule for the) determination of wages has been stated by Nârada. “The annual wages of a herdsman for a hundred head of cattle shall be a heifer, for two hundred a cow, and the milk (of the whole herd) every eighth day” The loss by negligence has, moreover, been clearly explained by Manu¹

20 “For a beast which has been lost, or destroyed by worms, or killed “by dogs, or (has died) by falling into a pit, and if no proper efforts “are made, the herdsman alone shall be made to pay” He shall not be made to pay for those which have been forcibly taken away by robbers As says Manu² “But for an animal forcibly taken away

25 “by robbers, the herdsman shall not be made to pay, provided he “informed the owner at a proper time and place” Of those, moreover, which have perished by (the acts of) God or the King, the ear &c should be exhibited *vide* the text of Manu³ “If cattle die, let him carry “to his master then ears, skin, tails, bladders, tendons, and the yellow

30 “concrete bile, and let him point then particular marks”

If the cattle die or are taken away by robbers through his fault, for the watchman of the beasts, the fine is thirteen *panas*¹ less by a half i.e. twelve *panas* and a half more, has been ordained to be taken by the King himself By the use of the first *cha*, are included those which
 5 have fallen, others than dogs. By the use of the word *tu*, 'however', the Author excludes the punishment for the herdsman who reports a forcible taking away by robbers, tiger, and the like That has been declared by *Manu and Nârada*² "But for an animal forcibly taken
 10 "away by robbers, the herdsman shall not be made to pay, provided he "informed the owner at a proper time and place" *Brhaspati* also "When he does not restore nor complain and report to the owner, "the herdsman is responsible for the fault, and is also liable for a fine
 15 "(to be paid) to the King". By the second use of *cha*, the Author removes the doubt about any rule of option owing to a simultaneity of punishments (164-165).

Śûlapânî

Yājñavalkya, Verse 165

When the beast is lost through the fault of the keeper, the fine is half
 20 by thirteen *panas* ordained for the keeper To the owner, however, a money payment, and when the payment of money referred to in the text "if the beasts have died or been lost through mistake etc," is impossible this text is for the payment of the price (165)

25 While speaking of the cattle (generally), the Author speaks about a pasture-ground for cattle

Yājñavalkya, Verse 166

By the choice of the village, or by the authority of the king, a portion of land for the pasture-ground for cattle (should be kept). The twice-
 30 born may always take from any place grass, fuel, and flowers like his own.

Mitâksharâ — *Grâamechchhayâ*, by the choice of the village, i.e. by the choice of the inhabitants of the village regard being had to the large or small extent of the land, or by the King's will, a cattle pasture-

1 The *Vîrmitrodaya* interprets अर्धत्रयोदशपण as अवरहितत्रयोदशपण अर्धाधिकद्वादशपण i.e. सार्धद्वादशपण taking it as an उत्तरपदलोपी कर्मधारय relying upon the *Vâtula* viz तास्तृतीयप्रवर्षदा सप्तनाधिकरणेन समस्यन्त उत्तरपदलोपश्च The author of the *Mitâksharâ* takes it as अर्धाधिकत्रयोदशपण In regard to this, the editor of the Chowkhamba series says in Note 4 on p 643—तत् सधद्विमात्रादिषु अधत्रिमात्रादिनि सहाभाष्यकारशब्दप्रयोगादुपेक्ष्यम् ।

2 *Manu* Ch VIII 233.

ground should be made / e. some good portion of the uncultivated land should be appropriated for the pasturage¹ of kine and the like

A twice-born man in the absence of grass, fuel &c. may use of the cow the (sacrificial) fire, and the Deity take from anywhere, the grass wood and flowers (respectively) without opposition, as if (they were) his own. But fruits, he should take from an unenclosed spot only vide the text of Gautama². For the cow and the sacrificial fire he may take as his own grass, and fuel, as well as the flowers of "creepers and trees, and fruit also, if they be unenclosed"

This, moreover supposes an absence of pre-occupancy for a thing be occupied property also vests by occupancy in others besides twice-born men as has been declared by the same³ Author. A man becomes owner by inheritance purchase partition seizure or finding

As for what is again said in the text⁴: He indeed who "grass or wood, or flowers or fruits without asking (permission of the owner) deserves (the punishment of) the amputation of his hand," it applies to persons other than the twice born, or where there is no distress, or implies a purpose other than that of (feeding) the cows &c.

Śūlapani

Yājñavalkya Verse 166

At the option of the village Le of the villagers, a pasture-ground for the cows and the like may be made: or by the wish of the king the twice-born may take grass water etc from all places, when the land is no longer cultivated by others (166)

I AGF 112*

Here is another rule being propounded to provide for the convenience of cows and other cattle for standing sitting &c.

Yājñavalkya Verse 167

A space of one hundred *Dhanus*⁵ in extent should be left between a village and the fields of two hundred, for a small town and of four hundred, for a city

1 Bāṣambhaṭṭa notices a different reading कृत्वा for the protection of cattle

2 Ch XII. * in Anandāśrama No 28 Vol II Part I Sacred books of the East p 41

3 Ch X 31

4 Of Narada.—Bāṣambhaṭṭa. Colebrooke assigns it to Gautama Dig II.

5 A *Dhanus* = polo of four cubits.

for the

protection

books of

p 90

Mitāksharā — The space to be left between a village and its fields should be one hundred *Dhanus* in extent on all sides, exempt from tillage *Kharvatasya*, round a small town, with abundant thorny bushes growing in continuity around it, the extent of the space should be
5 two hundred *Nagarasya*, round a city, with the concourse of an immense population, the intervening space should be, by measurement, more than four hundred *Dhanus*

Thus ends the chapter on

‘Disputes between the Owners & Keepers of cattle’

10

Vīramitrodaya

Indeed, when the (whole) region is absorbed by the agricultural fields, how can there be a provision for the cows to feed or to roam about, in all cases there being a likelihood of punishment? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verses 166, 167

15 *Goprachara*, ‘the pasture-ground for cows’, i. e. an uncultivated portion of land intended for the cows to roam about, should be determined upon by the residents of the village or by the king at their option by regard to the vastness or smallness of the land. The twice-born, moreover, may take grass, wood, and flowers from all quarters, even
20 from the portions of lands accepted as donations, *savavut*, ‘like one’s own’, i. e. like from his own field.

Having thus treated of the feeding of the cows, the Author provides for their roaming about viz *Dhanus-satamiti*—‘a hundred *dhanus*’ etc. A measure of four hands is a *dhanus*, a hundred of that in extent i. e.
25 expanse, on all the four quarters, land to be left out in the ground intervening between the village and the fields *Kharvato*, a place better than a village, but inferior to a town. For that, the intervening space should be two hundred *dhanus*, and for a town, four hundred *dhanus* space should be left between the fields. Moreover, that portion of the
30 ground is utilised for the cattle to roam about and rest, therefore there is no penalty. This is the substance (166-167)

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 167

35 Four hands make a *dhanus*; a hundred of it make a *prastāra*. The intervening space between a village and the fields should be left on all sides for the cattle to roam. For a village of the type of *kharvata*, where there are many artisans and agriculturists, twice the above. For a town, four times (167)

CHAPTER XI.

Of Sale without Ownership.

Now the Author introduces the chapter from Yāwahāra called "Sale without Ownership." The characteristics of the same have been mentioned by Nārada¹ "When a thing kept as a deposit, or "the property of a stranger lost (by him) and found (by another man) or stolen articles are sold behind his back, it should be "considered as a sale (effected) by another than the (rightful) owner

In such a case what should be done? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya Verse 168

The owner can recover his own (property) sold by a stranger the blame would be of the buyer if he buy not publicly. If he purchase from a very low man in secret, at a very low price and at an unusual time, he is (considered) a thief

Mītākṣhara —Swam, his own, i. e. property belonging to himself anyavikṛtam, sold by a stranger, i. e. sold by one not the owner if he sees it, then he can recover, labheta, i. e. he should take it. Since the element of ownership is absent in the sale by one who was not the true owner. The expression "things sold" has been used to indicate by implication things given or deposited. For these transactions are also similar (in nature) to a sale by one not the owner. And hence has it been said² "A sale a gift, or a pledge made without "ownership should be rescinded "

The purchaser moreover becomes blameworthy if he buy aprakāṣite, not publicly, i. e. if he make the purchase in secret. So, if from a very low man, hṛāt, i. e. from one who cannot account for the acquisition of the thing by him, rāksa, in secret, i. e. in a lonely place, not ordinarily resorted to, bhīmanālyena, at a very low price, i. e. at a price lower than the original (price) of the thing itself, and vela-bhīne, at an unusual time, i. e. at a time which is other than the proper time, (if) he make a purchase, (e. g.) at night or such other time, then in such a case the purchaser is (considered) a thief taskarāḥ, i. e. becomes liable to punishment like a thief. As has been said³: "When a thing which had been sold by another than the owner has been recovered by

1 Ch. VII-1 2 By Kātyāyana, verse 613 Bāṣambhoṭṭa. 3 By Nārada-Ch. VII.3

śadya, i.e. recognised a thing while the same is in the hands of the purchaser which belonged to himself and which was either lost or stolen, he should cause the taker *hartaram*, i.e. the seller to be apprehended by the police or others. *It is time and place prevent* *deśakālapattān*, i.e. if there is (danger of) waste of time i.e. if there is danger of his running away even before the time a complaint is made to the police on account of their not being near *he shall himself apprehend*, *swayameva gṛhīṭva*, and hand over *samarpayet*, to them

Pa. 113*

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Śūlapani

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Yājñavalkya Verse 169

The owner also having obtained *no śidpāhṛtam*, the property which was lost or taken away should cause the person taking it to be arrested by the hands of the officers appointed for recovering stolen property. When the officers for recovering stolen property are not available at the place and it is impossible to protect the property until the time of their being brought over then he should himself take it and make over (169).

15

What should be done after the robber is apprehended? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya Verse 170

20

When the seller is pointed out, there is exoneration. The owner receives his thing the king the fine and the buyer his price back from him who sold it.

Mitākṣhara—If such a buyer when apprehended says I have not stolen it, but I have purchased it from another then of him i.e. of the buyer *vikreturdāriṇānamātreṇa śuddhīḥ*, there is exoneration merely by pointing out the seller. And then he will not be charged (as a party defendant) but the suit will proceed between the seller pointed out by him and the owner who had lost the thing. As says Bṛhaspati? "When the original taker is produced the buyer should in no case be sued. But a suit is ordained between the original taker and the owner who had lost the thing. In that suit, if it is found that a sale was made by one who was not the owner then the man *who sold*, *vikreta*,

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1 समसङ्ग is obviously a good reading

2 See Bāṣamabhiṣi p. 284 ll. 9-11

is the seller, of it, *tasya*, is of the thing lost or stolen, such as a cow &c,—from him the owner is the one who had lost the thing will get back his thing, *drawyam*, *nṛpaścha*, and the king also, a fine proportionate to the (degree of) offence, and *kretâ cha*, the buyer also, will obtain *mûlyam*, the price, (paid by him)

If, however, he happens to have gone to another (part of the) country, then time should be allowed for his production, regard being had to the number of Yojanas¹ (lying between) *vide* the text² “Either the purchase should be made in open (market), or the original seller should be made over In such a case, time should be given to him (is the buyer) for the production of the original seller according to (the distance of) the road” When, however, he is not able to produce the original seller on account of his not knowing the place (where he has gone), then he becomes exonerated only upon justifying the purchase, *vide* the text³. “If the seller cannot be produced, the buyer should be made to justify the purchase” When, again, he does not justify the purchase either by (the testimony of) witnesses or by an ordeal, nor does he point out the original seller, then he himself becomes liable to punishment, *vide* the text of *Manu*⁴ “The defendant not pointing out the original seller, nor justifying the purchase, should be ordered to pay the amount to the claimant as claimed by him, and also to pay a fine.”

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 170

Of the purchaser, the exoneration becomes established at the appearance of the seller This is in regard to an un-open purchase As says *Bṛhaspati* “Either the purchase should be made in open, or the original should be made over Time also should be given for the production of the original by regard to the extent of the distance” ‘Original’, is the seller, the original owner, should take the property In the case of a purchase not in the open the king shall recover a penalty from the purchaser The purchaser should recover the price from the seller

1 A Yojana is 4 kosa = 8 miles

2 Of *Kâtyâyana*, verse 615 *Bâlabhattacha*

3 Of *Kâtyâyana* verse 618, *Bâlabhattacha*

4 Not found in *Manu* The Author of *Mayûkha* and others assign it to *Kâtyâyana*, verse 619

If a purchase be made in the presence of an assemblage of tradesmen it need not be paid over to the owner either. So says Marichi. What was purchased in the presence of an assemblage of tradesmen, or was known to the king's officers what was purchased from one whose whereabouts are not known or where the seller is dead, in all these cases the owner should pay half the price and get back his own property. In such a case under the law half of both is taken away. For a purchase from one who is not known there is a fault as also in keeping it" (10)

It has been said that "The owner can recover his own (when) sold by a stranger." What will be done by one who wishes to recover it? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya Verse 171

Proof of a thing lost must be made by the evidence of the source of the acquisition, or of possession otherwise on failure of proof by him he should be made to pay the king a fine equal to the fifth part.

Mītākshara — Agamena by (the proof of) the source of acquisition or by inheritance purchase or the like or also, upabhoga by possession or by proof thereof &c. This was my property and the same was lost and recovered &c" must be made bhāvyam &c established by the owner of it. Anyatha, otherwise &c if the owner do not make out (his case) pañchabandho a fifth part &c a fifth portion of the lost thing should be paid by the owner of the lost thing, as fine to the king

Here moreover the order¹ (of proof) should be as follows: The original owner should prove the thing (claimed to be) lost as being his. Then the purchaser in order to obviate the charge of theft as also that he may get (back) the price (paid by him) should produce the seller. If however he is unable to produce him then for exonerating himself from any charge he should justify the purchase, and make over the thing (which was) lost to the owner

Viramitrodaya

Now begins the portion of Vyavahāra known as Sale without Ownership

Yājñavalkya Verses 168 169 170 171

His own property sold by another who was not the owner the owner gets back from the purchaser, as a sale by one not the owner

1 To the same effect is Bhaspati see Ch. XIII 9

See hātyāyana verses 613 614; Aparārka p. 7

cannot invest the purchaser with the right of ownership. The purchaser, moreover, when the purchase has not been made openly, would be guilty of a fault which will bring on punishment. For an open purchase, however, there would be no penalty, *vide* the text of

5 **Manu**¹ "If the original cannot be produced, the purchase being open, "the buyer is exculpated and should not be punished, and be let off "by the King, but the (original) owner who lost the property shall "get it back "

Similarly, *hināt*, 'from a very low person', as to whom there could

10 be no possibility of the right of ownership of the article being in him. Also *rahaḥ*, 'in secret', in a lonely place, and *hinamūlye*, 'at a very low price', for the payment of a comparatively small price, for such a purchase the purchaser should be punished as a thief. By the use of the word *cha*, are included sales by slaves and the like. That has been stated by

15 **Nārada**² "One purchasing from a dependent not authorised by the owner, "or from a disreputable individual, in secret, at a very low price, at an "improper time, incurs liability for the same offence" (168)

Of the owner of the lost property, when the article which was taken away was found by the owner, the purchaser who had got it by purchase,

20 when charged by the owner, should cause the person who had taken it away, to be arrested by the officers of the state or the like. So says **Nārada**³ "The purchaser should not conceal the source from which "he obtained it, he becomes exonerated by (pointing out) the source "of it. In case of prevarication, he becomes equally guilty, and incurs

25 "the entire penalty for it (the offence)" 'In case of prevarication' *i e* for concealing the origin (of his acquisition). If time and the place do not permit, and in the absence of the state officers or the like, when charged by the owner, the purchaser may himself hand over the seller to the owner (169)

30 Here the reason *vikreṭṭān sanāt*, 'by pointing out the seller', *i e* by pointing (him) out to the owner, there is 'exoneration', *suddhah*, of the purchaser, *i e* absence of the guilt inducing a penalty. The word *cha*, 'and', has the sense of *tu*, 'however'

Thus *vikrayi*, 'the seller', *i e* of that article—since *tasmāt*, 'from him', *i e* from the one pointed out by the purchaser, *swāmīno* 'the owner', *dravyam*, 'the article' *i e* that which was the subject-matter of the purchase, *kretā*, 'the purchaser' also, its price, and the King also obtains the penalty in accordance with the (magnitude of the) guilt (170)

1 Oh VIII 203

2 Oh VII 3

3 Oh VII 4 for न क्रयेत् the print reads न गृहेन—which is correct and has been adopted in the translation,

The Author mentions a rule regarding one who shields a robber
Yājñavalkya, Verse 172

He who receives from the hand of another, a thing stolen or lost, without informing the king, shall be fined ninety-six *panas*

5 Mitākṣharâ —*Hṛtam* *pranashtam*, a thing stolen or lost, and lying in the possession of the thief &c, he who takes it back forcibly or by similar means saying 'this man has stolen my thing', without informing the king, such a one shall be fined six and ninety *panas*, as he becomes guilty by shielding the thief

PAGE 114*

10

Vîramitrodaya

For one who not being the owner and sells, for a purchaser from him, and for the owner who shields these, the Author states a penalty

Yājñavalkya, Verse 172

15 Should be punished By the use of the word *tu*, 'however', when information is given, the Author cuts off the penalty (172)

Sûlapânî

Yājñavalkya, Verse 172

20 *Hṛtam pranashtatam wâ.*, 'A thing which was either stolen or was lost,' if one takes it from the hand of the thief etc saying 'this is mine,' without informing the king, such a one should be punished, as he becomes guilty of shielding the thief (172)

The Author mentions a rule regarding a thing recovered by the king's officers

Yājñavalkya, Verse 173

25 A thing which was lost or stolen, and which had been recovered by the customs officers or by the local watchmen, the owner may take away within one year, (and) after it, the king

30 Mitākṣharâ:—When, however, a thing lost or stolen, has been produced before the king by the officers of customs, or by the watchmen of the place, then, if the owner of the lost thing appear *samvat-sarâdarvâk*, within the period of one year, he shall get the thing (back) After the lapse of one year, however, the king shall take it

35 The king also should cause a proclamation to be made among the people, about the thing brought by his officers, and preserve the same for one year As says Gautama¹: "Those who find lost (pro-

charges for protection, he should pay two panas for each head. Thus is the rule to be construed in reference to all. Although the goat and the sheep are mentioned together in a conjunct compound *ajāvīkam*, still by the force of the repetition in the expression 'one-fourth, one-fourth each' the meaning deducible is that it refers to each individually.

Here ends the chapter on "Sale by One Not the Owner"

Vîramitrodaya

If the lost article is not brought back by the owner, but on the other hand by the king's officers, in such a case the Author states the adjustment.

Yājñavalkya, Verses 173, 174

By the customs officers, or by the local watchmen, *āhrtam*, 'recovered', property which was lost was recovered, that should be preserved by the king for one year, within that period if the owner who had lost it establishes it as his, he shall take it & get it. *Parato*, 'after it', i.e. after a year, the article for which the right of ownership of (any) other has not been established, the king may take (173).

The Author mentions the charges for the preservation of lost property.

Ekasaphe, 'for animals with one hoof', such as horses and the like, on the property being lost, four *panas*, to the king, shall the owner of the lost thing pay. When, moreover, the lost article is a human being, five *panas*. For supervision in connection with the buffalos and cows, two for each, and for goat and sheep i.e. for a he-goat and a ram, one should pay a quarter of *pana* for each.

"The lost property which was recovered, the king shall (keep as a) deposit for three years. Before (the spring of) three years, the owner may take, afterwards the king may take". This text of *Manu*, however has a reference to the (property of a) Brâhmana learned in the vedas and of illustrious character, the present text is in regard to cases other than that, and thus there is no contradiction (173-174).

Thus ends the chapter on Sale without Ownership

Sûlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 174

Ekasaphe, 'in regard to one-hoofed animals,' such as the horse etc., when lost and recovered by the king, one should pay four *panas* (to the king) for its preservation (174).

Thus ends the Chapter on Sale without Ownership.

CHAPTER XII

Of the Resumption of Gifts.

Now is being expounded the Chapter of Law called Gifts which has obtained a twofold designation viz. the Resumption of a gift or Non-resumption of a gift, according as the parties concerned resort to ways which are proper or improper. Its characteristics have been stated by Narada¹ "When a man wishes to take back a thing which he has not properly bestowed it is called a resumption of gifts, a title of law. That title of law wherein having bestowed a chattel *not properly* *anamyak*, i. e. by means not laid down as proper a man wishes to recover it back, (that title) is called "Resumption of Gifts" i. e. that transaction of gift where there is resumption of that which had been given. And by having resort to legally prescribed methods, its converse in the same title at law comes to be known as Non-resumption of gifts. That title at law called the law of gifts in which there is non-resumption or non retaking of what had been given is called the "Non resumption of gifts." That, moreover is fourfold having regard to its division into what may be given and

PAGE 115*

what may not be given. As says Narada² "What may be given, and what not, valid gifts, and invalid gifts thus the law of gifts is declared (to be) fourfold in judicial "affairs." There, by 'What may be given, *deyam*, is expressed to be that which can be a fit subject matter for an unforbidden transaction of gift. By 'What may not be given *adeyam* is indicated that which is unfit to be given either on account of its being not one's own property or its being prohibited (as a thing to be given). That, on the other hand which had been given by one in full possession of his faculties, and which cannot be revoked is called a valid gift *Dattam*. And 'an invalid gift, *Adattam* is described to be that which may be taken back. With a view to describe this in brief the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 175

One's property may be given, without detriment to the family

Mitākṣhara —Swam, one's property i. e. his own *kutumbāvirodhena*, without detriment to the family : i. e. without impediment to the family : i. e. so much only should be given as may remain after (providing for) the maintenance of the family. Since its maintenance is a necessity

For says Manu¹ "Aged parents, a chaste wife, and an infant
 "son, should be maintained even by doing a hundred misdeeds,"
 so said Manu. "Without detriment to the family"—by this the
 Author points out one class of things which may not be given
 5 "One's property one may give"—by this also, the unendowable
 character of the five kinds of property viz, the Anvâhita² and Yâchitaka
 deposits, as well as a pledge, a joint property, and a Nîkṣhepa deposit
 has been indicated by the method of negative³ reasoning As to
 the eightfold character of things not liable to be given which has
 10 been mentioned by Nârada⁴ "An Anvâhita deposit, a Yâchitaka, a
 "pledge, a joint property, a deposit, a son, a wife, the entire property
 "of one who has offspring (4) These have been declared by the
 "revered sages as inalienable even in times of extreme distress, as
 "also that which had been promised to another (5)." This text only
 15 intends things which are inalienable, and not as indicating an absence
 of the right of ownership, as the right of ownership exists over a son,
 a wife, the entire property, and that which had been promised The
 nature of Anvâhita and the rest has been already explained before⁵

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 175

20 When there is no wife or son, one may give what is his without
 detriment to (the interests of) the family When, however, sons etc
 exist, the entirety should not be given What has been promised to one
 should not be given to another

25 In a period of adversity, sons etc may be given, so says Kâtyâyana⁶
 "Either in a sale or in a gift, must not be given when unwilling In
 "times of adversity however, a gift or even a sale may be"

'Unwilling' i e the sons and the rest. Even there, an only son must
 not be given, vide the text of Vasistha⁷—"Never, however, should one
 30 give an only son" (175)

1 Not found in the printed edition of Manu

2 See pages 840, 841 above, for an explanation of these terms as given by
 Viṣṇûkṛishṇa himself

3 The व्यतिरेक method of reasoning i e by an opposite way See note 3
 page 707 above for a fuller explanation of this term and also of the corresponding
 term अत्रय The meaning is that by saying that one should give what is "his
 own property", a necessary implication is raised against the gift of things
 which are not held in the right of full ownership, i e over which the donor has
 only a partial right 4 Ch IV 4-5 5 i e on page 101 text and p 840 tr above

6 Verses 638, 639 7 Ch XI 3

By¹ reason of the text 'One's property he may give' an occasion might arise for the giving away of a wife and a son and the like. With a view to obviate this, the Author says

Yājñavalkya Verse 176

Except a wife and a son. Nor, when there is progeny his entire property as also what had been promised to another 5

Mītākshara —Darasutaditye² *except a wife and a son* : i. e. excluding the wife and the son he should give his own property; and not a wife or a son. This is the meaning. Similarly when the son, grandson and similar anuvaya, progeny exist the entire property he should not give. *vide* the text³: "Having begotten sons, he should 10
duly initiate them, and provide for the maintenance of these." So also, gold &c., anyasmai pratīṣṭam *when promised* (to be given) to another should not be given to any other

Having thus mentioned property which may be given with the exception of a wife and a son the Author mentions in that context, the rule that property which is not alienable should be accepted by the donee in public 15

Yājñavalkya, Verse 176 (1)

'Let the acceptance be public, especially of immovable property' 20

Mītākshara.—Taking over is pratigrahaḥ *acceptance*. That should be made prakāśaḥ, *in public*, with a view to obviate any dispute. And sthavarasya cha vidheḥ⁴, *especially of the immovable* the acceptance should be made only in public. As it is not possible to prove its possession (by the donee) as can be done in the case of gold and other 25
movables.

1 The right of ownership being undefined

2 See *A. Iyer vs. Sanyal* 33 Bom. 669 at pp. 674-687 where Chandavarkar J. has discussed this passage and its bearing upon the relative rights and positions of a son and a father in a Mītāksharā family

3 Of Manu—Dīpambhāṣā.

4 See *H. Iyer vs. V. Iyer* 4 Bom. II O. R. A. O. J. 71 at p. 34 and also *Kalidas vs. Kankya Lal* 11 I. A. 218 at p. 230 where this passage has been translated by the court.

Having thus referred to a subject which only arose incidentally, the Author proceeds further with the subject under discussion, and says

Yâjñavalkya, Verse 176 (2)

5 ¹Whatever is promised (to be given) shall be given Having once
given (it), let him not resume (it)

Mitākṣharā:—Deyam pratiśrutam chaiva, whatever has been *promised* to any one as a religious charity, *must* necessarily *be given* to him, if² the other does not swerve from (the path of) religion. If, however, he swerve, then it should not be given. As Gautama³ has stated
10 “Even if he may have promised, he should not give it to one who
“has irreligious associations”.

. Datwâ nâpaharet punah, *what had been given, let him not resume it*
 From this it follows that whatever has been completely given accord-
 ing to law, should not be resumed in (the case of) all the seven
 15 classes (of valid gifts). But should be confirmed
 PAGE 116* in that condition, but also that, what had been
 given in an illegal manner must be resumed in
 (the case of) all the sixteen kinds of invalid gifts

Nârada⁴ also having premised that "Valid gifts are of seven kinds,
20 "and invalid gifts of sixteen kinds" has dealt with the characteristics
of valid and invalid gifts thus "The price paid for merchandise,
' "wages, (a present offered) for an amusement, (a gift made) from
"affection, or from gratitude, or as a woman's⁵ Śulka, and a respectful
"gift, are the seven kinds of valid gifts" (8).

25 Invalid gifts are the following (sixteen) "What has been given
"by one under the influence of fear, anger, sorrow, sudden excite
"ment, or pain, or as a bribe, or in jest, or fraudulently, under false

1 See *Ghelabhai vs Uderam*, 36 Bom 29 at p 35, where Chhandavarkar J has translated this passage

2 This translation differs from that given by Ohandavarkar J in 36 Bom at p 35 The translation given there is obviously not in conformity with the text of the Mitâksharâ, which makes it a condition precedent for the completion of the gift, that the donee should not swerve from religion

3 Oh IV 23

4 Ch IV 8-11 See *Harywam vs Naran*, 4 Bom H C R A C J at p 33

5 See p 1135 note 4

"pretences (9) Or by a child, or by a fool or by a person not his
own master or by one distressed or by one intoxicated or by one
insane, or in consideration of a reward thinking This man will
do me some service (10) and also that which was given to an
unworthy person thought to be worthy or for an unlawful purpose;
whatever gift has been made through ignorance (of real facts) is
considered as an invalid gift. 5

The meaning is this What has been paid as "the price for
merchandise i. e. a thing bought. 'Wages' i. e. the salary paid to
one who had done work. "For amusement i. e. given to the bards,
singers and the like "From affection i. e. given to daughters, sons
and the like. 'From gratitude i. e. to one who has conferred any
obligation given by way of repaying the obligation. "A woman's
Sūlka" i. e. that which was given to the relations of a damsel for
(bringing about the) marriage And "a respectful gift i. e. what
was given and the result of which is not¹ observed (in this world). 10
These seven kinds of gifts are valid gifts, and must not be resumed.

"Through fear' what was given to the keepers' of prisoners &c.
"Under the influence of anger i. e. what was given to another (as
an inducement) for removing his enmity towards sons and the like. 20
What was given in pangs of grief caused by the separation of a son
or a similar cause. "By way of a bribe" i. e. given to persons in

1 i. e. not having tangible results in this world.

2 For a lucid explanation of the quotation from Nārada see Asahīya's commentary of Nārada on this passage and translated by Dr Jolly at pp. 129-130 (notes) of Vol XXXIII of the Sacred Books of the East.

3 अशुभम्—This term is indicative of persons of dangerous character such as rogues, ruffians &c. Asahīya explains it as follows—"e.g. if an honest man promises one hundred drachmas to a ruffian who addresses him, while he is passing through a forest, with the words "If thou givest me one hundred drachmas, thou shalt live. Otherwise thou shalt die."

Bhāṣabhāṣya suggests as an example, gifts' promised or given to the jail officers &c.

4 See Śrī Sūtraṃ Pañcī vs Śrī Harīṣa Pañcī 35 Bom. 169 at p. 180 per Chandraśekhara J. where this passage has been translated differently thus: "Something paid to a person bound to do an act, with the object of removing an obstacle to the performance of his duty. While Vijnāneśvara's explanation obviously refers to a gift made to a person in authority with a view to removing all obstructions to the successful termination of the matter under consideration. To the same effect is Asahīya.

- authority for the removal of obstruction to (one's) business
 "In jest" *i e* what has been, as a fun, given Even (when) one
 man gives his own property to another and that other also gives his
 to him This is "a fraudulent gift" "Under a false pretence" *i e*.
 5 (where) intending to give one hundred, he stipulates for a thousand,
 and gives "By a child" *i e* by one who has not attained the age
 of sixteen "By a fool" *i e* by one who is ignorant of the popular
 usage "By one who is not his own master" *e g* by a son, a slave,
 or the like. "By one distressed" *e g* by one diseased &c "By one
 10 "intoxicated" *i e* by one intoxicated by some intoxicant. "By one
 "insane" *i e*. by one who is overpowered by an insanity such as that
 brought on by air &c "Given in expectation of a return" *e g* (where a
 gift is made in the expectation that) 'he will bring about the accomplish-
 "ment of my object' Given to a man who is not versed in (all) the four
 15 Vedas, on his representing that he was versed in the four Vedas Given
 to one, who having obtained a gift on his representing that he would
 perform a sacrifice, but who appropriates it in gambling and similar
 other acts Gifts of these sixteen kinds as enumerated above are
 invalid even if they were (completely) made, since these can be
 20 resumed

- The invalidity of a gift made by 'one distressed', attaches to
 such as are those other than relating to religious purposes Since
 Kâtâyâna has observed: "If a gift¹ be promised by a person whether
 "in health or in distress, for a religious purpose, and he die without
 25 "making it, his son should be compelled to make it good; of this
 "there is no doubt."

Moreover, here is another text which is expressed in a concise
 form, but which is common to all (kinds of) disputes Says Manu²
 "A fraudulent pledge or sale, a fraudulent gift, acceptance, and any

1 See *Ghelabai vs Udram* 30 Bom 29 at p 35 Where Chhandavarkar J
 observes, "The word son is here merely illustrative and stands for any one who
 inherits or takes the promisor's property These are monitory, not mandatory
 texts, but the principle underlying them is that, where a Hindu, who has directed
 a trust of his property for a religious purpose, dies before giving effect to it,
 Hindu law authorises his heir to take steps for carrying out his directions, after
 recovering the property from a trespasser"

2 Ch VIII 165

"transaction where he detects fraud he (i.e. the judge) shall annul
"the whole of such (transaction). *Loṣa* means fraud. The meaning
is, that by every kind of fraud intended to be practised (in future)
(if) the transaction of pledge sale gift or acceptance &c. were
brought about, upon the discovery of that fraud these transactions 5
of sale &c. should be declared null and void. For him, moreover
who accepts any of the sixteen invalid gifts, and also for him who
bestows any of the seven kinds which ought not to be given a penalty
has been declared by Nārada¹. "He who accepts an invalid gift
"through avarice, as also he who bestows one which ought not to 10
"be given the donor of the unendowable thing deserves punishment
"as also the acceptor of the invalid gift."

Here ends the chapter on the Resumption of Gifts.

Viramītrodaya

Now the chapter of Vyavahāra known as non-delivery of gifts 15
Now, what may be given and what not valid gifts and also invalid
gifts thus the law of gifts is declared to be fourfold in judicial matters
the Author expounds this text of Nārada²

Yājñavalkya, Verses 175, 176

Svām one's i.e. of one's own property, excepting the wife and 20
the son, without detriment to the family i.e. the family which must
necessarily be maintained *deyam* may be given. The meaning is
that what may remain after (providing for) the maintenance of the
family may be given

Having thus stated what may be given the Author states what 25
may not be given. When there is progeny i.e. when the son, grand
son and other descendants exist *sarvasvām*, the entire property
should not be given. *Anyasmai yatpratirūṭam* what has been
promised to another i.e. what has been agreed to be given; that should
not be given to one in excess of that. By the use of the word *cha*, 30
and also are included other things not to be given stated by other
Rishis. So also Bṛhaspati³. "Common property sons wife a pledge,
"the entire property, a deposit, things borrowed and similarly what has
"been promised to another, thus the property which may not be given

1 Ch. IV 1.

2 Ch. XV 1

3 Ch. IV 1

"is declared to be of eight sorts". "Common property" : *c.* having several owners, of the son and the wife, they are not to be given only when they disagree Vide the text of Kātyāyana "The wives and
 5 "also sons, however, must not be subjected to sale or gift when (they
 "are) unwilling, the entire property, however, one may utilize for
 "oneself In times of adversity, however, may be made a gift or even
 "a sale." As regards consent, moreover, Vasishtha¹ states a special
 rule "Not, however, an only son should one give, or accept as a gift.
 10 "He indeed is for continuing the line of the ancestors Nor should a
 "woman either give or accept a son excepting with the permission of the
 "husband " 'Excepting with the permission' is connected with the
 giving only In regard to acceptance, by reason of non²-existence, even
 when there is no permission she having the right thereto Here accord-
 ing to Smṛtisāra "By acting against what is prohibited leads to irrel-
 15 "igion³, and not that the donation or⁴ gift is not accomplished, in the
 "case of the gift of an entirety of property or the like "

Brhaspati⁵ states the varieties of gifts "Wages, for the⁶
 "pleasure, the price of merchandise, the woman's *sulka*, (that given) to
 "a benefactor, and through reverence, kindness, or affection, thus are
 20 "stated the eight varieties of valid gifts "

Nārada⁷ mentions "What was given under the influence of
 "fear, anger, sorrow, sudden excitement, or pain, so also, as a bribe,
 "or in jest, or fraudulently, or under a false pretence, or by a child, or
 "by a fool, or by a person not his own master, or by one distressed, or by
 25 "one intoxicated, or by one insane, or in consideration of some gain,
 "thinking this man will do me some service "

By one in distress given in charity is, however, a valid gift
 indeed since Kātyāyana has observed "If he die without making it, his
 "son should be compelled to make it good, of this there is no doubt"
 30 "Brhaspati⁸ "When anything has been given through a desire for

1 Ch XV 3-5 2 "प्रतिग्रहेऽविद्यमानत्वेन The Benares printed edition omits, an obvious error

3 : *c.* the person disobeying may incur the sin of irreligion or disobedience to the dictates of Dharma, see Balusu Gurulingaswami vs Balusu Ramalakshman 23 Mad 398, 26 I A. 113

4 In other words the gift becomes complete दातुराय प्रतिषेध न प्रतिग्रहीतु, This is exactly the principle underlying the application of the doctrine of *factum valet*.

5 Ch XV 8

6 : *c.* When pleased *c g* at a song &c

7 Ch IV 9-10

8 Ch XV 11

"a reward, or to an unworthy man mistaken for a worthy person,
"or for an immoral purpose the owner may resume the gift

On the occasion of (a discussion as to) what may be given, the
Author states the necessity of openness in the acceptance of a gift-
pratigraha an acceptance etc. With a view to obviate a dispute an
open acceptance of a gift should be made. Especially of an immovable
the acceptance must be made in the open only as it is not possible to
prove its possession by ones self as (can be done) in the case of gold
and other movables

Now the Author proceeds with the matter under consideration :
What had been promised as a religious charity must necessarily be
given provided the donee does not swerve from (the path of) religion
as Gautama¹ has stated. Even if he may have promised he should
not give it to one who has irreligious association. What was given
properly as of the aforesaid seven kinds having once given one
should not take back. By the use of the word *cha* 'also' it is indicated
as the cumulative sense of the text that of the sixteen kinds of invalid
gifts one may take back (175-176).

Thus in the commentary on Yājñavalkya ends the chapter on
Nondelivery of gifts

Śūlapani

Yājñavalkya Verse 176

An acceptance of a gift should be known to many. *Pratistulam*
what has been promised, i.e. promised by word of mouth. Even there
as regards immovables in which many kinsmen are interested should be
known to the kinsmen and others. What has been promised by a word
of mouth must certainly be given. One should not take back what was
once given. As says Harita: "By not giving what was promised as
"also by cancelling a gift one goes to various hells also becomes born a
"lower animal."

Bṛhaspati² states what may not be given: "What has been given
"by one angry or resenting an injury or through inadvertence or by one
"distressed, one infatuated, or extremely old or terrified, overpowered by
"grief and what is given in a soft mood these are declared as invalid
gifts. What is given through desire for a reward or to an unworthy
"man mistaken for a worthy person, or for an immoral purpose the owner
"may resume the gift (176).

Thus ends the Chapter on Resumption of Gifts.

CHAPTER XIII

Rescission of Purchase

Now is being described the 'Rescission of Purchase' Its nature has been described by Nârada¹: "Where a purchaser, after having purchased (an article) for a price, does not approve of it, that is termed "Rescission of Purchase' a title of law " There also the same Author² has stated that on the day on which the purchase was made, on that same day should the thing be delivered back without any change: "When a purchaser, after having purchased an article for a price, considers "that he has made a bad bargain, he must, return it to the vendor "on that same day in an undamaged condition." In the case of a return on the second or any subsequent day, a special rule has been mentioned by the same Sage³ "When the purchaser returns it "on the second day, he shall lose a thirtieth (part) from the price, "twice as much (if it be returned) on the third day, after that time, "it is absolutely the purchaser's." The meaning is, that thereafter a rescission should not be made This (rule), moreover, has a reference to things perishable by use, other than seed and like other things.

In the case of the purchase of seed &c, an entirely different rule prevails as to rescission So the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 177

The time (allowed) for the trial and examination of seed, metal, beasts of burden, jewels, females, milch-cattle, and of males is respectively, ten days, one day, five days, seven days, one month, three days, and half a month

Mitâkṣharâ — Bîjam, seed, i e the seed of paddy and other grain ayah, metal, such as iron &c, wāhyah, a beast of burden, i e a bullock and the like, ratnam, jewel, i e pearls, corals &c, stree, a female, i e a dâsi, dohyam, milch-cattle, e.g. a she-buffalo &c, pumân, a male, i e. a male slave Of these, i e of the seed and the rest, the period for trial and examination should be understood to be ten days &c. respectively in the order of (their) enumeration And when, while under trial and examination, there occurs a repentance on account of the badness of the thing

1 Ch IX 1

2 Ch IX 2

3 Ch IX. 3

(purchased), then the sale can only be rescinded within ten days, and not later (than that period) And this is the reason of this rule

As for the text of *Mān*¹: If anybody in this world after buying or selling anything repent of his bargain he may return or 'take back that chattel within ten days' that refers to things not liable² to destruction by use such as a house a field a vehicle, a bed a seat and the like excepting iron and the other things with regard to which the rule has been stated (as above).

Moreover all this has a reference to what was bought without an examination What, therefore, had been examined³ and then purchased after an agreement, that is not to be returned, it should not be returned to the seller That rule has been laid⁴ down thus: 'The (intending) purchaser shall first examine an article, i. e. (before purchasing it), having regard to its faults and excellences that which has been approved by the purchaser after a close examination cannot afterwards be returned to the vendor'

Vīramitrodaya

Now the Author expounds the chapter of Law called the Rescission of purchase which has been characterised by Nārada⁵ thus: 'Where a purchaser after having purchased (an article) for a price does not approve of it that is termed a 'Rescission of Purchase' a title of law

Yājñavalkya, Verse 177

Up to ten days and the like is the limit for the examination of seed etc., and therefore if within that interval there is a revulsion about the bought article then it should be returned and not after that. This is the meaning Ten days eleven days, five days, seven days, a month three days half a month is (the limit) respectively for seed metal beasts of burden such as horses etc., jewels females, such as the *daśi* etc., milch-cattle such as the cow etc., and of males such as servants etc.

1. Ch. VIII. 223

2. There is a mistake in the text on p. 117 l. 15 for *योगविषय* read *योगविषय*

3. The reading *परीक्षितं* *सू* is better than *परीक्ष* given in the text at l. 16 and in translating the text, the former reading is adopted and not *परीक्ष* Bālabhāṭṭa reads similarly and notices *परीक्ष* as a V. I. but apparently does not prefer *परीक्ष*

4. By Nārada Ch. IX. 4

5. Ch. IX. 1

- “ If anybody in this world after buying or selling a thing, repent
 “of his bargain, he may return or take back that chattel within ten days:
 “After ten days, however, one cannot take back or compel it to be
 “taken back, one taking or returning either should be punished six
 5 “hundred by the king”. This text of *Manu*¹ has application to seeds
 only. Vide this text of *Kātyāyana* “ Whatever article which when
 “purchased was not known to be faulty, but was afterwards discovered
 “to be so, that article of merchandise so purchased should be given
 “(back) to the owner in time, otherwise however, not ” ‘ In time ’ i. e.
 10 within the period of inspection and test; ‘ Otherwise,’ i. e. after that All
 this, moreover, is to be observed in the case of all that was purchased
 without an examination viz since *Kātyāyana* has observed ‘not known,’
 and also the text of *Brhaspati*². “ One should inspect a merchandise³
 “himself, and also show it carefully to others, after having accepted
 15 “after an examination and approval by many, one should not give it up ”

- Even before the stated period also, *Nārada*⁴ states a special rule in
 regard to the return of a purchased article. “ When one, after
 “having purchased an article for a price, considers that he has made a
 “bad bargain, he must return it to the vendor on that same day in an
 20 “undamaged condition. If he returns it on the second day, he shall lose
 “a thirtieth part from the price, twice as much if it be returned on
 “the third day. After that it becomes absolutely the purchaser’s.”
 ‘ After that ’, has a reference to the milch-cattle. “ After having
 “purchased a thing in the market such as a milch-cattle or the like, if
 25 “out of repentance a man return it unblemished within time, he shall
 “bear a tenth part of the price,” this text of *Kātyāyana*, has reference
 to a period subsequent to the interval (allowed) for examination. Or
 both of these are applicable when the purchased article has been made
 over to the purchaser. Otherwise, however, “ After having purchased,
 30 “if a purchaser repent of a thing which has come into his hands, a wise
 “man in such a case should give up a sixth part, and give up the bought
 “article.” The adjustment is to be as under this text. Under the text of
Manu viz “Not the one having a blemish, nor that which was defective,
 “not one at a distance, nor that which was concealed,” an article; the

1 Ch VIII 222-223

2 Ch XVIII 3

3 ऋषिः *Brhaspati* defines a ऋषि thus (XVIII 2) “Two sorts of property are distinguished, immovable and movable, when a purchase is concluded, the term vendible property (*pratyā* ऋषि) is applied to it ”

4 Ch IX 2-3

defect of which was known at the time of the purchase should not be returned even during the interval for inspection, since Nārada¹ has observed. "A second-hand garment which was in a ragged condition and was soiled with dust even if (it be) with blemishes such an article when once purchased cannot thereafter be returned to the seller (177)

Sūlpāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 177

Of the seven things such as the seed etc. ten days and so on respectively is the period for test and determination of merits or demerits. If the fault is known before that, the commodity may be given back to the seller; so says Brhaspati: Before this, if a defect results in the article, then it should be returned to the seller and the purchaser shall 'get back the price' (177).

While treating of the (time for) inspection of milch cattle &c. the Author states the rule regarding the examination of gold and the like also

Yājñavalkya, Verse 178

Gold is not reduced in fire in (the case of) silver it is reduced by two *palas* in a hundred, in tin by eight, (so) also in lead, in copper five, in iron, ten

Mitākṣharā:—While being heated in fire, gold is not reduced. Therefore, as much may have been delivered into the hands of goldsmiths for preparing a bracelet &c., so much by weight must be returned by these. Otherwise, they should be compelled to make good the loss and be punished too. In the case of silver however when (a quantity weighing) a hundred *palas* is being heated, two *palas* are lost, *apṣṭau*, eight, in the case of tin, *trapṇa*, and also lead, *śiṣe cha*, i.e. in a hundred, as necessarily follows. In the case of tin as also of lead, while a hundred *palas* are being heated, eight *palas* lose weight. *Tāmre pañcha datayasi*, in copper five, in iron ten, i.e. in a hundred *palas* of copper five *palas*, in those of iron, ten *palas* are lost. Here also 'a hundred' is indeed to be understood. As regards white-copper as it is made out of tin and copper a (scale of) reduction is to be determined in accordance with (the rules for) these. Artisans, carrying a reduction further than this, should be punished

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 178

Gold, while being heated in the fire for being manufactured (into an article) is undiminished. Of silver, when a hundred are being heated, two *palas* are reduced. Of tin and lead, for a hundred *palas*, eight *palas* Copper, for a hundred *palas*, five. Thus in the case of iron, ten are reduced. In case of larger reduction, the goldsmith and the others should be compelled to pay, and should be punished also (178)

The Author mentions an increase in some cases, such as in the case of blankets &c

Yājñavalkya, Verse 179

In the case of woolen and cotton yarns, the increase is ten *palas* in a hundred, in (cloth of) middling quality, five, and in fine quality, three *palas* PAGE 118*

Mitâksharâ:—In the case of woolen yarn of rough quality, from which blankets and similar things are prepared, in those cases, an increase of ten *palas* in a hundred *palas* should be understood. A similar rule should be understood in the case of cloth &c, prepared from cotton yarn, *madhye*, in (the case of cloth of) *middling quality*, i. e. in the case of cloth &c, prepared from yarn which is not very fine, the increase is five *palas* (in a hundred). In cloth prepared from fine yarn, the increase should be understood to be three *palas* in a hundred. This (rule), moreover, applies in the case of cloth, which is not washed.

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 179

In the case of a blanket or other cloth manufactured from the ram's hair, as also of cloth woven from cotton yarn, for a hundred *palas* given for weaving, an increase of ten *palas* takes place owing to an addition of paste to the fabric. In regard to the same, when it is not too fine, nor too rough, the increase is five *palas*. For one woven out of fine yarn, three *palas* (179)

The Author mentions a special rule in regard to other articles:

Yājñavalkya, Verse 180

In the case of embroidered cloth, as also in cloth made of hair, a reduction of a thirtieth part is allowed. There is no decrease, nor an increase in the case of silken cloth or those made of barks

Mitākṣhara —Karmikam, *embroidered cloth*, i.e. cloth prepared with pictures thereon. That cloth where a wheel or a *śaśṭika* or a like design is woven into by yarn fibres is known as *embroidered cloth*, *karmika*. That cloth in which hair are woven into e.g. an upper garment, is a *romabaddhah cloth made of hair*. In these cases, *kṣhayaḥ*, a reduction, by a thirtieth part should be understood. In the case of *silken cloth*, *kanṭhīye*, i.e. made of silk, and of those made of barks *valkalakṣhucha*, i.e. of cloth prepared from barks of trees, there is neither an increase nor a reduction. But, as much as has been given to the weaver and the like for being woven into, exactly so much should be taken back. 5 10

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 180

Where on a woven cloth or the like a *śaśṭika* or a similar figure is wrought by embroidery with yarn and needle that is (called) *Karmika* or embroidered cloth. Where in a cloth or the like hair are woven in that is cloth made of hair *romabaddhah*, (e.g.) the Nepala blanket. There a thirtieth part is the reduction. In cloth produced from silk or barks of trees such as the fine silk cloth there is neither increase nor decrease (180) 15

The commodities being innumerable it is impossible to consider the rule of reduction or increase in the case of each article. So the Author mentions in general a rule for determining a decrease or an increase. 20

Yājñavalkya Verse 181

When a thing has deteriorated whatever the experts in those articles may declare after taking into consideration the place the time the use, and the strength or weakness, must certainly be caused to be paid. 25

Mitākṣhara —In the case of a hemp or a silk cloth where the article *has deteriorated naṣṭhe* i.e. has undergone a reduction whatever the experts in those articles *drawyaṇām kuśalāḥ*, i.e. those who are versed in rules of increase or decrease in the case of those articles, after having examined into the (circumstances of) *deśam place kālam time, upabhogam, use* and also the *balabalam, strengh or icedness*, i.e. durability or non-durability of the article which has deteriorated may determine *taṁ asañjāyām* that certainly the artisans must be made to pay. 30

Thus ends the Chapter on Rescission of Purchase

Vîramitrodaya

On the occasion of the (rules regarding the) examination of seeds etc., the Author states the rules for the inspection of gold and like other articles

Yājñavalkya, Verses 178, 179, 180, 181

Svarnam, 'gold' *i e* of the best quality, is not reduced in fire *Rajate*, 'in the case of silver,' *sate*, 'for a hundred,' *i e*, for a measure of hundred, two *palas* become reduced in fire. In the case of tin, zinc and also lead, for a hundred *palas* eight *palas*, for a hundred of the copper *palas*, five *palas*, for a hundred *palas* of the iron, ten *palas* become reduced in fire. By the use of the word *cha*, is added, the loss in the case of white-copper, produced from lead and copper in proportion to the parts of these (178)

In the case of blankets and cloths prepared from the rough yarn of wool or cotton, for a manufacture of a hundred yarns, the increase is ten *palas*. For one of a middling quality, *i e* not too fine, for a manufacture of a hundred *palas*, the increase is by five *palas*. In case of very fine manufactures, however, of these, for a hundred *palas*, the increase of three *palas* is accepted, *i e* regarded as proper by the experts as it is besmeared with gruel etc. (179)

The cloth on which, after its manufacture, a *swastika*, wheel, or the like is embroidered with the needle, is called *Kārmika* 'the embroidered cloth,' where in the case of an upper garment or the like, hair are woven, that is *romabaddha*, 'cloth made of hair,' in the case of these, a thirtieth part is regarded as a proper reduction. *Kauśeye*, 'in the case of silken cloth,' *i e* cloth made of yarn produced from cocoon of the (silk) worm, as also in regard to cloth etc. made of barks of trees, there is no increase or decrease

By the use of the word *cha*, 'and', is included absence of an increase or decrease in the case of the pounding of wheat and many other things not mentioned (180)

In the case of those not particularly mentioned such as hemp, or linen, and other cloth, what men with special knowledge about the increase or decrease of things may declare after taking into consideration, the place, the time, the use and the strength or weakness of the lost article, that must undoubtedly be paid. By the use of the word *cha*, 'and' is added that in places where a decrease is proper, a decrease may be declared (181). [178—181]

Sûlapâni**Yājñavalkya, Verse 181**

When there is a doubt as to the quantity depreciated, whatever is declared by the experts after taking into account the place, the time, the strength, and the weakness, that certainly should be caused to be paid (181)

Thus ends the Chapter on Rescission of Purchase.

CHAPTER XIV

Breach of Contract of Service

The Author now sets out discussing another title of law known as the Breach of Contract of Service. Its nature has been described by Nārada¹ thus —“If a man has promised to render service and does not
 “*tēhderit* it is termed a Breach of Contract of Service a title of law’
 Service is the performance of an order. He who undertakes it, and after
 wards does not do it, that title of law is known as the Breach of
 Contract of Service. An attendant, moreover, is of five kinds. A
 pupil, an apprentice, a hired servant, a man appointed to (perform)
 a task and a slave. Of these the first four are known as servants or
 labourers. These moreover do pure work. Slaves, moreover, such
 as one born in the (master’s) house and the like are of fifteen sorts
 and perform impure service such as sweeping the house, the door, the
 impure places, the street, the dust bins &c. This has been made clear
 by Nārada². “The sages have described in the *Sâstras* five sorts of
 “attendants. Among these are four sorts of labourers; and slaves (of
 “the fifth category) are of fifteen kinds (3). A student, an apprentice
 “a hired servant; and the fourth,—a person specially appointed (to
 “do a thing) these are to be regarded as labourers. Slaves are those
 “born in the house and the rest (3). The sages have declared that
 “the state of dependence is common to all these; but that their
 “respective portion and income depends on their
 “particular caste and occupation (4). Also there
 “are two sorts of occupations; pure³ work and
 “impure work. Impure work is that done by slaves. Pure work
 is that done by labourers (5). Sweeping the house and the
 “gateway, the places where impurities are deposited, the street,
 the dust bins, shampooing the secret parts of the body, gathering
 “and putting away the leavings of food, ordure and urine (6). And
 “lastly rubbing the master’s limbs when desired; this should be re-
 “garded as impure work. All other work besides this is pure (7)”.
 PAGE 119*

1. Ch. V 1

2. Ch. V 2-7

3. As opposed to impure which is described further on in the lines following

There, by 'a student' is meant one who is desirous of studying the Vedas 'An apprentice' is one who wishes to study the mechanical arts He who does a work by wages is 'a hired servant' One supervising the (work of) labourers is an officer 'specially appointed to a task' 'Place of impurity' means a place where the leavings of the meals are thrown, such as a pit &c 'A dust-bin' is a place where the sweepings from the house, such as dust &c. are stored 'Putting away' means throwing off

'A hired servant' (as referred to) here is of three sorts: so it has been laid down¹ "Here, the highest class is that of a soldier, the agriculturist is the middle class, and the porters are the lowest class" "These are the three classes of hired servants".

Slaves again are² "One born at his (master's) house, one purchased, one received (as a gift), one obtained by inheritance; one maintained during famine, similarly one who was pledged by his master (26), One released from a heavy debt; one acquired (as a captive) in war, one won through a wager, one who has offered himself saying 'I am thine', an apostate from asceticism; one enslaved for a stipulated period (27), One who has become a slave in order to get a maintenance, one led in by a female slave, and one self-sold. Thus in all fifteen kinds of slaves are declared in "S'âstra (28)" Born in the (house of the master) of a female slave is 'one born at his (master's) house' 'Purchased' *i e* by (the payment of) a price 'Received' *i e* by a gift &c. 'Obtained by inheritance' *i e* one who was a slave of the father or other ancestor. 'Maintained during famine' *i e* one, who during famine, was saved from death in consideration of his becoming a slave 'Pledged by his master' *i e* who was made a pledge upon the acceptance of money (by the master) One reduced to slavery by being freed from his debts is 'a slave released from debt' 'Acquired in war' *i e* one conquered and captured in a battle 'Won through a wager' *i e*

1 By Nârada Ch V 23

2 See Nârada Ch V 26-28 It would be interesting to compare the provisions laid down here with similar provisions in Roman Law, and the learned reader is referred to the same The rules regarding the emancipation of slaves have a peculiar resemblance to those found in Roman Law.

one won after a stipulation. In case I am defeated in this dispute, I shall become your slave. "One who has offered him self saying I am thine" i.e. one voluntarily offering himself as a slave saying I am thy slave. "An apostate from asceticism" i.e. one who has swerved from the vow of asceticism. Stipulated i.e. one made a slave with the stipulation he shall be your slave for such a time. A slave of maintenance i.e. one who has entered into a perpetual state of slavery in lieu of maintenance. Led by a female slave—a female slave (*utlanot*) i.e. one born in the house led by her i.e. out of a fancy for her one who has married her and entered into slavery. He who sells himself is a self-sold slave. Thus these are the fifteen sorts. 5

As for the seven fold classification stated by Manu in: One made "captive under a standard" a slave for maintenance, one born in the "house" one bought, and one who is given one inherited from an ancestor and a slave of punishment are seven kinds of slaves" that is intended to point out that these persons are (regarded and treated as) slaves and not with a view to limit the numbers. 15

Of the attendants (mentioned before) viz. a pupil an apprentice a hired servant an appointed labourer the course of conduct for a pupil has already been stated before. Being invited (by the preceptor) indeed he ought to study, and whatever is acquired by "him he should offer to him" i.e. the preceptor. The rule for the specially appointed workman and the hired servant will be mentioned in the chapter on 'Payment of Wages' in the text 'As much work as a man performs, so much will be his wages' &c. 20

With a view to state a Special Rule regarding a slave and an apprentice, the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verso 182

One enslaved by force, and also one sold by robbers, are released (from slavery) one who saves the life of his master (is released) as also (are they released) by paying the expenses of maintenance or by paying off the debt. 70

1 Ch. VIII 415

2 See Yājñavalkya Achārśidhyā Verse 7 p. 107

3 See Verse 106 further on page 1231

"if his master redeems him by discharging the debt (32). It is how-
ever by paying the debt with interest that a debtor is released from
"slavery (33)

The modes of manumission of a slave who has offered himself by
saying 'I am thine' of a slave captured in war of one won through 5
a wager, of one enslaved for a stipulated period, and of one enslaved
on account of his being ensnared of a female slave have also been
similarly laid down by the same Sage¹ for all these cases respectively :
"One who has come forward and offered himself declaring 'I am
"thine' one made a prisoner in war and one won through a wager 10
these are released on giving each a substitute whose capacity for
work is equal to theirs (34). Also one enslaved for a stipulated
period becomes emancipated on the expiration of the period (35).
"One enslaved on account of his being connected with a female slave
is released upon the female slave being kept² in check (36)" i.e. by 15
being prevented from having intercourse with the slave

Thus therefore in the case of slaves who are born in the house
bought, obtained, acquired by inheritance and self sold there is no
emancipation except on account of the general cause of emancipation
(mentioned above) namely saving the life of the master and thus 20
securing his favour. Since no special mode has been mentioned

The act of emancipation moreover should be performed in the
following manner as has been laid down by the same Sage³ "He who
'pleased in his mind wishes to emancipate his own slave shall take
'from his⁴ shoulders a jar filled with water and smash it (42). He 25
'shall sprinkle his head with water containing whole grain⁵ and
'flowers, and having declared him a free man three times he shall
'dismiss him with his face turned towards the East.'

1 Ch V 31 33 (") and 31 ().

2 ऋग्म—By restraint; see the explanation in the Mitāk harā. The
Vivādashintimani explains it as 'by the abandonment of the female slave'
see Colclouke Digest III. I 4 Vol II p. 8

3 Nārada Ch V 42-43

4 i.e. of the slave's shoulder

5 Generally rice. Sometimes it may be any other grain such as wheat &c.
But it must be whole and not crushed or otherwise damaged.

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 182

One who has been enslaved by force, or sold by robbers, should be released from bondage, one who saves his master's life, when his life is in danger, the slave for maintenance, by paying up the expenses for maintenance, and also by giving maintenance in times of famine One maintained in adverse times also pays in cash, or a pair of cows (182)

There is, however, no emancipation of an apostate from asceticism, so the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 183 (1)

An apostate from asceticism shall become the king's slave till death.

Mitāksharā:—Pravrajyâ, *asceticism*, means a complete renunciation (of all worldly objects)—*Sannyâsa* One who is an *avasitah*, *apostate*, therefrom *i. e.* who has swerved from it. (Such a one) if he has not undergone expiation, indeed becomes a slave of the king Death alone shall terminate this (kind of) servitude In no other time can there be emancipation.

The Author mentions a rule regarding slaves having regard to (the several) *orders*, *Varnas*.¹

Yājñavalkya, Verse 183 (2)

Slavery is in the descending order of the *Varnas*, and not in the ascending order.

Mitāksharā —Of the *Varnas* such as the Brāhmana and the rest, a state of slavery shall exist *ânulomyena*, *in the descending order* Thus, of a Brāhmana, a Kṣatriya and the rest may become a slave, of a Kṣatriya, the Vaiśya and the Sûdra, and of a Vaiśya, a Sûdra, thus the state of slavery shall operate in the descending order Of an ascetic, however, who renounces his own duties, slavery is indeed ordained even in an inverse order As says Nârada²: "Slavery is not "ordained in the inverse order of the (four) *Varnas*, except where "a man violates the duties peculiar to his class Slavery is considered as analogous to the condition of a wife "

¹ *i. e.* the classes See Yājñavalkya Âchâra Chapter IV On the distinction based on *Classes (Varna)* and *Castes (Jāti)* see verses 90-96 pages 241-267.

² Ob V 39

Vīramitrodaya

Now begins the Chapter known as Branch of Contract of Service. Its nature has been described by Nārada¹. If one after having under "taken to render service, does not render it, it is called a Branch of "Contract of Service" a title of law. Manu, moreover has not treated this separately as a title of law as he has included its treatment in the title called Non payment of wages intending it for some reason to be so stated.

An attendant, moreover is of five kinds. A pupil an apprentice a hired servant, one appointed to (perform) a task and a slave. There pure work is for four and impure work is for the slave vide the text of Nārada². 'Impure work has been stated to be for the slaves a pure work is for labourers. Sweeping the house and the gateway the places where impurities are deposited the street the dustbins shampooing the secret parts of the body; gathering and putting away the leavings of food, ordure and urine. And lastly rubbing the master's limbs when desired this should be regarded as impure work. All other work besides this is pure. There, a pupil is one in need of the study of the Vedas an apprentice is one desirous of learning some art a hired servant, is one performing work for wages one appointed to do a work i.e. one supervising by attendance over the workmen doing work. A slave also has been stated by Nārada³ (same as above p. 1210 ll 13-21).

Among these the course of conduct for a Pupil has already been stated before⁴ viz. Being invited (by the preceptor) indeed he ought to study and whatever is acquired by him he should bestow on him. Of the hired servant and of the one appointed will be stated in the Chapter on Payment of Wages. About the slaves, and the apprentice, however, the Author states here

Yājñavalkya, Verses 132-133

One forcibly made a slave one sold by robbers and thus made a slave and by the use of the words *cha* 'and' and *api* 'even' one given by him, as also one kept as a pledge, is released from slavery. He moreover who saves the life of the master when attacked by robbers tiger etc. such a one is manumitted. By the use of the word *api*, 'even' are added other reasons for the manumission of a slave Nārada states these.

1 Ch. V 5-7

2 Ch. V 26-28

3 See Achārādhyāya 27 p. 107 above.

4 Ch. V 31-35.

- “ One maintained during famine time, is released from bondage if he gives a pair of oxen. What has been consumed during famine, cannot be repaid (in value) by labour (31) A slave of maintenance is released immediately on his giving up the subsistence (30) Even a pledged slave (is released) if his master redeems him by discharging the debt (32) It is, however, by paying the debt with interest that a debtor is released (33). One who has come forward and offered himself declaring ‘I am thine’, one made a prisoner in war, and one won through a wager, these are released on giving each a substitute whose capacity for work is equal to theirs (34) Also one enslaved for a stipulated period becomes emancipated on the expiration of the period (35) One enslaved on account of his being connected with a female slave is released upon the female slave being kept in check (36)” “By work equal to theirs” i.e. by performing work which is proper for him. ‘Upon the female slave being kept in check’ i.e. by giving up intercourse Kâtyâyana says . “ When one has intercourse with his own slave, and she gives birth (to a child), then at the sight of the issue she should be made a non-slave, as she is with a progeny ” This, however, is only when the master is without a son etc. according to Prakâśa, Pârijâta, Ratnâkara and others

By favour also one may be released from bondage, Nârada¹ states the procedure on such an occasion .—“He who, being pleased in mind, wishes to emancipate his own slave, shall take from his shoulders a jar filled with water and smash it (42). He shall sprinkle his head with water containing uncrushed grain and flowers and having declared him a free man three times, he shall dismiss him with his face turned towards the East. From that time onwards he should be called ‘one protected by the master’s favour,’ food may be eaten with him, and a gift may be conferred on him , thus he becomes approved of the good ”

Kâtyâyana “ The master is declared to be the owner of the property which was of the slave But to what was obtained by favour or by sale of that property the master is not entitled. One not a slave, if she be married by a slave, she also gets into the status of a slave , because her husband is her lord, and her lord is under the bondage of the master ” ‘ By favour &c ’—the meaning is that by one’s own favour, or by the sale of oneself whatever money may have been obtained, that the master cannot claim

'By a slave etc.—Here if the word non-slave is used in antithesis to the word slave referred to in regard to the marriage any other not owned by any one or not having a master at all when she has been married she becomes of the ownership of the master of the husband. Necessarily therefore it follows that marriage with a slave has the result of release from the bondage of the former owner. And it is for this that this text occurs in a chapter on it. The cause of ownership moreover is the marriage by a slave with the consent of the former master. In the case of an opposition however there would be no obliteration of the ownership of the former master, just as in the case of a marriage with a servant girl. According to the moderners, however if she is married by a slave without the consent of the former master, then a white courie alone should be given to the former master by the new master and not that the status of slavery itself is not induced. They say that there exists the status of slavery in regard to the former master as an inducing cause for the taking of a white courie. As for the declaration of Harischandra in the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa: Even if released by the master a Śūdra is never manumitted from slavery that is born with him who will wipe it away from him? that is intended as deprecatory of a slave otherwise it should be remembered that his own manumission from slavery would not take place (182).

Prarajya etc. "asceticism etc. After entering into the ascetic order one who swerves off from it, *sa rājño dāsa dmarapāntikah* 'he is the King's slave till death i.e. until the time of his death his status of slavery continues. Of him, there would be no release as a slave. This is the meaning

Varṇāndm etc. Of the *varṇas* etc. slavery can occur in the descending order and not in the inverse order. As for example a *Kṣatriya* can be a slave of a *Brahmana* and not of a *Vaiya* etc. This moreover has application to others than those who have been apostates from asceticism. Since Nārada¹ has stated 'In the inverse order of the *varṇas* slavery is not ordained, excepting in the case of those who violate their own peculiar duties. Slavery has been regarded as analogous to the condition of a wife. Both these clauses viz. beginning with *varṇāndm* and *prarajyāvasantah* have application to others than a *Brahmana*. For² 'Where (the members of) the three

“*varnas* of the twice-born class become apostates from asceticism, the king “should cause the *Brāhmana* to be banished, and reduce to slavery the “*Kshatriya* and the *Vaiśyas*” The expression *Kshatratvit*, the *Kshatriya* “and the *Vaiśya*” is a collective dual compound (182–183).

5

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 183

Those who become apostates, *i e* have fallen off from the vow of asceticism, &c, and being of the *Kshatriya*, *Vaiśya* or *Sūdra* *varnas* become the slaves of the *Kshatriya* King This status of slavery is, moreover, in the descending order, and not in the ascending order A *Brāhmana* can never be the slave of a *Kshatriya* As says *Kātyāyana* “Among the three *Varnas*, there can never be a slavery for a *Vīpra*, even “though of the same *varna*, a *vīpra* should never be made a slave” (183)

15

The Author mentions the duties of an apprentice

Yājñavalkya, Verse 184

Though he have acquired his art, the apprentice must remain in his master’s house during the period stipulated, receiving his subsistence from the teacher, and giving to him the proceeds thereof

20

Mitāksharâ — *Antevâsî*, an apprentice, *vaset*, must remain, *gurorgrhe*, in the house of the master, *krtakālam*, during the stipulated period, *i e* for as long a period as may have been fixed under an agreement, *e g* thus, “I shall reside in your house for a period of four years for “learning medicine or any other art &c” and even when he has acquired the desired lore, even before the (expiration of) four years

25

How should he remain ? *Guruprāptabhojanah*, receiving his subsistence from the teacher, he who has obtained his food from his teacher— a person of such a description *Tatphalapradah*, giving to him the proceeds thereof, he who offers to the teacher the proceeds of it, *i e*, of the art— thus he should reside

30

Even a special rule has been indicated here by *Nārada*¹ “If one

PAGE 121*

“wishes to be initiated into the art of his own “craft, with the sanction of his relations, he may

“go and live with a teacher, after having fixed the “duration (of his apprenticeship) (16) The master shall teach

‘ him, feeding him at his own house. He must not employ him in
 “work of a different description, and must treat him like a son (17). If
 “one forsakes a master who instructs him and whose¹ character is un-
 “exceptionable, he shall be compelled by force to remain (at his
 ‘ master’s house), such a one makes himself liable for a corporal 5
 “punishment and imprisonment (18) Even though his course of in-
 “struction be completed an apprentice must continue to reside at
 ‘ the house of his master, until (the expiration of) the fixed period
 “whatever work he may do, while there the profits thereof shall belong
 ‘ to the master (19) After he has acquired his art, at (the end² of) 10
 the stipulated period, the apprentice shall reward³ his master plentifully
 “fully and return home, after having obtained leave from him (20)”

The word *Vadha*, ‘Corporal punishment’ here is used in the sense of beating having regard to the trifling nature of the fault.

Thus ends the Chapter on Breach of Contract of Service.

13

Vīramitrodaya

After having stated the rules relating to the slaves the Author states the rules relating to apprentices

Yājñavalkya, Verse 184

In your house, I shall stay for such a period thus having made
 : c fixed a period at the residence of the teacher *Kṛtatiḥpoṣi* 20

1 अक्षयः—who has not been found fault with, as having been concerned in any moral sin or legal crime.

2 i. e. when the time fixed for his apprenticeship ends. Asahya and Bālabhāṭṭa.

3 Dr Jolly translates in this manner According to the interpretation of Bālabhāṭṭa, अक्षयः would only mean a special part of worship viz. going round the object of worship with folded hands For he interprets अक्षयः as अक्षयः and with that view the literal meaning of अक्षयः may not have any force The reader will note that Bālabhāṭṭa’s interpretation is the one which will strike every one having in mind the sense ordinarily conveyed by a अक्षयः

‘ though he have acquired his art,’ i. e. even when he has secured the art, still, the *antevâsî*, ‘ apprentice ’, one who has received subsistence i. e. meals from the teacher, such a one should stay at his place paying back the fruit of that art as his fee. Any duty in excess of the
 5 art, however, the apprentice should not be made to perform So Nârada¹ says “ He must not put him to any other work, and “should treat him as a son ” So also² “ If one forsakes a master “who instructs and whose character is unexceptionable, he shall be “compelled by force to remain (at his master’s place), such a one makes
 10 “himself amenable for a corporal punishment and imprisonment ” Similarly³ “ After he has acquired his art, at (the end of) the “stipulated period, the apprentice shall reward his master plentifully, “and return home, after having obtained leave from him ”

Thus ends in the Commentary on Yâjñavalkya the chapter called
 15 the Breach of Contract of Service

Sûlapâni

Yâjñavalkya, Verse 184

Antevâsî, “an apprentice”, a pupil of a particular kind, *Kṛtâśulpah*, ‘who has acquired his art’ i. e. who has mastered the art of gold manufacture, &c. such a one *Kṛtakâlam*, ‘for the stipulated period’, having
 20 obtained his meals from the teacher, must reside in the house of the teacher alone The receipts of the art such as the kinds of jewellery &c. he should offer to the preceptor (184)

Here ends the Chapter on Breach of Contract of Service

1 Ch V 17

2 Ch V 18

3 Oh V 20,

CHAPTER XV

Transgression of a Compact.

Now is being described (the law regarding) the Transgression
of a Compact. Its characteristics have been indicated by Narada¹ through
(a discussion of) its contrary : "The (general) rules settled among
"Pākhandīs, Nāgamas² and like others is called a Compact (Samaya).
"Non Transgression³ of such a compact thus gives rise to a Title of
"Law known as Transgression of a Compact." Settlement of rules in
accordance with the special⁴ provision of law is a compact the non
transgression of the same i.e. non breach i.e. observance. When this is
being transgressed, it gives rise to a Title of Law. This is the meaning

The Author states a rule by way of an introduction to the same
Yājñavalkya Verse 185

A king, having erected a building in the town and having therein
lodged Brahmanas, versed in the⁵ three Vedas provided⁷ with livelihood,
should say to them Protect your Dharma⁸

1 Ch. X. 1

* Pākhandīs—i.e. Heretics—Kāshapanakas the Buddhist or Jain mendicants and others who do not accept the authority of the Vedas. See Mitākshara further on Yājñ II. 10 p. 1228

3 Nāgamas—traders and others. Those who regard the Veda as authority but only as the word of an *Āpta* i.e. the Pāsupatas and others. See Mitākshara on II. 10

4 This is why Vijñāneśvara characterises this definition of Narada as one given in a negative manner. *Apasamaya* is the transgression of a compact (Samaya). Its non-transgression i.e. performance, is *Asapasa* i.e. *Asapasa* i.e. a chapter of law which deals with the non-performance or transgression is a chapter entitled Transgression of a Compact. *अपसामयः* when freely translated here, only means by its opposite. It is in this way. The Chapter is headed 'Transgression of Compact' while the definition gives what is a Compact and how it is maintained. Thus the subject of the transgression of a compact is illustrated by a treatment of its opposite.

5 *अपसामयः*—i.e. the particular provisions of the Dharma-Śāstra. The Dharma or rule, as propounded in the Dharma-Śāstra bearing on special contracts or agreements.

6 i.e. the *Ri* *Yajur* and *Sama*. These are the three Vedas indicated by the expression *Trividya*.

7 i.e. after having properly endowed the institution with funds for the maintenance of persons acting there *ei* for their payment &c. The meaning is that he should assign land, money or the like for their maintenance, so that they may perform their duties without any interruption.

8 *Svadharma*—i.e. the duties binding upon self (*Swa*). The word *sva* (self) applies to all, and indicates the law in general, holding among the people. The author declares here what should be done by the Brāhmanas thus enjoined.

Mitâksharâ —The king, in his town *i e* in the fort or other place, having erected *sthân*am, *a building*, *i e* a white house, and *tatra brâhmanân nyasya*, *therein having lodged Brâhmanas*, *i e.* having appointed them there, and having provided that assemblage of Brâhmanas versed in the three Vedas, with livelihood *i e* having endowed them with land, gold &c should say to these Brâhmanas “May your own “*Dharma* be observed by you” *i e.* the rules regarding the Varnas¹ and Âśramas as dictated in the Vedas, and Smitis

Vîramitrodaya

10 Now the Author begins the treatment of the Chapter of Law called the “Transgression of a Compact ”

Yājñavalkya, Verse 185

Râjâ, ‘the king’, in his own town, having created *sthân*am, ‘a place’ such as a white house, *tatra Brâhmanân nyasya*, ‘and having therein lodged *Brâhmanas*’, *trividyam*, ‘those well versed in the three lores,’ *urtimat*, ‘provided with livelihood’ *i e* having made them rich and affluent in gold etc “May the duties of the Varnas and “Âśramas be looked after by you’ thus should he say to them, *i e.* appoint them to the task By the use of the word *tu*, ‘however,’ is excluded the inauguration without provision for maintenance (185)

Sûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 185

The king having caused a building to be erected in his town, and having therein lodged Brâhmanas renowned for their learning and heredity, should make provision for maintenance proper for a married man, for one who is accomplished in the study of the three lores such as the *Rk* and the rest, should say to them thus “You should protect your “*Dharma*.” As says *Brhaspati*² “The king should watch *Vipras* who are “Vedic scholars, learned divines, and have maintained the sacred fire, and “should provide maintenance for them They should perform for the “citizens their ordinary and special rites, as also performances for a particular objective, so also the expiatory and the auspicious ones, and declare “a decision in doubtful cases” (185)

1 The four principal *Varnas* are the *Brâhmana*, *Kṣatriya*, *Vaiśya* and *Sûdra* (See Yājñavalkya *Achârâdhyâya* Verse 10, also Ch IV) The *Âśramas* *i e* the paths of life are four *viz* The *Brahmacharya* or the life of a celibate student see Yājñ Achâra 32–50 *Gârhashtya* or the life of a householder, after marriage, the *Wânuprastha* the life of a hermit, and the *Sannyâsa* or the life of an ascetic

2 Ch XVII 2,4

The Author mentions the duties to be performed by them when so appointed

Yajñavalkya Verse 186

Without detriment to one's own *Dharma*, whatever customary law there may be, should also be carefully observed as also the duties imposed by the king

Mitakshara.—Duties arising under any *custom* such as the preservation of the pasture for cows and of water, and the management of temples and the like, should also be carefully observed without (how ever) infringing the duties prescribed by the *Śruti* and the *Smṛti*. Similarly the king should also enforce *śāradharmasodhana* *yah samayiko dharmah* such *customary rule only as are not inconsistent with one's own dharma* *et q* meals should be provided for all travellers or the rule that the horses and the like shall not be carried to the "dominions of the enemy"

Viramitrodaya

Thus having been appointed what should be their duty? So the Author says

Yajñavalkya Verse 186

Yah samayiko, whatever *customary rule* in the form of the pasturing of cows the preservation of temples etc and by reason of the agreement the duties resulting from the king's ordinances caused by the cowherds etc, such also as, the horses and the like should not be taken over into the enemy's circle and such as in my kingdom it should be so arranged that guests should not be without having a meal and the like commandments issued by the king by his own desire that too should be preserved *et* looked after by the *Brahmanas* who have been appointed with the direction 'may you preserve our own laws By the use of the word *et* however the Author excludes such customary rule as is opposed to one's laws

By the use of the word *api* 'also' is included obligatory compacts stated in this text of Bṛhaspati: 'A compact formed among villagers

1 *Samayik* may liber mean a compact agreement, or a custom or usage which is nothing but a course of conduct followed by a tacit agreement.

“companies (of artizans), and associations (which) is (called) an agree-
“ment—such (an agreement) must be observed both in times of
“distress and for acts of piety also”, and in addition to the one establish-
ed by the King or his officers By the use of the word *cha*, ‘as also’, the

5 Author includes what is authorised by the King (186)

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 186

The rule which has been fixed by a compact which is not in conflict
with one’s own *Dharma*, as also that made by the king, that also must be
10 observed So also *Brhaspati* “Without detriment to established rules
“whatever royal command has been issued, that itself must be followed
“under the king’s orders” (186)

Having thus stated that a ‘Customary rule,’ ‘should be observed,
the Athor mentions a penalty for its infringement

15 Yājñavalkya, Verse 187

He who embezzles the property of a *gana*, as also he who violates
their usage, the king should deprive such a one of all his effects and banish
him from his realm.

PAGE 122*

Mitâkṣharâ — **Yah**, *he*, moreover, who misappropriates the property
20 of a *gana* *i e* property pertaining to any guild or
Penalty for violat- association of villagers, **samvit**, a *customary rule*, is
ing a customary Rule a compact, either made by an association or by
the king He who **lainghayet**, *violates, i e.* transgresses these, of such a
man, the whole property should be taken away, and the king, **vipravâs-**
25 **ayet**, *should banish, i e* expel him, **svarâshtrât**, *from his realm.* This
penalty, moreover, should be administered in cases of aggravated
offences or the like

In the case of petty offences, however, any of the four penalties
viz banishment, or a fine of four *suvarnas*, six *nishkas*, or a hundred
30 silver coins, may be fixed by regard to the caste and the capacity (of
the offender) as propounded by **Manu**¹ “If a man belonging to a cor-
poration inhabiting a village or a district, after solemnly swearing

to a compact, break it through avarice, (the king) shall banish him
“from his realm (219). And having imprisoned such a breaker of a
compact, he shall compel him to pay four *śuvarṇas*, six *niṣkas*, and
“one hundred silver (coins) (220)

Vīramitredaya

The Author states the penalty for a transgression of such a compact

Yājñavalkya, Verse 187

The meaning is that in the case of an infringement the King should
deprive him of the entirety of his property and expel him. Here in the
interest of brevity of the composition should be understood as the
statement of the penalty for one taking away the property of the
gaṇa (association)

This penalty moreover is to be observed in the case of an aggra-
vated form of offence. In the case of a petty offence however any
one of the penalties mentioned by Manu¹ may be fixed by regard to
the caste capacity and the like viz If a man belonging to a corpora-
tion inhabiting a village or a district after solemnly swearing to a com-
pact break it through avarice the king shall banish him from his realm
(219). And having imprisoned such a breaker of a compact he shall
compel him to pay four *śuvarṇas* six *niṣkas* and one hundred silver
“coins (220) (187).

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 187

He who embezzles the common property of an association, as also one
who transgresses the terms of a compact, such a one should be deprived of
his entire property and the King should expel him from the kingdom (187)

Thus they should act the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 188 (1)

The directions given by the advisers of the association should be ob-
served by all.

Mītākṣharā — Among the members, those who are competent to
advise as to the interests of the Associations, the directions given by
these should be followed by others who are incorporated as members.

Otherwise there is penalty; so the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 188 (2)

There, he who acts contrary, shall be compelled to pay the first
amercement

- 5 Mitākṣharâ —He, however, from among the members, who acts
obstructively to the directions of one who advises as to the interests
of the Association—such a man—must indeed be punished by the
king with the first amercement

Vîramitrodaya

- 10 A rule established by a village association or the like must not be
transgressed, as is the case with a rule fixed by the king, so the Author
says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 188

- 15 Those who declare something for the benefit of the public such as
e g the construction of a bridge etc must be obeyed by all in regard to
the advise of these declared in this manner He, moreover, who
in such a case acts contrary *i e* is opposed, shall be compelled to pay
the penalty for the first amercement (188).

Śûlapâni

- 20 **Yājñavalkya, Verse 188**

The members of an association, such as the village guilds, &c should
follow the directions of the advisers of the association, be they two or three.
He, moreover, who acts contrary to it should be compelled to pay the first
amerement (188)

- 25 How should the king in this manner behave towards the members
of an Association? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 189

- Those assembled for the affairs of the Association, let the king dismiss,
when their business is finished, after honouring them with gifts, honour,
30 and expressions of civility

Mitākṣharâ —Such members of the Association as may have
approached the king for a purpose of the association, the king should
dismiss after pleasing them by means of gifts, honour, and expres-
sions of civilities, after they have finished their business.

Vīramītrodaya

In regard to those who execute the behests of the Author states the duty of the king

Yājñavalkya Verse 189

Those who have come to him in connection with a business in the interest of an association after the completion of their business the king should favour all of them with gifts cordial reception and honours and then dismiss (189)

Sūlapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 189

Those who have arrived in connection with the business of an Association the king should honour with present honours and cordial reception (189)

The Author mentions a rule for the king appoints what is given to the Association

Yājñavalkya Verse 190

Whatever a man who is sent for the business of an Association receives, let him deliver it. He should be compelled to pay eleven fold. If he does not himself deliver

Mitākṣhara —He who, when deputed to wait upon the king on a business of the Association, whatever he receives such as gold, silver &c., all that he must offer unasked to the Committee of the Association. Otherwise, he shall be made to pay a fine equal to eleven times the property obtained (by him).

Vīramītrodaya

When all do not go near the king for the business of the association but only one deputed by the king then how can there be the honouring of all? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya Verse 190

When any one is deputed for a business in the interests of the association whatever he obtains from the king that he should distribute among all. When he does not so make over then he should be compelled by the king to pay elevenfold of what was given for the idea is that the honour done to the one was itself the honour for all (190).

Sūlapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 190

One who has been deputed for the business of the association should bring and tender whatever money he receives. If he does not give he should be compelled to pay the same eleven times (190).

The members of the advising body should be of a particular description. So the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 191

Men knowing Dharma pure, unavaricious, should be commissioned to consider the business. The directions of these.—the advisers of the general body,—must be executed

Mitākṣharā — Dharmajñā, *men knowing the Dharma*, as laid down in the *Śruti* and the *Smṛti*, pure internally and externally, unavaricious for any pecuniary gain, should be commissioned as members of the deliberative assembly. Their directions must be executed by others. This rule is again repeated as an indication of (special) regard (therefor.).

Vīramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 191

Those well-versed in the rules of the *Śrauta* and *Smṛti* performances, possessing internal and external purity devoid of avariciousness, thoughtful of the interests of the association in their transactions, such should be invested by the king. The meaning is that the non-observance of the advice of these benefactors of the association necessarily leading to punishment, their words should be followed by all (191)

Śūlpāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 191

Versed in the import of the Vedas, pure in monetary affairs, not avaricious should be the advisers of the association in regard to their transactions. The opinion of these who give sound advice should be followed. The repetition again of this text is with the object of mentioning special acquisitions such as the knowledge of the Vedas, etc. (191)

Now, with a view to extend the rules laid down for the Scholars in three Vedas to *Śrautas* etc. the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 192

This is the rule for the associations of *Śrautas*, *Naiṣadhas*, *Pākṣandhas* and *Ganas*. The king should preserve their peculiarities and conserve their rules of old

PAGE 123 *

Mitākṣharā — *Śrautas* or bodies of artisans are those who subsist by the manufacture of the same commodity. *Naiṣadhas* such as the

1 These are the same as referred to in Verse 188 above

Pāsupatas and others, are those who accept the authority of the Vedas (simply) as composed by an Apta. The *Paṭivān* such as *Najata*, *Sampata*, etc., are those who do not even admit the authority of the Vedas. A *Cana* is a body of men living by the same profession such as the soldiers, and the like. Eṣam, i.e. the four varieties of men, this is the rule i.e. as laid down. Without detriment to one's own "Dharma etc." Moreover let the king preserve their peculiar rules of conduct, and also conserve their hereditary craft.

Here ends the Chapter on the Transgression of a Compact

Viramitrodaya

The Author extends the law laid down for the *Travivras* to guilds etc.

Vājñavalkya, Verse 192

The combination of people maintain themselves by (the sale of) one kind of merchandise is called the *Śreni*. *Vaigimath* the citizens, *Ikkapāṇi* not accepting the Vedas as authoritative. *Gaṇa* the guild of persons pursuing one profession such as the manufacturer of arms etc. i.e. the rule stated (in verse 186) above without detriment to "one's own dharma &c." By the use of the word *apī* also are included the king's officers.

In connection with the subject the Author states the duty of the king in regard to these. He should preserve their rules as established of old. By the first *cha* and are included the Brahmanas spoken of before. By the second *cha* is added that he should fix rules for those for whom no rules exist (192).

Thus in the commentary of Vājñavalkya ends the Chapter on the Transgression of a Compact

Śūlāpāṇi

Vājñavalkya Verse 193

Śrenipāṇi, such as the picture makers *śrenipāṇi* is tradesmen and various other citizens. *Ikkapāṇi*, i.e. apostate from asceticism. *Gaṇa*, such as an association of Brahmanas. Of these also, this very name i.e. as stated above is the rule. The king should preserve their peculiarities and conserve the rules as established as of old (193).

Thus ends the Chapter on the Transgression of a Compact

1 According to the tradition the Vedas are the direct revelations of the Divine Word made to the seers who simply transmitted what they saw. There are some schools of thinkers who do not accept the origin of the Vedas but maintain that they are the compositions of several sages. They accept the authority of the Vedas, not as a Divine Word revealed and transmitted through the seers but simply as a work of high authority entitled to respect and weight, as having been composed by men of vast learning and accomplishment.

2 Varieties of *Ikkapāṇi*. These do not accept the authority of the Vedas at all. 3 i.e. Yājñ II 186. 4. See Verse 9 above pp. 46-47.

CHAPTER XVI

On the Non-payment of Wages

Now begins the chapter called the non-payment of Wages, a title of law. Its characteristics have been stated by Nârada¹ "A series of
 5 "rules (will be) stated (next) for the payment and non-payment of
 "wages of labourers. It is termed 'Non-payment of Wages' a title
 "of law." The meaning of this (is this): The chapter of law wherein
 the rules of payment and non-payment of wages of the labourers have
 been stated (*viz*) in the stanzas following, is known as the chapter on
 10 the 'Non-payment of Wages'

There the Author mentions (a rule as to) a decision

Yājñavalkya, Verse 193

One who having received his wages, abandons the work, must pay
 twice. If none is received, he shall be made to pay an equal amount. The
 15 implements shall be preserved by the servants

Mitāksharâ —One, by whom the wages had been received, if he aban-
 dons *et* do not perform the work which he had undertaken, should pay
 twice the amount of wages to the owner. When, however, he abandons
 a task which he had agreed to do, when he had not received any
 20 wages, then he should be made to pay an equal amount of as much as
 was fixed as wages, and not a double

Or, (the passage may be interpreted² thus) he shall be forcibly
 compelled to perform his work, after payment to him of the wages
 promised, as directed by the following text of Nârada³ "One, who
 25 "does not perform a work after having agreed to do it, should be
 "forcibly compelled to do it, after paying him his wages"

The rule as to wages also, has been stated by the same Sage⁴ "Let
 "the master, for whom work is performed, pay wages to the servants
 "hired (by him) according to their agreement, at the beginning, at the
 30 "middle, or at the end, as may have been settled between them"

1 Ch VI 1

2 Vidyânesvara proposes this interpretation of the text, as an alternative
 course suggested by the text of Nârada

3 Ch VI 5

4 Ch VI 2.

The servants also must preserve to the best of their ability implements of husbandry such as the bullock and the rope of the plough and like others; otherwise there would not be any ploughing etc.

Viramitrodaya

"A series of rules are stated in connection with the payment and non-payment of wages of labourers. That is termed 3
"Non-payment of wages—a title of law thus stated in this text of Varada" the Author treats of the title of law known as "the Non-payment of wages"

Yajñavalkya Verse 101

"*Chaitanyam* One by whom wages had been received such a labourer having undertaken *Arma vyaya* as also a contractor if he abandon the work *Arma* an equal amount *Arma* equal to the amount of wages *Arma* such an amount he should be compelled to pay *Arma* by the kin. And under compulsion he should *Arma* 15
perform the work after paying him the wages as stated by Varada.

On who does not perform the work after having agreed to do it should be forcibly compelled to perform after paying him his wages. This for him who after having commenced does not (continue to) perform.

Where there is no commencement however the rule is stated by 20
Manu. A labourer who without being ill out of arrogance does "not perform the work as agreed to shall be fined eight *Arma* and "no wages shall be paid to him.

By the word 'abandons' the penalty has been stated where the abandonment of the work is of his own making; otherwise however 25
"if he abandons on account of a fault of the owner he should get for as "much as he has performed" the rule thus stated by Varada should be observed.

The labourer also should preserve the implements of the owner such as, the whip the plough etc. The meaning is that if it is not properly 30
looked after and preserved the lost article should be restored to the owner. On whatever occasion any particular wage has been agreed upon between the owner and the labourer that kind of wages on that occasion should be paid. This is clear and therefore may be over looked (193).

Sûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 193

One who has accepted wages for the performance of a work, if he abandons that work shall pay double the wages. If the wages have not
 5 been received he may be made to pay equal *Bhrtyah*, 'by the servants',
ie Bhrîlakah i e 'servants on wages'. The implements such as the plough,
 bridle etc should be preserved (193)

The Author mentions a rule as to one who causes a work to be performed without determining the wages

10 Yājñavalkya, Verse 194

He, however, should be made to pay by the rule of the land a tenth part of the (proceeds of) trade, cattle, or crop, who without settling the wages, causes work to be done.

Mîtāksharâ — That master, however, *ie*, a grocer, an owner of
 15 cows, or an agriculturist, who even without clearly settling the wages, causes work to be done by a hired servant, whatever (profits) may be obtained from that work, *ie* from the trade, cattle, or agriculture, the tenth portion of that should be caused to be paid to the hired servant, *Mahîkshîâ*, by the ruler of the the land, *ie* by the king

20 Vîramitrodaya

When the labourer is working without any wages being determined what should be paid to the labourer? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 194

That master, however, who causes work to be performed such as
 25 trade and the like without the wages being determined, such a one should be made by the king to pay to the labourer a tenth part of the profit of trade, cattle, or agriculture. This, moreover, is with reference to a cultivator of the soil, vide the text of *Brhaspati*¹ viz "A third or a
 "fifth shall a cultivator of the soil take as his share. One who is given
 30 "food and clothing shall take a fifth of the plough." A third share in the absence of food or clothing. (194)

S'ûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 194

He, moreover, who causes work to be done even without determining
 35 the wages, such a one should be made to pay by the king a tenth part of the income from trade, cattle, and harvest (194)

The Author mentions a rule for one who does something without an order

Yājñavalkya, Verse 195

When one disregards the place and the time, as also where one otherwise causes a reduction in profits, in such a case the will of the master (shall prevail) but more shall be paid if more be made 5

PAGE 124*

Mitrākṣharā.—A hired servant however who does not sell a commodity at the proper time¹ or in a proper place and thus disregards these through insolence or the like or one who at the same time or place brings in less profit than what would have been reaped by an extensive sale (of the merchandise), in the case of such a servant the will of the master shall prevail in the matter of payment of wages i.e. as much may be wish, so much should he pay and not the entire wages 10

When, however more profits are made by reason of a special knowledge as to time and place then an amount exceeding that fixed before should be paid by the master to the labourer 15

Vīramitrodaya

When the owner suffers a loss in the profit on account of the fault of the labourer the Author mentions the diminution in the wages

Yājñavalkya, Verse 195

That labourer however who transgresses the time and the place appropriate for trade or cultivation and does not make the sale cultivation &c. is guilty of transgression as also he who otherwise makes a profit by spending too much of the master's property *tatra* for such i.e. in regard to such a labourer *śrīminah*, of the master, in regard to the payment of wages *chhandah* "will i.e. option The meaning is as much as the master wishes, so much should he pay and not the entirety of the wages 20

¹ The meaning is this though he see a proper time and place for the sale of the commodity if the factor through insolence or the like cause do not sell it or if he accept less profit, thinking that the time and place would cause him much trouble let the master pay him what wages he pleases not the full hire Colobrooke Digest.

When, moreover, by reason of his special knowledge of the place and the season the labourer makes a greater profit, then more wages should be paid in addition to the tenth mentioned in the rule. By the first use of the word *cha* is included the special, particular etc. about the purchaser, and by the second use of the word *cha* the loss in the original capital (195).

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 195

He, however, who carries the load, etc., beyond the limit of the region other than the one which has been fixed, or does extra work beyond the fixed time, or performs more work than the nature of that fixed, in such cases it is at the option of the owner. In the case of more, however, more must necessarily be paid. For less, less, and hence also the option (195)

The Author mentions a rule as to the payment of wages for a task accomplished by several workmen

Yājñavalkya, Verse 196

As much work a man does, so much will be his wages; if it cannot be accomplished by both, the wages should be paid for the work done according to the agreement

Mitâksharâ — When, moreover, even a single task for which the wages have been fixed, (and the performance of) which was (under taken and) commenced, but which, on account of illness or any other impediment was found to be impossible to be accomplished even by both—by the use of the word ‘even’ (is implied) “even by many”—
if it could be finished, then **yo yâvat karma karoti, as much work a labourer does, tâvat, so much,** i.e. proportionately to the work done by him, as determined upon by an arbitrator, should be paid to him as his **vetanam wages**, and not an equal amount. It should not be supposed that no payment may be made, on the ground that there was no agreement for payment of wages for the several parts of the work

If, however, the work be accomplished by both, i.e. be finished, then as much as was agreed upon i.e. stipulated for, so much should be paid to both and not the entire amount of wages to each, nor should the payment be according to the work after determining it.

Viramitrodaya

The Author states a rule in regard to work to be performed by several labourers

Yājñavalkya Verse 196

When one (piece of) work is completed by being performed by two or more contributing more or less labour then by regard to the less or more labour of each the wages should be distributed among them when it cannot be accomplished by two or more The meaning of the word *api* is that when it is not accomplished on account of the fault of the second labourer If the work is accomplished the contract should be completed as agreed upon

The wages agreed upon to be paid for a particular performance are to be paid only on the completion of the work and the wages are not to be paid for only a part performed Th meaning of the substance is that the wages are not to be paid distributively to each individual labourer but are to be paid collectively in a single lot to all together or by dividing it among them (196)

Sūlapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 196

He who performs as much work his wages should be paid by regard to that work If that work cannot be accomplished by both If however it can be accomplished, and has been finished wages should be paid as agreed upon (196).

The Author mentions a rule regarding a Soldier and a Carrier

Yājñavalkya Verse 197

A Carrier shall be compelled to make good a vessel which has perished except it be by (the act of) God or the king One who creates an obstruction at the time of starting shall be made to pay twice the (amount of) wages.

Mīlākṣhara —A vessel regarding which no calamity has arisen owing to (the act of) God or the king, if such a vessel be destroyed by a carrier through his folly then he should be made to pay for such a vessel according to the loss (caused). Narada says¹ the same " If a vessel be damaged on account of the fault of the Carrier, he shall be compelled to make good whatever loss may have been caused, excepting such as may be due to an Act of God or the king "

1 Ch. VI. 9

He, moreover, who having before undertaken the service of carrying one who intended to start on an auspicious day for a marriage or other similar purpose, creates an impediment at the time of starting by saying at that time that he would not do the work, then he shall be fined double the amount of the wages fixed, since an obstruction was raised to a highly auspicious undertaking

Śûlapâni

Yâjñavalkya, Verse 197

With the exception of anything due to the (act of) king or God, if through the fault of the carrier any goods or property of the trader such as saffron, etc perish, then the carrier entrusted with its transport should be made to pay One, moreover, who creates an impediment at the time of starting out (on a journey) shall be made to pay twice the amount of the wages (197)

Yâjñavalkya, Verse 198

(If he declines) after setting out, he shall be fined a seventh part, a fourth if (he desert) on the way, he shall forfeit the entire amount of wages if (he declines) in the midway, so also one who causes a work to be abandoned

Mitāksharâ —Moreover, *prakrânte*, after setting out, i.e. after a start had (once) been made, he who gives up a task undertaken by himself,—such a one—should be compelled to pay a seventh part of the wages agreed upon

It may be said indeed in this very connection by the text¹ “one who creates an obstruction at the time of starting &c.”

An objection the payment of double the amount of wages has just before been stated, and now, a seventh part, thus there is a contradiction The answer to this is: that for a man who abandons a work at a time when another servant may be procured, the seventh part (is the fine), while for one who gives up at the auspicious moment of starting itself, a fine of double the amount of wages (is prescribed), thus there is no contradiction He, moreover, who abandons *pathi*, on the way, i.e. after a start was made and the journey had once been commenced,—such a one should be fined a fourth part of the wages He, moreover, who deserts in the midway shall be fined the entire amount of wages

¹ Yâjñ II. 197 (above)

He, however, *tyajakāḥ*, who causes the work to be abandoned : *e* when the master compels a servant to stop work, when the latter was not giving it up such a one also (*i.e.* the master) shall be compelled to pay to the servant the seventh and other portions respectively regard being had to the place (where compulsion was caused) as stated before. 5
PAGE 125 *

This, rule moreover, regards one who has not had any disease or a like calamity, *rule* the text of *Manu*¹ "A lured servant who, not being ill, does no perform, through insolence, the work as agreed upon, shall be fined eight *Arghyalas*² and no wages shall be paid to him

When, moreover after the disappearance of the disease or the like cause he makes good his undertaking, taking into calculation the lapsed days, then indeed he gets his wages, *rule* the text of *Manu*³ "If however one who was ill after recovery performs his work according to the original agreement he shall indeed receive his wages even after (the lapse of) a very long time." 10 15

When, however one after he is cured of the disease, being perfectly at ease, through idleness or like other cause does not do the work commenced, even to a small extent, nor gets it finished by another to such a one no wages shall be paid. As says *Manu*⁴ "But if he, whether sick or well does not (perform or) cause to be performed (by others) his work according to his agreement, the wages 20 "for that work shall not be given to him, even if (it be only) slightly 'incomplete'"

Here ends the Chapter on the Non-payment of Wages.

Vīramītrodaya

It has been stated above that the implements shall be preserved "by the servants There, for not preserving or for a prejudicial performance the Author mentions the penalty

Yājñavalkya, Verses 197 198

Without the act of king or God where a vessel has perished owing to the ignorance of the carrier then the carrier must be compelled to pay 30

1 Ch. VIII, 215

2 The *Guḍja* berry *i.e.* of gold, silver or copper according as the case may be (*Medhātithi*). 'of gold' (*Kullūka*).

3 Ch. VIII, 216.

4 Ch. VIII, 217

By the use of the word, “*tu*”, the Author excludes what has perished by the act of king or God.

On a day fixed for starting for a marriage or a like purpose the labourer who raises obstructions, and when another labourer is not available, shall be made to pay double the amount of wages by compulsion : *e* by beating and any other mode causing extreme pain By the use of the word “*eva*” are excluded the performance of work at any other time. Then by the use of the word “*cha*” are included those who cause considerable delay in half the way (197)

- 10 When a work has been commenced and another labourer is available one leaving the work should be made to pay a seventh part, on the way : *e* in midway in one’s own country, one abandoning, (shall pay) a fourth part, and one abandoning at half the journey, the whole of the wages should be made to pay He also who by mischievous counsel causes a workman to give up work, such a one also should be compelled to pay double the amount of wages

- The words ‘*api*’ and ‘*cha*’ are for excluding any option In the matter of a cumulative punishment *Manu*¹ thus “If ill, when he reco-
vers, he should perform as originally agreed upon, such a one will
20 “ certainly receive his wages even after a very long time ” The meaning is that the days of interruption should be counted and the work should be completed within these days If, however, when he is in perfect health, but does not perform work through idleness or the like, then he does not get the wages, *vide* the text of *Manu*² “ But
25 “when whether sick or well he does not cause to be performed the work, “the wages for that work shall not be given to him although it is short “ by a small portion ” This is the substance

Here ends the Chapter on Non-payment of Wages.

Sûlapâni

30

Yājñavalkya, Verse 198

At the time of commencing a journey he who even at the (starting) place gives up work, the person abandoning shall be compelled to pay a seventh part of the wages The rest is clear (198)

CHAPTER XVII

On Gambling and Betting on Animals.

Now commences the Chapter of law called "Gambling and Betting on Animals." Its characteristics have been mentioned by Harada¹ "Di honest gambling, with live small slices of leather little staves
 "of ivory or like others and also betting on lands, form a title of
 "law called Gambling and Betting on Animal. *Ukṛt* means dice
Baidhna is a small piece of leather. *Satṛit*—small staves of ivory
 &c. made long and squared. By the use of the term *Ukṛt* Or like
 other are included other instruments of enjoyment, such as the
 play having the four components² of an army division including the
 elephant, the horse the chariot, and the like. Gambling & play
 ing by means of these inanimate things is preceded by a bet. Simi-
 larly that play by means of lands such as a cock, a pigeon and the
 like—and by the use of the word and *ch* wrestlers rams buffaloes
 etc.—which is initiated by a bet, both of these give rise to a title of
 law called Gambling and Betting on Animals. That has been
 stated by Manu³ "That which is arranged by (the use of) inanimate
 "things is called among men gambling (*Dyut*) when, however
 "the play is enjoyed by means of animate beings, it should be known
 "as Betting (*Samikrayah*)"

The Author mentions the (scale of) remuneration of a keeper of the Gambling Hall

Yājñavalkya, Verse 199

In a bet, when the wager is a hundred (fold) the keeper of a gambling house shall take five per cent from a gamester⁴, and ten per cent from the others.

Mitakharā—The stake determined by mutual agreement of the gamblers is called a bet *glahā*. In such a bet one who has (stipulated to have) a hundred in reference to it, &c. an increase which is

1 Ch. XVI 1

An army is generally described as having four parts viz the elephant, the horse the chariot and the foot. *Chaturvākyā* is a kind of chess in which these four parts are represented

2 Ch. VIII 23

4. i.e. the keeper of a gambling house

of a higher proportion than a hundred-fold is an increase by hundred fold From such a gamester, **Sabhikah**, the keeper of the hall, may take five per cent for his own maintenance A hundred in which five

5 *panas* is the increase is a 'five per cent', **pañchakam śatam** The affix *Kan* (in *S'atakam*) is used under the rule¹ " These affixes (mentioned in Pāṇini V. I upto, rule 47) have also the sense of ' an "interest, or rent, or a profit, or a tax, or a bribe given thereby' or in "that " The meaning is that he should take a twentieth part (of the gains) of the winner of the bet

10 He to whom belongs the house for the residence of gamesters, is a **Sabhikah**, keeper of the gambling house One who makes provision for all the instruments of gambling such as dice etc , and maintains himself with the amount received therefrom is called a *Sabhāpati* From any other, moreover, i e from a gamester who has not laid a

15 wager upto a hundred (fold), **daśakam śatam**, ten per cent, he should take a tenth part of the amount won This is the import

Śūlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 199

20 At the time of the gambling, etc where a small increment is recovered from the gambler, from that per hundred from the clever gambler, the officer of the gambling house should take five per cent Where it has not been taken, then ten per cent from the profit (199)

What should be done by a keeper who has thus been provided for ? So the Author says

25 **Yājñavalkya, Verse 200**

PAGE 126 *

He, being well protected, shall pay a portion to the king as fixed. He shall recover the amount of the wager, and pay the winner , and being ever patient shall give a true decision,

30 **Mitākṣharâ**. —The Officer of the gambling house, for whom provision has thus been made **sah**, he, being protected from rogues and gamesters by the king—shall pay to the king a portion as agreed upon Similarly, he should recover the amount of the wages, i e. should recover it from the losing party, by accepting a pledge or by

arrest etc. And having recovered that amount, he the keeper should pay it to the winner : i e the successful party. Also, being (ever) patient, he should always declare a true decision to the gamblers. That has been stated by, Narada¹. 'The master of the gaming house shall arrange the game, and pay the stakes won therein'

5

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 200

The keeper of the house when properly protected by the king shall pay to the king a portion as arranged. Being always patient he shall take from the gambler the amount won. And to the winner also he should pay the amount sticking to the truth. Brhaspati² states a special rule. "One defeated in a secret game or ignorant (of the rules) or (defeated) by (the use of) false dice or deceit, though acquainted with the game shall be released and one who has lost his entire wealth in a game shall not be compelled to give the whole of it" (00).

10

15

When, however, the Keeper is not able to make (the party) pay, the king should cause it to be paid. So the Author says

Yājñavalkya Verse 201

That which has been won publicly in an assembly of gamblers, in a gaming house having a keeper where the (fixed) portion has been received by the king he shall compel the amount to be paid, but not otherwise.

20

Mītākṣhara --Prasiddhe, publicly, and not in secret, in an assembly of gamblers having a keeper of a gaming house, and in the presence of the officer of gaming appointed by the king, and when the king's portion had been paid by the keeper, the king shall compel a dishonest gamester to pay the amount of the bet won regarding which there is no difference of opinion. Anyatha otherwise, a bet won in secret, without a keeper and where the king's portion has not been paid, he shall not cause to be paid to winners.

25

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 201

Where the king has received his own portion, he shall compel the amount to be paid which has been won publicly in the house of gamblers in the presence of the game-keeper and not otherwise (201)

30

The Author mentions the means for a decision when there is a dispute as to success or defeat

Yājñavalkya, Verse 202 (1)

5 The Judges of the disputes (about gambling) as also the witnesses shall be (the gamesters) themselves

Mitâkṣharâ.—*Drashtârah*, the judges, of gambling should be *ta eva*, themselves, *i e* the gamesters, *i e* should be appointed by the king There the rule¹ that 'they should be accomplished by learning and study' &c does not hold *Sâkshinaścha*, the witnesses also, in a bet should be selected from the gamblers themselves The prohibitive rule² given in "A woman, a minor, an old man, a rogue &c" does not apply here.

The Author mentions a penalty by way of prohibiting gambling in certain cases

15 Yājñavalkya, Verses 202 (2)

Persons gambling with false dice or other instruments shall be branded and banished by the king.

Mitâkṣharâ—Those who play with false dice or other instruments similarly prepared, for causing a deception *e g* by charmed jewels, charms, or medicinal preparations and the like, these the king shall brand with a dog's or other mark, and banish from the kingdom A special rule has been mentioned by *Nârada*³ as to banishment "The king shall "banish from the⁴ kingdom wicked men who play with false dice, "after a wreath of dice has been hung round their necks, for, that is "the punishment ordained for them" Moreover, those texts of *Manu*⁵ which prohibit gambling, *e g* "Whoever, either gambles him- "self or bets or causes it (by others), all those the king shall punish "corporally, as also those *S'ûdhas* who assume the distinctive marks "of the twice-born" and others, even these should be understood to apply to gambling with false dice, as also to gambling where there is no keeper nor the gambling officer of the State

1 See Yājñ II 2 p 3 above

2 *i e* in Yājñ II 70 p 851 above

3 Ch XVI 6

4 Dr Jolly's Edition gives a different reading च निर्वेद्युतमण्डलात् "shall drive out of the gaming house"

5 Ch IX 224

Śūlapāṭi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 202

The judges of disputes regarding gambling as also the witnesses shall be (the gamblers) themselves. Persons gambling with false dice or fraudulent gamblers should be branded by the king and banished. As says Naraḍa: "The king shall banish from the kingdom wicked men " who play with false dice, after a wreath of dice hung round their necks. " For that is the punishment ordained for them" (*0*).

Yājñavalkya, Verse 203 (1)

Gambling should be ordained under the supervision of a single officer, with a view to (use it as a means of) the detection of thieves.

Mitākṣhara:—Moreover the gambling as discussed above should be ordained under a single supervision : i e one where the mouthpiece or the chief is one. The meaning is that it should be organised by the king under the supervision of an officer of the State. *Taskarajñāna kīraṇat, with a view to the detection of thieves.* Having kept in view the object of detecting thieves, as gamblers generally hail from those who amass wealth by theft and so it should be placed under the supervision of one (officer) with a view to the detection of thieves

PAGE 127 *

The Author mentions a rule with a view to extend the laws of gambling to betting on animals

Yājñavalkya Verse 203 (2)

This very law should be understood to apply in the case of betting by means of animate beings.

Mitākṣhara —The law as to gambling as has been laid down above¹ " In a bet when the wager is a hundred (fold) &c." that very law should be understood *prapidyate, in the case of betting with animate beings, : i e that which is made by means of wrestlers, rams, buffalos and the like, and which is called a Samāhṛayaḥ*

Here ends the Chapter called Gambling and Betting on Animals.

Viramitrodaya

'Now the Chapter of the law called "Gambling and Betting on Animals, and as stated in the text of Manu² viz. ' That which is 'arranged by (the use of) Inanimate things is called in this world gambling, *dyāta* that however, which is arranged by means of animate beings should be known as betting on animals, *samāhṛayaḥ*, and divided into two parts, the author begins

Yājñavalkya, Verses 199-203

The stake determined by the mutual agreement of the gamblers is called a "bet", *glahah*, in such a bet, in a hundred *i e* by the measure of a hundred and increased, the keeper of the hall, *Sabhākah*, *i e* the officer presiding the gambling may take five per hundred *i e* for a hundred of gold etc five of gold etc, from the clever and successful gambler who makes the bet From any other, when the profit is less than a hundred, he should take ten per cent, that is the meaning By the use of the word *tu* is excluded the recovery of five per cent from one who is defeated

The keeper of the gambling house who has been protected by the king by the arrangement for his subsistence and by the warding off of attacks from others should pay to the king as fixed *i e* in the order as fixed, a portion from the amount of his acquisitions (199)

He should give the won bets to the winner. Afterwards at the place of the defeat he should himself recover *i e* take, after recovering it Fruthtelling and patience, one who has these two The meaning is (that) he should give a correct decision (200)

If, however, the keeper of the house is not able to recover, then it should be compelled by the king to be paid, so the Author says '*prāpte*' etc, 'recovered etc' where it has been obtained by the king publicly *i e* not covertly in an assembly of the gamblers *i e* in the company of the betters In a place with a keeper attached to the house the king should compel it to be paid to the keeper. Or it should be construed thus *sthāne* "at the place" *i e* at the gambling place, the king should compel the keeper of the house to be paid Otherwise, *i e* where the king has not received a share, or in a secret assembly of the gamblers, or at a place not presided over by a keeper of the house, what has been won, the king need not compel to be paid (201)

In transactions relating to gambling, the judges *i e* the persons entitled to give decisions, as well as the witnesses shall be (the gamesters) By the use of the word *eva* are excluded the absence of a fault indicated in the text¹ "women, minors, aged persons, gamblers etc" Those who gamble with false dice etc *i e* involving deceit or with fraudulent motives *i e* with an intention to deceive, as also by means of gems, charms, or medicaments, such persons should be branded by the king and exiled So says Nārada² "The king shall banish from the kingdom wicked men who play with false dice, after a wreath of dice has been hung around their necks, for, that is the punishment ordained for them" Thus in the text of Manu³ "Whoever himself engages, or causes others to engage, in gambling or betting, on animals, all these, the king shall punish corporally, and also those Sūdras who

1 See Yājñ. II 70, 71 p 851

2 Ch XVI 6

3 Ch IX 224

'assume the distinctive marks of the twice-born and of others are to be regarded as having a reference to those gamblers only who use false dice (20²).

Where there is only one officer of the king viz. the keeper of the (gambling) house as the mouth piece i.e. the principal officer such gambling should be arranged with the object of finding out the thieves 5

The law as to gambling stated in the text¹ in a bet when the 'wager is of hundred etc. the Author extends to betting on animals—*Eṣha creti* this same etc. (By means of) living beings such as wrestlers rams etc., in a gambling which is to be carried on known as 10
the *samdhva,ah* i.e. betting on animals the very law as has been stated above is to be understood This is the meaning 1

Says Brhaspati² When birds rams deer or other (animals) 'are employed to fight against one another after a wager has been laid it is called betting on animals 15

When any one is defeated in a prize fight between two animals 'the wager which has been laid there shall be paid by the owner (of the defeated animal) A wager shall be made in public, false gamblers 'shall be punished Narada³ If a man arranges a gambling which 'has not been authorized by the king such a one shall not get the stake, 20
and moreover shall incur a penalty That which has been jokingly made or which has not been reported to the king there also he shall 'not get his stake and he will also incur a penalty

Vāṇṣu⁴ 'Those who use false dice in gaming shall have their 'hands lopped off Those who resort to fraudulent practices in gaming 25
'(shall lose) the fore-finger and the thumb (199-203)

Thus in the commentary on Yājñavalkya ends
the Chapter on Gambling and Betting on Animals.

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 203

This gambling should be caused to be presided over by a principal officer with a view to get information about thieves. This same procedure should be understood to be in the case of betting with animals called *Samdhva,ah*. When gambling is carried on by means of animals such as the ram the cock etc. with a stake on, that is known as gambling with animals. Although gambling has been forbidden by Manu⁵ in the text 30
'Whoever either gambles himself or bets or causes it (by others), all those the king shall punish corporally as also those Śūdras who assume the 'distinctive marks of the twice-born' still if a beginning is made any how this rule of the law has been stated. 40

Thus ends the Chapter on Gambling and Betting on Animals.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Of Abuse.

Now the Author introduces the law of Abuse Its definition has been stated by Nârada¹ “ Abusive language, couched in offensive and
 5 “ violent terms, regarding the native country, caste, family, and so
 “ forth (of a man), are termed ‘ Abuse ’ ” Offensive and violent language about a (man’s) country &c , violent talk is an *Ākrośa*, *Nyanga* is a disrespectful talk Language which savours of both these, and which is also abusive and thus causes dismay, is called ‘ Abuse ’
 10 There, *e g* ‘ the natives of *Gauda* are fond of quarrelling ’, is (an instance of) an abuse regarding a country, ‘ The *Vipras* are an extremely covetous people ’, is (an instance of) an abuse regarding a caste, ‘ the members of the *Viśvâmutra* family are cruel in their acts ’, is (an instance of) an abuse regarding a family By the use of the term
 15 *Âdi*, ‘ and so forth ’, is also included violent language regarding learned men, or men versed in crafts and the like, used by means of abusing learning, craft &c

Of that, a three-fold division has been laid down by Nârada *viz* *Niṣṭhura* &c., with a view to (be of help in the) discrimination as to
 20 the punishments The characteristics of those divisions also have been stated by the same Author² “ That, again, is divided into three species, “ according as it is *Niṣṭhura* (cruel), *Āśīla* (indecent), or *Tīvra* (sharp) “ The punishment for each increases in severity respectively according to the nature of the insult offered (2) Abuse combined with
 25 “ reproaches should be regarded as *Niṣṭhura* (cruel), abuse couched “ in insulting language is *Āśīla* (indecent); the learned call an “ abuse *Tīvra* (sharp), by which a man is charged with an offence “ causing expulsion from caste (3). ” “ Fy upon you fool ! you are “ a rascal ”, is (an instance of) an abuse combined with reproaches
 30 Here insulting means ungentlemanly language , censurable—*e g* (imputing) intercourse with a sister etc —language savouring of such words is called an indecent abuse (*Āśīlam*) And violent language imputing an offence of a heinous nature *e g* “ Thou art a drunkard ”, is an instance of an abuse called *Tīvra* (sharp)

1 Oh XV 1

2, Oh XV 2-3.

Of these, the Author mentions the punishment for a *Nishthura* abuse towards a man of the same *Varṇa*

Yājñavalkya Verse 204

He, who, by true, untrue or ironical statements ridicules persons as wanting in limbs, or an organ of sense or suffering from a disease shall be fined thirteen and a half *panas*

Mitakshara —*Nyūnabāh* wanting in a limb i.e. deprived of a hand or a foot etc. *Nyūnendriyāḥ* wanting in organs i.e. being without an eye or an ear etc. *Rogīṇaḥ* suffering from a disease i.e. a skin disease or leprosy etc. Of these whether by true untrue or by an ironical praise e.g. when one man says about another that "this man who is devoid (of the use) of both the eyes is blind" that is (an instance of) a true statement. Where however he says "This man having eyes is blind" it is (an instance of) an untrue statement. Where the statement is "you look beautiful even in your deformity" that is (an instance of) an ironical praise—if a man *trihand* *kṣhepam* karoti i.e. reviles or abuses them, such a man should be fined a half and thirteen *panas*.

As for the text of *Manu* "He who calls another man one-eyed, lame or the like even if it be in accordance with facts shall be punished with a fine not less than a *ḥirajyotiṣa*" that has reference to one who belongs to a *Varṇa* notorious for extremely bad behaviour.

When however, sons etc. abuse mothers or the like then these should be fined a hundred (as) has been said by the same sage: "He who defames his mother his father his wife his brother his son, or his teacher and he who gives no the way to his preceptor shall be compelled to pay one hundred *panas*." This rule moreover is to be observed in the case of the mother and other elderly (and respectable) persons who are guilty and in the case of a wife who is innocent.

Sūlapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 204

If one makes a statement of abuse regarding persons defective in organs or defective as from suffering in diseases either by a true statement or by a false statement or in any other manner then he shall be punished half by thirteen *panas*. *Narada* states the characteristics of abuse (same as at page 1246 ll 2-6 above) (204)

PAGE 128*

The Author states the penalty for an *Aslîla* (indecent) abuse**Yājñavalkya, Verse 205**The king shall compel a man to pay a fine of Twenty-five *panas* who abuses another saying "I shall have intercourse with your mother or sister"

5 Mitâksharâ — One abusing thus. "I shall have intercourse with your 'sister or mother', the king shall compel to pay a fine of twenty-five *panas* *i e* which consists of a twenty plus five *panas*

Śûlapâni**Yājñavalkya, Verse 205**

10 *Pañchavimsatikam*, 'Twenty-five, *i e* which consists, of twenty-five *panas* The rest is plain In some places the reading is 'or similarly a mother' (205)

15 Having thus stated the rules for men of equal merits and *Vanna*, the Author proceeds with a view to declare the law regarding men of varying merits

Yājñavalkya, Verse 206 (1)(For the abuse of a man) of an inferior (status) (the fine is) half ;
and for (the abuse) of others' wives or superiors, (the fine is) two-fold

20 Mitâksharâ — Adhameshu, (In the case of an abuse) of men of inferior (status), *i e* relatively to the person abusing by regard to the inferiority in (the mode of) living and such other qualities, the fine is half In the present context, the full fine being twenty-five *panas* as stated in the previous clause, a fine equal to the half of that *i e* twelve and a half should be understood As for an abuse regarding 'others'

25 'wives,' a uniform fine of double *i e* twice twenty-five *i e* fifty *panas* should be understood Similarly, for an abuse of 'Superiors' *i e* of those who are relatively superior, in learning and conduct, to the person (abusing), the fine shall also be fifty *panas*

The Author states the rule for determining the penalty for mutual abuse between men of different *Varnas* such as the *Mūrdhāvasikta* and others

Yājñavalkya Verse 206 (2)

The determination of the penalty should be made by regard to the superiority or inferiority of the *Varna* and *Jāti* 5

Mītākṣhara — *Varnāḥ* i.e. a *Brāhmaṇa* &c, *Jātis* i.e. the *Mūrdhāvasikta* and others. *Varnāḥ* and *jātayah* (joined together make up the compound) *Varna-jātayah* Superior and inferior (joined together make up the compound) Superior and inferior *Varnajātayah* which are superior and inferior (when joined together make up the compound expression) *Varnas* and *jātis* which are superior and inferior 10
In the case of an abuse being mutually committed by these *varṇajātyuttharādharaiḥ*, *varṇas* and *jātis* which are superior and inferior *daṇḍasya prapayanam*, the determination of the penalty, i.e. the inference should be understood to be made by reference to the maximum penalty 15

It appears that by particularly specifying Superiors and inferiors, the determination of the penalty is to be made also by reference to the relative superiority or inferiority (of the parties), e.g.¹ for abusing a *Mūrdhāvasikta* who is inferior to a *Brāhmaṇa*, but superior to a *Kṣatriya*, a *Brāhmaṇa* deserves a penalty which would be slightly above fifty *panas* which is the penalty for the abuse of a *Kṣatriya* viz. seventy five *panas*. A *Kṣatriya* also for abusing him² becomes amenable to a fine which would be slightly less than one hundred *panas* which is the penalty for an abuse of a *Brāhmaṇa* viz. 20
Seventy five *panas*. A *Mūrdhāvasikta* also deserves the same fine for an abuse of (either of) these two. In the case of an abuse mutually between a *Mūrdhāvasikta* and an *Ambaṣṭha* the same penalties shall be understood respectively as would be the case in an abuse mutually between a *Brāhmaṇa* and a *Kṣatriya*. Similar punishments should be inferred in other cases also 25 30

1. In the instances given the Author has illustrated the rule by taking the causes of abuse by the lower and higher tribes

2. i.e. *Mūrdhāvasikta*; see Ch. IV *Achārādhyāya* of Yājñavalkya.

Śûlapâṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 206

Of equal *varnas* by regard to the person indulging in the abuse, and among those of low qualities than the accused, half of twenty-five should
5 be taken as the fine In regard to an abuse of others' wives and of the preceptors or the like, double of that *i e* fifty in quantity

Varnâh, 'classes', such as the Brâhmanas and the like *Jâts*, 'castes,' such as the *Mûrdhâbhîṣhikta* etc In regard to these also, for an abuse by the higher of an inferior or by the lower of the superior, the administration
10 of punishment should be made The rest is clear (206)

Having thus stated the penalties in the case of all the *Varnas* the Author mentions a penalty for an abuse among the *Varnas* again but by reference to the *Pratiloma*¹ and *Anuloma* order

Yājñavalkya, Verse 207

15 In the case of the abuse of one of a superior class, the fine is two-fold and three-fold (respectively), and of one of a lower class, it is to be reduced in the ratio of a half (respectively)

Mitâksharâ — Apawâdâḥ, abuse, *i e* vilification Abuses by persons belonging to an inferior class are *prâtilomyâpawâdâḥ*, abuses of one of a
20 superior class, *teṣhu*, in these cases, *e g* for a *Kṣhatrîya* or a *Vaiśya* abusing a *Brâhmana*, the fines should be understood respectively to be double of that mentioned in the foregoing text² laying down a double *i e* of fifty *panas*, so that double *i e* a hundred, and a treble *i e* a hundred and fifty *panas* (shall be understood)

25 In the case of an abuse of a *Brâhmana* by a *S'ûdra*, there is either corporal punishment or cutting off of the tongue, as says *Manu*³: "A *Kṣhatrîya* having defamed a *Brâhmana* shall be fined one hundred " (*Panas*), a *Vaiśya*, one hundred and fifty or two hundred, while a "*S'ûdra* shall make himself amenable for corporal punishment."

PAGE 129 *

30 In the cases also of a *Vaiśya* and a *S'ûdra* who are lower down a *Kṣhatrîya* by one or more than one class (respectively), by a parity of reasoning, the penalty for abusing a *Kṣhatrîya* should be understood to be a hundred and a hundred and fifty (*panas*) For a *S'ûdra* abusing a *Vaiśya*, a hundred (*panas*, shall be the fine)

1 'in descending and ascending order' See Yājñ Âchârâ Ch IV

2. *i e* in Yâñ. II 206 (1) above p 1249

3. Ch VIII. 267.

In the cases of abuse of the lower classes *e g* in an abuse of a *Kṣatriya*, a *Vaiśya* or a *Sūdra* by a *Brāhmana*, of that, *tasmāt*, i. e. of the penalty for a *Kṣatriya* abusing a *Brāhmana* of a hundred (*panas*) a reduction of a half should be made in the case of each class respectively, and the remainder i. e. fifty twenty-five, and twelve and a half (*panas*), should be the fine, respectively, for a *Brāhmana*. That has been stated by *Manu*¹ A *Brāhmana* shall be "fined fifty (*panas*) for defaming a *Kṣatriya* in (the case of the "abuse of) a *Vaiśya* the fine shall be twenty-five (*panas*) in (the "case of) a *Sūdra* twelve." In the case of an abuse by a *Kṣatriya* of a *Vaiśya* or a *Sūdra* the fines respectively shall be fifty and twenty five (*panas*). And in an abuse by a *Vaiśya* of a *Sūdra* a (fine of) fifty (*panas*). Thus the law should be understood, *vide* the text of *Gautama*² "The fine in the (cases) of a *Kṣatriya* and a *Vaiśya* shall be "similaras in the case of a *Brāhmana* and a *Kṣatriya* (respectively)," and also under the text of *Manu*³ "A *Vaiśya* and a *Sūdra* must be punished 'exactly in the same manner according to their respective castes.'

Śālapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 207

The meaning is that for an abuse of the *Brāhmana* by a *Kṣatriya*, a hundred, and by a *Vaiśya* of a hundred together with a half. Obviously by making it fourfold two hundred is that for a *Sūdra*. 20

*Manu*¹ states a penalty for an abuse of an inferior order "A *Brāhmana* shall be fined fifty *panas* for defaming a *Kṣatriya*, and a half of fifty for (defaming) a *Vaiśya*, and for (defaming) a *Sūdra* twelve is the penalty (207) 25

The Author mentions again a rule regarding a *Niṣṭhura* abuse

Yājñavalkya, Verse 208

For an abuse threatening injury to the arm, neck, eye, or thigh, the fine shall be a hundred, and a half of it in (the case of) the foot, nose, ear, the hand, or the like 80

Mitākṣharā —For an injury to the arm &c. each by a threatening abuse i. e. for threatening by words *e g* in the form 'I shall lop off "your arm &c." *Satyah*, a hundred, i. e. a fine limited by a hundred shall be understood. In the case of a verbal threat of an injury to the foot, nose, ear hand or the like,—by the use of the word *Adi* or the like, (are also included) the hips and the like—*tadardhikah* half of that, i. e. half of that i. e. a fifty *panas*, should be understood. 85

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 208

After a threat "I shall lop off your arm," followed by an injury, the penalty is of the extent of one hundred In regard to the foot etc ,
5 its half, i. e fifty (208)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 209

When, however, a feeble person speaks like that, he shall be fined ten *panas*, similarly, one able should be asked to furnish security for the safety of him

10 Mitâksharâ.—Moreover, when he who is reduced in strength on account of fever or a like cause, threatens another with the words "I shall lop off your arms and other limbs", or the like, he shall be fined ten *panas*

15 When, however, one has capacity and threatens, as before, another person who has been reduced in strength, he should be compelled to furnish security for the safety of the weak person for the period after the (infliction of the) fine of a hundred &c, mentioned before

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 209

20 One, however, who is unable to cause the injury, and speaks in this manner, shall be fined ten *panas* One, however, who is capable and speaks in this way, after being punished with the aforestated one hundred, shall be made to give security for the protection of the person threatened (209)

The Author mentions a penalty in the case of a *Tivra* abuse

25 Yājñavalkya, Verse 210

In the case of an abuse involving degradation from caste the fine is that for a middle *Sâhasa*. For (an abuse) imputing a secondary sin, however, he shall be compelled to pay the fine for the lowest *Sâhasa*

30 Mitâksharâ—In the case of men belonging to the *Varnas*, an abuse of them involving their degradation, *e g* the offence of Brâhmicide &c., the fine shall be as that for a middle *Sâhasa* For an abuse, however, imputing the commission of a secondary sin, *e g* 'Thou art a cow-killer' or the like, he shall be fined as for the lowest *Sâhasa*.

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 210

35 For an accusation of a Brâhmana in the form "you are a Brahmicide" and the like by a Kshatriya, the punishment to be administered is the middle amercement And for an accusation for killing a cow etc. he should be made to pay the first amercement (210),

Yājñavalkya, Verse 211

For an abuse of a *Brāhmana* learned in the three *Vedas* the king or the gods, the fine shall be (as for) the highest *Sāhasa*, the middling (for an abuse) of the castes or the *Pīgas*; and the lowest (for an abuse) of the village or the country

Mitākṣharā:—Moreover *Brāhmanas* learned in the three *Vedas* : *a*. accomplished by learning the *Vedas* For an abuse of these of the kings, and of the gods, the fine shall be (as for) the highest *Sāhasa*. Moreover, for an abuse of the *Pīgas* : *e*. associations of the castes such as the *Brāhmana*, the *Mūrdhavasikta* and others, the fine shall be (as for) a middling *Sāhasa*. In the case of an abuse of a village or the country, the fine shall be understood to be (as for) the lowest *Sāhasa* each.

Here ends the Title of law called Abuse.

Viramītrodaya

Now the chapter of law called Abuse defined by Nārada¹ "Abusive language, caused in offensive and violent terms regarding 'the native country caste, family etc., (of a person) is termed Abuse. The Author discusses that

Yājñavalkya Verses 204-211

There however, an abuse is of three sorts. So says Bṛhaspati² "Offensive language or defamation regarding one's country village family or the like which is not a fact that, is known as the abuse of the 'first degree Referring (in terms of contempt) to a man's sister or 'mother or charging with a minor sin is termed abuse of a middling sort 'by those learned in the law Charging a man with taking forbidden food or drinks, or taxing him with a heinous sin is termed abuse of the highest 'degree as also maliciously exposing his weakest points.

Dravyam 'fact : *e* the thing without it in short false thus a false assertion as to a sin or a defect in a limb or inferiority of family; an assertion of this nature is lowest a false assertion about an inferior sin is a middling abuse and a false assertion as to a heinous sin is the highest kind of abuse. This is the meaning

There in regard to the first, the punishment is stated A true assertion *e g* you are blind an untrue assertion of a similar character in the case of one not blind ironical statement : *e* an apparent praise resulting in a censure as for example in the case of a

blind person etc. the statement 'you are lotus-eyed', or the like. If by these statements one reviles another in an ironical manner in regard to a defect in a limb or an organ, or being affected by a disease or the like, then he shall be punished with thirteen and a half *i. e.* a half and twelve 'panas. This moreover is (a rule) in regard to those of the same caste That has been declared by Br̥haspati² "When two persons abuse each other, their punishment if they are equal in caste and merits has been approved in the Śāstra to be thirteen and half panas, in the case of equals the penalty is equal, of one who is inferior, the same is double, and for a superior, half has been ordained for a mutual abuse."

As regards abuse concerning a mother etc. Manu³ states a special rule. "He who defames the mother, the father, the wife, the brother, the son or the teacher, and also he who does not give way to the preceptor shall be compelled to pay one-hundred panas" This according to Mitākṣharā⁴ is applicable in the case of a mother etc. when they are guilty, and in the case of a wife when she is innocent (204).

'I shall have sexual intercourse with your sister or mother and have been having the enjoyment', one abusing thus and causing pain to one equal in caste, the king shall compel to pay the penalty of twenty-five panas The use of the word *vā*, 'or', is made indifferently, thereby 'I shall have intercourse with your daughter or wife even' and the like (form of abuse) also is included The word *ha* is used simply for filling up the line (205).

The penalty of half by thirteen panas or twenty-five panas which is mentioned above in the case of equals shall be half in the case of inferiors when abused, in the case of others' wives or superiors, it shall be double of that stated for equals.

The Author mentions regarding mutual abuse in the case of persons who are relatively higher and inferior in caste, merit, and class also. *Danḍe* 'punishment' etc. *varṇāḥ* 'classes', such as the Brāhmana etc, *jāṭis*, 'castes', such as the *Mūrdhāvasikṭa* and others, *uttarādharāḥ*, 'superior and inferior', *i. e.* higher and lower. In the case of mutual abuse between these the determination of the punishment should be specially made; as for example for a Brāhmana for

1 See note above

2 Ch XX 5

3 Ch VIII. 276

4 The print of the Vîramitrodaya is thus 'मात्रादेर्निरपराधत्वे जायाया सापराधत्वे चैतादिति मिताक्षरा' apparently a slip as-is confirmed by the Mitākṣharā where the reading is सापराधेषु मात्रादिषु etc

abusing a *Mārdhavasikta* who is inferior to a *Brāhmaṇa* and is superior to a *Kṣatriya* shall pay half as much more the penalty as is laid down for the abuse of a *Kṣatriya* and less by a quarter of the penalty for the abuse of a *Brāhmaṇa* (206).

‘Half in the case of inferiors as has been stated above as if mentioning this as an illustration the Author mentions a special rule in the case of persons still lower and much higher *pratilomyeti* etc. In the case of an abuse of one of a superior class by one of those who are lower than the lowest, the punishments are respectively four-fold etc. In the case of an abuse of an inferior class by one of the highest class, respectively of the lower ones the punishments shall respectively be half half of the half and in the descending order. Thus such punishment as is prescribed in the case of an abuse of a *Brāhmaṇa* by a *Brāhmaṇa*, quadruple of that shall be for a *Śūdra*, triple of it for a *Vaiya*, and double of it for a *Kṣatriya* shall be the punishment for the abuse of the *Brāhmaṇa*. The punishment which is prescribed for the abuse of a *Brāhmaṇa* by a *Brāhmaṇa*, the half of that shall be for the abuse of a *Kṣatriya*, quarter of it for the abuse of a *Vaiya*, and the eight part for abusing a *Śūdra* shall be the punishment for a *Brāhmaṇa*. This should be understood elsewhere (207).

For an abusive threat ‘I shall cut off your arm or of a like nature, and threatening the destruction of an eye etc. the penalty shall be hundred *paṇas* and for an abusive threat of injury to the foot etc. half of a hundred shall be the punishment in the case of persons equal in caste. By the use of the word *adī* ‘et cetera’, is included hips and other minor organs (208).

This, moreover, to cut off the arms etc. is in regard to one who is able one however, who is weak and indulges in such abuse shall be punished ten *paṇas*. In the case of one who is very strong and indulges in the threat of an injury should be compelled to give security for the protection of the whole and for the avoidance of the arm-cutting etc. By the use of the word *is* is excluded one who is mightier still. By the use of the word *itad*, i. e., ‘also’, is included the statement that in the absence of a security he should be kept under restraint by the king. Here also the more or less is to be determined by regard to the distinction of the best and the lowest (209).

The Author now mentions with regard to abusive threats of the first, middlemost and the lowest class. For an accusation involving

degradation such the offence of Brāhmicide or the like, for such a charge the penalty is as for the middle *sāhasa*. For an abuse, however, imputing the commission of a secondary sin, the penalty as for the lowest *sāhasa* should be imposed. That for the middle *sāhasa* has been
 5 noted before. This, moreover, is with reference to persons of the same quality and the like By regard to the distinction of the higher or lower class, more or less should be inferred (210).

For an abuse of the *Brāhmanas* learned in the three Vedas *i. e.* accomplished scholars in the three Vedas, as also for the defamation of the
 10 king and of the gods also Thus, by the use of the word *ādāt*, 'etc.', is included the cutting of the trees etc. For an abusive language against a *Brāhmana*, that for the highest *sāhasa*. For an abuse of the caste, the pugas etc *i. e.* the associations of the *Mūrdhāvasikta* and the like, as that for the middle *sāhasa*, and for an abuse of the village or the country,
 15 the penalty for the first *sāhasa* shall be imposed For an abuse of *Kshatriyas* and the like, a double etc. should be understood. In regard to an abuse involving degradation *Manu*¹ says: "For a mutual abuse, "however, by a *Brāhmana* or a *Kshatriya* the punishment should be "administered as ordained. On the *Brāhmana* the lowest, and on the
 20 "Kshatriya the middlemost amercement."

In connection with the *Sūdras* *Bṛhaspati*² says: "For reviling "the *vipras* he is liable to have his tongue cut off."

So also "For one pronouncing their names and castes with "malicious intent, a red-hot iron spike of ten fingers in length should
 25 "be ordered in his mouth." This, however, appears to be in regard to excessive abuse actuated by habitual malice.

Here ends the Chapter called Abuse

Sūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 211

For those who indulge in an abuse of the learned in the three Vedas
 30 and the like, the highest amercement is the penalty, of the *jātis* such as the *Mūrdhābhishikta* &c, of the association of tradesmen and the like, the middle amercement, and of the village or the country, the first amercement, shall be the punishment

35 Thus ends the Chapter on verbal Abuse

1 Ch VIII 277

2 Not found in the published extracts of *Bṛhaspati*.

CHAPTER XIX.

Assault.

Now begins a chapter called Assault. Its characteristics have been stated by Narada¹: "Injuring the limbs of another with a hand, 'foot, weapon or otherwise' or defiling him with ashes or the like, is 'termed Assault' That injury i. e. striking and causing pain to another's limbs i. e. (also) to movable and immovable property by means of the hand foot, weapon or otherwise—by the use of the word 'otherwise *Ādi* i. e. (also) by means of stones &c— similarly that defilement by means of ashes—by the use of the word *Ādi* or the like', by means of dust, mud, faces also—which causes mental pain on account of the (vile) touch both these are known as 'Assault.' 5 10

That by means which an injury is caused is a *danda*, i. e. the body, a *pāruṣya* i. e. inimical behaviour by means of it towards movable property or the like, is called *Danda-pāruṣya* (Assault). 15

Having moreover stated its threefold division, distinguished by the raising of the hand &c. a second threefold division again has been stated by² the same Sage by regard to the threefold acts regarding articles of small, middling, or superior value "There are three "species of that also as it may be either small, middling, or extreme, "according as it consists in the raising (of a hand or weapon) or in "an unexpected attack, or in striking a wound (5) Stealing articles of small, middling or superior value, is called the three *Sāhasas*, there, the thorny weeds should be extirpated' 'An unexpected attack i. e. striking one who has not the least warning (about it). Only three *Sāhasas* i. e. three kinds of *Sāhasas*. i. e. daring deeds c. g. Assaults. 20 25

Moreover when abuse or assault has once commenced, whoever of the two contending parties, forbears, for such a one not only that there is no punishment, but he is indeed to be respected Similarly' for one who first began the quarrel, there shall be a higher punishment. Also when after the quarrel has commenced, he who follows up his attack is liable to be punished 30

And when it is not possible to discriminate between the guilt of the two, the fine shall be equal. Moreover, in the case of an insult offered to the *Āryas* by the *S'vapachas* and the like, the Good¹ people themselves have authority to levy a fine, if they are unable, the king should indeed chastise them, and not (merely) receive a fine. Thus, the five rules of procedure have been mentioned² by the same Sage :

“For both kinds of these, a five-fold rule of procedure has been laid down:” When, after an altercation has once commenced, and both have been excited to a high pitch, he who forbears is respected ; and he who pushes on (the quarrel) deserves punishment. He who is the first to offer an insult is decidedly a criminal, he who returns the insult is likewise culpable, but for him who began the quarrel, the punishment shall be heavier (9). When both parties are implicated equally, he of the two shall receive punishment who follows up his attack, whether he was (originally) the aggressor or the defendant (10). When two parties have been guilty of insult, and both have commenced to quarrel at the same time, they shall suffer the same punishment, in case that no difference (in their respective culpability) becomes apparent (8). If a *S'vapāka*, *Shandha*, a *Chandāla*, cripple, one who maintains by killing (beings), an elephant-driver, a *Vrātya*,³ a slave, transgress their limit and offer an insult to the teacher,⁴ preceptor, or the king, they shall instantly be punished corporally (11 and 12). Any one of the better class whom these persons offer an insult, may himself administer the punishment. The king has⁴ nothing to do with their punishment (13). For these people are the refuse of human society, and their property (likewise) savours of impurity. Therefore the king shall inflict corporal punishment upon them, and he must not (merely) punish them with a fine (14).”

1. The good men themselves shall punish them. But if they are unable, then the king shall chastise them and not merely remit with a fine. *Asahāya*

2. Ch. XV 7-14

3. One deprived of the caste for the non-performance of the ceremony of initiation. These are again admitted into the caste by the performance of a rite known as the *Vrātya-stoma*. It is also the descriptive name used in reference to the caste which originated from a *Sūda* father and a *Kṣhatrīya* mother.

4. Dr Jolly reads thus. गुर्वचारातिगेषु च (11) मयादानिक्रमे &c (12) “or one who treats a Guru or spiritual teacher with disregard” “should offend a superior &c” (12)

PAGE 131*

Premising the necessity of establishing an assault of the character thus¹ described the Author mentions the means of dealing out punishment when there is a doubt about it

Yājñavalkya, Verse 212

In the case of an assault to which there were no witnesses, the point at issue should be determined by means of marks, by probabilities, by popular report, and the like, lest the mark should be counterfeited. 5

Mīlākṣharā:—When, any one complains to the king thus, “I was beaten by such a one in secret,” then *chūṣmāi*, by means of marks, i. e. signs indicating colour &c., on the body *yuktya*, by probabilities, 10 by regard to the relation of cause and effect, *āgamena*, popular report, i. e. from the talk among the people—by the use of the word *cha*, and ‘the like, by an ordeal also—the determination should be made bearing in mind the possibility of a counterfeit mark

Vīramitrodaya

Now the Author begins the chapter on Assault. Its characteristics have been mentioned by Nārada¹: Injuring the limbs of another ‘with a hand foot, weapon or otherwise or defiling him with ashes or ‘the like is termed assault.” By the use of the word *adi* ‘and the like’ is included the cutting of the trees etc. 15 20

There first, on a doubt arising whether one has committed the assault or not, the Author mentions the means of determining the same

Yājñavalkya Verse 212

For an attack for which there are no witnesses i. e. (one) made in secret and when the assault was made with the feet and weapons, and a denial is set up such a dispute should be decided i. e. determined by means of marks such as scars etc. on the body by probabilities taking into consideration the motive etc. by knowledge i. e. by popular report By the use of the word *cha*, ‘and’, by ordeals *Kūta* etc. i. e., by others than by counterfeit marks By the use of the word *iva* however 25 30 the Author excludes the imposition of punishment etc. for mere verbal accusation such as I was beaten by him (212).

1 There is a mistake in the print of the text at p 131 Ll. for *यं पुराणं* &c.² read *यं पुराणं* etc.

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 212

5 Having assaulted another at a place devoid of witnesses and smearing one's body with blood, when one asserts "I have been beaten by him", there, for fear of counterfeit marks the decision is to be given by regard to unadulterated marks and also by the evidence of truthful people Brhaspati¹ states the characteristics of an assault "Injury by means of a staff, a stone, a club or ashes, mud or dust, or attacking with weapons, "is termed assault" (212)

10 Having thus determined the particular means, the Author mentions a special punishment

Yājñavalkya, Verses 213 and 214

For throwing ashes, mud, or dust the punishment recorded is ten *panas*, and double that amount for attacking with an impurity, a heel, 15 a spittle (213)

This if (the offence be committed) against one of an equal class. But (it would be) double (if the offence be committed) against another's wives, or against persons of higher orders, if, against persons of lower classes, a half of the fine, there shall be no fine for an offence committed 20 through infatuation, drunkenness, or the like (214)

Mitâkṣharâ —He who throws ashes, mud or dust at another should be compelled to pay a fine of ten *panas* By impurity is also included tears, phlegm, nails, hair, ear-wax, rheum of the eyes, and leavings at the meals. Pârṣṇih, *heel*, the hind part of a foot. 25 Nishthyûtam, *a spittle*, i. e. the water thrown out of the mouth For an assault with these, a fine twice of that i. e. the fine mentioned before viz (of) ten i. e. twenty *panas*, must be understood Again, a special rule has been stated by Kâtyâyana in cases of Assaults with *fæces* &c "It is declared to be four-fold, when the assault is committed, 30 "by (means of throwing) the vomit, or urine, or *fæces* or the like, on "the lower extremities, six-fold if thrown upon the middle extremity of the body, but eight-fold if upon the head" By the use of the term *Ādi*, 'or the like,' are included fat, semen, blood, the marrow of the bones, and flesh &c. (213)

35 The fine thus mentioned before should be understood in the case of persons of the same tribe. In the case of assaults on the

wives of others, it applies generally without differentiation. Also, (in the case of assaults) against persons of a higher order : *i.e.* higher in learning or conduct as compared with (the actor) himself a fine must be understood which would be double in amount of that mentioned before : *i.e.* of ten *panas* and also of twenty *panas*. In the case of persons of a lower class : *i.e.* inferior in learning &c. as compared with himself a fine half in amount of that mentioned before : *i.e.* five *panas*, or ten *panas* must be understood.

Mohah infatuation, means mental aberration. *Madah drunkenness*, is the particular condition (which is) produced by the drinking of intoxicating liquor. By the use of the word *Adi* the possession by a spirit &c. (also are included). When under the influence of these an assault is committed no penalty shall be imposed even when the ashes etc. (actually) touch the body (214).

Vīramitrodaya

Now after having thus determined (the fact of) the assault as the next step, the Author states the penalties according to circumstances up to the end of the chapter

Yājñavalkya, Verses 213-14

For a bodily assault upon another such as by ashes mud or dust, the penalty for the assailant shall be ten *panas*. For an attack with an impurity such as tears etc., or with a heel : *i.e.* the hind part of the leg or with a spittle : *i.e.* the excreta of the mouth the penalty is double of ten *panas* (213).

The penalty in this manner should be observed in the case of the equals in all the *varṇas*. For an attack on others wives or upon members of the higher *varṇas*, in regard to an offence of this character the punishment shall be double of that stated for the equals. In regard to a similar offence towards members of lower *varṇas* half the penalty of that stated for the equals should be imposed. *Mohah infatuation* : *i.e.* ignorance *madah drunkenness*, such as by liquor etc. By the use of the word *adi*, 'or the like', is included arrogance. By these even, if assault is made with ashes etc., there is no punishment. By the use of the word *cha*, and is indicated the addition of treble and quadruple punishments in the case of higher and higher degrees. It shall be four fold when (the attack is committed) by means of urine, vomit or fish or the like ; six fold if on the middle part of the body, but eight-fold if upon the head. The quadruple etc. is to be understood as of ten *panas* (213-14).

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 213-14

When the ashes etc touch another's body the penalty is ten panas
For a touch of the impurities also the same doubled (213)

5

Yājñavalkya, Verse 214

Similar is the penalty as characterised above in the case of persons of
the same caste, in the case of others' wives or of persons of superior caste
it is two-fold For those of the lower caste, half When it is done through
mistake etc (there is) no punishment (214).

10

The Author mentions a penalty in cases of assault by inferior
persons (against superiors)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 215

The limb of one who is himself not a *Brāhmaṇa*, which causes injury
to a *Viṇa*, must be cut off. When it is raised, the lowest amercement, (*is*
laid down), and half of it in (the case of) a touch

15

Mitākṣharā :—The limb of one who is (himself) not a *Brāhmaṇa*,
abrāhmaṇasya, i. e. of a *Kṣatriya* or the like, viz the hand, the foot etc.
which causes injury to the *Brāhmaṇas*, that should be cut off. Of a
S'ūdra causing injury to a *Kṣatriya* or a *Vaiśya* even, the punish-
ment indeed is the cutting off of the limb : “ With whatever limb a man
“ of a lower class does injury to one of a higher class, even that limb of
“ his should be cut off,” this is the command of *Manu*¹ From the rule
as to the cutting off of the limb of a *S'ūdra* for an offence against any
one of the twice-born tribes, by a parity of reasoning, the same punish-
ment would accrue to a *Vaiśya* causing any injury to a *Kṣatriya*

20

25

Udgīrṇe, when raised, i. e. when a weapon etc., is raised with a view
to strike, the punishment for the first amercement must be understood.
Of a *S'ūdra*, however, even for a raising (of the hand etc), the
punishment, indeed, is the cutting off of the hand etc., vide the text
of *Manu*²: “ For raising a hand or a stick, he deserves the punishment
“ of having his hand cut off.”

30

PAGE 132*

Sparśane, for touching, a weapon etc for raising it, however,
tadardhikah, half of it, i. e. half the punishment for the lowest *Sāhasa*,
must be understood. In cases of assaults by means of ashes etc. by a

Kṣatriya and a *Vaiśya* the punishment should be determined by regard to the rule stated in the text: 'In cases of the abuse of one 'of a superior class, the fine is two-fold and three-fold" Even there a *Śūdra* shall, indeed, have his hand cut off *like* the text of *Manu* 'If out of arrogance he spits (on a superior), the king shall 'cause both his lips to be cut off; if he urines (on him), the penis, if he breaks wind (against him), the anus "

Śūlapani

Yājñavalkya Verse 215

The hand etc. of a non *Brāhmana* causing injury to a *Brāhmana* should be cut for an attempt made however the first amercement but for touching a weapon as an attempt—half (215).

Having thus stated the punishment for an offence in the case of persons of lower classes, the Author proceeds again in regard to a person of the same caste

Yājñavalkya Verse 216

For holding up a hand or a foot, the punishment shall be ten and twenty *panas* (respectively) For threatening each other with a weapon, the punishment shall be the middle amercement for all

Mārkhaṇa —For raising a hand or a foot with the object of striking the fine shall be understood respectively to be ten *panas* or twenty *panas*. For raising a weapon with the object of striking each other in the case of the classes the middle amercement shall be the fine

Viramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya Verses 215-16

The limb of a *Kṣatriya* such as hand foot etc which causes injury to a *Brāhmana* by beating etc. should be cut off By the use of the word *cha*, and all the *Vaiśyas* and the *Śūdras* causing injury to *Kṣatriya* and the limb of a *Śūdra*, causing injury to a *Vaiśya* are included. *Kena kena* 'by whom? Vide this text of *Manu* "With whatever limb a man of a lower class does injury to one of a higher class, even that limb of his should be cut off; this is the command of *Manu* By the reading of the word *tu*, 'however, is excluded the cutting off of the limb of a *Brāhmana*.

Udgîrṇe, 'when raised', i. e. when uplifted for the purpose of an attack, in the case of a weapon etc. the penalty is as for the first *sâhasa*. For a mere touch of the weapon, however, by oneself for the purpose of raising it, the penalty is half of that for the first *sâhasa*. The first *sâhasa*, moreover, is for one other than a Śûdra. In connection with a Śûdra Manu¹ having observed "for raising a hand or a stick, "he deserves the punishment of having his hand cut off."

In the case of members of all the *varnas*, for the offence of raising the hand mutually against each other, the punishment is ten *panas*. For an attack with the foot the punishment is assessed at twenty *panas*, and for raising a weapon, the punishment is of the middle *sâhasa*. By the first use of the word *tu*, 'however', is excluded the falling of the weapon, and by the second use of the word *tu*, is excluded the penalty stated in the case of unequal castes (215-16).

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 216

For an attempt for an attack with the hands or the feet, the punishments respectively are ten and twenty *panas*, for an attempt with a weapon, the middling amercement (216)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 217

For pulling out the foot, the hair, the clothes or the hand (of another), ten *panas*, for causing pain by violently pulling a man caused to be tied in his clothes and trampling him under the foot, a hundred (*panas*) is the fine.

Mitâkṣharâ — Moreover, he who catches hold of the foot, the hair, the clothes, or the hand, or any of these, and pulls them out, *ulluñchhati*, i. e. violently plucks them, such a one shall be fined ten *panas*. Causing pain, pulling, tying in a cloth and trampling under foot (all joined together, make up the compound expression) 'Causing pain, pulling, tying in a cloth and trampling under foot', for doing that, a man shall be fined a hundred *panas*. The purport is this. He who after tying in a cloth, and violently pulling, tramples another under foot, such a man should be compelled to pay a hundred *panas*.

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 217

For pulling up the leg etc the punishment shall be ten *panas*. Injury by pulling and tying with a cloth these together make the conjunct compound, 'one who ties round by the upper cloth', and after tightening pulls up with the foot, for him the penalty shall be one hundred *panas* (217)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 218

The man causing pain without shedding blood by means of a stick or the like, shall be fined thirty-two *panas* double (that) at the appearance of blood

Mītākṣharā —Moreover he however who strikes mildly with a piece of wood or mud so that no blood is shed such a one shall be fined thirty-two *panas*. When however, on account of hard beating, blood is shed, then he shall be fined twice thirty-two i.e. sixty-four *panas*. A special rule, moreover has been pointed out by Mann¹ in the case of the breaking open of the skin, flesh &c.: 'He who breaks the skin shall be fined a hundred as also one who draws out blood. He who breaks the flesh, six *ni* *das* while he who breaks a bone shall be "banished"'

Sūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 218

For severely attacking with a wood the punishment shall be thirty two *panas* if blood does not appear. For its appearance however the penalty is double (218).

Yājñavalkya, Verse 219

For breaking a hand, a foot, or a tooth, and for cutting an ear or nose the fine shall be the middle (amercement) similarly for laying open a sore and also for beating almost to death.

Mītākṣharā —Moreover for breaking a hand a foot, or a tooth in each case, as also for cutting an ear or the nose (in each case) for laying open a healed up sore and for beating in such a manner that the man becomes almost dead, the middle amercement shall be understood. Here, the similarity of acts should be ascertained by regard to the result of the act.

Sūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 219

For breaking the hand piercing the nose opening up a healed scar or for striking one who is almost dead the penalty is the middle amercement (219).

Yājñavalkya, Verse 220

For a restraint in respect of motion, eating or speech for an injury to the eye and the like, for a fracture of the neck, the arm, or the thigh, the middle amercement.

Mītākṣharā.—Moreover for restraining motion, eating or speech, for an injury to the eye—and by the use of the term *Adi*, to the

tongue also--; *landharâ* means the neck; an arm is wellknown *sakhi* means the thigh, for fracturing each of these, the fine shall be, the middle amercement

PAGE 133*.

Sûlapâni

5 Yājñavalkya, Verse 220

For obstructing the movements, etc piercing the eyes etc or for breaking the neck and the like, the punishment shall be the middle amercement (220).

Yājñavalkya, Verse 221 (1)

10 When several assault a single person, the fine for them shall be double of that already mentioned.

Mitākṣharâ —Moreover, when however, several (people) combining together break the limb of one (man), or do any other similar act, then whatever fine has been laid down for the particular offence, a
15 fine double in amount of that must be understood in each case respectively. On account of the extreme aggravation of these offences, even in the cases of offences committed against persons of inferior classes, or of higher classes respectively, the reduction or increase is to be determined by reference to this very law of punishment in the
20 order mentioned in regard to the offence of abuse and the offences enumerated thereafter, and laid down in regard to persons of the same class, *vide* the text ¹ " Whatever punishment has been mentioned for the offence of abuse (and the like) committed against
" persons of superior or inferior classes respectively, the same penalty
25 " shall respectively be inflicted by the King in the offences of assault
" (and the like) also "

Vîramitrodaya

(For an assault) on members of the same caste the Author states

Yājñavalkya, Verses 217-21 (1)

30 For pulling out *i. e.* pulling with a jerk the feet etc. of others the penalty is ten *panas*. For causing pain *i. e.* for causing injury by pressing one's foot against one who has been tightly tied by a cloth and pulled, the penalty is a hundred of the *panas* (217).

1 Author not known Bâlabhāṭṭa assigns it to Manu But it is not found in the available editions of Manu

When a man assaults another with a wood etc. so that blood is not seen he should be condemned to pay thirty-two *paṇas* for the appearance of the blood, however he should be made to pay double in the case of breaking open of the skin etc. *Manu*¹ states a special rule He who breaks a skin shall be fined a hundred as also one who draws out blood. He who breaks the flesh six *niṣkaṣas* while “banished shall he be who breaks the bone (218).

For a wound of the three organs such as the hand and the rest each, for cutting of the nose for opening up a healed scar, and for beating in such a manner that he would be as if dead, the penalty is the middle *sāhasa*. By the use of the word *tathā* similarly is included the cutting of the finger (219).

Cheṣṭitē motion etc. for causing a restraint in respect of motion eating or speech or any of these for piercing the tongue etc. as also for an injury to the neck the arm or the thigh, for an injury to any of these the punishment is the middle amercement. By the use of the word *ka* ‘and’, is included the heel and the like (220).

Where many attack one there the penalty which has been stated for one as an assailant double of that is the penalty for the other. This is the meaning. Here the higher or lower punishment or the distinction of higher or lower is not to be observed [221 (1)].

Yājñavalkya Verse 221 (2)

That which had been taken away during the scuffle shall be restored, and a fine double (in value) of that

Mitākṣharā —During the continuance of the scuffle whatever has been taken away by a party should be given back by him. Also a fine double the amount (in value) of the thing taken away must be paid as penalty for the deprivation

Vīramitrodaya

Moreover

Yājñavalkya Verse 221 (2)

During the continuance of a fight what has been taken away by one as belonging to another should be returned by him to the other and on that account a penalty of double the value of that as for taking it away should be taken by the king [221 (?)]

Sûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 221

For many combining together and beating one, the punishment shall be double of those stated And in the scuffle whatever has been taken
5 away from any one, that shall be given to him, and double of that should be given to the king as a penalty (221)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 222

He, who causes bodily injury, shall pay the expenses incidental thereto, and shall also pay the fine mentioned in regard to the particular assault

10 Mitākṣharâ —Moreover, he who causes injury (to another) by beating, shall pay such expenses as may be incurred for dressing and curing the wound, and for medicine and special diet therefor The fine to be paid is the fine imposed for the particular kind of assault in
15 penses incidental to the wound

Vîramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 222

He, however, who causes a wound etc by beating shall be compelled to pay the amount of expenses incurred for the complete
20 recovery of the one on whom a wound has been caused. The meaning is he should be compelled to pay as much money as would be required for procuring medicine etc for him In places where a wound etc. has
30 been caused, not only the payment for it, but also a penalty should be caused to be paid by him as has been prescribed generally for the
25 particular quarrel The use of the word *cha* 'and', in the cumulative sense excludes option (222).

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 222

One who causes pain to another by breaking the hand, foot, etc such
30 a one shall pay the expenses for the restoration, i e for as much period as is required for him to be under nursing etc to be able again, for such interval That punishment which has been stated for a scuffle, that also he shall be made to pay (222)

Having mentioned the penalties for assaults upon the limbs of others, the Author now mentions the penalty for the spoliation of external property¹

Yājñavalkya, Verse 223

For striking at the wall, or for boring or breaking or demolishing it, he shall be made to pay a fine of five ten and twenty *panas* respectively and also the expenses (incidental thereto)

Mītākṣhara :—For striking, at a wall with a club or other similar weapon or for making a whole in it, or for breaking it into two (sections), the fine shall be understood to be five *panas*, ten *pana*. 10 and twenty *panas* respectively For demolishing a wall moreover, all these three fines shall be inflicted cumulatively Also the amount (of expenses) for rebuilding it shall be paid to the owner

Sūlapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 223

For an attack with a club etc or a wound with a stick, or for piercing with the sword one should be compelled to pay respectively five ten, and twenty *panas*. Similarly for pulling over a wall or the bricks etc. by the reasoning of juxtaposition twenty *panas* also should be declared and he should also be made to pay the expenses for the restoration (3) 20

Yājñavalkya, Verse 224

One throwing in a house a thing (which is capable of) causing bodily injury or deprivation of life shall be compelled to pay sixteen *panas* for the first, and the middle amercement for the second offence (respectively)

Mītākṣhara :—And again, one throwing into the house of another things which cause bodily injury & a thorn &c. shall be compelled to pay sixteen *panas*, while one throwing things causing deprivation of life e.g. poison, snake &c. shall be punished in the middle amercement. 25

Sūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 224

For throwing thorns and other such things in the house as also a snake and the like, for the first he shall be compelled to pay sixteen *panas* and for the second the middle amercement (4). 30

1 अस्मिन् अर्थे, The offences mentioned hitherto refer to a man's अस्मिन् internal property such as land, foot &c ; now the Author mentions offences relating to his external property Shortly stated and in terms of the Indian Penal Code, the offences enumerated above are Offences against the Body The author now enumerates Offences against Property

The Author mentions the punishment for assaulting beasts

Yājñavalkya, Verse 225

For causing pain, drawing blood, as also for cutting off branches, or a limb of minor beasts, the fine shall be one beginning with two *panas* and upwards.

- 5 Mitāksharâ.—In the case of minor beasts such as the goat, the sheep, the deer and the like, for beating, causing injury, and drawing blood, or a *sâkhângachhedane*, for cutting off the branches—by the word *S'âkhâ*—branch—are indicated such limbs as are without the circulation of life in them, limbs such as the horns &c—*angani*, limbs, such as
10 the hands, the feet, and like others *S'âkhâ* (A branch) and *anga* (a limb) joined together make up the compound expression *S'âkh-angam* For cutting that, the fine is (laid down) commencing with two *panas* &c A fine which has in it two *panas* is a fine of two *panas* That series of punishments in which a sum of two *panas* is
15 the first & the beginning—is a fine 'beginning with two *panas* and upwards' That series of fines moreover is two *panas*, four *panas*, six *panas*, eight *panas*, and in a similar series, and not as two *panas*, three *panas*, four *panas*, five *panas* &c

PAGE 135 *

- If it be asked how is that? the answer is By regard to the
20 heinousness of the offence, the three kinds of higher punishments are to be understood as being higher than the lowest punishments There, also, instead of resorting to the numbers three &c which have not been specifically mentioned, it is better to get at the aggravated penalty by the repetition of the number two which has been specially
25 mentioned Thus there is no fault

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 225

- For causing injury to inferior animals such as the goats, sheep, etc for causing blood, and also for cutting the branches, such as the horns or
30 the limbs or feet etc the punishment shall respectively be in doubling order beginning with two *panas* At some place the reading is double of the double in order (225)

Yājñavalkya, Verso 226

For cutting off (their) genital organs, and for causing death the middle amercement, as also the price. In the case of superior animals the fine shall be double in similar cases.

Mītākharā — Moreover for cutting off the genital organs of minor beasts and for causing their death, the fine shall be the middle amercement and the price shall be paid to the owner. In the case of superior animals however e.g. the cow, elephant the horse and like others, *elephā sthāpēphā, for similar case i.e.* for beating or drawing out blood or doing similar acts, a fine double of that mentioned before should be understood.

Śūlapani

Yājñavalkya, Verse 226

For the cutting of the genital organs of lower beasts or for killing them the middling amercement and the price should be caused to be paid to the owner of the animal. In the case of higher animals such as the cow etc. double the amount of that stated before should be levied (2 6)

The Author mentions the penalty for an injury to immovable property

Yājñavalkya, Verso 227

For cutting off the branches, or the trunk, or uprooting entirely the trees which throw down branches having sprouts, as also trees which are the means of livelihood, the fine is twenty *panas* and (its) double.

Mītākharā — Prarohāḥ, *sprouts i.e.* shoots branches having these are branches having sprouts, i.e. those branches which when cut off develop again at each knot of trees like the banyan and the like such trees, are called *prarohakakṣmaḥ, trees which throw down branches having sprouts* for cutting off the branches of these. That from which the original branches shoot out is called the trunk, for cutting that, as also for cutting up a tree together with its roots, there shall be a fine beginning with twenty *pana* and increased by twofold of the previous one.

This is what is (intended to be) said. The three penalties of fine i.e. twenty *panas*, forty *panas*, and eighty *panas* are inflicted respectively for the offences of the cutting off of the branches and for the offences following in their order.

And even of trees which do not 'throw down branches having sprouts,' but which are a means of livelihood *e.g.* the mango tree and the like, fines similar to these mentioned before must be understood for acts similar to those specified above, *i.e.* in the case of trees which are not
5 the means of livelihood, nor do throw down branches having sprouts

S'ūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 227

For lopping off the branches of trees, the roots of which enter the ground such as the *vata* etc or of trees such as the mango and the like
10 which are the source of livelihood of the people, beginning with twenty *panas* the punishment should be increased in doubling order of the one prior in the case of the one following (227)

The Author mentions a rule regarding particular trees

Yājñavalkya, Verse 228

15 In the case of trees growing in a sacrificial place, a cemetery, a boundary, a sacred place, or a temple, and trees well known, the fine is two-fold.

Mitākṣharā -- For cutting off the branches or for doing like acts in regard to trees growing on a sacrificial place or in a similar other place, a fine twice that mentioned before. So also in the case of trees which are
20 well known such as the *pippala*,¹ *palāśa* and the like, the fine is two-fold.

S'ūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 228

Chaitya is a tree growing on a high place, *usruta*, *i.e.* 'well-known',
25 for the cutting of the trunk etc of these twenty (*panas*) is the consequent (inference) (228)

The Author mentions a rule regarding creepers etc

Yājñavalkya, Verse 229

30 In the case of injury in the aforementioned parts to² *Gulma*, *Guchchha*, *Kshupa*, *Latās* (creepers), *Pratāna*, *Oshadhi*, and *Virudh*, the fine is half of that before mentioned

Mitākṣharā.—*Gulmāḥ* such as the *Mālatī*³ plant and the like, are those creepers which do not develop into any considerable length. *Guchchhas*

1 *Pippala*—is the holy fig tree *Ficus Religiosa* *Palāśa* also called *Kimsūka* *Butea Frondosa* see p 1151 n 5 also p 944 n 3 (above)

2 These are the several groups of creepers and shrubs with minute distinctions which have been indicated by Vājñāneśvara further on

3 मालती (*Mālatī*) *Echites Caryophyllata*, is a kind of jasmine with white fragrant flowers

are not in form like creepers, nor are they generally straight and smooth, e.g. the *Karantaka*¹ plant and like others. *Kṣhupaḥ* e.g. the *Karantaka*² plant or the like, which are generally straight and smooth. *Lataḥ* or creepers which develop into considerable lengths such as the grape, *Atimukta*³ &c. *Pratanāḥ* are creepers without knots or offshoots, and growing straight such as the *Sāra*⁴ and others. *Oṣadhayaḥ* are those which develop fruit such as the paddy plant etc. *Virudhaḥ* are those which even when cut grow and develop in various parts, such as *Gulīchā*⁵ and the like.

In the case of these, for injuries as aforementioned such as cutting or lopping off, a fine half of that mentioned before must be understood.

Thus ends the Chapter on Assault

Viramitrodaya

Having thus stated the penalty for an assault on the body of an individual the Author mentions the same for an assault on other things.

Yājñavalkya, verses 223-29

For striking at : e felling to the ground a partition : e of a wall or for piercing through it with a club etc., or for cutting it : e splitting into two with a sword etc. or for rending it with a stick etc.—the word *tathā* 'similarly' goes with all the three. The meanings of all have been expressed by the words clubs etc. Five ten and twenty *paṇas* in order follow alternatively in the case of attack for felling it down however *tadāyayam*, the expenses for it : e the amount of money spent for the reconstruction of the wall. By the use of the word *tathā*, 'also' simultaneity is intended (223).

1 कृत्वाः (*Kṛvāḥ*) *Amaranth* *leucolobus* a species of Amaranth white or yellow in colour and having thorns.

2 कर्षी (*Karṣī*) *Asium Odoratum* a kind of tree with white, red or yellow flowers; known in Marathi as the *Karṣī* (कर्षी).

3 अतिमुक्ता (*Atimukta*) a kind of creeper otherwise known as *Vadharī* (वार्वरी) (Marathi शिंगा or कर्षी शिंगा) represented as twining itself round the mango tree and as the beloved of that tree. Also the name of a tree *Dalbergia Oxyderrum* (शिंदी). Apte

4 कर्षी—This plant cannot be identified

5 गुल्लि (*Gullichi*)—Marathi-गुल्लि *Cocculus cordifolius*—a very useful plant generally growing on trees; it is a drug of considerable importance in the Indian medicine

Things which are likely to cause pain such as thorns etc , or which may cause deprivation of life, such as a snake etc. one throwing these in the house of another, shall be punished in the manner that the throwing causes injury. There the first *i. e* the one who throws thorns
5 etc , sixteen panas, the second *i e* one who throws a serpent etc should be compelled to pay the middle amercement (224)

In the case of minor beasts such as the deer, the goat etc for an attack which brings out blood and causes pain, or for cutting off the branches in the form of the horn etc , or for the injury to a limb such
10 as a foot etc a series of punishments of which two *panas* is the first shall be inflicted. This is the meaning Here by mentioning the number two the increase in the *panas* is by two and two in respective order (225)

For cutting off the organ of minor beasts or for killing them, the
15 middle amercement shall be the punishment And he shall also pay the price to the owner. For causing injury to superior animals, double the amount of penalty stated in the case of minor beasts should be inflicted. By the use of the word *cha* 'and', here also the price should be paid By the use of the word *eva*, 'only', is excluded the payment of the price
20 in the case of the four such as the one who causes pain etc. (226).

In the case of trees which throw down branches having sprout, such as the *vata* tree and the like, and also trees which are the means of livelihood such as the mango and the like, for cutting off the branches or the entire trunk from its roots up and of its limbs the punish-
25 ments shall be double commencing with twenty *panas i e* twenty-
forty, eighty respectively in the case of the three By the use of the word *cha*, 'and', is included the fact that in the case of trees with roots going down being the source of livelihood and the rest etc., for cutting it off, double that shall be the punishment (227)

Chaitya, 'a sacrificial place', *i e* a lovely place , boundary *i e* the
30 limit of two villages and the like. On these *i e* on these holy and sacrificial places, on the places where there are temples of gods, for cutting off the branches of trees growing there, as also in the case of well known trees such as the *pippala* etc double of that mentioned
35 before *i e* of twenty *panas* etc shall be the punishment By the use of the word *cha* is added by inclusion the payment of expenses for restoration (228).

Gulmāḥ : *c* creepers not long nor thick such as *Mālāṭī* etc. *Guchchhah* not having the form of a creeper and not straight such as the *Karavīra* and the like. *Kaṣṭhāḥ*, small trees with straight stems such as the *Karavīra* plant and the like. *Latāḥ* creepers extending to great lengths such as the *atimukta* and the like. These also growing thick without any knots or offshoots such as *sārvā* etc. *Oṣadhayah* herbs which develop fruit such as the paddy plant etc. Although cut they grow variously again and so called *virudhāḥ* such as the *gudāchi* and the like. For the cutting off of the branches of these half of what has been stated before viz. of twenty *paṇas* : *c* ten *paṇas* shall be the punishment. Here also the payment for the expenses of the recoupment is also to be observed. Manu' "He who raises his hand or a stick shall have his hand cut off he who in anger kicks with his foot shall have his foot cut off (281) A low caste man who tries to place himself on the same seat with a man of a high caste shall be branded on his hip and be banished or (the king) shall cause his buttocks to be gashed (282). If out of arrogance he spits (on a superior) the king shall cause both his lips to be cut off if he urinates (on him) the penis if he breaks wind (against him) the anus (283). If he lays hold of the hair (the king) should lop off his hands unhesitatingly likewise (if he takes him) by the feet the beard the neck or the scrotum (284) This penalty is for a Śūdra in regard to a Brāhmana. Vāyana' One who causes pain without blood thirty *paṇas* with blood sixty *paṇas* For fear of prolixity other punishments are not stated here (223-229)

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 229

Gulmāḥ, such as the *mālāṭī* plant etc. *Guchchhah*, such as the *Karavīra* etc., *Kaṣṭhāḥ*, such as the *Karavīra* etc. *Latāḥ* i. e. creepers such as grapes etc. *Pradāḥ* : *c* creepers without knots or offshoots such as the *sārvā* etc. *Oṣadhayah* i. e. herbs such as corn trees which develop fruit. *Virudhāḥ* i. e. creepers which even when outgrow with special strength, such as the *gudāchi* etc. for the cutting of the trunk etc. of these half of the penalty stated before. And the payment for their growth again.

Thus ends the Chapter on Assaults.

CHAPTER XX

Sâhasas or Heinous Offences

PAGES 135*

Now, intending to discuss the title of law called the *Sâhasa*, the Author first states its definition

5 Yājñavalkya, Verse 230 (1)

When common property is forcibly carried away, that is called a *Sâhasa*.

10 Mitâkṣharâ — A deprivation of property which is *sâmânya*, common, i.e. which is held in common, or, (also) having regard to its general characteristic of being incapable of appropriation at will, which is another's property is a *Sâhasa*. Whence ? *prasabhaharaṇât*, on account of a forcible carrying away, in short, on account of a deprivation by a show of force.

15 This is what is (intended to be) said By disregarding the Royal sanction, or the protest of the people, whatever act of beating, or assaulting the wife of another and the like is committed in the presence of State Authorities or the ordinary people, all that is a *Sâhasa*, this is the nature of a *Sâhasa*. Therefore, even in the case of a deprivation of property which is common or which is another's, there is a *Sâhasa* on account of the same being done by means of a show of force

20 The characteristics of a *Sâhasa* have been described by Nârada¹ also " Whatever act is performed by force by persons inflamed with " (the pride of) strength is called a *Sâhasa*, *sahah* means force in "this world " The *Sâhasa* of this description, although it is closely allied to theft, abuse, assault, and seduction, of women, still differs
25 from these on account of the special element of show of excessive force, and so has been specially mentioned with the object of (laying down) excessive punishments

Of that also, after having laid down a threefold division into the lowest and the others, and with a view to demonstrate the different punishments, the characteristics have also been described by the
30 same Sage² " That again is declared to be threefold in the *S'âstras* " viz (*Sâhasa* of) the first, middlemost, and the highest degree The " definition thereof has been given separately (3) Destroying, reviling, disfiguring or otherwise (injuring) fruits, roots, water and

' the like, or agricultural utensils is declared to be a *Sihasa*, of the
 " first degree (4) (Injuring) in the same way clothes cattle food,
 " drink or household utensils is declared to be a *Sihasa* of the
 " middlemost degree (5). Taking human life by means of poison
 weapons and the like in leonine assault on another man's wife and
 " whatever other (offences) encompassing life (may be imagined) is
 " called a *Sihasa* of the highest degree (6). The punishment to be
 " inflicted for it must be proportionate to the heaviness of the crime,
 " (so however as) not to be less than a hundred (*Pana*) for a
 " *Sihasa* of the first degree whereas for a *Sihasa* of the middle
 " most degree the punishment is declared by persons acquainted with
 " the *Vātra* to be not less than five hundred (*pana*) (7). For a
 " *Sihasa* of the highest degree a fine amounting to no less than a
 " thousand *pana* is ordained. (Moreover) corporal punishment
 " confiscation of the entire property banishment from the town, and
 " branding as well as amputation of that limb (with which the crime
 " had been committed) is declared to be the punishment for *Sihasa* of
 " the highest degree (8). Corporal punishment and the like punishment
 in a *Sihasa* of the highest degree should be administered cumulatively¹
 or alternatively by a discriminating regard to the offence committed.

Among these the Author mentions the penalty for a *Sihasa* which is in the form of deprivation of another's property

Yajñavalkya Verse 230 (2)

The fine is twice the amount of the value of it, but four-fold when (the offence is) denied

Mitākshara — *Of it i.e. of the thing taken away dwiguna twice the amount madyat, of the value shall be dandah, the fine* He however who having committed a *Sihasa* *nihate* denies saying 'I did not do, for such a one a fine is inflicted which is *chaturguna*, four times the value of the thing

From this very rule where a special penalty is laid down it may² be inferred that the general rules of punishment laid down in connection with *Sihasa* of the first degree and the like are applicable to cases other than (where there has been) the deprivation (of property).

1 दण्डः—Chastisement which may extend to Capital punishment

2 उपसर्गसम्पन्न

3 गत्यने ।

Vīramitrodaya

"Whatever act is performed by force by a person inflamed with
 "(the pride of) strength is called *Sāhasa*, *saha* means force in this
 " world Theft is a special variety of it The difference between
 5 "(*sāhasa* and theft) is as follows, where the criminal act consists of a
 " forcible attack it is *sāhasa*, where it is done by fraud it is theft "
 Thus characterized by Nārada,¹ the Author begins the title of law
 called *Sāhasa* which consists of a forcible injury in spite of the know-
 ledge of the owner and which is distinguished from theft

Yājñavalkya, Verse 230

- 10 *Sāmānya*, 'common', *ī e*, which is held as common property, in
 short which is another's property. Property of this character such as
 gold etc Of that forcibly carrying away *ī e* dropping with force in
 the presence of the owner. Such a taking away by regard to the
 15 literal meaning is *sāhasa*, declared by the word *sahasa*, *ī e* declared in
 the Smṛtis There, of that *ī e* of the property twice the value when it
 is snatched away and four-fold when it is denied *ī e* concealed (230).

S'ūlapâni

Yājñavalkya Verse 230

- 20 Common property *ī e* property of a low kind, such as grain etc , or of
 the ownership of the many, of common property such as corn etc Of
 common property also such as corn etc, deprivation in the presence of the
 owner by force *ī e* taking it away by compulsion constitutes a title of
 law known as heinous offences When, however, anything is done in the
 25 absence of the owner or is denied after committal, that is known as theft
 As says Manu ² "It will be an offence of robbery when it is committed
 " in the presence (of the owner) and with violence, if (it is committed) in
 " his absence it becomes theft, as also if it is denied after it has been
 " taken " "In the presence' *ī e* in the presence of the owner, in the absence,
 30 it becomes theft, 'denies' *ī e* conceals

- Nārada³ having stated five kinds of *Sāhasas* such as the homicide
 etc has also stated an act done with violence to be *Sāhasa* thus " Man-
 " slaughter, robbery, an indecent assault on another man's wife and the
 " two species of assault, these are the five kinds of heinous offences
 35 " That again is of three kinds etc (see Nārada ch xiv 3-8, see above Mitāk-
 sharâṇṇa p 1276 l. 3 to p 1277 l 18) Whatever act is performed by force by
 persons inflamed with (the arrongance of) strength is called *Sāhasa*
 (a heinous offence), *saha* or force means strength in this world (230)

The Author mentions a rule regarding one causing a *Sīhara* (to be committed)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 231

He who causes the commission of a *Sīhara* shall be made to pay a double fine and he who causes it by declaring "I shall pay" shall be made to pay four fold 5

Madakshara:—Yah he, however who says (to another) "Commit *Sīhara*", and (thus) karayati, *causes* a *Sīhara* to be committed, dwiguṇam dandam dāpyah *shall be made to pay twice the amount of penalty*, imposed upon the actor himself. He moreover who says "I shall pay you money" and thus causes a *Sīhara* to be committed such a one shall be compelled to pay chatarganam, *a four fold fine* on account of the aggravation of the offence 10

Vīramitrodaya

The punishment for one who causes a *Sīhara* is like the one who perpetrates it (himself). So the Author says 15

Yājñavalkya, Verse 231

He who causes a *Sīhara* to be perpetrated by an order do the "*Sīhara*"; such a one shall be compelled to pay a penalty twice that for the perpetration of the *Sīhara*. On a possibility occurring of a penalty being inflicted upon you I shall pay the amount. he who saying thus causes a *Sīhara* shall be compelled to pay four times that for the perpetration of *Sīhara* (231). 20

Śūlapani

Yājñavalkya, Verse 231

He etc. He who causes by his words to commit an offence such a one should be compelled to pay a penalty twice of that for the offence. He moreover who causes it to be done with the words "I shall give you money you do" shall be compelled to pay four times on account of the aggravated form (of the offence) (231). 25

The Author mentions a special rule regarding a particular offence for abusing the venerable etc. 30

PAGE 186*

The Author mentions rules regarding particular *Sīhara*s

Yājñavalkya, Verses 232 & 233.

He who abuses or disobeys the venerable who beats his brother's wife, who does not give what is promised, who breaks open a house (which is sealed) (232), 35

Or who does an injury to his neighbour, or blood-relations and the like, for all such offenders fifty *panas* is the fine, this is the invariable rule

Mitākṣharâ — Of the venerable, *arghasya*, i.e. those who deserve to be respected, e.g. the teacher &c, he who offers an abuse or transgresses their commands, as also he who beats his brother's wife, similarly one who does not pay an amount which was promised, i.e. agreed upon, he, also, who breaks open a house which is sealed, also, he who does an injury to the owners of houses or fields adjoining his own house or field, or to blood relations, i.e. those born in his own family—and by the use of the term *ādī*, 'Also', (he who causes injury) to the inhabitants of his own village or country—all these shall be punishable with a fine of fifty *panas*

Vîramitrodaya

The Author mentions particular punishments for particular *sāhasas*
15 Yājñavalkya, Verses 232-33

One who levels an abuse or transgresses the commands of the venerable people such as the preceptor etc, he also who gives a beating to the brother's wife, likewise one who does not deliver something such as gold etc., which has been accepted for delivery from another, he who breaks open a house which is sealed with a signet (232),

One who does an injury to any one of these, viz. the inhabitants of his own or of the neighbouring village, gentiles i.e. persons born in his own family, and by the use of the word *ādī*, 'et cetera' *srenī* and others also; for these stated before, the penalty is measured by fifty *panas* Thus has been definitely declared the punishment in the *Dharmasāstra* By the use of the word *cha*, 'and', is included one who does not indulge in a speech (233)

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 232

He who abuses and also disobeys the respectable, such as the preceptor etc, as also one who beats his brother's wife, similarly he who does not give what is promised, and also one who breaks open a house which is sealed, also one who does an injury to the owners of the fields or houses adjoining his own house or field, as also his relatives i.e. persons born in his family—by the use of the word *ādī* 'and the like', as also persons of his village or country—such a one should be punished with fifty *panas* (233)

Of the *Sāmanta* such as a betelnutseller and the like as alone are authorized by an association By the use of the word *Ādī* for one causing injury to *Sreṇī* and the like also, a fine of fifty *panas* should be imposed (233)

Yājñavalkya. Verses 234-237

He who wantonly consorts with a widow, who does not run (in response) to a call (for help) who causelessly raises a cry (for help), he who being a Chāṇḍāla, touches men of the higher classes (234)

Who feeds Śūdra ascetics on (the occasions of) religious or obsequial ceremonies, who pronounces an improper oath, who being unqualified, does an act which can be performed by those (only) who are qualified (235) 5

As also he who destroys the virility of a bull or inferior beasts, who conceals common property who destroys the fetus of a female slave (236)

Or whoever being the father the son, the sister and a brother the husband and the wife the preceptor and the pupil, abandons each the other when (that other is) not degraded shall be fined a hundred *ṛ* (237) 10

Mītākṣhara —Moreover he who without a *Vijya* or a proper appointment has connection with a widow (merely) by self will or who upon a cry for help being raised by persons frightened by thieves and like others, does not run for help even when he is able as also he who causelessly raises a cry (for help) he who being a Chāṇḍāla touches a Brāhmana or others also he, who feeds Śūdra ascetics such as the Digambaras and others at religious or obsequial ceremonies he also, who pronounces an improper oath, *e.g.* I shall take my mother &c, similarly one who being unqualified *e.g.* a Śūdra and the like does an act *e.g.* study &c. which can be done only by one qualified. A bull means a strong bull. minor beasts such as a goat &c. one who destroys the virility *i.e.* the procreative power of these. In the case of the rearing (one who destroys the virility) of trees and minor plants &c. —(it should be interpreted thus)—one who causes the destruction of the fruits or budding blossoms of trees etc. by means of sprinkling asafetida or other drugs. he who conceals common property *i.e.* who causes a deception in regard to property which is common as also one causing the abortion of a female slave as also those who being related as their father etc. abandon each the other without being degraded all these severally deserve to be fined one hundred *ṛ* each 20 25 30

Thus ends the chapter on *Sahasas*.

Vîramitrodaya

With a view to treat of adultery with women as distinguished from *sâhasa* and although differentiated from *sâhasa* there being comparison between the two, the Author while stating the penalty for that, mentions
5 the penalty for others also with a view to brevity of the composition

Yājñavalkya, Verses 234–37

Svachchhandena, 'wantonly', i. e. *svechchhayâ*, i. e. 'according to his impulse,' having intercourse with a widow, when a cry is raised by those frightened by robbers and others, one who though competent does
10 not run up for preventing it; one who causelessly raises a hew and cry, one being a *Chandâla* touching Brâhmanas or the like, one who feeds the Sudras or the ascetics such as the nude ones and the like at rituals in honour of the gods or of the manes, one who indulges in an improper oath such as "I shall approach the mother if this is false"
15 and the like, similarly one unfit such as the *śūdra* and the like performing the acts of those who are qualified such as the Brâhmana and others studying the vedas, one who destroys the virility i. e. procreative capacity of bulls or lower beasts, one concealing common property which is undivided, one who destroys the embryo of a
20 female slave, and any one of the following two abandoning the other viz father and son, sister and brother, husband and wife, preceptor and the pupil, when the other has not been degraded, such a one — i. e. all these, become liable for a penalty of one hundred panas The use of the first *cha* is inclusive of one who raises up a cry even for a reason,
25 by the second use, of one who has fallen, by the third, of the heretics, by the fourth, of a ritual in honour of men, by the fifth, of a bull, by the sixth, of the mother and the son renouncing each other, of the father and son by one alone, for the abandonment of the other Śankha says "He who lustfully abandons those not degraded shall incur the
30 "penalty of a hundred" This moreover, is, when the abandonment is by the unlearned, for an abandonment by the learned, however, says Manu¹ "Neither the mother, nor the father nor wife nor the son
"should be cast off, one casting them off when they are not guilty of "degradation shall be fined by the king six hundred" When the
35 learned cast off each other, a penalty of three hundred should be understood (234–37)

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 234

He who has an intercourse with a widow without an "appointment", one who does not run up (for help) when loudly invoked by those oppressed with the fear of robbery as also one who causelessly raises up a cry; one who being a *chāṇḍāla* touches the Brāhmana and the others. 5

Yājñavalkya Verse 235

He also who causes the ascetics such as the *digambaras* etc. to be fed at rituals in honour of the Gods and the manes he also who utters an improper oath e.g. "I shall have recourse to mother" and he also who being himself unfit such as a Śūdra etc. does acts for which he is not fit such as imparting education etc. (235). 10

Yājñavalkya Verse 236

*Viṇṇahā*¹ a bull i.e. a fat bull other animals such as goat etc., one who destroys the virility i.e. the procreative capacity of these. For the rearing trees, lower animals etc. one who by the use of medicaments such as *asapboṭṭiḍa* etc. causes the fruits and the flowers of trees to fall one who causes deception regarding common property one who causes abortion to a female slave (36). 15

Yājñavalkya Verse 237

Those also such as the father and the like although not degraded abandon each other all these shall be liable to pay a penalty of a hundred *paṇas* (237). 20

On the occasion of discussing Śāstras, the Author mentions a penalty for similar offences by the washermen and like others 25

Yājñavalkya, Verse 238

A washerman wearing the garments of another shall be fined three *paṇas*, and in cases of a sale, hiring out, pledge, or a loan on request ten *paṇas*.

PAGE 137*

Mitākṣhara —*Nejakah*, a washerman is one who cleans clothes (by washing) such a one, if he himself puts on clothes made over to him for being washed then should be fined three *paṇas*. He moreover who sells them, or hires out, e.g. (with an agreement such as): "This cloth is being given to you for such a period, so much money should be given to me" and who thus lets out on hire or makes a pledge of it, or gives it to his relatives and friends upon request, such a one shall be fined ten *paṇas* for each offence. Those clothes, moreover must be washed 30 35

1. वि-वर्णि—a scion bull.

Śūlapāṇi

On the occasion of treating the Śāhasas the Author mentions a penalty for the washermen and the like in regard to offences of a like nature.

Yājñavalkya Verse 238

A washerman, i.e. one who cleans the clothes; such a one if he himself puts on clothes which have been made over to him for washing then he should be fined three *panas*. One moreover who sells these or pledges on an agreement that "this is being given to you for use for a particular period you should give me so much money" in this way one who pledges it or creates a charge on it, or one who gives it over to his relatives on a request, such a one should be punished with ten *panas* for each offence. 5

These clothes, moreover should be washed on a smooth plank of the silk-cotton tree and not on a stone. As Manu' has observed "Nor shall he return the clothes (of one person) for the clothes (of another) nor allow anybody to wear them" (35). 10 15

Yājñavalkya Verse 239

For witnesses in a dispute between a father and a son, the fine is three *panas*. Also for him who engages himself therein, for such a one also the fine is eight fold.

Mitākṣhara — In a dispute between a father and a son he who undertakes to be a witness, and does not ward off the dispute such a one shall be fined three *panas*. He moreover who in a dispute with a wager between them, becomes a surety—and by the use of the term *cha* also he who fans the dispute between them, even he—shall be fined an amount eight times three *panas*, i.e. twenty-four *panas*. In the case of (a dispute between) a husband and a wife or like others, this same (rule as to the) fine must be followed. 20 25

Viramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya Verse 239

In a quarrel between the father and the son one who undertakes to be a witness and does not ward off the quarrel, for him the penalty is measured by three *panas*. He moreover who intermeddles in their dispute and aggravates the quarrel for him—by the use of the word *api* even in such a dispute for the surety—a fine of eight *panas* should be administered (239). 30 35

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 239

For witnesses in a dispute between a father and son the penalty is three *panas*. For one who intermeddles, the penalty is eight *panas* (39).

Yājñavalkya, Verse 240

He who falsifies scales, royal mandates, measures, and also standard coins, and also he who uses these, shall (both) be forced to pay the highest amercement.

5 Mitâkṣharâ —Tulâ, scales, i e the weightment rod Sâsanam, a Royal mandate, has been described¹ before Mâna, a measure, such as a *prastha*,² a *drona*, and the like Nânakam, a standard coin, i e (money) stamped with (the royal) mark or the like, such as a *dramma*,³ a *nishka*, or the like

10 In the case of these, he who *kûtakṛt*, falsifies them, i e who makes them different from the general standard of the country, whether less or more, or stamps (money such as) *dramma* and the like in an unusual manner, or alloys it with copper or other (base metal), and he also who uses them knowing them to be false, both of these shall each be fined in the highest amercement.

15 Vîramitrodaya
Yājñavalkya, Verse 240

Tulâ, 'scale' i e the weighing rod, *śâsanâ*, 'the royal command', has been mentioned before, *mânam*, 'measure', such as *prastha*² etc, *nânakam*, 'coin', marked with signets such as the *nishka*, *dramma* etc
20 Of these one who manufactures a counterfeit and fraudulently causes delusion in another, and one who even though knowing, enters into transactions with these counterfeiters, such a one should be compelled to pay the highest amercement By the use of the first *cha* is included one who causes the counterfeit, and by the second *cha*, one who
25 deals with a counterfeit (240)

Śûlapâni
Yājñavalkya, Verse 240

One who manufactures false scales and with these who knowingly makes sales and purchases, coin such as *vrnaka* etc (240)

1 i e in the Âchârâdhyâya Verses 318, 319, 320 page 580 Mr Colebrooke gives—"Market rates—(literally, Commands), the king's written precepts regulating market rates"

2 *Prastha*, *Drona*—kinds of measures A *Prastha* is a measure having thirty two *palas*, while a *Drona* is either the same as an *Âdhaka*, or equal to 4 *Âdhakas* or $\frac{1}{16}$ th of a *Khârî* or 32, or 64 *shers*

3 *Dramma* (Colebrooke reads *bherma*)—a *drachma* (c f the greek *drachm*)
Nishka—A golden coin of different values, but generally taken to be equal to one *Karṣha* or *Suvarṇa* of 16 *mâshas*, or also a weight of gold equal to 108 or 150 *suvarṇas*

The Author propounds a rule regarding the examiner¹ of coins
Yājñavalkya, Verse 241

He who declares good money bad, as also he who declares bad money good, that examiner of coins shall indeed be compelled to pay the highest amercement.

5

Mītākṣharā:—That examiner of coins, moreover who declares a dramma or other coin good even when it is alloyed² with copper or the like, or declares a good coin to be false, such a one shall be fined in the highest amercement

Viramitrodaya

10

Yājñavalkya Verse 241

That examiner of coins who declares a faultless (coin) to be counterfeit, and a counterfeit coin to be faultless shall be made to pay the highest amercement. By the use of the word *cha* is included one who although knowing it to be counterfeit says 'I do not know' (241)

15

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 241

The examiner of coins *i.e.* one who tests the marks. The rest is clear

The Sage mentions a rule regarding a physician

Yājñavalkya, Verse 242

20

A physician falsely posing himself as such shall be fined in the first amercement in the case of lower animals in the middlemost, in the case of men and in the highest amercement, in the case of royal persons.

PAGE 137*

Mītākṣharā —Bhṛṣhak, a physician, moreover who *mūhyā*, *falsely* *i.e.* even when he is ignorant of the science of medicine, yet for the purpose of making out a livelihood, poses himself as a duly qualified physician, and treats medically lower animals, men or royal persons, such a one shall be fined in the first, middlemost, and the highest amercements respectively

25

There also, the amount of the fine, whether it should be small or great, must be determined in the cases of lower animals &c. by regard to the value (of the particular beast), or the *varna* (of the man), or the close relationship to royalty

30

1 Colebrooke reads as if the introductory remark of Viṣṇūśekhara referred to the coins and not to the person testing them,

2 *i.e.* which is over-alloyed &c.

Vîramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 242

- An apothecary falsely posing as one dealing with diseased animals
i. e. animals such as the cow and the like, and giving them treatment,
 5 the first amercement, and posing himself falsely with reference to men
 not connected with royalty, the middle amercement, and the apothecary
i. e. the physician posing falsely with royal personages shall be made
 to pay the highest amercement (242).

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 242

- 10 "Lower animals" such as the cow etc and in regard to ordinary, such
 as man, the middle (amercement) (242)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 243

- 15 He, moreover, who restrains one who ought not to be restrained, or
 releases one who is restrained before the decision (in his case) is arrived
 at, such a one shall be fined in the highest amercement

- Mitâksharâ — He, moreover, who restrains without the king's com-
 mand one who does not deserve to be restrained and who is innocent;
 as also he who releases one who was restrained being summoned in
 20 connection with a trial at law, even before yet the trial was conclud-
 ed, shall be compelled to pay the highest amercement.

Vîramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 243

- 25 One who restrains one who does not deserve to be restrained, and
 who being in authority discharges *i. e.* does not restrain one who
 deserves to be restrained, as also one who being authorised lets off one
 who has been summoned for a judicial trial when the trial has not
 been decided, shall be compelled to pay as penalty the highest amerce-
 ment By the use of *cha* several times is included one who beats one
 30 who should not be beaten, as also one who releases one who has been
 imprisoned (243)

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 243

- 55 Having summoned one in whose case a decision has not been given,
 for the giving of a decision (243)

Yājñavalkya Verse 244

He who abstracts one-eighth share by a (false) measure or balance, such a one shall be compelled to pay a fine of two hundred *panas*, and (proportionately) determined (according) as the loss is greater or less.

Mitākshara—That grocer moreover who, from paddy cotton or any other vendible commodity abstracts an eighth part by (using) a false measure, or a false balance, or by any other means, such a one shall be fined two hundred *panas*. The smallness or greatness of the fine must be¹ determined by regard to the greater or less quality of the portion abstracted.

Viramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 244

That grocer who in the case of vendible articles like the paddy cotton etc. by a counterfeit measure or by a counterfeit balance deprives people of an eighth part, such a one should be made to pay the penalty of two hundred *panas*. In the case of more or less of the eighth part taken away, the penalty should be determined according to the loss or greater loss caused. By the word *api* even is included the deception in counting and the like; by the use of the word *cha* is included the greater or less portion of the part taken off (244).

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 244

Mātsra i. e. by measure such as a *prastha* etc. for an increase or a decrease and of the same when an eighth has been increased or decreased shall be compelled to pay a penalty as may be determined after investigation (244).

Yājñavalkya Verse 245

He who adulterates with articles of inferior quality, medicines oil, salt, perfumes, grain, sugar and the like, which are kept for sale, shall indeed be compelled to pay sixteen *panas*.

Mitākshara—*Bhuphajam*, a medicine, i. e., medicinal drug; *sukhal*, oil, such as clarified butter and the like articles of perfumery such as *uśra*² and the like. The term *āhi*, 'and the like,' comprehends *asafetida*, pepper and the like. In the case of these, the fine for mixing inferior substances with these for the purpose of sale, is sixteen *panas*.

1 So that if the fraud be less than an eighth portion the fine shall be less than two hundred *panas*, and greater if the fraud exceed the eighth portion.

2 Known as *klus* or *sedis* (क्लुस in Marathi)—the root of the (श्री) *Pirupa* grass—*Andropogon muricatus*.

Vîramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 245

5 *Bhaishajyam*, 'medicament', i e medicinal articles, *snehah*, 'oily things', such as ghee etc, *lavanam*, 'salt', such as the rock-salt, *gandhah*, 'perfume,' such as *usîra* etc, the corn and jagri are wellknown, the meaning of the word *âdi* (indicates) *asaphœtida*, *marich*, pepper etc. In these articles of sale one mixing an article of inferior quality for the purpose of sale shall be compelled to pay sixteen *panas*. By the use of the word *tu*, 'however', is excluded the penalty of two hundred or the

10 like stated before (245)

Sûlapâñi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 245

One effecting a sale after mixing an article of inferior quality shall be punished sixteen *panas* (245)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 246

15 When earth, hide, gem, yarn, iron, wood, bark, or cloth, which is not of good quality, is made (to appear as) of good quality, the fine is eight times the amount of the sale

20 *Mitâksharâ* :—Moreover, when a superior quality does not exist in articles such as hide &c., it is regarded as being *ajâti*, *not of good quality*; for *giving such a thing* the appearance of (a substance of) *good quality*, *jâtkarane*, i e for the purposes of the sale, making it resemble a thing of a valuable kind, by the addition of (a different) odour, colour or juice, as for instance, counterfeiting fragrant

25 *Āmalaka*¹ by adding the odour of the *Mallikâ*² flower to (a piece of) earth, or the tiger-skin by adding vivid colours to a cat-skin, or a ruby by tinging a *sphaṭika* bead with another hue; or a silken thread, by giving a glossy appearance to a cotton thread, or silver, by bringing on a bright colour by polishing black metal; or sandal

30 wood by adding the odour of sandal to a piece of *Bilva*³ wood, or passing the bark of *kankola*⁴ for that of a clove; or counterfeiting a silken cloth by creating a glossy appearance on a cotton cloth, (in such

1 Known in Marathi as आवळा (Āvlâ) *Nyctanthes undulata*

2 *Mallikâ* is a kind of jasmine *Phyllanthus emblica*

3 Known as the Bela (बेल) tree *Aegle Marmelos* or wood-apple

4 *Kankola* is the name of a plant bearing a berry, which also is known as *kankola*

cases) the fine must be understood to be eight fold of the commodity (offered) for sale as the earth, leather and the like, which is made to resemble (another commodity). _____

Vīramitrodhaya

Yājñavalkya Verse 246

In the case of earth etc. as articles for sale and not of the required quality : e when it is not of the quality which will induce the higher price one by bringing on a bright colour etc. with a view to make it appear of the quality which will induce a higher price should be fined eight times the price of the best article of the kind (246).

Sūtapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 246

Of these which are of a lower value one who through covetousness counterfeits into one of good quality shall be fined eight times the amount of the price received; as for example mixing earth with the fragrance of the *malikā* flower and selling it as fragrant *amalaka* and such other acts may be inferred.

Yājñavalkya, Verses 247-248

He who pledges or sells a sealed casket or a valuable vessel which is artificially prepared, shall be fined thus. (247)

For (a thing the value of which is) the fraction of a *pana*, fifty (*panas*), and for a *pana* a hundred, for two *panas* two hundred; and when the value is higher (the fine is) higher

PAGE 139*

Mitākṣharā — Seal means a cover That which has the cover of a seal is a sealed casket *samudram*. *Parivartanam*, artificial preparation, i e transformation. He who exhibits one casket (i e one) containing pearls, and changes it by a sleight of hands for another casket filled up but containing *Sphaṭikās* (or glass stones), as also he who counterfeits a valuable commodity such as the musk and the like, and either sells it or deposits it as a pledge the determination of fine for such a one should be understood as follows: If the actual price of the counterfeited musk or other article is the fraction of a *pana* *pañcābhīne*, i e less : e if its value is less than a *pana*, the fine for a sale in which the counterfeited article was sold shall be fifty *panas*. In the case where however, the price is a *pana*, the fine shall be a hundred and in the case of an article of the value of two *panas*, two hundred, and in this manner the amount of the fine should be increased according as the price is (determined to be) higher

Vîramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verses 247-248

- 5 *Mudrām*, 'seal', i.e. the cover, of that having been exhibited for sale etc., at the time of the sale with that a cover with a seal full of pearls, one who changes it by a sleight of the hand etc. for a pot full of bright pebbles etc., etc. (247-48)

Sûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 248

- 10 For one who misappropriates a valuable vessel or a sealed casket, or artificially prepares saffron etc. and who sells it, the determination of the fine should be made. How should it be made? So the Author says when it is less by a *pana* the penalty shall be fifty *panas*, when it is a full *pana* (the penalty is) hundred *panas*. For two *panas*, two hundred. For a value exceeding this, the penalty should be made according to the excess.

15 Yājñavalkya, Verse 249

- (For (traders) combining to maintain a price to the prejudice of labourers and artisans, although knowing the rise or fall of the prices, the fine shall be the highest amercement.

- 20 *Mitâksharâ*.—Although knowing the increase or decrease in the market rates as regulated by the king, if traders combine, i.e. join together, and out of greed for profit, maintain another price, which is detrimental to the labourers, *kârûnam*, such as the washermen and others, or *śūpmâm*, the artisans such as painters or sculptors and the like, they shall be fined one thousand *panas*.

25

Sûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 249

- 30 For grocers fixing a price for the corns etc. without the consent of the king and in a manner which would be oppressive, as also for the artisans and manufacturers for effecting an increase or decrease in the price declared by the king, the penalty should be one thousand *panas*. Manufacturer, such as the weaver, *S'ūpi*, 'artisan', i.e. sculptor (249)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 250

For traders combining to obstruct (the sale of) a commodity by (demanding) a wrong price, or for selling it, the fine laid down is the highest amercement

Mitākṣhara:—Moreover, those traders who combining together, obstruct (the sale of) a commodity arrived from a foreign country by demanding it at a wrong price *anarghena*, i. e. at a lower value or sell it at a higher price, the highest amercement or fine for these has been laid down by Manu and others' 5

Vīramitrodaya

10

Yājñavalkya Verses 249-250

Of those who fix an inconvenient price i. e. the rate for corns etc. and of the traders who bring about the depreciation or increase of the price fixed by the king the penalty for these has been stated by the sages to be measured by a thousand *panas*. So also for those traders obstructing the sale of a valuable commodity by (setting up) a small price, and those who purchase by deceit etc. or those who sell a commodity of small value for a high price the penalty laid down is the highest amercement (249-250) 15

At what price then, must a commodity be sold? so the Author says 20

Yājñavalkya, Verse 251

The sale or purchase should be (conducted) at that price which is fixed by the king the surplus made therefrom is understood to be the legal profit of traders.

Mitākṣhara:—Rajani, by the king when he is near *sthāpyate yorṅbah* whatever price is determined i. e. is regulated by him by such a rate the sale and purchase must be made every day. That surplus which has been derived from it is *nisravaḥ*, the surplus made i. e. the special balance i. e. the surplus over the rate as regulated by the king is the only legal profit of the traders and not the one made from rates determined by their own fancy. A special rule, has, moreover, been indicated by Manu in the matter of regulating prices: "Once in (every) five nights, or at the close of each fortnight or month, the king shall settle the prices in the presence of these (i. e. the traders)" 25 30

1 The meaning which results therefrom is that a fine is directed for the offence of raising or lowering the market rate fixed by the king. The sage declares that purchase and sale should be conducted according to the prices regulated by the Sovereign' (Colebrooke)

2, Ch. VIII. 492, Some editions of Manu read एते एतेऽप्य वा एते—

Vîramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 251

Now with the avoidance of these penalties how can they have their subsistence? So the Author proceeds "by the king etc" That
5 price which has been fixed by the tradesmen in the presence of the king with his sanction, with that price should the sale and purchase be made by the merchants every day Therefore the residue which would remain from the purchase and sale, *i e* the excess part, that alone, should be the source for the subsistence of the tradesmen dealing in
10 profits Here *Manu*¹ states a special rule "Once every five nights, "or at the close of each fortnight or a month, the king should fix the "prices in the presence of these, *i e* the traders" (251).

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verses 250-251

15 Whatever price is fixed by the king, with that alone should the sale and purchase be effected Whatever is realised by the sale of the articles of merchandise in excess of the original amount has been declared as the small profit for the traders.

Yājñavalkya, Verse 252

20 On commodities of one's own country, a trader shall take five per hundred, and ten on those from foreign countries, when he buys and sells again immediately

Mitākṣharâ:—Moreover, he who purchases a commodity obtained in his own country and sells it, such a one shall take a profit of five
25 per cent *i e* five in one hundred *panas* On a commodity, however, obtained from a foreign country, he should take as his profit, ten *panas* on an original cost of one hundred *panas*, (on) a commodity, the sale of which is brought about immediately on the day of purchase

30 But he again, who sells at a subsequent time, for such a one, a greater profit shall be allowed as a longer time elapses. And thus, the market prices of commodities of his own country should be so regulated by the king that there may be a profit of five *panas* in a hundred *panas* on the regulated price

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 252

35 For an article of merchandise in one's own country the trader should recover five per cent as profit, while for an article imported from another country, ten per cent provided the sale and purchase occur immediately, in the case of delay, there is no rule (252)

PAGE 140*

The Author mentions the principle for determining the price of a foreign commodity

Yājñavalkya, Verse 253

Adding the incidental charges to the cost of the commodity let the price be fixed which shall be equitable both to the buyer and the seller

Mātākshara — On a commodity arriving from another country after calculating the charges which are incurred for carrying it from and back to the foreign¹ country as also the customs and other dues, and adding these to the original cost of the commodity the price should be determined by the king² which will be equitable both to the buyer and the seller so that a profit of ten per cent may be made

Viramitrodaya

Of what kind from what commodity is this residu ? So the Author says ' In one's country etc

Yājñavalkya Verses 252-53

If after purchasing in one's own country only it is sold there, for a commodity of the value of hundred *panas* five *panas* but for having purchased in another country and brought in on a own country if a commodity is sold there the trader shall take ten *panas* as the profit If he sells the commodity not after a long interval after its purchase By reason of its being in a distant country when there is long delay for a sale, having added the expenses for the importation preservation etc. of the commodity and thus adding to the original cost on a hundred of that by regard to the difference due to the native and foreign country, the king should fix a price which should be fifteen per cent in excess and which should ben fit the seller and the purchaser By the use of the word *cha* are added the citizens also by the use of the word *eva* only is excluded (the possibility of) neglect by the king in the matter of fixing the price Here other penalties in regard to other subject matters are not stated for fear of adding to the bulk of the book

Thus ends th Chapter on *Sāhasas*.

Sūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 253

For an article of merchandise which has been received from a mountainous and distant country whatever has been incurred as expenditure etc. the price of that should be determined by thousand folding the same in such a manner that it may not be detrimental to the vendor or the purchaser (*53).

1 In this instance another or a foreign country should not be assumed by a difference in language or the intervention of mountains or rivers but by the actual distance by *Paṇas*.

* Ol. Manu Ch. VIII. 401 where a general rule has been laid down

CHAPTER XXI

Non-delivery after Sale

Having finished a topic which incidentally arose, the Author now introduces the chapter on Non-delivery after Sale. Its characteristics, moreover, have been stated by Nârada¹ "When a commodity has been sold for a price and is not delivered to the purchaser, it is termed "Non-delivery of a sold chattel—a Title of Law." There, after mentioning the two-fold division of vendible things according as they are movable or immovable, its six-fold character has been demonstrated by the same Author² "In this world vendible property is of two kinds, movable and "immovable (2). The rule regarding delivery and³ non-delivery of "merchandise is declared six-fold by the learned *viz* (What is sold) "by tale, by weight, by measure, according to work, according to its "beauty, and according to its splendour (3)." 'By tale' as the betel-nut or the like. 'By weight' such as gold, musk, saffron and the like. 'By measure' such as rice or the like. 'According to work' such as a horse, buffalo and the like as determined by the burden carried or the milk yielded by them. 'According to its beauty' such as a prostitute &c. 'According to its splendour' *i. e.* according to their lustre such as an emerald, a ruby or the like.

The Author mentions a fine for one who having sold a merchandise of (any of) these six kinds, does not deliver it.

Yājñavalkya, Verse 254

He who, having received the price of a thing sold, does not, however, deliver it to the buyer, shall be compelled to deliver it together with interest, or with the foreign profit, to one who has come from a foreign country.

Mitākṣharâ:—That merchandise of which the price has been received by the seller is *grhîtamûlyam* one, *the price of which was received*, if the seller does not deliver such a thing on demand to a local purchaser, and if that merchandise bore a higher price at the time of the sale, but is obtainable at a low price at another time, then the seller shall be compelled to pay to the buyer the article together with the excess in value of the commodity—whether movable or immovable—over the one to which it is reduced. When there is no difference in

1 Ch VIII 1

2 Ch VIII 2-3

3 *Dâna* is delivery and *Âdâna* is non-delivery, Dr Jolly translates it as gift and receipt, and so does Colebrooke III. 3, 3.

the price of the commodity and its original price but the commodity retains the same price at which it was agreed to be sold at the time of the (contract of) sale the seller shall be compelled to make over to the buyer the merchandise itself together with the profit which a seller may have made e. g. two, three, or the like per hundred as already discussed or otherwise according to the option of the seller. As says Narada: "If there has been a fall in the market value of the article in question, the purchaser shall receive both the article itself together with the difference in value. This law applies to those who are inhabitants of the same place but to those who travel abroad the profit arising from (trading in) foreign countries shall be made over (as well)."

When however on account of a rise in the price of the commodity there is a diminution in (the value of) the thing then the seller must be compelled to deliver over the thing itself together with the charges for enjoyment of the thing itself such as in the case of cloth for wearing it and in the case of a house for comfortably dwelling in it, and the like. As says Narada: "If a man sells property for a certain price and does not hand it over to the purchaser he shall have to pay its produce if it is immovable or the profits arising from it, if it is movable property."

Possession by the seller is declared a decrease as the thing loses in value from the point of view of the buyer. The decrease (here comprehended) is not any destruction of property such as the demolition of a wall or the like since that has already been mentioned in: "If the article should have been injured or destroyed by fire or carried off the loss shall be (charged) to the seller alone as he did not deliver (it) after it had been sold (by him)."

When however, such a purchaser has come from a foreign country for taking away the merchandise then the seller must be compelled to deliver over the thing to the buyer together with such profit as might have been made by one taking the merchandise and selling it in a foreign country.

This rule however, regarding the delivery of a thing purchased shall be observed in the absence of a rescission. When, however, there is a rescission the rule must be followed as laid down by Manu in: "If (anybody), after buying or selling anything &c."

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 254

- He who does not deliver an article of merchandise of which the price had been received by him, such a one shall be compelled to pay to the purchaser the price together with the interest, if that is received from the country. If, however, it is received from another country then he shall be compelled to pay together with the profit thereon. Vishnu¹ says "One who having received the price of a thing sold, does not deliver it does not give to the purchaser, such a one shall be compelled to pay to him together with interest, and he should be punished by the King with hundred "panas" (254)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 255

- A commodity, even if sold once may be sold again, if the first purchaser do not take it, and if there is loss on account of the fault of the purchaser, the same shall be his alone

- Mitākṣhara — Moreover, when, however, the purchaser, repenting of his purchase, does not desire to take delivery of the commodity sold, then the commodity even when sold (once) may be sold to any other. Also, when the purchaser does not accept (delivery of) a thing when (it was) offered by the seller, and if the commodity is destroyed by act of God or of the king, then the loss will be of the purchaser alone; since the loss happens through the fault of the purchaser in refusing to accept the commodity.

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 255

- When an article has been sold and the first purchaser does not accept, it should be sold (again). If there is any depreciation through the fault of the purchaser then that is of the purchaser himself (255)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 256

- Should a commodity be injured by act of God or of the king, the loss shall be of the seller alone, if he did not deliver it on a demand

- Mitākṣharā — Moreover, when, however, the seller does not deliver a thing even upon request by the buyer, even when he has not rescinded (the sale), and it is injured by an act of God or of the king, then such loss is of the seller alone. Therefore, another unblemished commodity, similar to that which has been damaged, must be delivered to the buyer.

Śūlapani

Yajñavalkya Verse 224

If through the act of King or God anyblemish occurs in the article
 any depreciation that follows is of the seller only if it is not delivered
 to the purchaser who was asking for it. It follows therefore that if the
 purchaser does not accept when it is being delivered then the fault is of
 the purchaser. (20)

Vīramitrodaya

Now ' when a commodity has been sold for a price and is not
" delivered to the purchaser, it is termed ' Non-delivery after sale.' A
" title of law, " thus characterized by Nārada¹ the Author treats of
5 the title of law called ' Non-delivery after sale '

Yājñavalkya, Verses 254-57

When from the purchaser the price has been received by the seller
himself, if he does not deliver the same to the purchaser, then he should
10 be compelled to deliver the commodity to him together with the increase.
The increase has been stated by Nārada²: "If a man sells property for a
" certain price and does not deliver it to the purchaser, he shall pay its
" depreciation if it is immovable, or the profits if it is a movable
" property." *Kṛtyam*, 'depreciation' i.e. (as for) possession; profits
such as service etc

15 By the use of the word *eva*, 'only', (however) is understood to be
in the absence of a repentance by the purchaser. On a repentance
by him, however the rule laid down by Manu³ should be followed :
' If anybody in this world after buying or selling anything repent
(of the bargain) he may give or take back that commodity within
20 ' ten days.' Nārada⁴ : If there is a fall in the market value itself of the
" article, the purchaser shall receive both the article itself and the
" difference in value. This law applies to those who are inhabitants of
" the same place, but to those who travel abroad, the profits arising from
(trading i.) foreign countries shall be made over." Vishnu⁵ : ' He who
25 " does not deliver to the purchaser a commodity the price of which has
" been received by him, shall be compelled to deliver it with interest.
" And he shall be fined hundred paṇas by the king' (254)

When even after the commodity was sold, it was not taken over by
the first purchaser on account of his change of mind during the interval
30 of inspection or after that time, while that commodity is being sold, if
there is a depreciation in the value of the commodity on account of a
defect occurring in it by reason of the fault of the purchaser not pro-
perly inspecting it or by an act of God or of the king, then that
depreciation will be of the purchaser only. If when the purchaser
35 demanded it and the seller did not deliver, then the loss is of the seller
himself. This is the meaning. The word *apī* is used in the sense

1 Ch. VIII. 1.

2 Ch. VIII. 4.

3. Ch. VIII. 222.

4 Ch. VIII. 5.

5 Ch. V. 1-2 p 126-27.

of opposition. The use of the word *eva*, only, twice discriminates the purchaser and the seller by the use of the word *ku* the Author intends the cause for the depreciation.

Without expressing disagreement If the first purchaser through confusion etc. does not take delivery if the commodity is delivered in the hands of another after the acceptance of the price or if the commodity having a fault has been sold as faultless there the punishment shall be double of the price of both the commodities by the use of the word *cha* is added that to the purchaser also double that of the price should be given That says Nārada¹ "He who after having sold to "one delivers it to another shall be compelled to pay double of that amount and also a fine of an equal amount (6). This law has thus been declared with regard to a merchandise for which a price has been paid where the price has not been tendered there is no rescission to be "imputed to the seller except in the case of a special agreement (10) By the use of the word *ku*, 'however' is excluded (a transaction) where the price has not been received but the sale has been only by a word of mouth (254-57).

Sūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 257

When an article has been sold to one, and it is again sold to another as faultless, although faulty then double the amount of the price shall be the penalty (257).

Rescission of a sale has (thus) been described; the characteristics of a rescission of a purchase, have already been discussed before. Now the Author mentions a rule which is common to both of these

Yājñavalkya, Verse 258

No rescission of a sale of commodities shall be made by a trader unless he was ignorant of the excessive or diminished rates (therefor) He who does (rescind) shall be liable to pay a fine of a sixth part.

Mitākṣharā —Nandīyāḥ kīryah, no rescission (of a purchase) shall be made by a purchaser, who does not perceive any excess in the price charged, or the commodity upon a valuation of the same subsequent to the time of the purchase but at the rates prevailing at the time

¹ Ch. VIII. 6 10

² It seems Mr Colebrookes reads this verse in Yājñavalkya differently His reading would appear to be *यत्नमपि न जानाति* since he translates as "who well knows the profit and loss &c See Colebrookes Dig I p 68

In the case of things which do not suffer by enjoyment and which have a fixed value the fine for one making a rescission after the time for rescission is over shall be imposed in accordance with the rule laid down by Manu. But after (the lapse of) ten days he may neither give it nor take it to be given (back) both he who takes it (back), as well as he who gives it (back) shall be fined by the king six hundred pāṇas.

Thus ends the chapter called Non-delivery after sale

Varamitrodāya

Now of the rescission of purchase which has been stated before generally the Author mentions the special rule in point in regard to non-delivery after sale

Yajñavalkya Verse 253

A rescission should not be made by a trader when he has purchased without knowing the depreciation of the value of the commodity. Having sold without knowing the appreciation in the price of the commodity a rescission should not be made. Thus one who makes a rescission even without knowing makes himself amenable for penalty for a sixth of the price of the commodity. By the use of the word *chī* also is meant that a rescission may be made upon a discovery of the fall or rise. Nor is there the text having *ś* deleted included.

Ītṛhaspati. What has been sold by an intoxicated or insane or at a very low price or under the impulse of fear or by one not his own master shall be relinquished by him (the purchaser) or (the seller) may recover it back. The connection is that the purchaser shall give it up and the seller shall take it back.

Thus ends in the commentary on Yajñavalkya the Chapter on Non-delivery after sale

Śūlpāṇi

Yajñavalkya Verse 254

When merchants make purchases without ascertaining the appreciation or depreciation of the articles of sale a rescission should not be made. When one makes a rescission he shall be liable to pay as penalty one-sixth part of the price of the articles sold. Narada states a special rule (see above Mitākṣharā p. 130* L. 14.) (38)

1 Ch. VIII 223

* XVIII

2 The Ikṣvāku edition read *mita* *mita* while Dr. Jolly in his Extracts of Ītṛhaspati had it appears the reading *mita* which I follow and therefore followed and is accepted in the translation

4 Ch. IX 2-3

CHAPTER XXII

Trading by Partnership

Now is being described the Title of Law called 'Trading in Partnership'

5 Yājñavalkya, Verse 259

Among traders carrying on a business in partnership with a view to gain, the profit and loss shall be according to the (contribution of each to the) stock, or according as was determined by special agreement.

10 Mĭtāksharâ —Samavâyah, *partnership*, is an agreement¹ by which several persons agree to do any business together Under such an agreement, for such work as is done by each of the people, such as traders, actors, dancers and like others, working with a view to gain, the share of *profit or loss*, *lābhālābhau*, *i e* of an increase or decrease, will be determined by regard to the contribution of each *i e* according to the quantity of stock for the use of the trade supplied by each

15 Or, the shares (in the profit and loss) shall be determined as fixed upon by any agreement or compact (between the parties), such as, having regard to the chief qualities and capacity in each, such a one should be entitled to two shares, such another one share, and the like

20 Vĭramitrodaya

The Author now begins the title of law known as "Trading by Partnership"

Yājñavalkya, Verse 259

25 Of the traders combining together for profit and engaging in a transaction, the profit or loss shall be (determined) according to (the contribution of) the original amount of money Or if the profit and loss have been the subject of a special agreement, then these shall be according to such arrangement in that manner in the case of traders, actors etc (259)

Śūlapāni

30 Yājñavalkya, Verse 259

Of tradesmen engaging in trade by a combination with a view to profit, the profit or loss should be understood to be according to the share of the capital of each, or the same should be determined as may have been previously agreed to (259)

1 An agreement thus ' We will all do this business together '

Yājñavalkya, Verse 260

Whatever is forbidden or not sanctioned, as also what has been injured through negligence, such property he shall make good but he shall be entitled to a tenth part of the property preserved from misfortune

Mītākṣharā — Again among those trading as partners if on account of the action of some one against a prohibition that a certain commodity is not to be dealt with in a particular manner any property *nakṣam*, is injured, similarly by doing something *anādiṣṭam*, not sanctioned, i.e. not allowed as also if any thing is injured *pramadāt* through negligence : i.e. on account of want of competence such a one shall make good that commodity to the traders. 5 10

He, moreover from among them who preserves any merchandise from any misfortune proceeding from either the king or the like, such a one obtains a tenth portion of the merchandise thus protected

Viramītrodaya

Among the company when the capital is lost or preserved by one, the Author states a rule 15

Yājñavalkya Verse 260

Of traders trading in partnership together when from the merchandise any commodity has been the subject of a special direction that it should not be dealt with in a particular manner or My commodity should not be dealt with in this manner thus it has been prohibited or 'it should be dealt with in this manner' when it has thus been specially directed when the commodity has been lost by one through ignorance such a one should give that commodity. He moreover who being surrounded by a multitude preserves it alone from attacks by robbers or the like shall get the tenth part of the commodity. This is the meaning. By the first use of the word *cha* it is intended that if the commodity is destroyed through the mistake of all, then the loss is to be determined proportionately to the amount of their contribution by the second use of the word *cha* it is added that upon the death of one who preserves the property his son gets the tenth part *vide* the text of Nārada¹ "Should one of the partners die the heirs to his 'property shall get his share' (260). 20 25 30

Śālapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 260

One engaging in what is prohibited and not permitted and whatever money has been lost through carelessness such a one should recoup the loss. From property saved from a misfortune, such as the attack of robbers or the like or from the robbers he may take a tenth part (*60). 35 40

Yājñavalkya, Verse 261

The king shall take as a tax a twentieth share of the price fixed (by him) A Commodity which has been specially reserved as also that which is worthy of a king shall, if sold, belong to the king.

- 5 Mitākṣharâ — For fixing the price of a commodity *e g* such an article of merchandise shall have such a price *i e* by reason of the same being determined upon by the king, he (*i e* the king) shall receive a twentieth part of the price as a tax That, moreover, which *vyâsiddham*, *had been specially reserved*, *i e* prohibited by the king from
10 being sold anywhere else, also that which is worthy of the king, such as jewels, rubies and the like, even when forbidden, if the same be sold out of greed for profit without informing the king, *tadrâjagâmi*, *the same shall belong to the king*, *i e* all that merchandise the king shall appropriate without (regard to) the payment of the price

15

Vîramitrodaya

On the occasion of the treatment of the right to a share, the Author mentions the king's right to a share

Yājñavalkya, Verse 261

- By reason of his fixing the price the king shall take a twentieth
20 part, the meaning is that the king shall take from the price Some, however, hold that the king should not take a share, but the commodity itself or its price in entirety should be taken by the king *Vyâsiddham*, 'specially reserved', *i e* 'this must not be sold here', a commodity which has been thus prohibited by the king but has been also there.
25 *Rajayogyam cha*, 'also that which is worthy of a king', such as a rouge elephant or the like, although not prohibited have been sold elsewhere without the permission of the king, *tad râjagâmi*, 'that goes to the king', may be appropriated by the king *i e* even without his paying the price (261)

30

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 261

- On account of the determination of the price, the king may take a twentieth part of the price as his tax Such article, moreover, as may have been prohibited by the king as for sale (in the market) on account of
35 its extraordinary character, as also such as is fit for the king as *e g* a white chowry, such article even though sold, is of the king (261)

Yājñavalkya Verse 262

He who falsely declares the quantity who avoids a tolling office, shall be compelled to pay eight times, as also he who purchases or sells fraudulently
[AOR 147]

Mitākṣhara —That trader again who conceals the (real) quantity of a commodity with the object of defrauding the customs (officers) or skulks away from the tolling offices as also he who either purchases or sells an article which is the subject of a dispute (as to) whether it belongs to this or it is of that man all these shall be fined eight times the amount of the value of the commodity

Vīramitrodaya

The Author mentions the penalty for one who does not pay to the king and is adverse

Yājñavalkya Verse 263

One who with a view to evade the payment of the tax declares falsely the measure in quantity of the merchandise such as cloth pearls etc., or avoiding the excise officer saying this has been deposited by me here it is neither sold nor purchased, and thus causing deception a trader who thus effects a sale or purchase shall be compelled to pay eight times the price of the commodity as penalty. By the use of the word *cha* twice, the Author indicates severally as the cause for the infliction of a fine upon those who deceitfully carry on sales or purchase indicated by the word ending in the present participle termination (262)

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 264

He who through covetousness declares falsely at the excise office the quantity of an article for a sale and one who without paying the toll sneaks off from the excise office he also who with a view to defraud the king at the time of the sale ultimately fraudulently makes purchases or sales such a one should be compelled to pay as penalty an eightfold of the money defrauded. When moreover without even going to the toll office he goes elsewhere by another road then the entire property should be confiscated. As says Viṣṇu' "One who evades the toll office shall incur the forfeiture of the entirety" (262)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 263

A marine officer levying a land cess, shall be compelled to pay ten *panas*. The same shall be (the fine) for not inviting the Brâhmanas and *Prâtivēśyas*

- 5 **Mitâksharâ**.—And again, customs dues are two-fold, *viz* one levied on land, and another levied on water. Of these, the tax levied on land has been mentioned in the text¹ “The king shall take as a tax the twentieth ‘share of the price fixed’”. The tax levied on water, however, has been mentioned in the text of *Manu*² “At a ferry, a conveyance shall be
10 “made to pay one *pana*, a man half a *pana*, an animal and “also a woman a quarter, and an unloaded man one-half of a “quarter (404). Conveyances fully laden with vessels shall be made “to pay toll at a ferry according to the substance³, empty vessels, as “also men without a luggage (shall pay) a trifle (405). But a
15 “woman who has been pregnant for two months or more, an ascetic, “a monk, as also a Brâhmana,⁴ students of the Vedas, shall not be “made to pay toll at a ferry (407)”

- Here is another special rule⁵ applicable even to both kinds of tolls
“A toll is never levied on a sum less than a *kârshâpana*, it is never levi-
20 “able on a livelihood gained by art, nor on an infant, nor on a messenger, “nor on what has been received as alms, nor on the remains of stolen “property, nor on a *S’otriya*, nor on a hermit, nor on a sacrifice”

- That, by which a thing is floated is a ferry *e.g.* a boat and the like. One who is commissioned to recover the toll levied on these is
25 **Tarikah** a *Marine Officer*. Such a one, when he recovers a toll levied on land shall be fined ten *panas*. *Vēśa*, *Vēśma* and *Pratvēśa* are indicative of one’s own house and the (neighbours in its) front or rear. People living in these parts are *Prâtivēśyas* or people living in the neighbourhood. Brâhmanas and *Prâtivēśyas* (joined together) make up
30 (the compound expression) ‘Brâhmanas and *Prâtivēśyas*’. The non-invitation of these on exequal occasions or the like, when they are accomplished by the study of the Vedas and by their (pure) lives, and when he has competence (to invite them)—this itself must be understood to be punishable with ten *panas*.

1 Yājñavalkya II 261 p 1306 above 2 Oh VIII 404, 405 and 407

3 *i.e.* according to the quantity of the goods as well as their value

4 ब्राह्मणालिङ्गीनी—ब्राह्मणग्रहण विशेषणम् । —मेचातिथि

5 See Vasishtha Ch XIX 37. Bâlabhāṭṭa assigns it to Manu

Viramitrodaya

Like a trader not paying the tax a penalty is payable by the officer of the king also when he recovers a tax which is not proper. Intending to lay down this rule the Author states a penalty also for transgressions of a like character.

Yājñavalkya Verse 263

Tarika 'A naval officer is one appointed for the water tax a twentieth part of the price fixed as stated before when he recovers a tax on land such a one shall be compelled to pay the penalty of ten *panas*'

Pratisea is a house in the close vicinity of one's own house one who does not invite Brahmanas residing there even when there is occasion for an invitation¹ to others shall be compelled to pay also a penalty of ten *panas*. By the use of the word *h¹* it is added 'if he accepts his invitation.' *Manu* states the water tax. At a ferry a conveyance shall be made to pay one *pana* a man half a *pana* an animal and a woman a quarter and half of a quarter an unloaded man. Conveyances fully laden with vessels shall be made to pay a toll at a ferry according to the substance. Empty vessels as also men without a luggage a trifle. 'A man is a man carrying a load'

Here there is a special rule even with regard to the two kinds of tolls. A toll is never levied for a sum less than a *Adrahya*, *pana*. It is never leviable on a livelihood gained by art nor on an infant, nor on a messenger nor on what has been received as alms nor on the remains of stolen property, nor on a *Srutya* nor on a hermit, nor on a sacrifice (263).

Sūlapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 263

One authorized as a toll officer for the water cess recovering on land the toll which is to be recovered on water should be compelled to pay ten *panas* and one not inviting neighbouring Brahmanas on an occasion of feast should similarly be fined ten *panas* (263).

1 See verse 261 p. 1306 above

" अतिविराम्य अतिविराम्य and appears to be good. A reading अतिविराम्य is the reading in the Benares edition. This (ii) *rami tak* is the reading or that appears to be the deliberate omission of *Mitramitra*. This is suggested by the next *śloka* in which the author says अतिविराम्य अतिविराम्य. This view of *Mitramitra* appears to be in direct opposition to the text of *Yājñavalkya* which says अतिविराम्य 'or not inviting'. While the reading is correct, would give the converse or alternative viz. inviting when there is no occasion for it. This if the reading is correct is not proper.

2 There is no *śloka* in the original.

4 Ch. VIII. 406-7

The Author mentions a rule regarding the property of a trader dying abroad

Yājñavalkya, Verse 264

5 If one goes abroad and dies (there), his wealth shall be taken by his *dâyâdas*, *bândhavas* of his *jñâts*, or who may have come, and failing these, by the king.

10 **Mitâksharâ** —When one of those who trade in partnership goes abroad and dies, then his share, his *dâyâdâh* i. e. his sons and other lineal descendants, *bândhavâh* i. e. (relations) *ex parte materna*, such as the maternal uncle and others; his *jñâtayah* i. e. his Sapinda relations other than his lineal descendants, or *who may have come*, *âgatâh* i. e. such of the members of the joint trading partnership as may have returned from the country abroad, (these) shall take *Failing these, tair vinâ*, i. e. in the absence of these viz the *dâyâdas* and others, the king shall take.

15 By the use of the word *vâ*, 'or', the Author indicates the uncertain² nature of the right of the *dâyâdas* and others to succeed. The rule as to the order of succession, however, must be understood here to be the same as that propounded in the text³ "The wife, the daughter &c"⁴

20 Among merchants also, he who is competent to offer the funeral oblation and pay the debts and do similar acts shall take. If there is no distinction as to the capacity (for doing the above), all the merchants trading together in union shall take after dividing. In the absence of these also, after waiting for the appearance of the *dâyâdas* and others for ten years, and on their non-appearance, the king may take it himself.

25 All this has been made clear by Nârada⁵ "Should one of the partners die, his *dâyâdas* shall get his share (7). In the absence of the *dâyâdas*, any one (of the partners), if all are equally competent. On failure of these, he shall keep it well guarded for ten years (17). When such property without an owner, and unclaimed by a *dâyâda* 30 "has been preserved for ten years, the king may then take it over to himself. Thus, the law will not be violated."

1 The whole of this passage has been translated and referred to by Messrs West and Bahler in their *Hindu Law* at a p 135 sqq and in *Sakrabhai* vs *Maqanlal* 26 Bom 206 (F B) at pp 218-219

2 वैकल्पिक *Vaikalpika*—optional Contingent

3 Yājñavalkya II 135 & 136 See p 1065 above

4 The subject of that text is the negation of the pupil, Co-student Brâhman* and the affirmation of the right of the trader

5 Ch III 7, 17-18

Virāmitrodāya

If among men trading by partnership one dies then by whom should his share be taken? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya Verse 264

While one trading as a partner dies his share his sons and the rest his mother's sister's sons and the like of his sapindas who have gone there shall take the property according to the right. By the word and or, the alternative choice as well as the relative priority are included. Otherwise the whole goes to the king (264) 5

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 264

Among persons trading by partnership, if one dies in another country his property his sons etc. in their absence uncles etc. in their absence kindred, and in their absence—except in the case of the property of a Brāhmana—the king, shall take (264). 10 15

Yājñavalkya Verse 265 (1)

A man of crooked ways let the other partners expel without profit one unable (himself) may have it done by another

PAGE 144*

Mīlakṣharat—Moreover jīmah a man of crooked ways, i.e. a cheat, such a one, the other partners, nirgatalabham tyajeyuh, should deprive of all profit and expel, i.e. deprive. He moreover among partners carrying on a joint trading business who atakṣah, i.e. unable to supervise the vessels of merchandise and do other like acts, such a one karayet, may cause his own duty such as that of conveying the goods of trade or supervise the accounts of the receipts and debts relating thereto and like other acts anyena, by another 20 25

The Author extends the law (relating to partnership) among traders as stated before to priests officiating at a sacrifice and the like others

Yājñavalkya, Verse 265 (2)

By this has (also) been stated the law regarding officiating priests at sacrifices, husbandmen, and artisans. 30

Mitākṣharâ:—Anena, by this, i. e. by the statement of the rule¹

Special rule regarding the distribution of the property of sacrificial priests

regarding traders viz. "the profit and loss shall be according to the stock &c", *rtwijâm*, regarding officiating priests at sacrifices such as the *Hotar* and others, the husbandmen, as also the actors, dancers and others maintaining themselves on arts, *vidhîh*, the law, i. e. the rule of conduct *âkhyâtah*, has been stated

Even there, a special rule has been stated by **Manu**² regarding the distribution of the property of priests "Among all (the priests) officiating at³ a sacrifice, those (first four who are) entitled to a half (*Ardhînah*) are the first (to receive), the next (four), one half of that, the set entitled to a third share, one-third, and those entitled to a fourth, a quarter" The meaning of this passage is this under the text "in a *Jyotiṣhtoma*⁴ sacrifice, they shall endow it with a hundred", a hundred cows have been enjoined as an endowment for

1 Yājñavalkya II 259 see p 1304 above

2 Ch VIII 210

3 The principal priests officiating at a sacrifice who are called *Ritviks* are sixteen in number distributed under four classes each class having four members

(1) The first class includes those who are entitled to a half of the entire *Dakṣhîṇâ*, and are known as the *Ardhînah*

(2) The members of the second class are entitled to a half of the first, and hence are known as *Tadarhînah*

(3) The third class are entitled to a third of the first class, and are called *Trîṭyîṇah*

(4) The fourth class are entitled to a quarter of the first class, and are known as *Pâdînah*

Although one hundred cows are considered as a proper *Dakṣhîṇâ* for a sacrifice, still to make the whole distribution commensurate, 96 is the number chosen (see Amara I 3 16) so that the first class take 48 cows, the second class 24, the third 16, and the fourth, 12, thus making up the total of 100 cows This is one way of distribution and has been expounded in the text of the *Mitākṣharâ* Another way of distribution is suggested by some e. g. by *Nârada*, according to which the whole is divided into 25 shares and the several classes shall receive 12, 6, 4 and 3 shares each respectively, a mode which, it will be seen, only defects in the method of working out the figures, but yields the same result

4 *Jyotiṣhtoma* is a Soma sacrifice and is considered as the type of a whole class of sacrificial ceremonies At this sacrifice sixteen officiating priests are required by law, and these are grouped into four classes, each class having again four priests in it as described in the note above, and in the text of the *Mitākṣharâ*,

the sacrifice as indicative of respect to the *ṛciks* or priests officiating at the sacrifice. The *ṛciks*, moreover, are sixteen in number viz. the *Hotā* and others. There, in answer to the question, what person is entitled to what share? the rule in the present text is laid down. Of all the sixteen priests officiating at a sacrifice those who are the chief viz. the *Hotā Adhvaryuh*, *Brahmā* and *Udgātā*, these are entitled to a half of the hundred cows i. e. equal to forty eight cows, to make the division complete into entire numbers.² Those next in order viz. the *Mastrācarunah*, *Pratiprasthūtā*, *Brôhmanîchehāmā*, and *Prastotā* are entitled to a half of that i. e. half of the principal share i. e. twenty four (cows). Those, moreover, who are entitled to a third viz. the *Achhāvāk*, *Nekhā*, *Āgnidhra* and *Pranharī* these being entitled to a third i. e. a third of the principal share, shall take a third i. e. sixteen cows. Those indeed, who are entitled to a quarter viz. the *Grâvastvā*, *Unnetā*, *Putā* and *Subrahmanyah* these shall take what amounts to a fourth part of the principal share i. e. twelve cows.

Indeed how can this rule as to shares prevail? There is here neither a compact (to that effect) nor a combination of capital, nor any express text, under which there may be a rule as to the shares. And under the maxim¹ of law viz. "In the absence of a special rule the shares shall be equal, it is proper that all shall be entitled to equal shares or proportionately to their labour.

Here the answer is. In the *Dvādasāha*² sacrifice which is only a variant of the principal sacrifice called *Jyotishṣoma*, it is not proper to suppose that (the recognition of) the *Ardhinas*, *Trīṇas* and *Pūḍnas* is a mere repetition of something

1 *सर्वे समाने*, Jaimini X. III. 63 Thirteenth Adhikarapa. See note above. The relative proportion of the shares of the several classes mentioned in the text will not be maintained if 100 be taken as the total number in relation to which the half &c is to be determined. Moreover according to the lexicon *Amara* (I. 3. 16) the word *ardha* 'half' when in the masculine gender is used generally to indicate 'a portion' and not a precise half. Thus 48 is chosen as the figure for the first class and then the numbers 24, 16 and 12 respectively are deduced by the method described above.

2 *Dvādasāha*—is an offshoot of the principal sacrifice called *Jyotishṣoma*, which is called the *Pratipri*, i. e. the basic sacrifice as opposed to a *Vikṛt*, which means a variant of the base, with slight variations as to details.

already established, if in the principal sacrifice, the *Mantrâvaruna* and the other priests were not entitled to a half, a third, and the fourth shares respectively. Therefore the rule as to (particular) shares as mentioned before (necessarily) follows from the very force of the¹ expressions *Ardhins* &c used in the Veda. Thus there is no fault.

Thus ends the Chapter in the Law of Partnership

Vīramitrodaya

Who indeed will not get his share? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 265 (1)

- 10) *Jihmah*, 'crooked', i.e. one who by his tricks is instrumental in the non-accomplishment of the business of the partnership such a one they (i.e. the partners) should expel i.e. drive out, without (giving any) profit. The meaning is that if he is unable alone (to do it) then he should have his part performed by another, but should not practise deceit [265 (1)]

1 *Samâkhyâ*—'name, expression,' one of the six means of proof of the Vinyoga vidhi, the other five being *Sruti*, *Ānga*, *Vākya*, *Prakarana* and *Sthâna* (See General Note on the Hindu Law Texts p. IV)

The meaning is this. The objector maintains in the statement of this objection, that the persons to whom the terms viz. *Ardhinas*, *Trīṅgas* &c are applied, are not necessarily entitled to a half, a third, or a fourth respectively, in every other sacrifice also, simply because of the fact that they get those shares in the principal sacrifice of *Jyotiṣhtoma*. This would be justifiable if it were a mere repetition of what had already been established. But no such rule has been established after a proper demonstration, and therefore there is no room for its adoption as a mere repetition (*Anuvâda*). The answer, however, is that it is not as a repetition (*Anuvâda*) of anything established (*Siddha*) that this rule as to shares is being propounded, but that the very force of the expressions viz. *Ardhinas*, &c used in the Veda carries with it the meaning that the several priests thus indicated are entitled to a half, a third, and a fourth share respectively.

N B An *Anuvâda* (अनुवाद) is an explanatory repetition of, or reference to, what is already mentioned.

It is also called उद्देश्य the *subject* of the assertion as opposed to विधेय, the fact or the quality asserted of the subject i.e. the *predicate*, and is to be proved or established. The उद्देश्य is already known or assumed as established, while the विधेय is that to establish the connection of which with the उद्देश्य is the object of the proposition. Thus 'Devadatta is wise,' Here Devadatta is the उद्देश्य or the subject and being already known or assumed as established is from another point of view also an अनुवाद, but 'wisdom' is that which is to be established with reference to Devadatta and is therefore the विधेय. This may be further developed to clarify the above thus 'the wise Devadatta is good.' Here Devadatta and his wisdom are known, and his goodness is to be established.

Viramitrodaya

The rule as to profit and loss stated before¹ as the law among the tradesmen the Author extends in the case of sacrificial priests and others

Vaj. avalīya Verse 263 (2)

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Ananta by this i.e. by the statement of the rule as stated before the law has been stated for the sacrificial priest such as the *Hoti* etc., for husbandmen i.e. those who carry on agriculture for artisans i.e. those who engage in works of art dancing etc.

Regarding the division of property among the sacrificial priests *Manu* states a special rule. Among all (the priests officiating at a sacrifice) those entitled to a half are the first (to receive) the next (four) one half of that the set entitled to a third share one third and those entitled to a fourth a quarter.

It is stated in the Vedic text that in a *Jyotishom* sacrifice they shall endow it with a hundred by this a hundred cows has been enjoined. There amongst the sixteen official priests those who are the first four viz. the *Hotsr Adhvaryu Ishtvar* and *Udgata* are entitled in the capacity of their first right to a share to a half by less i.e. for these four forty-eight cows for the next four viz. *Madrik rana Ishtaprathita* *Brhadmandachakravart* and *Ishtav* will have half of it i.e. will be entitled to twenty-four as their share the third viz. *Ahishhtak* *Vesht* *Agnidhra* and *Pratiharta* these four are sharers for a third i.e. the third part of forty-eight thus for the sixteen cows. The fourth moreover viz. *Grdhrastud Unnet* *Jad* and *Subrahmanya* they are the sharers of the fourth of the first part thus to them twelve cows are to be given. Moreover in whichever performance whatever quantity has been stated as the *dakṣiṇ* for that occasion which he should take these or all these all of them should take together. Under the text He gives two golden lights to the *Adhvaryu* such *dakṣiṇ* is as for example for the sacred bath etc. as have been stated in particular connections should be taken by him only and here there is no division. This is the meaning *Sākha* and *Likhita*. Now after the *Ritvik* has been installed, after him another should be installed; the *dakṣiṇ* shall be for him only who has been installed before. One who is installed after may get a trifle if he stays on for the period. He should bide the time waiting for the occasion. He should not sacrifice for another. He

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- “should finish the sacrifice, having gone away, if one returns, he may
“get a trifle, if, however, the chief priest goes out, that priest should
“be fined a hundred coins.” *Manu*¹ “After the *dakṣiṇās* have been
“paid, if he abandons his work he shall obtain his full share and have it
5 “performed by another” *i e* by the son or the like. *Brhaspati*² “What-
“ever has been contributed jointly together, that should be demanded in
“the same manner Here if some one does not make a demand such a
“one loses the profit” Similarly³ “When by the deficiency of one
“partner as to cattle or seeds a loss happens in (the produce of) the field,
10 “it must be made good by him.” The meaning is, that on account of
“whose contribution there is loss to the field by him should it be paid
“Also when goldsmiths or other artists operate jointly, upon (a work
“of) art, they shall share the profits in due proportion corresponding
“to the nature of their work.” Profits *i e* wages. *Kâtyâyana*⁵ “If
15 “artisans *viz* apprentices, more advanced students, and teachers (are
“employed together in one undertaking) they shall receive one after
“another in order one, two, three, and four shares” *Brhaspati*⁶ “The
“same rule has been declared for dancers by those conversant in law
“The expert in *tāla* (beating time) gets a half more, while the singers
20 “take equal shares.” Half more *i e* together with the half

S'ûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 265

- One who is crooked *i e* deceitful, the partners should expel by cutting
off his share One who is unable to look after a vessel etc should have
25 the work done by another

The law relating to the sacrificial priests, husbandmen, and artisans
is the same as stated (here) for tradesmen (265)

1 Ch VIII 208
3 Ch XIV 25
5 Ch V 632

2 Ch XIV 19
4 Ch XIV 28
6 Ch XXIV 130

CHAPTER XXIII

On Theft.

Now commences the chapter on Theft. Its definition has been stated by Manu. "An offence which is committed in the presence and with violence would be called *Sihasa* (i.e. robbery), if (it is committed) in the absence it would be called *Steja* (theft) as also where anything is denied after it has been committed." In the presence i.e. in the presence of the owner guarding the property or the king, or the chief officer or like other. With violence, i.e. with a show of criminal force when a deprivation of another's property or any such similar act is committed, it becomes a *Sihasa* or robbery. Theft, moreover is two-fold. 'In the absence i.e. where in the absence of the owner of the property or like another's property is taken away by deception, it is called theft. Where moreover even when the act is committed in the presence (the actor) denies (it) through fear (saying) I did not do this even that is theft. It has also been said by Narada' PAGE 145* "Taking away by any of these several means whatsoever by deception property of persons asleep, or disordered in intellect or intoxicated, sages declare to be theft

There as the catching of a thief is necessary for punishing him, and as for catching him it is necessary to detect him, the Author presently mentions the means of detecting him

Yājñavalkya Verse 268

A thief is arrested by the police-officer, by means of the lost article or by the foot-mark a man once convicted of an offence as also one who lives in an unknown place.

Mītākṣharā.—One who is declared by the people This is a thief chandro—such a one should be arrested by the police-officers, grabakāṭh, i.e. the state officers, such as the watchmen of the place and the like others or he may be apprehended by means of the *lopra*, lost article i.e. the vessel &c. which had been taken away, as (it is) an index of

1 Ch. VIII. 338

2 ग्राह्य is another reading which is seen in Manu and elsewhere. In that case it would mean "after it has been taken away."

3 Ch. XL. 17V

theft, or by tracing the foot-marks,¹ immediately from the day of the loss. He, moreover, **pūrva-karmāparādhī**, *who had once been convicted of an offence, i.e.* who had once been found out to have committed a theft, as also one **aśuddhawâsakah**, *who lives in an unknown place, i.e.* one whose
5 place of residence is unknown i.e. not well-known, such a one also may be arrested

‘Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 266

By the officers of the police, one who has been pointed out as a thief
10 should be apprehended for theft by a mark or sign of theft, by foot-mark i.e. commencing with the place of loss and in pursuit of the foot-steps of the thieves etc., or previous acts of robbery, and one who has not established his place of residence (266)

Yājñavalkya, Verses 267-268

15 Others also may be apprehended on suspicion, such as those who conceal their caste, name, and the like, those who are addicted to gambling, women, and drinking, as also those whose mouth becomes parched up, and voice falters (267),

Also those who make inquiries about another's wealth and houses,
20 whose movements are mysterious, who having no income spend much, and those who sell lost articles (268).

Mitākṣharā:—Moreover, not only that those mentioned before should alone be arrested, but **anyepi**, *others also*, by means of marks to be presently mentioned **śāṅkayâ grāhyâh**, *may be apprehended on suspicion*

25 ‘On account of the concealment of the caste’, *e.g.* in the form ‘I am not a Śūdra’, on account of the concealment of the name *e.g.* one saying ‘I am not Lapittha’ And by the use of the term **Ādi—** ‘and the like,’ those also should be apprehended, who are exposed by the concealment of their own country, village, family and the like

30 Those who are excessively addicted to gambling, public women, drinking, and other similar vices, as also one who when accosted by the police officers ‘whence have you come?’ **śushkamukhah**, *has his mouth parched up*, or **bhinnaswaro**, *his voice falters*, then he also may be apprehended. By the use of the plural number are included also those
35 whose forehead¹ perspires, and the like others

1 See Yājñi II 13-15 p 691 above

Likewise those who without any cause make inquiries, how much wealth has he ? or where is his house ? or those who move about concealing their identity by putting on a disguise those also who having no income spend much as also those who are vendors of lost articles, i.e. of the old clothes, broken pots and similar other articles the owners whereof are not known all these may be apprehended on suspicion as thieves. 5

Having thus apprehended people having various marks of suspicion about their having committed a theft a decision as to whether these are thieves or good people should be declared after a minute inquiry, and not by a mere discovery of the signs (of a thief), as it is possible that the marks of (having) the lost article and others may be found even on one who is not a thief as says Nārada¹ " An article should " be determined upon as a lost one by special investigation, i.e. when " it had dropped down from another's hand, and was discovered on " the ground without any special desire for it, whether it was " deposited there by a thief " Similarly " the untruthful appear as the " truthful likewise, the truthful look as if they were untruthful thus various aspects (of things) are seen (in this world), therefore an investigation has been prescribed " 15 20

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 267

Others also, besides those stated should be apprehended on suspicion as thieves, by the denial of the name etc. Denial of name such as " I am not such a one " denial of caste such as " I am not a Brāhmana." By the use of the word *Adi* and the like are included the country the family the place etc. Similarly those addicted to gambling In these manner when asked, " who are you ? " " When are you coming ? " those whose mouths become parched and the voice breaks these also should be apprehended (267). 25 30

Yājñavalkya Verse 268

Those who make enquiries about the property of others as also about the houses those who move about secretly ; those who, having no income incur expenditure ; those who dispose of broken ear rings and the like ; (these) should be apprehended on suspicion (268) 35

1 Not found in the published edition of Nārada by Dr Jolly

The person thus apprehended on a suspicion of theft must prove himself innocent, so the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 269

5 If one who has been apprehended on suspicion do not clear himself from the (charge of) theft, the king shall compel him to make good the lost article, and punish him with the penalty for a thief

10 Mitāksharâ:—If one apprehended on suspicion as a thief does not clear himself from that charge, then he shall be compelled to pay the amount and be liable to corporal punishment as will be presently mentioned Therefore, he should be cleared either by human¹ proof, or in its absence, by an ordeal

PAGE 146*

Indeed, how can the statement *e g* "I am no thief" be possible as evidence in an answer² of denial; because it is negative in its nature The answer is the admissibility of an affirmative as well as a negative proof in an ordeal has been demonstrated in the

15 The answer text³ : "Or by consent any one (of the two) may perform " Moreover⁴, although human proof is not possible in an answer of a simple denial, still when it is joined to a special plea, which is of an affirmative character, and then becomes 'a combination of a denial and an exception', it makes it possible even for the negative evidence to be added *e g* if the accused prove by evidence his statement *e g*. "At
20 "the time of the loss or theft I was in another place", the absence of theft (by him) becomes necessarily proved, and thus indeed there
25 follows an exoneration.

1 See p 713 ll. 21-24

2 See Text p 7 Translation p 661, ll 16-18 above

3 Of Yājñavalkya II 96 (1), See p. 913 above

4 See pages 664-665 above. The meaning is that a statement in a defence which is merely of a negative character cannot be established by proof positive-
e g when a man says 'I have not committed this theft'—unless he can establish some positive fact which will collaterally support his negative answer, *e g*. by his setting up an alibi, when he can affirmatively prove that he was in another place at the time when the theft was committed. And for this he will have to file a mixed plea 'combined of a denial and a special plea'

The Author mentions the penalty for a thief

Yājñavalkya, Verse 270 (1)

Having compelled the thief to restore the property stolen, (the king) should punish him by the several (modes of) corporal punishments

- 5 Mitâksharâ.—He, however, who either by means of the tests stated before, or by means other than those, has been proved to have committed a theft, should be compelled to make over to the owner the property *apahriam*, *stolen*, either the thing itself or by determining its equivalent (in money), *wiwdhairwadhaighâtayet* and (the king), *should*
10 *punish him by the several (modes of) corporal punishments*

- This, however, has a reference to articles of a superior quality, in the case of which the punishment of the highest amercement is incurred, and does not hold in the case of the theft of articles of small or middling value such as flowers, clothes &c Since, on account
15 of the text of Nârada¹ viz “ The series of punishments, which has been “ordained by the wise for the three kinds of Sâhasas is equally applicable to theft, according as it concerns one of the three species of “articles in their order ” The corporal punishment, which is ordained for a Sâhasa of the highest order, has been assigned in the case of articles
20 of superior value What, moreover, has been observed by Vrdhha Manu in the text “ The property of these is tainted with sin, since it “has been acquired by illegal means, therefore, the king should inflict “corporal punishments on them, and should not merely inflict a pecu-
“niary fine,” that too has a reference to offences of a serious nature.

- 25 The Author mentions an exception in the case of certain thieves
Yājñavalkya, Verse 270 (2)

He should brand a Brâhmana, and banish him from his kingdom.

- Mitâksharâ —Moreover, a Brâhmana (who has been found as a) thief, the king should not chastise by a corporal punishment, but after
30 branding him on the forehead, he should banish him from his kingdom The branding, too, should be with the mark of a dog’s foot. For Manu² says “ For violating the bed of the preceptor (the mark of) a female “part shall be impressed, for drinking spirituous liquor, the sign of a “tavern, in the case of a theft, moreover, the mark of a dog’s foot
35 “should be made, for killing a Brâhmana, a headless corpse”

1 Ch XIV, 21

2 Ch LX 237

This proceeding moreover shall be observed in the case of one who does not perform the (necessary) expiation after the punishment (was declared) as says Manu¹. But (men of) all castes who perform "the penances as prescribed must not be branded by the king on the forehead, but shall be made to pay the highest amercement."

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Vīramitrodaya

Not only should one be arrested on suspicion but also one about whom the offence of theft has been determined, nor also is the punishment of a money kind such as the highest amercement etc. but even a corporal punishment banishment etc. shall also be for a thief so the Author proceeds

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Yājñavalkya Verse 270

By several (varieties of) corporal punishments such as impaling on a cross lopping off of the hands and the like means of corporal punishments for thefts in the case of others (which will be stated here after) for like cases the Brāhmaṇas should be branded on the forehead and banished from one's Kingdom (270).

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Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 270

Vadhañ, by corporal punishments, i. e. by means of punishments to be stated hereafter *acchenham*, with a brand, i. e. together with the mark of his own foot. As says Bṛhan Manu "On account of the property having "been acquired by illegal means, the wealth of these is tainted with sin. "Therefore the king should inflict corporal punishments on them and should not merely inflict a pecuniary fine (270).

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The Author mentions the means of getting at the stolen property after the thief has been discovered

Yājñavalkya, Verse 271

In the case of a murder or a theft, the blame attaches to the village-officer when the offender has not (been traced to have) gone off; to the owner of a pasture ground; to the detectives of thieves, when (the offence is committed) on the high-way or in a non-pasture ground.

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Mītākṣharā :—If the killing of man or of any other living animal, or a deprivation of property takes place in a village, then the blame for neglecting a thief would be that of the headman of the village

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alone, and to atone for it, he himself must catch the thief and hand (him) over to the king. When he is unable to do that, he should pay the stolen amount to the owner, if he does not point out the foot-marks of the thief to have emerged from out of the village and beyond it.

- 5 When, moreover, such marks are pointed out, where the same (appear to) enter, the owner of such property alone should make over the stolen amount. Likewise Nârada¹ also says. "He, within whose pasture-ground a robbery has been committed, must trace the thief to the best of his power, or else he must make good what has been stolen, when the
- 10 "foot-marks cannot be traced beyond (into another man's ground) (16) "When the foot-marks, after leaving that ground, are lost and cannot "be traced any further, the neighbours, the watchmen on the road, and "governors of that region shall be made to pay² (17) "

- 15 When, however, the theft takes place in a pasture-ground, the responsibility rests with the owner of the pasture alone. When, however, the deprivation takes place on the road itself, or in a *nonpasture ground*, *awitake*, i.e. in a place other than a pasture-ground, then the blame lies with the detectives of thieves, or the watchman of the road, or the governor of that region.

20 Śûlapâṇi
Yājñavalkya, Verse 271

- When a man or the like has been killed, or a cow etc. has been stolen in a village, the blame attaches to the village headman, if the foot-mark of the men etc. is not seen emerging out of the village. "Outside the
- 25 village," however, i.e. on the road, then it (i.e. the blame) is of the owner of the pasture ground. In non-pastures i.e. places other than pastures such as fields etc. of the officer appointed to guard against thieves (271)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 272

- A village, however, should pay (when) within its own limits, or that
- 30 where the foot (mark) has reached. When beyond a *krośa*, five of the surrounding villages, or even ten villages also

PAGE 146*

Mitākṣharâ —Moreover, when however, a theft &c., occurs outside a village, but in a field which is on the outskirts of its boundary limits, then the inhabitants of that village alone should pay, if the foot mark

of the thief has not emerged out beyond the boundary limit. When, however, it has emerged out, that village whereinto the foot marks of the thief enter shall alone make over the thief and do other acts.

When, however any one is killed or robbed midway between several towns, and in a place which is more than a *krośi*¹ outside (each of them), and foot marks of the thief have also been lost on account of the pressure of the crowd, then in such a case five villages : *i* e the five villages together, or ten villages : *i* e the ten villages together should pay. The optional clause is used to indicate that as much should be done as would bring about a restoration of the property stolen &c, from the villages contiguous to the place. 5 10

When, however the king is not able to cause property stolen elsewhere to be restored then he should indeed pay from his own treasury *vide* the text of Gaṇṭama 'Having recovered property "stolen by thieves, he shall return it to the owner or he shall" pay out "of his own treasury" 15

In case of a doubt as to whether property was stolen or not, the decision should be made by means of human proof or by ordeal as has been laid down by Vṛddha Bhatta. If, while the property is being caused to be restored, a doubt arises as to a theft (having 'taken place) the person robbed should be put to an oath, or he may "establish (his case) by (the evidence of) his relatives." 20

Vīramītrodaya

Yājñavalkya Verses 271-72

In the case of manslaughter, or theft of property or robbery etc. the fault is of the headman of the village for conniving at a thief therefore the village, its master should restore back property which has been lost within his territory if the foot prints of the thief do not emerge out of the village. If however they emerge out then wherever they are traced as entering the master of that territory should give. On the pasture-ground for the grazing of the cattle etc the responsibility for assault or robbery is of the owner. At a place other than the pasture ground the responsibility 25 30

1 *i* e two English miles

* Ch. X 40-47

3 *i* e when the thieves are not traced, or having been traced have vanished, then the king should pay from his own treasury Haradajita.

for assault, robbery etc is of the patrol of the road in regard to the tracing of the theft. The half of the verse beginning with 'within its limits etc' is also connected with this. If, however, an assault or a robbery occur at a place intervening between several villages, and the

5 foot-prints also are obliterated by the pressure of the crowd etc. then the people of the five villages, or of ten villages collectively, should pay

The word *atha vâ* 'or, even' is used as indicative of neglect. Thus, the result is that those who are in the neighbourhood of a *krośa* should pay. In some books for *krośât* the reading is *krāhtāt*,
10 'from the cultivated land' By the first use of the word *tu* is excluded the responsibility beyond the territory

When, however, the king is not able to compel the restoration from others of the property stolen, then the king himself should pay what was stolen by the thief. Since *Gautama*¹ has observed "Having
15 "recovered property stolen by thieves he shall return it to the owner, "or he shall pay out of his own treasury" (271-72).

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 272

20 What is lost within one's boundary, the village itself should pay, or where the foot-marks emerge out of a cultivated place and elsewhere, what is stolen away, the men of five villages together should give by regard to the contiguity, or men of ten villages is the optional rule (272)

The Author mentions a special penalty in cases of particular offences
Yājñavalkya, Verse 273

25 The King shall cause to be impaled on a stake *Bandigrâhas*, likewise the stealers of horses and elephants, as also those who commit murders with violence

30 *Mitâkṣharâ* —The king should cause, to be impaled on a stake the *Bandigrâhas*² and like others, or also men who commit murders accompanied with violence and force. This, moreover, is a rule regarding only one kind of corporal punishment, *vide* the text of *Manu*³ "Those who "break into a (royal) storehouse, an armoury, or a temple, and those "who steal elephants, horses, or chariots, he shall indeed slay without "hesitation"

1 Ch X 46-47

2 *Bandigrâhas* are those persons who forcibly take or carry away others as prisoners.

3 Ch. IX, 280

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 273

Those desperadoes, who regardless of life and with the object of (extracting) money carry wealthy persons as prisoners the as also those who steal elephants and horses similarly those who kill with violence all these the king should impale on stakes (73) 5

Yājñavalkya Verse 274

The pick-pockets and cut purses should be deprived of the tongs of their hands, for a second offence they should be deprived of a hand or a foot

Mīlākṣhara—Moreover he who throws up the clothes or other things : & carries them away is *utkṣhepakah* a pickpocket. He who carries away gold or other things tied in a cloth &c either by loosening or cutting (the knot) is *granthi-bhedakah* a cutpurse. These two respectively should have the forefinger and the thumb resembling a tong removed from their hand. 10

Dwītyaparadhe on a second offence moreover a hand and a foot (joined together make up the compound expression) a hand and a foot. That and each one of these is a hand and a foot. Those two should each have a hand or a foot taken away from them : & of the pick-pocket and the cut purse a hand and a foot should be cut off from each. This is the meaning. 15 20

This also has a reference to articles which bring on the highest *Sāhara*, since Narada¹ has observed. The amputation of that limb "(with which the crime had been committed) is declared to be the "punishment for a *Sāhara* of the highest degree. 25

For a third offence, however death alone (is the punishment). So Manu² (says) "On the first conviction he should cause two "fingers of a cut-purse to be cut off on the second a hand and a "foot on the third, he deserves death.

The meaning is, the punishment should be determined upon by regard to the caste and the amount of property, as also the value &c 30

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 274

One who robs by lifting is a lifter. One who steals gold etc. tied in a cloth by breaking open the knot is a cut purse. These two for a first offence should be deprived of the thumb and the first finger of the hand; for a second offence should have their one hand and foot lopped off and for the third offence these should be sentenced to death. As Manu has stated : "For the third he incurs a capital punishment" (74) 35

As it is impossible to lay down several punishments in regard to each kind of property, having regard to the fact that the causes for a heavy or light punishment are innumerable, *viz* the caste, the amount of the property, the relation, or the appropriation and disposal (of the same), as also the age, capacity, the qualities, the country, the time, and such other causes, the Author mentions a general rule for determining a punishment

Yājñavalkya, Verse 275

In the case of the theft of inferior, middling, and superior articles, the fine shall be according to the value. In passing sentence, the place, the time, the age and the capacity should be taken into consideration.

Mitāksharâ —In the case of a *theft*, *harane*, of articles of inferior, middling, as also of superior quality, the punishment should be determined *sârato*, *according to the value*, *i. e.* the price (of the article &c.) The nature of an article of an inferior or other quality has been mentioned by Nârada¹ "Earthenware, a seat, a couch, bone, wood, leather, grass, and the like, leguminous² grain, and prepared food, these are instances of articles of small value (14) Clothes other than those made of silk, and likewise cattle other than cows, and metals other than gold, are articles of middling value, as also are rice and barley (15) Gold, jewels, a silken cloth, a woman, a man, a cow, an elephant, and a horse, and the property belonging to a god, a Brâhmana, or a king, must be understood as articles of superior value (16)"

PAGE 148*

The same Author³ has pointed out a rule of punishment in terms of a *Sâhasa* of the inferior, middling, or superior quality in the case of articles of three classes, derived from the general rule. "That series of punishments which has been ordained by the wise for the three kinds of Sâhasas is equally applicable even to theft regarding articles of the three classes respectively" In the case of a jewel or a pot which is made of earth, or of cattle other than cows and horses, such as a buffalo, a ram, and the like, and also gold, grain &c., belonging to a Brâhmana, there is a rule of differentiation as to higher or lower quality

1 Ch XIV 14-16

2 *Samiddhânya*—is any pulse or grain growing in pods, a leguminous grain;

3 Ch XIV, 21, Gautama Ch XII, 15-17.

and thus when it is desired to determine upon a higher or a lower form of punishment, it should be done by regard to the price &c.

There moreover *daṇḍakarmāṇi*, in *giving sentence* for fixing upon a particular punishment the country the time and the age (of the offender) &c., should be carefully taken into consideration as the determining causes thereof. These moreover also imply the (consideration as to) the caste the size of the (particular) article and (the extent of) the appropriation, or like other matters. Moreover 'The guilt of a *Sūtra* in the case of a theft is eight fold and twice that and higher still will be the punishment in each higher caste and "in cases of offences by the learned the punishment shall be very much "increased." The meaning is thus By the word guilt (used) here the punishment is intended. Whatever punishment has been prescribed for a particular theft, the same should be administered eight fold in the case of theft by a learned *Sūtra*. In the case of learned men of other castes, moreover *ṛ* of the *Vaiśya* *Kṣatriya* or *Brāhmana* castes, the guilt is two-fold and higher up to sixteen, thirty-two, and sixty-four times the amount since there is a higher punishment for a theft committed by a learned *Sūtra*.

The same meaning has been brought out by Manu also "In (a case of) theft the guilt of a *Sūtra* is eight fold, sixteen times, that of a *Vaiśya*, and thirty-two times in the case of a *Kṣatriya* (337). "That of a *Brāhmana* sixty-four-fold or quite fully a hundred, or (even) twice four-and-sixty fold; (each of them) knowing the "nature of the offence (338)."

Similarly a higher punishment is also determined by the consequences (of the offence). As says Manu "Of him who steals more than ten *kumbhas* of grain, corporal punishment (shall be inflicted) "in other cases he shall be fined eleven times as much, and shall be made "to pay the property (to the owner)." A *kumbha* is equal to twenty *Dronas*.

1. Bāṣambhaṭṭa assigns this text to Vasiṣṭha, but it is not found in the Dharmasūtras of that author.

- There is a mistake in the print of the text here (p. 148 l. 1).

Instead of *ṛ* read *ṛ*.

3. Ch. VIII 327-338

4. Ch. VIII 320

5. or its value

The punishments of beating, deprivation of a limb, or death, to be declared against the thief should be determined upon by regard to the qualities of the owner robbed, as also to the time being plentiful of harvests, or of famine. Moreover, in the case of precious jewels and like articles, there is a particular punishment even by regard to the particular number (stolen). "A¹ corporal punishment shall be inflicted in the case of a theft of more than a hundred of articles made of gold, silver (or other like metal), and of most excellent clothes, as also of (a theft) of all kinds of jewels. For (stealing) more than fifty, the (punishment of) cutting off of the hands is intended, in other cases, a fine eleven times the price (of the article stolen) should be fixed." Likewise, from (the quality of) the particular article also. "For² stealing away men of noble family, and especially women, and precious gems of all kinds, he deserves (the punishment of) death." For stealing away men not of a high family, however, there is a different punishment. "The³ punishment for one who steals away a man, is the highest amercement, in the case, however, of a like offence against a woman, he shall be deprived of his entire property, and a corporal punishment for one who steals a maiden." In the case of articles of trifling value, however, *vide* the text of Nârada⁴: "In the case of articles of a value less than a *mâsha* a fine five times the price of the article shall be imposed. For stealing wood, a pot grass and the like, as also articles made of clay, hamboo, and vessels made of bamboo⁵, muscles, bones and hides. For stealing vegetables with green roots, and fruits and roots, preparations of cow-milk, and of the sugar-cane, and salt or oil. Cooked food, (specially) prepared food; fish, flesh; and every sort of object of (any) value, a fine five times the value (shall be the punishment)." 5

30 A punishment, however, which in the cases of articles of small value is less than a hundred, or limited by fifty, the same should be adequately adjusted in (the case of thefts of) articles of the value of a *Mâsha* or of a higher value. The text of Manu⁶, moreover,

1 See Manu Ch VIII. 321-322 Bâlabhattacharya assigns this text to Nârada

2 Ch VIII 323, 3 Nârada Appendix 28 4 Appendix 22-24

5 The reading in Nârada is वेतस्य—'of rattan' 6. Ch VIII 329

applicable to trifling articles, viz. "the fine shall be twice the value of the article, has a reference to articles of a very small value e.g. an earthen pot or the like. Moreover, there is an excess of punishment also on account of an aggravation of the offence. "The king should cut off the hands of those thieves who make holes in the walls and commit thefts at night, and shall impale them on a pointed stake." Thus all these are innumerable, and cannot be specifically mentioned in regard to each article and so a lower or higher form of punishment should be determined by regard to the several circumstances such as the caste, the quality and the quantity (of the subject matter), and like others.

Of travellers, however there is no punishment for slight infringements, as says Manu. "A twice-born (man) who is travelling and whose provisions are exhausted shall not be fined if he takes a couple of stalks of sugar-cane or a couple of roots from the field of another man." Also: "Of gram, rice wheat, barley millet, and bean, a handful may be taken by those who are on their way in a journey if not prohibited. Likewise he who has not eaten at six meals, may take at the seventh meal from a man who neglects his sacred duties, without (however) making a provision for the morrow."

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 273

For stealing articles of low middling and highest qualities, such as fuel pots salt jaggree, camphor saffron etc. the punishment should be administered by taking into consideration the original price, the place and the time of the robbery in determining the penalty in passing sentence (275).

The Author mentions a punishment even for one who is not himself a thief, but who helps a thief

Yājñavalkya, Verse 276

To him who knowingly supplies food, lodging, fire, water, counsel, implements and expenses, to a thief or a murderer the punishment shall be the highest.

1 Author not known 2 Ch. VIII. 311 3 Ch. XI. 16

4 i.e. when a man has been compelled to fast for three successive days and three nights, he may (even) steal, but only from one who does not answer the responsibilities enjoined by the Śāstra and, the theft also should not be with a view to store up provisions not even for the morrow, but simply to satisfy the hunger so keenly felt.

Mitâksharâ —**Bhaktam**, *food*, for eating, **avakâśo**, *lodging*, i.e. a resting place, **agnih**, *fire*, for removing the cold of the thief,, **udakam**, *water*, for one thirsty, **mantrah**, *counsel*, i.e. advice in the matter of a theft, **upakaraṇam**, *implement*, i.e. the means for committing a theft, **wyayah**,
5 *expenses*, i.e. in the journey of one going out to another region for committing a theft. He who offers these **chaurasya**, *to a thief*, **hantur wâ**,
or *to a murderer*, **jânannapi**, *even (after) knowing him*, (to be such), for him the punishment shall be the highest amercement

A blame attaches even to those who tolerate a thief, since Nârada¹
10 has said: "Or those who neglect² them though able (to arrest),
"partake of (the responsibility of) their crime themselves."

Śûlapâni

Now an extension of the (rules regarding the) thieves

Yājñavalkya, Verse 276

15 *Bhaktam*, 'food', i.e. for eating, 'lodging', a resting place, fire for relieving cold, water, for one thirsty, counsel, i.e. advice, implements, the means for committing a theft, expenses, i.e. in a journey of one going out to another region for committing theft, he who deliberately gives these to a thief or to a homicide, for him the penalty shall be the highest
20 amercement Kâtyâyana says "Those who purchase articles, as also
"those who accept as donations, all these are equally punishable, as also
"those who conceal them " (276)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 277

For giving a blow with a weapon, and also for causing an abortion,
25 the punishment is the highest, for the killing of a man or a woman the punishment may be the highest or the lowest

Mitâksharâ:—Śastrâvapâtane, *for giving a blow with a weapon*, on the limbs of another, and **garbhasya pātane**, *for causing abortion*, in cases other than that of a female slave or of a Brâhmana, the punishment
30 i.e. the penalty shall be the highest. For causing the abortion of a female slave, however, a fine of a hundred has been mentioned (in the

1 Ch XIV 19

2. उपेक्षा—*is forbearance or neglect, connivance* The meaning here is that those men who exhibit a kind of passiveness regarding criminals, even when they have the capacity to arrest them, knowing them to be such, render themselves responsible as accomplices

text¹) One who destroys the fetus of a female slave. As for the fetus of a Brāhmana the Author will mention an extension of the rule in² 'One who destroys a fetus unknowingly &c' And for the murder of a man or a woman the highest or the lowest punishment must be understood as laid down, having regard to the character mode of living and such other circumstances (regarding the deceased) 3

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 277

For destroying a womb by striking a weapon, the punishment is the highest (amercement). For killing a superior man or woman the highest and for murdering a lower man or woman the lowest amercement (77) 10

Yājñavalkya, Verse 278

A woman who is superlatively wicked, who destroys males, who breaks reservoirs, shall, if not pregnant be plunged into water after a stone being tied 15

Mitākṣhara — Moreover one who is extremely wicked is vipraduṣṭhā a superlatively wicked woman, & a one who causes the destruction of a child in the embryo, also who causes herself to miscarry, as also she who kills a man and one who breaks reservoirs: these women, if not pregnant, should be plunged into water, after tying a stone round their neck, so that they may not swim up. 20

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 278

A woman who is superlatively wicked, or who is an adulteress or also a man who destroys an embankment should have a stone tied to them and be immersed in water the woman, also if she be not pregnant (78). 25

Yājñavalkya, Verse 279

One who administers poison, or sets fire or kills her husband, preceptor or her own child, shall be deprived of her ears, hands, nose and lips, and be caused to be killed by bullocks. 30

1 II 236 see p. 1261 l 9 above

2 Vīṭeśvara and Bāṣambhaṭṭa both say it is in the 1 rīyakṣitidhyāya, but it is not to be found there. It is probably a reference to Verse 80 following hereafter

Mitākṣharâ —Moreover, (here again) one who is not pregnant is understood She also who administers *ie* puts poison into the food, drink &c with the object of killing others, she, again, who sets fire to a village &c that it may be burnt; likewise, one who causes
 5 her own husband, preceptor, or children to be killed, such a one should have her ears, hands, nose and lips cut off, and herself caused to be killed by means of wild and untamed bulls

This statement of a rule regarding a Sâbasika and made in the chapter on theft should be understood to be made incidentally.

10

Vîramitrodaya

While treating particularly of (the law of) theft, the Author mentions penalties for similar offences

Yājñavalkya, Verses 273-79

Those who imprison moneyed men and keep them are (called)
 15 *Bandigrahās* (men-lifters); also those who steal horses or elephants, and those who forcibly kill men, such thieves the king should impale on spikes as (for) a capital punishment (273)

One stealing clothes after lifting them, as also stealing gold etc. tied in a cloth after untying the knot, should be deprived of the fore-
 20 finger and the thumb, and on a second offence of pick-pocketing, the king should deprive them either of a foot or a hand (274)

For stealing articles of low, middling, or high value, the punishment should be administered by regard to the value of the article equal to its price

25 In the matter of determining the punishment, the country and other circumstances also should be taken into consideration by the king There, says Nârada¹ " Earthen pots, bed-steads, bones, wood, " hide, grass, and the like, as also leguminous grains and cooked food " are known as articles of low value Clothes excepting silken ones, as
 30 " also beasts excepting cow, and metals excepting gold, are articles of " middling value, as also are paddy and barley Gold, jewels, silken " articles, women, men, cow, elephants, horses and articles belonging to " the deity and the Brâhmanas should be regarded as articles of " the highest value "

35 By the use of [the word *tathâ*, 'also', is included the addition of the king The word *mahâdravya* used here-after discriminates

¹ Ch XIV 14-16.

such elephants horses as belong to the king By the first use of the word *cha* are included those who destroy the chariots by the second use of the word *cha* are included those who break through a fire place etc. *vide* the text of *Manu*¹ Those who break through the building containing fire or weapons or the temples of Gods as also those who destroy the elephants the horses and chariots the king should certainly chastise without hesitation By the use of the word *cha* certainly is excluded any monetary penalty *Manu* has observed By reason of having a quired money by unjust means their property has a taint in it therefore the king should punish them corporally and should not inflict (merely) a monetary punishment (75).

For him who offers food place for residence or fire for relieving cold or offering fire water etc. which would relieve cold or instruments for stealing or killing such as a sword or expenses for the journey over travelling to distant countries or any of these to a thief of gold etc. or to a homicide or the like even though not knowing him as a thief for such a one although not a thief the highest is the one equal for a thief alone is the punishment in conformity with the following text of *Narada* Those who invite or those who give counsel or offer an asylum all these are regarded as equally amenable to punishment as also those who conceal them Those who give food or time as also those who neglect running after thieves when they have capacity these also are guilty of that offence When the king is not able to ward off thieves one offering food etc. to a thief in the interest of self protection is not guilty *vide* this text of *Viññu* Except when the king is unable (76).

For striking the body of another with a weapon and for bringing about an abortion excepting in the case of a fetus of a female slave or of a *Brāhmaṇa* the penalty is the highest amercement; for destroying or killing the wives of particular persons such as characterized by their being *Brāhmaṇas* the penalty shall be the highest or the lowest amercement. *Id* or ; the option (indicated here) is (to be exercised) by regard to the general behaviour and character By the use of the word *api* also in the case of others than those known by their behaviour and character, the penalty shall be the middling amercement By the use of the word *cha*, having regard to the text of *Viññu*¹ He who steals

1 See Ch. IX 40

Not found in *Manu*

2 Ch. XIV 19

4 Ch. V 17 5 Ch. V 87

"gems (shall pay) the highest amercement," is included the theft of a not valuable jewel (277).

A woman who is superlatively wicked, who kills the foetus & causes her own abortion, who destroys males, as also one who breaks
5 reservoirs, should be plunged into water after a stone being tied to her neck, provided they are not pregnant. By the first use of *cha* are included males who are poisoners or incendiaries. By the second use of the *cha* are included acts stated in the text of Śankha viz "For
10 "breaking open a well, a reservoir, a tank used for drinking water, or "for polluting liquid things, as also for offering a non-slave woman "to a slave" (278).

A woman who is a poisoner or incendiary, or who brings about the death of the husband, the father etc, or of the child, should be deprived of her ear, nose and lips, and be caused to be killed by a bull (273-79).

15 Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 279

The poisoner and the incendiary, as well as a woman who murders her husband, and others should have their ears, hands, nose, and the lip lopped off, and be caused to be destroyed by sharp horned cows (279).

PAGE 150*

20 Where a murder has been committed and the murderer is not known, the Author mentions the means of detecting the murderer.

Yājñavalkya, Verse 280

Of one who is killed by an unknown (person), the sons and relations should be immediately questioned as regards any quarrel, as also separately
25 such women of his as were in love with other men.

Mitāksharâ — Of one who has been killed by an unknown individual, the sons, and all near relations *kalahamâśu prashnavyâh*, should immediately be questioned as regards any quarrel, thus "With whom had he had a
30 "quarrel"? Likewise, such women belonging to the deceased, and who were in love with other men & were adulterous, should also be questioned

Śālapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 230

Of one who has been killed by an unknown person, the sons and relatives should immediately be questioned by the king & officers about any previous quarrel. Also his women in love with other men should each be questioned separately (230).

5

How should they be questioned? So the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 281

'Was he fond of women, wealth, or a *vṛtti*? ' or 'With whom did he go?' Or (the king) may minutely make inquiries of the people living in the vicinity of the place of murder

10

Mītākṣhara — Was he fond of women? Had he a greed for money? or 'Had he a desire to earn a livelihood? or thus: 'For what woman had he a fondness and how is she connected? For which wealth had he a fondness? or 'Whence did he think of securing his livelihood? or 'With whom did he go to another country? Thus in various ways should his adulterous women be separately questioned after giving them assurances.

15

Likewise, such men *e. g.* the cowherds, foresters and others as were in the neighbourhood of the place of murder should also be questioned in confidence. Thus after determining upon the murderer by several means such as these, a punishment adequate for him may be declared

20

Vīramitrodaya

In the text¹ In the case of murder or theft &c. murder is stated by way of illustration; 'there how can it be determined that he is a murderer? Anticipating this in the context the Author suggests an answer

25

Yājñavalkya Verses 280-31

Where a person is killed, and it is not known by what particular individual he was killed there his sons and relations should immediately be questioned thus 'with whom had he a quarrel? ; with a view to (solve) the doubt regarding the escape of the thief; his women such as wife, sister etc. 'With which other persons were they in love? should each be separately questioned so as to avoid non-disclosure through shyness in the presence of each other (280).

30

And his sons and relations should be asked whether he was fond of women, or of money, or of employment, and with whom he had gone In the absence of sons, relations, and others, persons in the vicinity of (the place of) death such as the cow-herd and the forester, he should
5 question after creating confidence By the use of the word *cha*, 'also', the Author includes the question such as 'with whose wife was he in love' ? By the use of the word *api*, 'also', is included the suggestion that even without a question one should find out a trace of enmity (280-81)

Śûlapâni

10 Yājñavalkya, Verse 281

The investigating officer of the state should slowly and persuasively question the people of the locality as to whether he was addicted to women, was covetous of wealth, or was looking out for a living, as also with whom he had gone, or the woman also, whose was she and the like Bṛhaspati¹
15 says "Where a corpse is found, but the murderer cannot be discovered, "the king shall trace him by drawing an inference from previous en-
"mities of his" (281)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 282

Those who set fire to a field, a house, a forest, a village, a pasture-
20 ground or a threshing floor, likewise he who carnally knows the wives of the king, shall be burnt in a fire of grass.

Mitâkṣharâ —Moreover, those who set fire to *kshetram*, a field, in which the fruits and the crops have ripened *Weśma* means a house, *vanam*, a forest i e a wild forest or a pleasure forest, village,
25 *vivîtam*, a pasture ground has² been explained, or *khalam*, a threshing floor, as also he who has carnal intercourse with a wife of the king; all these should be covered with the *virana*³ grass, and burnt This punishment has been mentioned here, as it is incidental to the punishment of death, (which accrues) to the incendiaries of fields &c

30 Thus ends the Chapter on Theft

1 Oh XXII 34

2 See Yājñ II 160 (2) and the Mitâkṣharâ thereon p 1171 ll 17-18 above.

3 Straw—a kind of grass at the root of which is found the fragrant *khush* or वाञ्छा See Amara II 4 164 —the *Andropogon Muricatus*

Vīramitrodaya

Now on the occasion of mentioning the penalties for theft and (causing) death the Author states the penalties for a like offence

Yājñavalkya Verse 252

The persons setting fire to any one of the six things such as a field and the rest as also those having sexual intercourse with the wife of the king should be covered with the *śrīṅga* grass and burnt in its fire. By the use of the word *śrīṅga* are included those stated by Manu¹ in the text viz. "He who destroys a rampart (of a town) or fills up the ditch or who breaks through the (town) gates should be immediately killed" 5
By the use of the word *śrīṅga* however the Author excludes its destruction by any other means as says Katyayana "Fifth r through a desire for securing a friend or earning wealth or wishing the welfare of the king and the people should never let off desperados who are a danger to all beings. The king who either through covetousness or through fear does not destroy sinners there a commotion springs up in his territory and he is deprived of (his) kingdom 10
15

Narada² "This law of punishment has been generally stated for all "excepting corporal punishment for a Brāhmana a Brāhmana should not "be killed in his case the punishment is shaving of the head banishment 20
"from the town with a brand mark of a culprit on the forehead and a "parade on a donkey" Yama "Never shall at any place be corporal "punishment for a Brāhmana he should be kept in prison under restraint "and the king should give him food or he should be tied with a rope and the king should compel him to do labour for a month or half a month. 25
"Taking into consideration the real subject-matter having regard to the offence a Brāhmana may be compelled to perform works forbidden "(for him)."

Other punishments are passed over through fear of prolixity

Here ends in the commentary on Yājñavalkya
the Chapter on Theft

30

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 252

Those who set fire to a field etc., those who have intercourse with the king's wives should be burnt on a pile of fire the pile made of *śrīṅga* or other grass (28³). 35

Here ends the Chapter on Theft

CHAPTER XXIV

On Adultery with women

The Chapter of Law called 'Adultery' is being now propounded With a view to adjustment with the punishments for the lowest and other *Sāhasas*, a threefold division of the same has been specified by Vyāsa. "That has been designated as of three kinds, the lowest, the "middlemost, and the highest Conversation with another's wife "in an improper place, or at an improper time, or in a solitary place, "throwing side-long glances at each other, and (exchanging) smiles, "is known as the lowest *Sāhasa*. Sending fragrant scents and "flowers, odours, ornaments, clothes, and causing allurements by food "and drink, is known as the middlemost *Sāhasa* Sitting together "in the same seat in a solitary place, with mutual contact, as also "pulling each other's hair, is known as a complete act of adultery"

15 *Saṅgrahaṇam*, *adultery*, is the (carnal) union of a man and a woman.

As the detection of adultery is necessary for the punishment of one who commits it, the Author mentions the means of detecting the same

Yājñavalkya, Verse 283

20 A man should be caught in the very act of adultery, with another's wife, or while holding each other's hairs, or by other signs of excitement of lust, also by the admissions of both

PAGE 151*

25 *Mitākṣharā*:—A man should be detected as intent on adultery by the knowledge derived from the signs of holding each other's hairs, and the like *Keśākeśi*, *holding each other's hairs*, is the (particular kind of) pastime in which each holds the other's hairs Under the rule¹ of grammar

1 तत्र तेनेदम् Pāṇini II 2 27 The rule means this When two homonymous words both being in the locative case (तत्र), or both being in the instrumental case (तेन), are compounded, the sense being—'this happens therein with that,' the compound so formed is Bahuvrīhi.

The locative case is used when the sense is that of sitting, and the instrumental when the sense is that of striking e g in the example here केशेषु केशेषु गृहीत्वा इदं क्रीडनं प्रवृत्त—इति केशकेशि The same would be the form when two combatants hold each other's hair in a duel An example of the instrumental is दण्डादण्डि, मुसलामुसलि &c.

'Two homonymous words coming together in heating—this happens therein or with that, a Bahuvrīhi compound is formed' and under another rule in 1 "The affix ' (१) comes after a Bahuvrīhi when "the compound denotes a reciprocity of action" the affix ' is added at the end of the compound. And as it is in an adverbial form the instrumental case is used. Therefore the meaning is this: From his amusing himself with another's wife when he holds each other's hair, or from the fresh signs of amorous intercourse such as the marks created by the nails of the hand, by the teeth and the like, or by the admission (of the fact) by both (thus) having known him to have attempted to commit a adultery, he should be arrested. The use of the expression 'another's wife' with a view to exclude a woman who has been appointed (to be a concubine), or a protected female slave.

Sulapāni

Yajñavalkya Verse 283

In regard to adultery, let persons with or without women, one may be apprehended while they mutually grasp each other's hair or by marks of amorous contact, such as the scars by the nail or teeth, or by the admission of the woman or the man (१३)

Yajñavalkya Verse 284

Touching the knot of the lower garment, the breasts, the upper garments, thighs, and the hair, holding conversation at an improper place and time, as also sitting together on one seat.

Mitākāra —Moreover he again who behaves as if with a lustful desire towards another's wife by touching the part (of her body) bearing the knot of the (lower) garment or the garment covering her breasts or the lower parts of her body or the hair of her head likewise, he who holds conversation with her at an unjust place or at a place in a place which is lonely or where crowds of people have

१ १ नि १ ४—१ अथर्ववेद

* The whole formation is based on the rules of grammar viz: the two mentioned above and three more viz १ नि १ १ ३—१३ १ अथर्ववेद under which the vowel 'a' at the end of the first compound is elongated (१ अथर्ववेद); the adverbial compound has a support from १ नि १ १ १ (अथर्ववेद) and the dropping or elision of the instrumental is accounted for by १ नि १ १ ४ ४ अथर्ववेद See Māhātmya

३ १ १ under a Niyoga or appointment to begot an issue

gathered together, or which is obscured by darkness, or who closets himself with another's wife on one sofa or any other like seat, as if intent on having carnal intercourse with her, such a one should be arrested as one who had attempted to commit adultery

- 5 This rule, however, applies to a man about whom there is a suspicion as to an offence. Of any other, however, there is no guilt, as says **Manu**¹ "That man, however, not before accused, who holds
"conversation for some (good) reason, shall not incur any guilt, since
"in him there is no transgression." It has been said by the same
10 **Author**², that he who forbears when touched by another's wife, such a one also may be apprehended. "He who touches a woman at an
"improper place, or forbears when (himself) touched, all that is con-
"sidered as adulterous intercourse with mutual consent." It has
been said by the **Same sage**³ that he, moreover, who boastfully declares
15 before a company of gallants thus "I have enjoyed this charming
"accomplished woman times out of number"—such a one also may be
apprehended. "When a man, actuated by vanity, folly, or braggadism,
"declares himself that he has enjoyed (the love of) a certain woman,
"that is also regarded as (constituting) an offence of adultery."

Vîramitrodaya

- Now on the occasion of treating an intercourse with the wife of the king the Author begins the title of law known as 'Adultery with Women, which has been split into three varieties by **Vyâsa** in the following manner. "That has been designated as of three kinds, the lowest, the mid-
25 "dle and the highest. Conversations with another's wife in an improper
"(or lonely) place, throwing sidelong glances at each other, and (exchang-
"ing) smiles is known as the first kind of adultery. Sending fragrant
"scents and flowers, odours, ornaments, and clothes, and causing allure-
"ment by food and drink is known as the middlemost. Sitting together
30 "in the seat in a solitary place, mutually reclining against each other, as
"also pulling each other's hair is known as a complete act of adultery."

There, first the Author mentions the means by which adultery developing into sexual intercourse may be known

1 Ch VIII 355

2 Ch VIII 358

3 Not found in Manu. The text, however, is to be found in Nârada Ch. XII 69



The Author now mentions the penalty for Adultery

Yājñavalkya, Verse 286

In the case of one of the same class, the highest amercement in an Anuloma¹ (intercourse) the middle (amercement) but in a Pratiloma¹ death of the man, and the lopping off of the ear and the like of the woman

Mitaksharā —In the case of a man of any of the four *varnas* a man shall be fined one thousand and eighty *panas* for having intercourse with a woman of his own caste, but who was another's wife or protected. When, however he has intercourse with a woman of a lower order, and who is not under the protection of any one, then he shall be fined in the middle amercement. When, moreover he has intercourse with a woman of his own *varna* who was not under (any one's) protection, or with a woman of a lower *varna* who was under protection, then a special penalty has been stated by Manu²

"A Brāhmana shall be fined a thousand when he has intercourse with a guarded *cuprā* woman³ against her will, he

PAGE 162* "shall be fined five hundred when he had connexion with one who was willing (378). A

"Brāhmana shall be compelled to pay a fine of one thousand if he has intercourse with women of two (classes)⁴ who are under protection for (a similar offence against) a *Sādrā* woman, the fine for a *Kshatriya* and *Vaiśya* shall be one thousand (388)."

This, moreover shall be understood to hold in the case of women other than the wives of the preceptor or a friend; since Narada⁵ has observed "Mother mother's sister mother-in-law maternal-uncle's wife father's sister the wife of a paternal-uncle, or a friend, or a pupil sister her friend, daughter-in-law (73) daughter spiritual preceptor's wife, a woman of his own *Gotra* come (to him) for protection, the queen a female ascetic, the nurse, a virtuous woman, and a woman who is of the highest class (74). When a man carnally knows any one out of these women, he is said to have committed the offence of violating⁶ the bed of a preceptor. For such a crime, no other punishment is ordained than the excision of the organ (76)."

1 See *Ācharādhyāya* Chapter IV. These terms are used with reference to the man who commits the act of adultery

2 Ch. VIII. 378, 383

3 A *Brāhmanī* woman

4 i.e. those mentioned in Manu Ch. VIII. 383

5 Ch. XII. 73-76

6 *गुण्यते* i.e. the special kind of crime where the offence is that of knowing carnally the preceptor's wife

In the case of a *Pratiloma* offence, *e g* intercourse with a woman of the highest class, death (is the sentence) for a male of the Kṣatriya or other (lower) class. This, however, has a reference to a guarded woman, for any other, there is a pecuniary fine, *vide* the text of **Manu**¹.

5 “But even these two², if they offend with a Brāhmanî, who is guarded, “shall be punished like a *S’ûdra*, or be burnt in a fire of dry grass (377) “If a Vaisya or a man of the Royal tribe has intercourse “with an unguarded Brāhmanî, let him (*i e* the king) fine the “Vaisya five hundred, but the Kshatriya one thousand (376)” Of

10 a *S’ûdra*, moreover, having intercourse with an unguarded woman of the highest class, the punishments are the excision of the organ, and confiscation of the entire property, and of him, having intercourse with a guarded woman (of a like description), the sentence is death and confiscation of the entire property, as has been stated by the **same Sage**³:

15 “A *S’ûdra* having intercourse with a woman of a twice-born class— “whether guarded or unguarded—if unguarded, he loses the organ, “and all his property, if guarded, everything (even his life)”

Of a woman, however, having intercourse with a man of a lower tribe, the ears—and by the use of the word *Ādi*, ‘and the like,’—the
20 nose, should be lopped off. For one having intercourse with a man of a superior or equal tribe, a fine should be ordered.

This rule regarding the sentence of death &c, is (intended) only for the king, he alone having the right to govern, and not for every twice-born⁴ individual. For such a one the holding of a weapon
25 having been prohibited by the text⁵. “A Brāhmana should not take “up a weapon even for inspecting (it)”

1 Ch VIII 377, 376

2 *i e* the Vaisya and Kshatriya referred to in VIII 376.

3 Ch VIII 374

4 Here the term used is quite general, but from the text quoted next, it appears to be intended for a Brāhmana

5 The Author of this text is not known. Bâlabhattacharya assigns it to Gautama, but it is not found in that book. Gautama on the other hand allows the profession of a warrior for a Brāhmana when he cannot obtain his livelihood by the ways prescribed for him. See Ch VII 6. To the same effect are the texts of Manu cited next.

When, however, while reporting to the king delay occurs in time and there is danger of the proper procedure being thwarted then one may himself kill an adulterer and the like the taking up of arms at such a time having been permitted by the text¹ the "twice-born men may take up arms when (the performance of) 'Dharma is being obstructed', also² 'By killing a desperado (in tent on doing harm), the slayer incurs no guilt, whether (he does it) publicly or in secret (for in such a case) fury recoils upon fury'" 5

Likewise in the case of a Kshatriya or a Vaisya each having in intercourse with a woman of the other class³ a fine in each case of one thousand *panas* must be understood That has been stated by Manu⁴ 10
 "If a Vaisya approaches a guarded female of the Kshatriya caste or a Kshatriya a guarded Vaisya woman, they both deserve the same punishment as in the case of an unguarded Brāhmaṇi woman"

Śūlapāni

Now the penalty for intercourse

15

Yājñavalkya Verse 286

For sexual intercourse with an unwilling woman of the same caste and under protection, in the case of a Brāhmaṇa and the like the penalty is the highest amercement. For intercourse with the father's sister etc. death only as the Author will state⁵ further on in the third Chapter For having intercourse, however with one not under protection and of a lower order the punishment is the middle amercement. So says Manu⁶: "For a Brāhmaṇa having intercourse with an unprotected Kshatriya or a Vaisya woman or with a Śūdra, the penalty shall be five hundred in the case of an *anṛtya* woman however it shall be one thousand" (386). "A Brāhmaṇa should be fined one thousand for approaching those when under protection" 20
 "For the Kshatriya and a Vaisya approaching a Śūdra woman the penalty shall be one thousand (384)." 25

For intercourse with women of higher orders in the case of Śūdras etc. death (shall be the punishment); and of the women the ear nose etc. should be cut off (286). 30

1. Of Manu Ch. VIII. 348

Manu Ch. VIII. 351 See page 26 ll. 5-8

3. See the text of Manu cited next which makes this clear

4. Ch. VIII. 382

5. Yājñ III. 282

6. Ch. VIII. 386, 384,

On the occasion of considering offences regarding the wives of others, the Author mentions the punishment (for an offence) regarding a maiden also

Yājñavalkya, Verse 287

- 5 If any one kidnap a maiden having ornaments on, he shall pay the highest amercement, and the lowest amercement in other cases, when the maiden belonged to the same *varna*, in the case of a maiden of a superior class, death has been ordained (as the punishment)

- 10 Mitākṣharâ —One kidnapping a maiden of his own class, who is about to be married, and who had been decked with ornaments, shall be punished in the highest amercement, and one kidnapping a maiden of his own tribe not approaching a marriage, (shall be fined) in the lowest amercement. For a Kṣatriya or any other carrying away a maiden of the highest tribe death alone (is the sentence) From the
15 rule as to punishment, it also appears (to be intended to be laid down) that the girl should be taken away from her abductor and be made over to some one else.

Sûlapâṇi

Now the despoiling of a maiden

- 20 Yājñavalkya, Verse 287

- One kidnapping for intercourse, an unwilling maiden decorated with ornaments, shall pay the highest amercement One, however, otherwise carrying her away, the lowest amercement That, moreover, is in the case of the women of the same caste In the case of higher orders, however, for
25 the kidnapper death alone (shall be the punishment)

The Author mentions a penalty for taking away girls of inferior tribes

Yājñavalkya, Verse 288 (1)

- 30 In the case of willing maidens of inferior classes, there is no offence, otherwise, however, (there is) a punishment

Mitākṣharâ —If one carries away a maiden of an inferior tribe who is full of love (for him), then there being no offence, (there is) no punishment. *Anyathâ tu, otherwise however, &c* for one kidnapping an unwilling one, the lowest amercement shall be the punishment.

The Author mentions a penalty for defiling a maiden

Yājñavalkya Verse 288 (2)

For defiling however, the lopping off of the hands and for (doing) similar acts towards one of a higher class, death

PAGE 153*

Mīlākṣharā— In the case of maidens of lower tribes is understood. If one forcibly defiles, by nail-scars or otherwise a maiden, who had no sexual desire then his hand should be lopped off when moreover he defiles a maiden of a like description by penetrating into the female organ by thrusting in his fingers, then the punishment is the lopping off of the fingers together with the fine of six hundred as stated by Manu¹ "But if any man through insolence forcibly contaminates a maiden, two of his fingers shall instantly be cut off and he also deserves a fine of six hundred" When, however he similarly defiles, as before one having a sexual desire, even then a special rule has been stated by the same² "A man of an equal class defiling a maiden having a sexual desire shall not incur the (punishment of) amputation of his fingers, but shall however be compelled to pay a fine of two hundred, as a deterrent for a (like) repetition."

When, however a maiden herself or a sharp woman defiles another maiden, there also a special rule has been stated by the same Sage³ "A maiden who herself operates upon a maiden, for such a one the fine is of two hundred (369). But a woman who pollutes a damsel shall instantly deserve a shaving and also the lopping off of her two fingers, and likewise (the punishment) to be carried on 'a donkey' Operates upon a maiden & c penetrates into the female organ of a maiden

When however a man has intercourse with a maiden of the highest tribe, then whether she was willing or unwilling a Kṣatriya and others shall invariably incur death, vide the text of Manu⁴ "A man of a lower tribe who has intercourse with a woman of a higher class, shall deserve corporal punishment."

When one has intercourse with one of his own class who has a sexual desire, then he shall pay the maiden's fee of a pair of cows to

1 Ch. VIII. 367
3 Ch. VIII. 369-370

2 Ch. VIII. 368
4 Ch. VIII. 366

her father ; if she be unwilling, the maiden's fee to the father, and an equal (amount) as fine to the king For one having intercourse with one of his own *varna* but having no desire, corporal punishment alone as says **Manu**¹ "He who has intercourse with one of an equal
5 "class, shall pay the maiden's fee to the father if he desires," also "He who violates an unwilling maiden shall instantly suffer corporal
"punishment, but one defiling a maiden of an equal class who has
"a sexual desire, shall not suffer corporal punishment"

Sûlapâñi

10 Yâjñavalkya, Verse 288

In the case of willing women of the lower order, there is no blame for having intercourse In the case of the maidens of the same caste without an intercourse despoiling through arrogance by thrusting the finger, the cutting off of the hands In the case of the superior women, death only
15 (288)

Yâjñavalkya, Verse 289

For slandering a woman, a man shall pay a hundred; and two hundred for levelling a false accusation. For connexion with beasts he shall be compelled to pay a hundred; and the middling fine for connexion with a
20 low woman or a cow

Mitāksharâ —Moreover, having regard to the context, a maiden is intended here by the word 'woman' If any person utters a slander concerning such a one *viz* by declaring defects in her, such as the diseases of epilepsy, pulmonary consumption, and the like complaints
25 of long standing, and of a bad type, even if they be (*i e*) existing (in her), or of having had mixed intercourse, and thus slander her saying 'She is not a maiden', such a one shall be compelled to pay a hundred **Mithyâbhisamsane tu**, for a false accusation however, *i e* for declaring defects in her, which (in fact) did not exist, he shall be
30 compelled to pay two hundred For connexion with beasts excepting a cow, he should be compelled to pay a hundred He, moreover, who has connexion with a **hînâm striyam**, low woman, *i e* a woman who has intercourse with low people—and since there is no particularisation, whether she be willing or unwilling,—or one who has connexion with
35 a cow, such a one shall be punished with the middlemost amercement.

Sûlapâñi

Yâjñavalkya, Verse 289

On an occasion of a marriage of a woman one maintaining an existing defect should be compelled to pay a hundred. For a mention of a
40 non-existing one he shall be compelled to pay ten hundred (289)

(some) *varna*, vide the text of Manu¹ “That woman who abandons
 “her (own) husband and goes to another man of her own *varna* out
 “of love (for him) is called a *Swaininî* or a wanton woman, slavery
 “is ordained in the descending order of the *varnas* and not in the
 5 “reverse order” And in the case of women having a *varna* it is not
 possible for connexion with another man when the husband is living,
 or even when he is dead. Since a prohibition has been ordained in the
 text² “Though destitute of virtue, or seeking pleasure (elsewhere),
 “or devoid of good qualities, (yet) a husband must be constantly
 10 “worshipped as a god by a faithful wife (154) At her pleasure, let
 “her emaciate her body by (living on pure) flowers, roots and fruit,
 “but she must never even mention the name of another man after the
 “death of her husband (157)”

Nor even can a woman be a common woman in her maiden
 15 condition For a gift is ordained only in the case of a maiden who
 has been under the guardianship of her father or any other relation.
 And even in the absence of a giver, it is only one of such a descrip-
 tion regarding whom a choice by herself has been ordained Nor,
 moreover, can there be a deprivation of the privilege of one's *Dharma*
 20 (merely) on account of a condition of slavery Slavery means only
 dependence, not apostasy from one's own religion.

Nor, even a prostitute is a common woman, since³ there is no
 caste where an intercourse is permissible excepting with such as have
 sprung from the (union with the women of) lower orders And if
 25 she falls within (one of) these, then a connexion is not permissible
 as has been mentioned before If (it be that) they are sprung from a
Pratiloma union, then certainly they are much more not approachable.

Therefore, on account of the degradation incurred by these
 women by coupling with another man, and by a further repetition of
 30 a censured act, as also by reason of the rule of prohibition against

1 Not found in the published edition of Manu Of Nârada Oh XII 49

2 Of Manu Oh V 154 and 157.

3 Here, three cases are possible A prostitute may either belong to a
 caste (1) other than that sprung from an *Anuloma* connexion of the *Varṇas*, or
 (2) which has sprung from such a connexion, or (3) which originated in a
Pratiloma connexion of the *Varṇas*, and the Author examines each case See
 Subodhini p 106 ll 24-27 and Bâlabhattachâ p 340

Anuloma castes, as is the case with a Brâhmana, that is not correct. These castes, *e g Kunda*¹, *Golala* and the like, are unending. Therefore the inference must be drawn that a caste known as *Ves'yâ* being well known in the world similarly as that of a Brâhmana and the
 5 others, is of an old origin, having sprung from a connection with a *Ves'yâ* female with a man of her own caste or of a superior one, and deriving maintenance from having sexual intercourse with men. Nor is this tradition without a basis. It has indeed been recorded in the *Skandapurâna*² thus: "There are certain *Apsarasas* called *Pañcha-*
 10 "*chûdâ*; their progeny is known as the *Ves'yâ* and is regarded as a fifth "caste". Therefore as there is no rule for them to marry and remain

1 There are defined in *Manu* Oh III 174. They are sons begotten on another man's wife, when born during the husband's life-time, the son is called a *Kunda*, and when born after his death, he is known as a *Golala*.

2 The passage in full has been given in the note on pp 154-155 of the Sanskrit text. It details the account of the origin of the *Ves'yâs*, describes their five-fold divisions, the characteristics of each, and the general rules governing the class.

The following is the translation of the passage.

"The caste known as the *Ves'yâ* has been known from long before, Oh *Dvijas*! Born of (an intercourse between persons of) the same caste or of different castes, and earning its livelihood from sexual intercourse with males (1)

"Courtezans known as *Pañchachûdâs* lived of old in the City of the Gods. Once upon a time they performed a singing dance in the presence of the Lord of the Gods (2)

"The sage *Durwâsa*, the best of the sages, learned, fiery and endowed with a portion of the God *Śiva* in him, being pleased with their dance and singing, ejaculated 'Excellent' (3)

"He shouted loudly often and often 'excellent', being full of delight. Seeing this wonderful sight, the women viciously laughed loudly (4) (and exclaimed) "Does this reciter of the *Vedas* appreciate our skill in singing!"

"Thus seeing from the signs that he was being insulted, the sage became excited with anger (5) and delivered a curse thus: "Hence to the region of Earth! You do not deserve to be among the Gods."

* PAGE 155

"Then being full of fright, the *Apsarasas* began to cry in humility (6)

"They respectfully begged: "Oh protector of the humble, save us!" (7) Thereupon the anger of the angry sage vanished, and he delivered the cancellation of his curse in the presence of the God *Śakra* thus: "There shall arise a fifth caste from these, from (people of) the four *Varnas*, and then the redemption of these will take place, and never otherwise, oh Never-aging ones!" (9).

(Continued on next page)

fixed to one man, in having connexion with a male of an equal or superior class there is no sin implied, nor (is any) penalty (incurred)

by men having access to them when these are not under the protection of any one. Although

there is no penalty still invisible sin is verily incurred since the rule is that "a man should always restrict him self

"to his wife" as also an expiation has been ordained in the text

"for having intercourse with leutes or prostitutes the *Prāpñatya* expiation is ordained"

Śūlapañi

Vajñavalkya Verse 200

For having intercourse with the undowered protected female slaves of others, and also for intercourse with the protected women with their consent likewise one having intercourse with women of the lower orders although approachable should be compelled to pay a penalty of fifty panas (290).

(Continued from last page)

"Those women too having come down upon the region of the Earth, and being wanton and addicted to sensuality with great delight did service to the rulers of the twice-born *Varṇas* (10).

"The progeny begotten from them is known as the *Vētyas*; I shall describe their five-fold distinctions according to their qualifications (11).

"The *Vētyas* are known as *Kalāvati*, *Rambhī*, *Nāyikā*, *Uḷkhalī*. Among *Vētyas* the *Nāyikā* is known by her beauty and is celebrated for the splendour of her dress." (12).

"*Kalāvati* is versed in amorous intercourse and is one who has worked for the art of singing and *Rambhī* is known to be an adept in matters of beauty art, and dress (13).

That woman who always has intercourse with two three or six men and who is absolutely wanting in art or beauty is known as *Uḷkhalī* (14).

"That woman who abandons her own husband and goes to another man of her own *Varṇa* out of love (for him), is called a *Sūmāṇī*; slavery is ordained in the descending order of the *Varṇas* and not in the ascending order (15).

"Restrained in speech, and restricting herself to intercourse with a man of a higher *Varṇa* she is regarded as a *dharmā* (patri), and is considered as a *Pātravati* even among harlots (16).

"She, who having once accepted a fee from one man does not desire another who offers one or many rupees, or one who offers the (sovereignty) over the three worlds or even *Indra* (17).

"Such a one even though a *Vētya* is to be regarded a virtuous and chaste woman and is respected as a lawfully married wife (18)."

By the text¹ : " In the case of protected female slaves, " while prescribing a punishment for a connexion with a kept mistress, such as a female slave, a wanton woman and the like, it comes to be inferentially laid down that there is no penalty when these are not in the keeping of any one. So the Author mentions an exception to this

Yājñavalkya, Verse 291

For forcible intercourse with a *Dâśī*, the fine is declared to be ten *panas*. For several (having intercourse) if she is unwilling, twenty-four for each separately.

10 Mitākṣharâ:—For a man having *prasaḥya*, *forcible*, i. e. compulsory intercourse, and without the payment of her fee, with a woman of the class who maintain themselves by sexual connexion with men, e. g. a female slave, a wanton woman or the like, the fine is ten *panas*. If several men have intercourse by force with one single woman even

15 when she was unwilling, then each shall be punished with a fine of twenty-four *panas*, separately. If however, after paying the fee as desired by her, they afterwards have connexion with her by force, even when she was unwilling, then there is no guilt of theirs, provided there is no appearance of a disease in her, since Nārada² has laid down : " A

20 "female slave who does not go when called upon, shall not be punished, "if she was diseased, or exhausted, or engaged, or was doing the service "of the king "

Śûlapâṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 291

25 For a forcible intercourse with a slave, ten *panas*. For many having intercourse with her when unwilling, the penalty for each is twenty-four *panas* (291)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 292

30 A prostitute who has received her wages, shall, if unwilling, pay double, under similar circumstances the man also shall be compelled to pay an equal amount if none is received

35 Mitākṣharâ —When after accepting her fee, and even when in good health, she is not willing for the owner of the money, then she shall pay twice the amount of the fee. Similarly if a man who having paid the fee, is himself unwilling, he shall indeed forfeit the amount (paid by him),

1 Yājñ II 290

2 Not found in the published edition of Nārada

for the same Sage¹ has said: "If a public woman declines to receive a man
 'after having received her fee she shall pay twice the amount (of the fee).
 "If the man be unwilling he shall forfeit the amount even if he had
 paid the wages." Similarly another special rule also has been stated
 by the same Sage² "The same (fine shall be imposed) on a man 5
 "who does not pay the (stipulated) fee after having had connexion
 "with a woman (of this description) (18) or who had forcible con-
 'nexion and who has thus caused scars by the hand, teeth, or nails
 "Should a man have connexion with her in an improper part, or
 "cause her to be approached by many, he must pay eight times the 10
 "amount of her fee and a penalty in an equal amount (19). Women
 'who are prominent among *Levys*, who are adepts in matters of
 "sexual intercourse and who are residents of the houses there shall
 "declare a decision in case of any doubt, in disputes arising therefrom

Yājñavalkya Verse 293

15

For a man having intercourse with a woman in an improper part, as
 also with a man, or for passing urine, the fine shall be twenty-four *panas*,
 as also for having intercourse with a female ascetic.

Mātṛkharat—Moreover he who has sexual connexion with one's
 own wife in the mouth or any such other part, or discharges the urine 20
 or excretion in the mouth of a male, or likewise has intercourse with
 a female ascetic shall be fined twenty four *panas*.

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 293

For one having intercourse in the lower parts other than the female 25
 organ twenty four For having intercourse with a male or sexually
 approaching a woman who has entered the fourth order the penalty is
 twenty-four *panas* (293).

Yājñavalkya, Verse 294

For having connexion with an *Antyâ* woman he shall be branded with an obscene mark, and banished. If a *Sûdra* has a like intercourse, he himself becomes an *Antya*. For an *Antya* having intercourse with an *Antya* woman, (death is the punishment).

Mitâksharâ —An *Antyâ* woman is a female of a *Chândâla*. For having connexion with her, members of the three *Varnas* who are not ready to perform an expiation, shall be fined a thousand *panas* according to the rule of *Manu*¹ viz. "and a thousand for an *Antyâ* woman," and then kubandhena aṅkyâh, shall be branded with an obscene mark, i. e. indecent mark e.g. the mark of the female organ, and the king should banish them from his kingdom. For one, however, who is ready for an expiation, fine alone (shall be the punishment). A *Sûdra*, moreover, having connexion with a *Chândâla* woman, himself becomes an *Antya* or *Chândâla*. For one, however, born of an *Antya* e.g. a *Chândâla* or the like other, death alone (is the punishment) for having connexion with a woman of a higher class.

Thus ends the Chapter on Intercourse with Women

Vîramitrodaya

The Author mentions penalties for adultery proper (as are) on the several occasions

Yājñavalkya, Verse 286-94

For having intercourse with an unwilling wife of another of the same *varna* and under his protection, the penalty is the highest amercement, and for intercourse, however, with the father's sister etc. the penalty is death only as the Author will state in the third book, as says *Manu*² "A Brâhmana shall be fined a thousand for an intercourse with an unguarded *vipra* woman against her will, he shall be fined five hundred when he had connection with one who was willing." Here, for intercourse with a woman of Another *varna* of a lower order the punishment is the middling amercement. In this connection *Manu*³ states a special rule "A Brâhmana having intercourse with an unprotected Kshatriyâ or Vaisiyâ woman or with a *Sûdrâ* woman shall be punished with five hundred with a woman born of the lowest class, however, a thousand. A thousand shall a Brâhmana be compelled

"to pay for having intercourse with one protected in a house. For a Kshatriya or a Vaisya the same shall be the penalty with reference to a Śūdra woman." By the expression *pratiloma* in the inverse order, it is intended that the males of the Śūdra etc. shall be capitally punished for having intercourse with a Vaisya woman and for a woman of a lower order the punishment shall be the lopping off of the ear and the nose. This is the meaning. This moreover has a reference to a woman under protection. That says Manu. The same too however for having intercourse with a Brahmani woman under protection shall be punished like a Śūdra or be burnt in a hay fire.

"If however a Vaisya or a Kshatriya have intercourse with an unprotected Brāhmani the Vaisya shall be made to pay five hundred, and the Kshatriya one thousand. For a woman having voluntary intercourse with a man of the same *varṇa* or one of a lower order a punishment shall be administered. For one however who has been enjoyed by a man there shall be no punishment. *vide* the following text of Matsyapurāṇa. "He however who violates in any way another's wife by force for such a one the punishment shall be corporeal chastisement. Of the woman however there shall be no offence.

Manu. "If a Vaisya has intercourse with an unprotected Kshatriya woman or a Kshatriya with a Vaisya woman these two shall deserve the punishment the same as for one having intercourse with an unprotected Brāhmani woman." Gautama in connection with the punishment for a Śūdra says "For an intercourse with an Ārya woman, cutting off of the male organ and deprivation of the entire property and if she would be one under protection the additional punishment of death." Baudhāyana states the procedure for (the punishment of) death. "One should burn a Śūdra with a hay fire. Harita. For one having violated the bed of one of a superior order the king shall have him tied and devoured by dogs and shall have him burnt with faggots. Yama. "If a Brahmani woman infatuated by passion has recourse to a Śūdra such a one the king shall punish to be devoured by dogs at the place of the executions. When a Brāhmani woman has recourse to a Vaisya or a Kshatriya there shall be a shaving of her head and she shall be paraded on a donkey." Bṛhaspati. "Where a woman comes to a man's house and excites his concupiscence by touching him or the like acts she

1 Ch. VIII 377-78

* Ch. VIII 383

3 Ch. XII. 2-3

4 Ch. II. 283

5 Ch. XXIV 15-16

"shall be punished, half her punishment shall be inflicted upon the
"man Her nose, lips, and ears having been cut off, she shall be
"paraded in the streets and plunged' into water, or she shall be got
"devoured by dogs in a public place frequented by many persons" (286)

- 5 *Alaṅkṛtām*, 'bedecked with ornaments' i. e. bedecked with orna-
ments for (the purpose of) nuptials, a maiden from among those of the
same *varṇa* i. e. a maiden of the same *varṇa*, for one kidnapping such
a one for sexual intercourse when she is unwilling, the highest amerce-
ment, otherwise i. e. when she is not bedecked with ornaments for
10 nuptials, one kidnapping a maiden of the same *varṇa*, should pay as
the penalty the first amercement. In the case of an inverse order i. e.
for a member of a lower order kidnapping the maiden of a higher order
death has been laid down for the kidnapper (287)

- 15 In the case of maidens of lower orders who are willing and are
kidnapped the fault of the kidnapper shall not be such as to deserve a
punishment, otherwise, however, i. e. when she is not willing, there shall be
punishment for the kidnapper. As says Nārada² " For a member of
"the same *varṇa*, for a transgression against a maiden of the same *varṇa*
"with a passion, but, however, that one should adorn her with ornaments,
20 "and after having duly honoured her he should marry her " In the case
of one who was unwilling and who has been kidnapped Śankha says
"One equal (in *varṇa*) should be resorted to after giving her the money
"price, ornaments and *stridhana* in duplicate " 'For defiling etc' For
defiling a maiden by inserting a finger in the secret part of one who was
25 unwilling, whether of the same or lower *varṇa*, the lopping off of the
hands of the defiler should be made In the case of one of a higher order,
for causing the defilement, capital punishment has been stated Here the
option stated by Manu³ is admissible "That man who through arrogance
"forcibly contaminates a maiden, two of his fingers shall be instantly cut
30 "off, and he shall pay a fine of six hundred *panas*" (A punishment)
exceeding six hundred being equal to the cutting of three fingers Here
Manu⁴ "A man of equal caste who defiles a willing maiden shall not
"suffer the amputation of the fingers, but shall pay a fine of two hun-
"dred with a view to prevent a repetition of the act" (369)

- 35 " A damsel who herself pollutes another damsel shall be fined two
"hundred *panas*, pay double the *su/ka* and receive ten lashes with a rod (370)

1 The Benares edition reads मञ्जुवैत shall be shattered to pieces'

2 Ch. XII 72

3 Ch VIII 368

4 Ch VIII 369-71

"But a woman who pollutes a damsel shall instantly have her head shaved and two fingers cut and also be paraded over a donkey (371).

Pollutes i.e. defiles by inserting her fingers 'woman i.e. a young woman (288)

The Author mentions a penalty for other kinds of defilement by the verse 'A hundred for defiling a woman etc. Here by the word woman is expressed by regard to the context, a maiden of her for a slander by any one, other than the bridegroom with the allegation of her being affected with epilepsy although existing or a similar disease such a one shall pay one hundred *panas* as the penalty. If however he makes an allegation as to epilepsy etc. which as a fact does not exist then he shall pay a fine of two hundred *panas*. For a bridegroom however for making a false allegation a penalty has been stated in the first book¹ under the text 'Who falsely blames (a girl) shall be punished with) a hundred. For pointing out a fault (which exist) as a fact, however there is no offence for a bridegroom

'Beasts i.e. beasts other than cows such as a sheep and the like. For connection with a woman of a lower order, such as a Śūdrā woman or a cow he shall be made to pay the middle amercement. By the use of the word *cha* is cumulated what is established by the text of Manu cited before viz. For intercourse with a kṣatriyā or a Vaiśyā woman under 'protection one shall be compelled to pay the highest amercement' (289).

The Author mentions an exception to the text stated before (269) viz. A woman of a lower order etc. A female slave not taken over or marriagable by a particular person is of three varieties. One who has been prevented from intercourse with any other man but has been reserved for his own enjoyment is a kept mistress as also a prostitute. A kept mistress however shall not be available for sexual intercourse by any person other than himself one who would do service to self. In the case of these three enumerated, with the first and the last even though intercourse with them is restricted to a particular man, any other man having intercourse shall pay a penalty of fifty *panas* (290).

And for an intercourse with force with a female slave or with a prostitute the penalty is ten *panas*. When a prostitute who is unwilling has been subjected to the intercourse of many men without break, then the penalty for each is twenty four *panas*. Thus therefore for inter

course by one or many with a prostitute who is willing there is no punishment, as also in the case of an *Avaruddhā* (a woman under protection) or a *Bhujishā* kept mistress for intercourse by men (for whom they were) restricted, there is no punishment since it has been stated "Those who
 5 "are approachable." Thus there is agreement with *Mitākṣharā*. *Misra*, however, relying upon the text of *Nārada* viz. "A twice-born
 "person having intercourse with a prostitute becomes amenable to
 "punishment, the fee for a prostitute has been stated to be one *pana*" and
 10 thus the punishment for a *Brāhmaṇa* has been stated to be equal to her
 fee and in the form of the middle amercement and thus that there is
 nowhere an absence of punishment. His meaning, however, is this: by
 having regard to the text of *Vyāsa* viz. "Where those basest of men
 "have intercourse with a woman who has been approached before by
 "many, in the case of such a one the punishment is intended to be as
 15 "for a prostitute and not as for a married woman," by which such a
 person has been declared to be the basest of men a punishment has
 been stated for intercourse with one who has been approached before.
 Moreover, under the text of the Author¹ "he should be solely
 "devoted to his wife" in the first book, (and) moreover, having regard to
 20 the fact that the Author has by implication prohibited an approach
 to any other woman than one's own wife, it should be inferred
 by the expression *gamyāsu* : e intended as approachable, to
 indicate those who may be approached for a small penalty as
 compared with others, moreover, it cannot be (maintained) that
 25 even although intercourse with a prostitute is prohibited, there
 is an absence of punishment, as there is no authority *Nārada* has
 stated a fine by way of a penance in the text: "The punishment for
 "one who approaches the unapproachable is declared to be laid by a
 "king as a penalty, the rules as to penance are for the purging of the
 30 "accumulated sin" and that the Author has stated the penalties as 'ten
panas etc' and thus there is a conflict, because the penalty in the text
 under consideration is in regard to a *Śūdra*. Thus it should be inferred
 that where the Author has stated fifty for a *Śūdra*, there for a *Brāhmaṇa*
 the penalty is five hundred, for a *Kṣatriya*, the first amercement, and
 35 for a *Vaiśya*, half of it In this way it appears that in a place where ten
panas are mentioned, double should be inferred for a *Vaiśya* (292)

Ayonāvit, 'in an improper part etc' For one having intercourse
 with a woman through the mouth or the waist, or with a man in

the mouth or the waist having intercourse by penetration the penalty is twenty four *paṇas*. By the use of the word *apī* the Author adds an enhanced punishment than that mentioned before in the case of those who are approachable (293).

The *anyā* woman : i.e. a *Chāṇḍālī* woman having intercourse with a member of the first three orders should be branded with an obscene mark : i.e. an indecent mark : i.e. the mark of the female organ and should be banished from the territory. A *Sūdra* however having intercourse with an *anyā* woman should only be branded similarly with the mark of the female organ but should not be banished. For a member of the *anyā* tribe having intercourse with an *Ārya* woman the punishment (is) death (294).

Thus ends the Chapter on Adultery with Women

śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 294

One who is born in the lowest is the lowest below which there is no lower grade of a *Sūdra* caste for having intercourse with such a one i.e. with a *Chāṇḍālī* he should be branded with a mark of a headless corpse and should be expelled. A *Sūdra*, however should simply be branded as above. He should neither be expelled nor punished. For having intercourse with an unprotected twice-born woman death alone is for a *Sūdra* (294)

In the book on *Vyavahāra* another Title of Law in The mutual relations of men and women has been propounded by Manu and Narada. There Narada¹ says : "That title of law in which the legal rules for women and men also regarding marriage and such other relations are stated is called 'the Mutual Relations of Women and men.' " Manu² also says 'Day and night, women must be kept in dependence by their own males, and if they attach themselves to sensual enjoyment, they must be kept under one's control "

Although a suit mutually between the husband and wife as plaintiff and defendant in the king's court is prohibited,³ still when transgression of their mutual duties has been mentioned directly or by hearsay the couple should be restored to the right path by the king by a fine or the like (penalty), otherwise he becomes blameworthy. This is the precept laid down for a king in connection with the duties of Husband and wife in the Chapter called 'the Duties of a King' in the book on *Vyavahāra*. This, moreover, has already been discussed in detail in the chapter on Marriage, and so has not again been mentioned by the Lord of the Yogis

CHAPTER XXV

Miscellaneous Disputes (Prākīrṇa)

Now is being commenced the title of Law called Miscellaneous. Its nature has been stated by Nārada¹ “Under the head of Miscellaneous

- 5 “(Disputes) are comprised Law Suits depending on the king, (such
“as) transgression of the King’s Commandments, as also obedience
“towards his injunctions (1) Grants of towns, the divisions of the
“constituent elements of a state, the duties and their opposite of
“Pālhandis,² Naigamas, S’reṇis and Ganas (2) Disputes, likewise,
10 “between father and son, neglect of (prescribed) penances, abstraction
“of gifts (made to worthy persons), and also the wrath of the anchorites
“(3). Sinful confusion of castes, the rules regarding their means of
“subsistence, and (in short) whatever has not been noticed in the
“preceding titles of law, all that shall come under (the title called)
15 “Miscellaneous (4).”

In the Title of Law called the Miscellaneous, such disputes as have a reference to the transgression or the obedience of the king’s commands, are closely connected with the king. In such cases, the king himself must assume the role of a contending party against such persons as
20 act ‘in violation of the (laws of) Smṛtis and usage’, and decide the suit. By saying this, the definition necessarily comes to be laid thus “That
“suit wherein the king is a party is called Prākīrṇa or Miscellaneous”³

PAGE 157*

There the Author mentions a particular penalty for a particular offence

25 Yājñavalkya, Verse 295

He who either omits or adds anything by writing in the king’s edict, or allows an adulterer or a thief to escape, shall suffer the highest amercement.

- 30 Mitākṣharâ—He who writes rājaśāsanam, the king’s edict, by exhibiting either less or more area of the land granted by the king, he also who after apprehending an adulterer or a thief, lets him off without making him over to the king, both these shall be punished with the highest amercement.

1 Ch XVII 1-4

2 All these terms have been explained before. See p 1229 and notes 1 & 2

3 This is the definition of the Prākīrṇa, and the description of it given by Nārada above, as also the enumeration of titles which may be included therein. It is clear that it includes those kinds of disputes where the State is a party, i. e. Disputes of a Public character. Cf The Public Law of the Roman Jurisprudence.

Viramitrodaya

Nārada has defined¹ the title of law called 'Relations between men and women' "Where the ritual of marriage of women and men is, described that title of law is called Relation between men and women. This chapter having been in terms already dealt with by the chapter on marriage the Author passes it over and begins by an entire chapter the title of law known as Miscellaneous and characterized by Nārada² as follows (same as Vitukṣharī on p. 1364 lines 4-15). 5

Yājñavalkya Verse 295

One who writes by either omission or addition an order commanded by the king for him as also for one who lets go an adulterer or a thief the penalty is the highest amercement. By the first use of the word *api* is included an adverse implication and by the second use (an addition in) the writing 10

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 295

He who omits from or adds in writing to the order of the King for him and for one who has sexual intercourse with others wives as also for one who lets a thief off the penalty is the highest amercement (*95). 15

As incidentally occurring in the context, the Author mentions a penalty also in cases other than those which depend on the king 20

Yājñavalkya, Verse 296

For defiling a *Dīva* with an uneatable thing, the punishment shall be the highest amercement a *Kṣatriya*, the middlemost a *Vaiśya*, the lowest, and a *Sūdra*, half of the lowest amercement (shall be the punishment) 25

Mṛakṣara — *Dūṣhayā*, for defiling a *Brāhmana* i.e. making him eat an uneatable thing, *abbakṣheya* i.e. the urine, faeces &c., or any such thing mixed with food or drink, a man becomes liable to be punished with the highest amercement for similarly defiling a *Kṣatriya*, however the middlemost (amercement) for defiling a *Vaiśya*, the lowest or first (amercement) and for defiling a *Sūdra* he becomes punishable with half the first amercement. This is the connection. For defiling with garlic or other similar uneatable things a greater or less punishment should be determined by regard to the greater or less magnitude of the offence. 30 35

Vīramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 296

For one accusing a Brāhmana with having eaten an uneatable thing such as fish etc the highest amercement, for accusing a Kshatriya, the
5 middle amercement, for accusing a Vaiśya the first amercement, for accusing a Śudra half of the first amercement, shall be the penalty (296).

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 296

For polluting a Brāhmana with non-eatables such as the fish etc the
10 punishment is the highest amercement; the rest is clear

As for the higher punishment mentioned by Viṣṇu¹ "One polluting a Brāhmana with an uneatable shall be punished with ten gold coins", that has a reference to serious (allegations) *e g.* about eating garlic and such other uneatables (296)

15 Yājñavalkya, Verse 297

He who deals in false gold, also one who sells unclean meat, shall be maimed and also compelled to pay the fine or the highest amercement

Mitākṣharâ:—Moreover, a goldsmith or other dealer in gold who
palms off false gold prepared by the addition of lustre (to a base
20 metal) by chemical processes, and a butcher or other dealer in flesh, who habitually sells unclean meat *e g.* the flesh of a dog or other like animal—and by the use of the word *cha*, 'also', also one who
palms off imitation silver or other metal (as good metal)—all these
shall be (maimed by being) deprived of the three organs *viz.* the
25 nose, the ears, and the hands. By the use of the word *cha*, 'and also',—shall also be compelled to pay the fine of the highest amercement, which comes to be inferred from (the use of) the (expression) cutting off of the organs. As for the punishment mentioned by Manu²:
30 "But the king shall cause a goldsmith who behaves dishonestly, the most noxious of all the thorns, to be cut to pieces by razors", that has a reference to the gold of a Deity, a Brāhmana or the King

Vīramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya Verse 297

A goldsmith or the like dealing falsely and in similar manner *Kūṭah*, in false, i. e. counterfeit gold creating an appearance of gold
a butcher or the like habitually selling unclean i. e. bad meat, such as the
flesh of dogs etc., should be deprived of three organs viz. the nose, the
ear and the hand and should be compelled to pay the highest amerce-
ment. By the first use of the word *cha* is included the banishment etc
of a Brāhmana who is undeserving of a corporal punishment by the
second use the Author intends the prescribing of a cumulative punish-
ment By the word *tu* however the Author excludes other cases such
as those which have a reference to the gold of the gods or of the
Brāhmana as per the following text: "A king should hack to pieces with
"edged weapons a goldsmith set on unjust dealings as the basest of the
"offenders of all sinners and the greatest thorn" (297). 5
10
15

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 297

One who deals in counterfeit gold by putting on a colourable resem-
blance those who sell prohibited meat by describing it as goat meat or the
like allowed by law should be deprived of the three organs i. e. the nose
ear and hands (297). 20

Yājñavalkya Verse 298

For any injury caused by a quadruped, when the keeper was crying
loudly 'Be away', there shall be no blame similarly for like injuries caused
by wood, earth, stone, arm, or a yoked beast. 25

Mitākṣharā — For the offence of killing a man or the like com-
mitted by a quadruped such as a bull an elephant, or like animals,
the blame shall not accrue to the owner of the bull or any other animal
when he was loudly crying 'Be away' Similarly for an injury
likewise caused by the throwing of a club, a clod of earth, an arrow or
a stone, by means of the arms, or by a yoked beast i. e. by a horse or
the like while carrying a yoke no blame shall accrue to the thrower
of the wood &c. when he was crying 'Be away' The object in stating
that there is no offence in any injury caused by throwing a wood
&c. is to indicate that there is no penalty for such injury However
the penance for doing anything even unintentionally does verily
exist. By the use of the words wood &c. the missiles of *S'akti*,
Tomara and the like are also included. 30
35

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 298

On an attack by a bull or like animals, one who previously shouts loudly 'Be away', for such a one there is no fault which can deserve punishment So also in the case of one practising at clubs or lumps of earth, who before shouts out with the words, 'Be away' there is no fault (298)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 299

In the case of injuries caused by a conveyance owing to the nose-string having been snapped or the yoke and the like having been broken, or by a rear motion (of the animals), the owner shall not be blamed

Mitākṣharā — Moreover, the string which is used in the nostril is (called) the nose-string, that cart or other conveyance where the nose string of a bullock yoked to the cart has given way is a *chhinna nasya* conveyance, similarly (in the case of an injury caused) by a conveyance where the yoke has given way By the use of the term *Ādi*, 'and the like,' where the axle or the wheels or any other part is broken by the vehicle moving rearwards *i e* backwards, and by the use of the word *cha*, 'also', by going crookedly or coming in front For an injury caused to men or others, the owner or the driver, *adoshabbhāk*, shall not be blamed, since the injury was caused by no action on his part So also *Manu*¹ (says) " When the nose-string is " snapped, when the yoke is broken, when the vehicle turns sideways " or back, or when the axle of a conveyance is broken, and similarly " when a wheel is broken (291) When the leather thongs, and " similarly the rope round the neck or bridle are broken, and when " the driver was crying 'Be away,' *Manu* has declared that in such " cases there shall be no punishment "

PAGE 158*

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 299

That which is placed on the nose is *nasya*. When one is injured by a conveyance carried by bullocks whose nose-strings are snapped, so also by a cart with its yoking-pin broken By the use of the word *ādi*, 'et cetera', are included the wheel and the like By such (conveyance) while riding back if any injury is done the owner does not incur any blame (299)

The Author mentions a punishment for the owner in case of neglect
Yājñavalkya Verse 300

The owner of an animal possessed of tusks or horns, who although having the power still fails to relieve, shall pay the lowest amercement, and a double, if the sufferer cried for help

5

Mitākṣharā:—While a man is being injured by animals *daṁṣṭrībhiḥ*, possessed of tusks, such as an elephant &c. *śṛṅgībhiḥ*, or of horns, such as bullocks &c., who are driven by an inexperienced driver and the owner although he was competent does not relieve them and then neglects them, then he shall pay the lowest amercement for having engaged an unskilled driver. When, however he does not relieve even when the sufferer cried "Oh I am (being) killed," then a double (fine shall be paid).

10

When, however he engages a competent driver then the driver alone shall be punished, and not the owner as says Manu: "If the driver be skilful he alone shall be fined." Moreover, special punishments shall be determined by regard to particular animals (concerned) as says Manu: "If a man is killed, the guilt will be at once the same as (that of) a thief, for large animals such as cows elephants, camels or horses, half of that (296). For injuring small cattle, the fine (shall be) two hundred *panas* the fine for beautiful wild quadrupeds and birds shall amount to fifty (*panas*) (297). For donkeys, sheep, and goats the fine shall be five *māśas* and the punishment for killing a dog or a pig shall be one *māśa* (298)."

15

20

Vīramitrodaya

25

Yājñavalkya, Verses 293-300

When the owner of a quadruped loudly warns people with the words "Be away be away", and any man is killed by an elephant, a bull, or the like such owner is not guilty of any offence similarly does not an offence occur on the part of one warning people with the words "be away for any injury caused by wood etc stored in a cart, and also by others apart away from it (298).

30

So also the owner of a cart or any other vehicle is not guilty on account of any injury caused by the backward or forward movement of the vehicle due to the nose-string having been snapped or the yoke or the yoke-pin being broken (299).

35

- If one who is competent does not offer relief to one who is being injured by a horned beast such as the cow, or a tusked one, such as the elephant etc. such a one should be punished with the first amercement. Similarly when a loud cry is raised and he does not give relief, he should be given double the punishment. If *gṛāh*, 'conveyance', i. e. that which is yoked; and the yoke i. e. the wood of the yoke. By the first use of the word *āpā*, 'also', is included the snapping stated by it, and by the second use is stated the snapping without the fault of the driver, as Manu¹ has declared a punishment for the owner for a fault of the driver thus: "Where a conveyance goes astray on account of the fault of the driver, there the owner is liable to punishment; when injury is caused, the punishment is two hundred (*pañ* is)". In the expression 'be away', the use of the word *āpā* does not exclude the tendency to kill. By the use of the word *āpā*, 'also', a third time are included animals like the female fox etc. (300).

Sūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya, Verse 300

- The owner of horned beasts such as the bull etc., as also of the animals with tusks, or tooth such as the spres etc. not offering relief, although competent, when one is attacked by these shall pay the first amercement. If the sufferer loudly cried for help such as "Take away the bull or the monkey" and if relief is not given, then he should pay double (300)

Yājñavalkya, Verse 301

- He who charges an adulterer as a thief shall be made to pay a fine of five hundred. For him who takes money and lets him go, eight times (of) the same.

- Mitākṣharā—Moreover, out of fear for the disrepute of one's own family, he who accosts a *jāram* an adulterer with another man's wife charges him *chaura* as a thief, and says 'Get thee gone.' *dāpyaḥ pañcha śatam damam*, shall be made to pay five hundred as penalty i. e. that kind of fine in which are five hundred *pañ*as. He, moreover, who accepts money from the adulterer, as a bribe, and releases the adulterer, such a one shall be made to pay eight times the amount of the sum so received.

Viramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya Verse 301

One accusing an adulterer as a thief out of fear of disreputation of the family, shall be made to pay a penalty of five hundred *panas*. Having accepted money payment as a bribe one who lets go an adulterer should be made to pay a fine eight times of the amount received (301) 5

Śūlapāni

Yājñavalkya Verse 301

Out of fear for a disrepute of (one's) family one charging an adulterer with the words "Here is a thief running away" shall be punished five hundred. One accepting money and releasing an adulterer shall be compelled to pay eight times the amount (301) 10

Yājñavalkya, Verse 302

The king should banish, after cutting off his tongue him who always imprecates evil upon the king who calumniates him as also he who divulges his secret counsels 15

Mitākṣhara —Again, one imprecating evil upon the king & of inimical sentiments towards the king always; & who speaks often and often, as also one who *tasyaivakrośakarīṇam* calumniates him, & & the king; & who has a habit of defaming him as also one who divulges & & reveals to unfriendly persons, *tanmantrān*, his secret counsels, calculated to increase the prosperity of his own kingdom, or to bring about the fall of another kingdom, the king should cut off the tongue of such a one and banish him from his own kingdom 20

For stealing the treasury, or for a like offence moreover death alone (is the punishment) *vide* the text of Manu: "On those who rob the king's treasury, and those who persist in opposing (his commands), he shall inflict various kinds of corporal punishments, likewise who 'conspire with the enemies.'" Various (kinds of) punishments e.g. confiscation of the entire property cutting off of a limb, death &c. 25 30

Even where there is confiscation of his entire property, that which is the means of his livelihood must not be attached excepting the implements of theft, as says Narada: "The weapons of soldiers, the 'beasts of burden and the like of those who maintain themselves by 'conveying the goods (of others), the ornaments of public women, 35

“the various musical or other instruments of those who are proficient in these (10), And any implement¹ by which artificers gain their subsistence, must not be laid hold on by the king, even when he confiscates their entire property (11)”

PAGE 159 *

- 5 On account of the prohibitive text, viz “for a Brâhmana, however, there shall be no corporal punishment,” the shaving of his head, and the like should be made in the place of execution, *vide* the text of **Manu**²: “For a Brâhmana, however, (the punishments are), the shaving of the head, the branding and banishing from the town
10 “*viz*, by branding his forehead with the mark of the crime with which he is charged, and by making him ride out on a donkey”

Vîramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya, Verse 302

- 15 One who indulging loudly in denunciations of the king *i. e.* one traducing the king, or one communicating his secret counsel to his enemies, should have his tongue cut off and be banished. Thus is the meaning

- By the first use of the word *cha* is included the (punishment of) deprivation of the entire property stated in the text of **Nârada**³ viz “For
20 “one who decries a king who is pursuing his own duties shall have his tongue cut off if his mind is not inclined at the deprivation of the property” By the second use of the word *cha* are included punishments prescribed by **Manu**⁴ in the various offences in the following text. “On
“those who rob the king’s treasury, and those who persist in opposing (his commands) he shall inflict various kinds of corporal punishments,
25 “ments, likewise on those who conspire with the enemies”

Śûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 302

- 30 One who makes a public accusation against the king in the presence of a large number of people, one who traduces the king, as also one who discloses his secret counsel which is the basis of the stability of the kingdom, should have his tongue cut off and be banished. For a Brâhmana, however, only banishment (302)

1 Dr Jolly, edition reads शिल्पद्रव्याणि शिल्पिनाम् Fr ‘The tools of artizans.’

2 Not found in the published editions of Manu

3, Oh. XV-XVI 30

4. Oh IX. 275.

Yājñavalkya Verse 303

For one who sells what was found on a dead body and likewise for him who strikes his *Guru* (seniors) and (also) for him who mounts the king's conveyance or throne, the punishment is the highest amercement.

Mitākshara —Moreover, for a vendor of what is found on the body of a dead person *e.g.* clothes, flowers, and the like for one who strikes his *Guru* : *e.* the father the preceptor and the like and likewise for one who, without the permission of the king, mounts on his conveyance *e.g.* the horse the elephant and the like, as also his seat, such as the royal throne or the like the punishment is the highest amercement

Viramitrodaya

Yājñavalkya Verse 303

For one who sells articles such as a garland etc. found on a dead body, as also one who strikes a preceptor and for him who mounts a horse belonging to the king or his throne without his permission the penalty is the highest amercement By the use of the word *tathā*, also, are included those who beat their wives or sons with anything other than a rope or a bamboo stick or at a place other than the back (303).

Śūlapāṇi

Yājñavalkya Verse 303

For one who sells clothes and the like placed on a dead body the punishment is the middle amercement as also for one who beats a senior or one who mounts the king's conveyance or throne (303).

Yājñavalkya, Verse 304

For him who puts out both eyes, him who predicts' evil of the king and for a *Sūdra* living as a *Brahmana*, the punishment is eight hundred (*panas*).

Mitākshara.—Again, he moreover who through anger puts out the eyes of another, he also, who being a scholar in the science of astrology but who, not being the preceptor or a like other well-wisher (of the king) predicts an evil : *e.* an inauspicious event about the king *e.g.* By the end of the year you will be deposed from your 'throne' or the like, and likewise one who being a *Sūdra*, with the object of getting a meal, exhibits the sacred thread and other marks of a *Brahmana* (on his body), for (all) these the punishment is eight hundred (*panas*) : *i.e.* that kind of punishment in which there are

1. *राजद्वेषितम्* It may also mean 'who imprecates evil or "spreads evil report" about the king; or also, who "obeys the commands of the king's enemies."

eight of a hundred *panas* For a Sûdra putting on the disguise of a Brâhmana with the object of getting an anniversary meal, the punishment prescribed in another Smṛiti should be observed *viz* "A mark
5 "resembling the sacred thread should be carved on his body by means
"of a heated pin." For one wearing the sacred thread or other sign of a Brâhmana for obtaining maintenance, death alone (is the punishment),
vide the text : " He should corporally punish those Sûdras who wear
"the marks of the twice-born "

Vîramitrodaya

10 Yājñavalkya, Verse 304

For one piercing the eyes of another, as also for one who performs a behest of an enemy of the king, as also for a Sûdra subsisting on alms received by wearing the emblems of a Brâhmana, the punishment shall be eight hundred *panas*. This is the meaning

15 If while living as a Brâhmana a Sûdra has sexual connection or the like with a Brâhmanî then he should certainly be put to death *Vide* the text of *Manu*¹ " All these the king shall punish, as also the
" Sûdras who wear the marks of the twice-born. " "For a Sudra wearing
" the garb of a Brâhmana for (participating in the) *smârta* performances
20 " such as a meal at a *śrâddha* and the like, the king should brand the
" sacred thread on his body with a heated wire," the above punishment laid down in another Smṛiti should also be observed. The text of
*Manu*² *viz* " One though born low, through avarice earns a living
" by the (performance of) acts proper for the highest, such a one the
25 " king shall deprive of all wealth and banish", has a reference to a Vaiśya and a Kshatriya By the use of the word *tathâ*, ' also ', is included the case of one who predicts an evil of the king such as "at the end of the
"year you will be deposed from your kingdom. " (304).

Śûlapânî

30 Yājñavalkya, Verse 304

Those who pierce the two eyes, those who predict evil of the king; for a Sûdra also who in the garb of a Brâhmana earns a livelihood, the punishment is eight hundred *panas*, as says *Vishṇu*³ " For striking
" out both eyes of a man, the king shall not release (such a one) from jail
35 " as long as he lives, or he shall order him to be reduced to a similar state,"
(304)

The Author mentions a penalty for wrongly deciding a suit through anger, avarice or like other cause

Yājñavalkya, Verse 305

After, however, reviewing judicial proceedings which have been wrongly decided, the assessors together with the victorious party should be fined in twice the amount in dispute. 5

Mītakṣhara—Vyavaharan, *judicial proceedings* dardṛkṣhan, which are wrongly decided in contravention of the Smṛti and Usage and which on account of passion, avarice or like other cause are suspected as being improperly conceived, the king should himself decide properly again and the assessors, together with the victorious party in the former trial, whose guilt has been established should each be compelled to pay twice the amount of the fine which is prescribed for a defeated party in a litigation. In the text¹: "out of passion avarice," there is no rule of punishment for the (wrongful) winner; and thus there is in this verse no (fault of) repetition of the former text² 10 15

When, however a wrong decision is given in a suit on account of the fault of the witnesses, then the witnesses alone should be punished and neither the winning party nor even the assessors. When, however a wrong decision is given in consultation with the king, the assessors and all others shall be punished, vide the text³: "One quarter (of the inquiry together with the king) goes to the offender, one quarter goes to the witness; one quarter goes to all the members of the court (and) one quarter goes to the king." This text³ moreover, is intended to demonstrate the guilt of the king and others (to) each severally and not of distributing the share of 20 25

1 Yājñ. II. 4 see p. 613 ll. 5-8 above. The fine for the wrongful winner is not mentioned in II. 4 and so this text is not open to the objection of the fault of repetition or tautology

2 of Nārada Ch. III. 12 see also III. 11 Cf. with this Manu Ch. VIII. 18, 19 &c

By these texts even those judges who do not deliberately give a false decision, but whose decision comes to be wrong, on account of their inattentiveness at the trial, are equally guilty

Medhātithi is of opinion that the guilt goes to the king if the sentence were passed by him, otherwise not.

3 i.e. the text of Nārada quoted above.

the (*apûrva*¹) unseen result (to be known hereafter) to each severally, as it has been said²: "An *apûrva* generates a result which (individually) " accrues to the actor (alone) "

Vîramitrodaya

5

Yājñavalkya, Verse 305

The king should try again causes at law in pursuance of the (rules of) Śâstra when he comes to know that these causes have been wrongly investigated through of feelings of passion, malice, anger etc and the councillors who tried the first cause should be severally punished
10 with twice the amount involved in the suit, along with the successful party who got success by the wrong investigation. In some books instead of *prithak*, 'separately', the reading is *damam* 'punishment.' Although as stated before, the punishment for the councillors has been here declared by way of the statement of a rule of punishment for the
15 successful party, the first use of the word *tu*, 'however', discriminates a cause honestly investigated by councillors from the one where the councillors become punishable on account of a retrial By the use a second time of *tu*, 'however', is excluded the punishment of one who has been fraudulently defeated (305).

20

Sûlapâni

Yājñavalkya, Verse 305

When judicial trials held according to law are again investigated with the help of many Brâhmanas versed in the Śâstras, if it is decided in the reverse, the first councillors together with the successful party shall
25 each be separately punished by the King Nârada³ states a special rule "In the case of those trials which have been tried by the help of witnesses " and councillors and also those which have been defeated on account of

1 According to the Ārya rules about the accrual of responsibility, in addition to the results of one's acts which the actor has to suffer in this world, he also prepares for himself by his thoughts and actions, something which always sticks to him even after he leaves the human body That is known as अर्वा *Apûrva* viz: "that unseen result of virtue and vice, which is a relation superinduced, not before possessed, unseen, but efficacious to connect the consequence with the past and remote cause, and to bring about at a distant period, or in another world or birth, the effect "

2 See Jaimini III 7-8 (18-20)

The meaning is that in the case of *Apûrva* there is no division or distribution of the guilt or its consequences, but that each one is jointly and severally amenable to the entire result

समवायः = सम्बन्ध Relating to, कर्तृसमवायिः = relating to the actor

his own evidence, there is no re-opening of it nor can there be under the law a re-trial" In the case of those which have failed on account of the witnesses and the councillors by an accusation of the witnesses or councillors there will not be a judicial trial again defeated by his own evidence *is* defeated on account of the mutually contradicting testimony So also Bṛhaspati. "By reason of his running away without filing a reply as also by taking resort to the opposite party one who is defeated, the plaintiff of such a one is not admitted as also of one who has given up his own statement" (303).

The Author mentions a penalty for one who tries to upset a proceeding decided according to law and justice

Yājñavalkya Verse 306

One who although defeated according to law and justice, still thinks 'I am not conquered such a one coming again (into Court) shall be made to pay double (the amount as) fine, when he is defeated

Bṛhaspati:—He moreover who although defeated after a legal procedure (still) impudently thinks I am not defeated such a one coming again into the court of law by adducing evidence of false documents and the like after he is again defeated at a legal trial, should be made to pay double the amount of fine

PAGE 160*

It has also been said by Narada: "If a man is of opinion that the suit has been decided and punishment declared in a way contrary to justice he may have the cause tried once more provided he should pay twice the amount of the fine inflicted" *Tīrtam* 'decided' i. e. by means of the documentary evidence, witnesses, &c but where the fine was not pronounced. *Uddhṛta dandam*, 'where the punishment is declared,' i. e. which has been carried to the stage of the declaration of the fine.

Again, as for the text of Manu: "Whenever a suit has been decided or a fine declared, a wise man should consider it as (finally) decided and must not annul it," it means that, in cases where a doubt arises as to the legality of a decision on account of the complaint either of the plaintiff or of the defendant, the same may again be judicially tried after having first affirmed him to (pay) a double fine

and not that even when the cause has been finally decided according to the rules of justice, it should be retried by a king through avarice &c.

5 Again, if a suit has been decided by another king, and if it be in departure from justice, even such a proceeding should be set right and decided legally after a careful investigation, *vide* the text¹ "What
"has been decided through ignorance² by another king, and in de-
"parture from the principles of justice, even that should be made good
'according to law, after weeding out the injustice"

10 Vîramitrodaya
Yājñavalkya, Verse 306

The disputant who out of suspicion as to the honest character of the first investigation regards oneself as not defeated according to law, such a one, when the other side succeeds against him again, the first party should be compelled to pay him as penalty twice the amount
15 in dispute (306)

Śûlapâṇi
Yājñavalkya, Verse 306

20 Although defeated by a judicial decision, one who thinks that he is not defeated, such a one after he is defeated again at court shall be compelled to pay as penalty twice the amount of the former penalty So says Nârada³ "If a man is of opinion that the suit has been decided and
"punishment declared in a way contrary to justice, he may have the case
"tried once more provided he should pay twice the amount inflicted".
'Decided' i.e. completed, 'decision declared' i.e. deposed to by the witnesses

25 For one who when defeated destroys himself by the poison or the like Brhaspati states "He who destroys himself by poison, hanging, or with weapon, such a one shall after death be besmeared with faeces, he does not deserve any rite" (306)

1 The Author of this text is not known Neither Bâlabhattacharya nor Visveswara mention the name

2 There is an error in the print of the text at p 160 l 8.

For राजा ज्ञानकृत read राजाज्ञानकृत

3 Ch I 65,

The Author indicates the devolution of wealth unjustly recovered as a fine

Yājñavalkya Verse 307

What has been obtained, through injustice by the king as a fine, having dedicated it to Varuṇa, he should give it himself to the Vipras (after) increasing it thirty-fold 5

Mītākṣharā —That fine which had been levied by the king through injustice out of avarice, should be increased thirty times, and the king should himself give the same to Brāhmanas after mentally dedicating thus, "Thine to Varuṇa " And as much was taken unjustly in the form of a fine from a party so much should be repaid to him; otherwise there would be the offence of theft, and also as the fine was recovered unjustly the right of ownership of the first owner remained unaffected 10

"This interpretation of the Dharma Śāstra is the composition of Viśvāneshvara himself a Yogin and a disciple of the sage bearing the title of Uttama (1). 15

"Thus has been set out the commentary on the Vyavahāra "Kāṇḍa of the Sage Yājñavalkya saturated with sweet languages, terse, but direct, and (at the same time) expounding the deep meaning (in it) (2). 20

"The composition called Mītākṣharā has been set out by me in "language deep (in meaning) and clear (in expression), wide in import (although) terse in form (3).

"The Interpretation of the work of the Sage Yājñavalkya thus "concluded, to what learned man will it not be acceptable? Though "extremely concise in words, it is as extensive in import and sprinkles "the immortal nectar (of learning) on the ears (4). 25

"Thus ends the Second Chapter called the Vyavahāra of the "commentary called the Śreya-Mītākṣharā on the Treatise on Dharma "Śāstra by Yājñavalkya, being a work of Viśvāneshvara Bhāṭṭāraka, the "leader of the Ascetics of the blessed Paramahansa, order, and the "son of the worthy Padmanābha Bhāṭṭa Upādhyāya." 30

Vîramitrodaya

5 A penalty has been stated to be recovered according to Śâstras; if, however, a penalty not according to Śâstra is caused to be recovered by the king, then the king himself is the offender and he himself should pay the penalty, so the Author says

Yājñavalkya, Verse 307

10 *Anyâyena*, 'through injustice', i.e. not in accordance with the Śâstra; *yo dandō grhitah*, 'the penalty which has been recovered', *tam*, 'that', penalty increased thirty-fold *varunāya nivedya*, 'having dedicated to Varuna' i.e. *utsrjya*, having offered to Varuna, himself to the Brâhmanas should give, i.e., make over.

Thus ends in the commentary called Vîramitrodaya on Yājñavalkya the Chapter known as the 'Miscellaneous title of law'

Śûlapâṇi

15

Yājñavalkya, Verse 307

The penalty which was unjustly recovered, he should first offer to Varuna and afterwards making it three-hundred-fold should himself give to the Brâhmanas (307)

20 'Manu' states the fruit of holding a judicial trial - 'In this manner a king bringing to a conclusion all these titles of law, washing away all sins he attains to the highest state' Having observed i.e. having investigated, is to be understood He² mentions the fruit for the punishable—

25 "Human beings who have committed sins and who have been punished by the kings, (thus) purified go to heaven like meritorious men Thus by the guilty being punished and the law purified and established, the king enjoys the fruit thereof along with the subjects
"Where the rule of punishment has not been stated by any of the good people, there taking into consideration the place, the time, etc., the punishment is to be declared, this is the rule"

30 Thus in the commentary of Yājñavalkya by

Śûlapâṇi ends the Second Book.

A List of Chapters in this Book is being stated

Chapter	I	On the General Rules of Procedure.
"	II	" Special Rules of Procedure.
"	III	" Recovery of Debts.
"	IV	" The Law of Deposits.
"	V	" Witnesses.
"	VI	" Documents
"	VII	" Ordeals.
"	VIII	" The Distribution of Dāya
"	IX	" Boundary Disputes.
"	X	" Disputes between owners and herdsmen
"	XI	" Sale without Ownership.
"	XII	" Resumption of Gifts.
"	XIII	" Rescission of Purchase.
"	XIV	" Breach of Contract of Service
"	XV	" Transgression of Compact.
"	XVI	" Non-payment of Wages.
"	XVII	" Gambling and Betting on Animals.
"	XVIII	" Abuse.
"	XIX	" Assault.
"	XX	" Sāhasa or Heinous Offences.
"	XXI	" Non-Delivery after sale.
"	XXII	" Trading by Partnership.
"	XXIII	" Theft.
"	XXIV	" Adultery with Women
"	XXV	" Miscellaneous <i>Prākṛta</i>

Thus, in all, there are twenty five Chapters.

Vīramitrodāya

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Yājñavalkya, Verse 307

10 Anyāyena, 'through injustice', i. e. not in accordance with the Śāstra; 'yo dāṇḍo grhītaḥ', 'the penalty which has been recovered', tam, 'that', penalty increased thirty-fold varuṇāya nivedya, 'having dedicated to Varuna' i. e. utsrjya, having offered to Varuna, himself to the Brāhmanas should give, i. e., make over.

Thus ends in the commentary called Vīramitrodāya on Yājñavalkya the Chapter known as the 'Miscellaneous title of law'

Śūlapāṇi

15

Yājñavalkya, Verse 307

The penalty which was unjustly recovered, he should first offer to Vāruna and afterwards making it three-hundred-fold should himself give to the Brāhmanas (307)

20 "Manu" states the fruit of holding a judicial trial - "In this manner a king bringing to a conclusion all these titles of law, washing away all sins he attains to the highest state" Having observed, i. e. having investigated, is to be understood. He² mentions the fruit for the punishable—
"Human beings who have committed sins and who have been
25 "punished by the kings, (thus) purified go to heaven like meritorious men - Thus by the guilty being punished and the law purified and established, the king enjoys the fruit thereof along with the subjects
"Where the rule of punishment has not been stated by any of the good
"people, there taking into consideration the place, the time, etc., the
"punishment is to be declared, this is the rule"

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" IX	" Boundary Disputes.
" X	" Disputes between owners and herdsmen.
" XI	" Sale without Ownership.
" XII	" Resumption of Gifts.
" XIII	" Rescission of Purchase
" XIV	" Breach of Contract of Service
" XV	" Transgression of Compact.
" XVI	" Non payment of Wages
" XVII	" Gambling and Betting on Animals
" XVIII	" Abuse.
" XIX	" Assault.
" XX	" Sillasa or Heinous Offences.
" XXI	" Non-Delivery after sale
" XXII	" Trading by Partnership.
" XXIII	" Theft.
" XXIV	" Adultery with Women
" XXV	" Miscellaneous <i>Prakara</i> .

Thus, in all, there are twenty five Chapters.

